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ABSTRACT
This thesis contributes to the debate surrounding the export-led development 
hypothesis by critically examining its theoretical and empirical validity. The first part 
of this thesis challenges different versions o f comparative advantage theory and 
argues that the theoretical foundations of the theory are weak.
The second chapter goes beyond the conventional critiques, which focus on 
the assumptions o f Ricardian comparative advantage theory, and argues that the real 
weakness of the theory can be found in its static nature and its simplistic treatment of 
labour theory of value. The third chapter argues that the neoclassical version o f the 
theory has fundamental problems in its interpretation o f capital and labour as factor 
endowments. It also questions the relevance of empirical work by arguing that even if  
the theory could predict the trade pattern o f a country correctly, this would not prove 
its accuracy.
The first part of chapter four challenges the ‘dynamic’ versions o f comparative 
advantage theory and argues that the theory is static in its nature and cannot be made 
dynamic. The second part o f this chapter evaluates the debate over trade policies and 
attempts to clarify the confusion over the definitions o f import-substitution and 
export-promotion. The third part summarises and critically evaluates the controversy 
over the so-called export pessimism and provides theoretical and empirical evidence 
in support of its validity.
The second part of this thesis investigates the empirical support for the export- 
led development hypothesis. Chapter five questions the relevance o f the empirical 
literature by examining the measures o f openness and techniques that are used. It 
argues that the majority of the literature is irrelevant and does not provide meaningful 
evidence to support or reject the export-led development hypothesis. Chapter six 
offers an alternative measure of trade openness, which is based on a ‘structurally 
adjusted trade intensity’ index, and empirically tests whether openness accelerates 
economic growth. Chapter seven criticises the World Bank’s 1993 report on Asia and 
shows its weaknesses in terms of the trade policies adopted by Asian countries. The 
final chapter concludes by suggesting an alternative interpretation o f the recent 
popularity of export-led development policies.
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In the old story, the peasant goes to the priest for advice on saving his dying chickens. 
The priest recommends prayer, but the chickens continue to die. The priest then 
recommends music for the chicken coop, but the deaths continue unabated. Pondering 
again, the priest recommends repainting the chicken coop in bright colours. Finally, all 
the chicken die. ‘What a shame’, the priest tells the peasant. ‘I had so many more good 
ideas.’
The Economist (29 June 1996)
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
1.1. BACKGROUND 
Neoclassical revolution of the 1980s
The revival of neoclassical ‘wisdom’ during the 1980s was due in part to the poor 
performance and crisis of the world economy during the 1970s. The world economy 
experienced an impressive growth performance after the Second World War for almost 
twenty-five years. During this process, Keynesian policies that emphasised the role of 
the state and demand management played an important role. The state was given a 
pivotal place in the development process. Many developing countries adopted import- 
substitution policies in order to stimulate industrialisation. The aim of the international 
world order was to build international cooperation, create the conditions for human 
security and prevent the pre-war pattern of ‘every country for itself. Two Bretton 
Woods organisations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, were 
created to facilitate the new international order. State intervention was seen as a device 
to sustain full employment, economic growth and adequate welfare services.
These principles were reversed in the 1980s. The world economy slowed and 
fell into recession with the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. Western countries witnessed an
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erosion of the Keynesian consensus. Right-wing governments came to power in 
Europe and the United States. They radically changed the ideological setting of the 
world. The prolonged global economic crisis of the 1980s and the inability of many 
governments to manage the economy were interpreted as a failure of alternatives to the 
neoclassical wisdom. The state was now seen as an obstacle to development rather 
than a facilitator. The focus of economic management changed from growth to 
efficiency. Because the market was assumed to be more efficient than the state, ‘rolling 
back the frontiers of the state’ became the chief slogan.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were also restructured in 
order to implement market reforms in developing countries. The so-called ‘Washington 
Consensus’ transformed the policies of these institutions. Stabilisation and structural 
adjustment programs were introduced with a clear neoclassical emphasis. According to 
these institutions, the problems of many developing countries were self-inflicted, 
caused by policy mismanagement by governments. In order to solve this crisis, they 
offered lending conditional upon liberal policies and a reduction in the role of the state.
Before the 1980s, the World Bank lent for specific programs and projects. 
However, conditional lending became dominant during the 1980s. Because many 
governments were desperate to borrow, they had no option but to accept the lending 
conditions. Governments could borrow money as long as they implemented 
liberalisation policies almost regardless of economic performance. Stabilisation policies 
are short-run demand management packages to achieve macroeconomic equilibrium: a 
sustainable balance of payments, a reduction in budget deficits and low inflation. 
Structural adjustment programs are long-run supply-side changes, in order to stimulate 
economic growth by allocating resources more efficiently. They include trade 
liberalisation, a reduction in the size of government (including privatisation and 
expenditure cuts), domestic market deregulation, financial market deregulation and 
labour market deregulation.
The recommendations of these policies are inextricably linked to their 
identification of the causes of the crisis. As government mismanagement was identified 
as the main cause of the crisis, their focus was solely on government failure, and 
liberalisation was seen as a panacea for development. The prime aim of structural 
adjustment programs was to reduce state intervention to a minimum level. The 
impelling force for economic growth would come from a closer integration into the
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world economy, rather than from the domestic market. A range of external and 
internal factors, including market failure, were largely ignored.
Developing countries faced a hostile international environment during the 
1980s. The world economic crisis affected them severely. International markets 
became more competitive and developed countries became more protectionist. 
Demand for primary products fell, terms of trade worsened, and foreign aid declined. 
As export earnings fell, debt repayment obligations rose, leaving much of Africa and 
Latin America in financial bankruptcy. Many developing countries fell into the so- 
called ‘debt trap’. The rise in oil prices increased import bills and forced more 
borrowing. They were also encouraged by Western banks to borrow in order to 
circulate the so-called petro-dollars. When developing countries borrowed large sums 
in the 1970s real interest rates were very low, sometimes even negative. However, 
during the 1980s real interest rates rose sharply as a result of strict monetary policies in 
the United States and Europe, which created enormous difficulties for developing 
countries. They were now highly indebted and, in order to make repayments, needed to 
borrow more at higher interest rates. It became increasingly formidable for developing 
countries to repay their debts. The worsening economic conditions reduced their 
financial credibility, and it was increasingly more difficult to borrow money from 
private international banks. The only solution was to borrow from the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund.1
For sure, there were big problems within many developing countries. They 
needed to export more and generate a structural transformation of the economy. 
Liberalisation was the solution offered by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. Liberalisation was gradually perceived as an answer to all the ills of 
the developing world. Ready-made prescriptions were put forward without considering 
specific country circumstances.
Abraham Maslow once said that if the only tool you have is a hammer, 
everything begins to look like a nail. The prescription of liberalising all 
conceivable markets in countries in every conceivable political circumstance is
1 ‘As the debt crisis deepened, more and more countries came under IMF-World Bank tutelage.’ 
(Oxfam, 1995b: 74)
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beginning to look increasingly like the application of Maslow's hammer.
(Banuri, 1991: 25)
Trade as a benefit to all countries
The idea that unrestricted international trade is beneficial to all participating countries 
is one of the oldest propositions in economics. It is said to work automatically to 
promote economic growth and income equality. Trade liberalisation is one of the most 
important components of structural adjustment programs. Trade liberalisation and 
export-led development, two concepts often confused, were offered as a development 
strategy. Exports were seen as the engine of growth. Trade liberalisation was expected 
to promote recovery by reducing the cost of imports. Exchange rate devaluations and 
import liberalisation have been implemented more vigorously than almost any other 
aspects of adjustment.
An argument in support of trade liberalisation is the recent globalisation thesis. 
According to the advocates of liberalisation, globalisation implies an integrated world 
through increased trade and capital flows. This, in turn, calls for governments to use 
liberalisation policies which reduce their capacity to implement independent national 
economic policies. The overall effect of this process is to tie together more closely 
what once were distinct and separate national economies. Capital is freed from 
constraints and has power to punish governments that limit its freedom. Consequently, 
globalised markets are very difficult to regulate. Governments that resist this process 
and try to implement interventionist policies quickly realise the impossibility of this and 
pay a heavy penalty. Governments are now at the mercy of uncontrollable global 
market forces. Financial and productive capital will flee from those countries that 
restrict their freedom and, by doing so, will put those economies in trouble. These 
developments are well advanced and irreversible. This process is seen as not only 
inevitable but also desirable. Liberalisation, as a result of globalisation, increases 
efficiency and productivity through competition and better resource reallocation. By 
reducing the arbitrary intervention of governments, it allows market forces to 
‘organise’ the economy. All that national governments need to do is to do nothing, and 
leave everything in the hands of free market forces. This integration also benefits 
developing countries through the movement of capital which is now more evenly
16
distributed world-wide. Thus, globalisation brings global benefits to everyone. 
Through globalisation, national differences will virtually all disappear. Hence, we are 
witnessing the end of the Third World.
The assertion that unrestricted international trade is beneficial to all 
participating countries, however, is contested by the fact that free trade has always 
been favoured by stronger economies.2 Most countries developed behind protective 
barriers, and allowed free trade only after they succeeded in developing international 
competitiveness. It is not surprising that free trade theory emerged in the United 
Kingdom, the first industrialised country. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, 
continental Europe or the United States did not echo the demand for freer trade. On 
the contrary, they were firmly protectionist. It was not until the end of the Second 
World War, when the United States became the strongest trading country, that its 
government advocated free trade. The then-weakened United Kingdom, together with 
all other European countries, remained protectionist until the 1960s. As Brett points 
out,
A successful political integration of an international economy based on laissez- 
faire  would depend upon the ability to sustain a process of even growth in the 
development of the productive capacity of the various countries which 
composed it. (Brett, 1985: 30)
The basic proposition of modem trade theory is that unregulated trade promotes 
equality of income among the participant nations. This implies not only that all 
participant countries benefit from free trade, but that low-income countries benefit 
more. As an Oxfam report argues, ‘[t]his approach ignores the fundamental reality of 
the market place: namely, that [countries] enter markets as unequal partners, and they 
leave them with rewards which reflect those inequalities.’3 Given that low-income 
countries are usually sceptical about the benefits of free trade, it is fair to ask why 
these countries are unable to understand the benefits of free trade policy. The
2 Brett (1985: 52). ‘The weak have always taken a much less enthusiastic view, since they were always 
more likely to find that their markets would be taken away from them by the more efficient foreign 
producers unless the state intervened to erect protective barriers behind which they would shelter.’ 
Weiss (1997:13)
3 Oxfam (1995b: 73).
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orthodoxy does not have an answer to this question. This unquestioning reliance on the 
idea that free trade brings equalisation of income is disturbing in the light of historical 
evidence for a widening disparity between the developed and the developing world.4
1.2. METHODOLOGY
The aim of this section is to present briefly the major peculiarities of mainstream 
methodological approaches. By doing so, it will establish a methodological framework 
for the rest of this thesis. The debate surrounding international trade is a subset of a 
wider debate over the nature of state intervention. The ‘state versus market’ arguments 
have a well publicised and established history. In the literature, a distinction has been 
made between two broad approaches to development: structuralist and neoclassical. 
However, even though this categorisation may be useful for simplification purposes, 
inclusion of classical Marxism in the structuralism category is inappropriate.
Little (1982) categorises different theoretical approaches to the role of the state 
into two broad groups, neoclassical and structuralist. Structuralism is an umbrella term 
for a general ‘anti-market viewpoint.’5 It covers different non-neoclassical approaches:
The structuralist sees the world as inflexible. Change is inhibited by obstacles, 
bottlenecks and constraints. People find it hard to move or adopt, and 
resources tend to be stuck. In economic terms, the supply of most things is 
inelastic. (Little, 1982: 20)
This inflexibility is particularly apparent in developing countries with poor 
infrastructure and underdeveloped markets. Since supply and demand are inelastic, 
quantity adjustments either do not take place or require large and disturbing price 
changes. Whilst exploring the origins of structuralism, Arndt classifies the ‘market 
failure’ arguments into three categories: signalling, response and mobility.
First, prices may give the wrong signals because they are distorted by 
monopoly or other influences. Secondly, labour and other factors of production
4 See Abramovitz (1989), Bairoch (1981, 1993), Gould (1972), Maddison (1991, 1995).
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may respond to price signals inadequately or even perversely. Thirdly, although 
ready to respond appropriately to correct price signals, factors of production 
may be immobile, unable to move quickly if at all. (Arndt, 1985: 152)
This challenged the neoclassical thesis, which suggests that given perfect competition 
and the absence of externalities, the market mechanism will produce the best desirable 
results through an efficient allocation of resources. Thus, state intervention is justified 
when markets fail. According to Arndt, this approach involves thinkers from a wide 
spectrum, such as Keynes, Nurkse, Lewis, Prebish, Singer, Myrdal, Sraffa, Chamberlin, 
Robinson, Kalecki, Seers and others.6
Given the diversity of theories, this categorisation, (neoclassical versus ‘non- 
neoclassical’) may be problematical. However, in the face of the recent unprecedented 
domination of neoclassical economics, and since different theories define themselves 
relative to the dominant view, this categorisation can be acceptable and even useful. 
Nevertheless, integrating Marx and classical Marxism into the structuralist category is 
inappropriate. Marx’s analysis of the economy was fundamentally different from these 
two approaches.
Inspired by modernisation theories, neoclassical economics presumes that 
development is a natural process. Harmony is the rule and conflict is an exception. 
Since development is perceived to be a simple and linear process, rather than focusing 
on the dynamics of this process, it is preferable to focus on the external forces that 
divert and hinder it. There is progress unless there are barriers to it. The priority is on 
the identification and elimination of the factors that halt development. Once these 
factors are identified and eliminated, market forces can maximise the well-being of 
society. As a result, if all countries follow a number of simple rules, poverty and 
inequality would gradually disappear.
According to this view, capitalism is fundamentally a stable system and 
problems are caused by external shocks and interventions. As capitalism is normally 
stable, instabilities are seen as abnormalities. An exaggerated and caricaturized version 
of the theory would argue that the only effective way to eliminate the impacts of 
external shocks is to leave them completely to the market mechanism. Since markets
5 Arndt (1985:151).
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are assumed flexible, shocks will quickly be eliminated and stability will be restored. 
Thus, the best policy for dealing with external shocks is not to deal with them at all. 
When the state intervenes, it causes more problems than it solves.
Structuralists, in contrast, argue that markets are not always stable and that 
there is no automatic mechanism to sustain stability at all times. There are ups and 
downs, swings and fluctuations. When there is an external shock, markets are not 
flexible enough to return to an equilibrium promptly. It may take a long time or 
equilibrium may never be achieved. The market mechanism itself can cause problems, 
and thus state intervention might be necessary, and even inevitable. Structuralists argue 
that even though the market mechanism is inherently unstable, stability can be 
established by state intervention. In this view, the linear approach is not abolished but 
modified. If the state applies sensible policies, development is still a straightforward 
process.
To put it simply, if prices could give the right signals (i.e. monopolies are 
eliminated or regulated), if labour and other factors of production could respond to 
price signals adequately, and if factors of production could be mobile and able to move 
quickly, the differences between neoclassical and structuralists would disappear and 
structuralists would become neoclassicists. The difference between them is not 
qualitative but quantitative, not in nature but in degree. The important question for 
these two camps is the speed of price changes. Neoclassicists argue that prices adjust 
fairly quickly, so that there is no need for state intervention. For structuralists, 
however, sluggish prices require state intervention. Few neoclassical economists would 
contend that prices are always completely flexible, and few structuralists would argue 
that they are completely sticky. In a sense, the boundaries between these two 
categories are artificial and these polar sides are necessary to put the arguments in 
perspective. People who consider themselves as belonging to one of these two broad 
categories could be placed on a two-dimensional line so that their positions could be 
defined relative to one another. Since price inflexibilities are thought to be particularly 
widespread in developing countries, as development takes place, structuralists’ 
arguments are gradually weakened and structuralists move towards neoclassical 
analysis.
6 See also Kay (1989) for a good exposition of richness and variety of the structuralist approach.
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For Marxists, however, equilibrium is an exception and disequilibrium is the 
rule. Instability, disharmony and conflict are seen as the nature of the capitalist 
development process. In their view, capitalism is considered as an extremely dynamic 
system. Competition and productivity increase are the characteristics of capitalism. 
This dynamism, the unplanned, uncontrolled nature of capitalist development, itself is 
the source of instability.7 Marxists would agree with structuralists that markets are 
inherently unstable, but for them ‘market abnormalities’ are not a major problem. 
‘Abnormalities’ are seen as normal and inherent to the nature of capitalist 
development.
Marxists see economic development as an unstable, unlinear and uneven 
process. Development and underdevelopment (or prevented development, as defined in 
neoclassical economics) are the natural results of the same development process and 
are unseparable from each other. Development itself causes underdevelopment and 
there is no natural tendency for all countries to converge. Development and 
underdevelopment (or uneven development) are the two sides of the same coin. In this 
view, the optimism of neoclassical economics (and structuralism) is rejected. It is 
argued that the development process is an unlinear and extremely complicated process 
and no simple advice can be given to developing countries. Explaining development in 
a particular country does not imply the possibility of generating development 
elsewhere.
The way in which Marxists analyse the economy is fundamentally different. 
They do not place themselves on the two-dimensional line. Their approach can be 
thought of as constituting another dimension, and many of the two-dimensional 
dichotomies between neoclassical and structuralists are irrelevant for Marxists.
For Marxists, ‘state versus market’ arguments are misleading. Neoclassical and 
structuralist views consider state policies as 'good' or 'bad', and all problems are caused
7 Marx’s analysis of capitalism is widely misunderstood. One extraordinary example can be given 
from Samuelson’s famous text book. Confusing Marx’s ‘tendency of profit rate to fall’ (TPRF) with 
‘law of diminishing return’, he blames Marx for neglecting technological changes and inventions. He 
writes: ‘If no invention had occurred, perhaps Marx would have been proven correct in his prophesy 
of the falling rate of profit. But invention increased the productivity of capital and repealed the law of 
the falling rate of profit. In the race between diminishing returns and advancing technology, 
technology has won by several lengths. Or, so history has progressed up to now’. (Samuelson and 
Nordhaus, 1985: 792). Confusing diminishing return with TPRF is bad enough, but blaming Marx for 
ignoring productivity increase is unfair. Not only the TPRF argument is based on productivity 
increase and not on the absence of it, but productivity increase is the base for all Marx’s arguments.
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i by ‘bad’ policies. Naturally, the solution is to adopt 'good' policies. Identification of
policies as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is a matter of theoretical and ideological debate. From this 
perspective, however, it is impossible to understand why these 'good' or 'bad' policies 
are being adopted. Thus, 'history' is omitted or neglected.8 Those who try to adopt a 
historical perspective (from the right or the left) mostly display an inaccurate 
understanding of the concept of the state and the international division of labour. First, 
state intervention (and consequently the state) is seen either as a pre-capitalist remnant 
which hinders capitalist development,9 or as a tool for independent development. 
Second, liberalisation is viewed either as the necessity of internationalisation or as the 
opening up of the economy to the structure which is imposed by the international 
division of labour.10 Rather than asking if state intervention in the economy is a ‘good’ 
or a ‘bad’ thing, Marxists are interested in the logic of the state. Why does the state 
exist? Why does the state intervene? They oppose the above views on the grounds that 
they are deceptive, misleading and ahistorical.
It is clear that, at certain junctions of history, one can identify different degrees 
of state intervention. Different levels of state intervention should be seen as a necessity 
in capitalist development, according to the needs of the capital accumulation process. 
State policies (more or less intervention or participation) in developed and developing 
countries, are determined by the dominant capital accumulation process which is itself 
determined by internal class structure and the international division of labour. Then, 
‘[t]he primary function of the state-in-general is to guarantee the reproduction of 
capitalist social relations -  relations which pertain to the existence of capital-in- 
general.’11 In this view, it is argued that government policies and the state are not 
independent of the necessities of the capital accumulation process. Thus, the state is 
neither an enemy of the people nor an independent body which protects and promotes 
the public interest. Marxists claim that state intervention in the economy is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for protecting the public interest.
The above arguments have direct relevance to the debate over international 
trade. Neoclasical theory claims that trade liberalisation tends to stimulate economic
8 Gulalp (1987).
9 As the critiques of state intervention see the capitalist development as a linear process, liberalisation 
is seen as a breakthrough and true policies according to the logic of capitalism.
10 Gulalp (1987).
11 Fine and Harris (1979: 146).
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growth and equalise income across countries. For this reason it is considered to be a 
‘good’ policy. A variety of structuralist theories, however, argue that free trade does 
not benefit all countries equally, unless the state intervenes and guarantees that 
participation in international trade is beneficial for the country. Therefore, free trade is 
perceived to be a ‘bad’ policy. Nevertheless, they believe that international trade 
remains a good option for developing countries in their attempt to accelerate economic 
development. Marxism, on the other hand, argues that, free or controlled, in the 
absence of international planning, trade will necessarily lead to uneven development 
and international disintegration. They believe that controlled trade is preferable to free 
trade, but disagree that controlled trade can solve the problems of developing 
countries.
This thesis will follow the methodology of the Marxist line of argument. The 
structuralist approach will also be employed when appropriate. The Marxist and the 
structuralist approaches overlap considerably in their attempt to criticise and produce 
alternatives to the neoclassical approach. They are in agreement on the weaknesses of 
neoclassical theory.
Ideological nature of trade
Debates over economic doctrines are not pure academic matters; they concern the 
destiny of millions of people. As such, their inspiration is inherently ideological.12 The 
world is disorderly and fractured, in which the observed reality is uneven development. 
All major indicators show that the income gap between rich and poor countries has 
never been so wide.13 Billions of people in the world live under conditions of extreme
12 Hudson (1992:1). Two different methodologies can be identified to the question of why and how 
economic theories are produced. One assumes that economic theories are pure and universally 
scientific. They are also independent of time, conditions and ideological perspectives of the economist, 
just like physical sciences. The second approach considers the broader philosophical, ideological 
background of the theories. Schumpeter is the leading figure for the first approach; G. Myrdal and J. 
Robinson are the leading figures for the second.
13 The United Nations Human Development Report, 1998, provides some astonishing evidence. 
According to the report, the richest fifth of the world's people consumes 86 percent of all goods and 
services while the poorest fifth consumes just 1.3 percent, with a ratio of richest to poorest 66 to 1, 
which used to be only 30 to 1, in the 1960s. According to the report, the 225 richest people in the 
world have a combined wealth of more than $1 trillion which is equal to the annual income of the 
poorest 47 percent of the earth’s population, some 2.5 billion people. The 3 richest people on the 
planet - Microsoft’s Bill Gates, the Walton family of Wal-Mart stores and legendary investor Warren 
Buffett - have assets that exceed the combined GDP of the 48 least developed countries.
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poverty. In this context, academic arguments on trade liberalisation can roughly be 
classified into two categories: for and against. The enthusiasm of both approaches to 
either criticise or defend trade liberalisation incapacitates them from understanding the 
logic behind it. Instead of starting with an attempt to comprehend how the world 
economy works, theorists usually seek a priori to defend the status quo or call for its 
transformation. The state-versus-market dichotomy and its variants result from such 
methodological comprehension. During the 1980s, the trade liberalisation versus 
protectionism debate became popular once again. ‘Export-oriented’ trade strategy 
became fashionable and attracted supporters some of whom succeeded in re-creating 
various myths around the concept. Economic liberalisation was offered as a panacea 
for the development problems of developing countries, regardless of their historical 
background. As Banuri (1991: 1) has noted, the ‘broad agenda for policy debate on 
development [has been] replaced with the narrow and technical issue of the means and 
the speed with which liberalisation ought to be introduced in the economy.’
It is typical to discuss the objectives or to display the 'good' and 'bad' of 
different types of trade policies, but this debate proves to be a fruitless exercise. A 
more progressive and stimulating approach is to examine the dynamics of trade 
policies. In the literature, however, the arguments are largely dominated by efficiency 
considerations. This approach fails to comprehend the true nature of trade 
liberalisation. Even if protectionism is inherently inefficient, a better question would be 
to ask why free trade has not been adopted more vigorously by all countries. If all 
participants benefit from free trade, there should not be resistance to it.
A contributing factor might be that ‘non-economists’ in general, and 
policymakers in particular, are unaware of the benefits of a free trade policy. It takes a 
long time for them to be convinced that free trade would produce a sufficiently high 
political payoff to be worth pursuing at the expense of other policies. What are the 
reasons for protectionism in the first place then? Listening to some of the adherents of 
free trade, one would believe that governments only adopt protectionism out of 
stupidity or a wilful desire to wreck their countries' economies. According to Krugman 
(1998), intellectuals simply do not understand comparative advantage theory and the 
benefits of free trade. He suggests three reasons for this: first, at the shallowest level, 
some intellectuals reject comparative advantage simply out of a desire to be 
intellectually fashionable. Second, at a deeper level, comparative advantage is a harder
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concept than it seems. And third, at the deepest level, opposition to comparative 
advantage reflects the aversion of many intellectuals to an essentially mathematical way 
of understanding the world.14 He asserts that intellectuals do not understand ‘Ricardo’s 
difficult idea’ and ‘they do not even want to hear about it.’ This view reduces trade to 
a technical matter. Trade relationships, however, signify deeper human relationships 
and should be analysed as such. The naivety of these overly simplistic arguments does 
not guarantee the accuracy of more sophisticated arguments. The aim of this 
dissertation is to argue that the theoretical and empirical arguments favouring the 
benefits of free trade are overwhelmingly based on unrealistic and overly simplistic 
assumptions and thus are neither convincing nor conclusive.
1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
In order to analyse the causes of the recent internationalisation and trade liberalisation 
processes, one needs to go beyond the narrow arguments on whether trade 
liberalisation and export-led development are good or bad trade policies. Nevertheless, 
the arguments on the implications of trade liberalisation are not trivial or nonsensical. 
The way trade liberalisation is presented (theoretically and empirically) gives some 
important hints about the underlying structure causing these changes. In order to know 
the real reasons behind trade liberalisation, the fictitious ones should be eliminated. 
This thesis limits itself to a less ambitious objective. It explores the theoretical and 
empirical literature to reveal whether the recent internationalisation process can be 
rationalised by the alleged benefits of international trade. The principal objective of this 
dissertation is to examine the theoretical and empirically validity of the arguments 
surrounding the trade liberalisation and export-led development hypotheses. It will 
investigate whether the liberal policies of the World Bank stimulate economic 
development in developing countries, and whether protectionist policies are the cause 
of stagnation. If the idea that ‘increased international trade benefits all participant 
countries’ can be rejected, there is a need to go beyond the narrow discussions on the 
benefits of trade policies. If increased internationalisation cannot be explained by the 
benefits of free trade, some other reasons must be investigated.
14 Krugman (1998: 23).
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This thesis examines the export-led development hypothesis from two 
perspectives. It first explores its theoretical cogency. There is an extensive literature on 
the theoretical foundations of the export-led development hypothesis. Since it was 
introduced by David Ricardo, comparative advantage theory has been modified and 
developed in various ways. The basic tenets of the theories, however, remained close 
to Ricardo’s original ideas. For this reason, the thesis will only investigate the basic 
arguments of comparative advantage theory. Secondly, the empirical part evaluates the 
existing literature and attempts to make a small contribution to this literature.
1.4. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The thesis is divided into two parts, theoretical and empirical. Part one provides an 
analysis of the theoretical discourse on the impact of trade on economic development. 
It comprises three chapters.
Chapter two examines the development of classical trade theory from the 
mercantilists to Smith and Ricardo. The focus is placed on Ricardo, the founder of 
comparative advantage theory. The mercantilists believed that a nation could gain from 
international trade only at the expense of other nations. As a result they advocated 
restrictive trade policies. Smith produced the theory of absolute advantage to justify 
free trade. Nations can gain from trade when one nation is more efficient than another 
in the production of one commodity, but is less efficient in the production of another 
commodity. His theory, however, was unable to explain trade when one country had 
no absolute advantage over another. Ricardo revolutionised trade theory by 
emphasising relative prices rather than absolute. According to comparative advantage 
theory, even if one nation is less efficient than the other in the production of all 
commodities, there is still a basis for mutually beneficial trade. Ricardo’s theory 
became the cornerstone of liberal international trade theory. Comparative advantage 
theory is one of the most important and most controversial theories in economics. 
According to Krugman (1998: 35), ‘Ricardo’s idea is truly, madly, deeply difficult. But 
it is also utterly true, immensely sophisticated -  and extremely relevant to the modem 
world.’ This chapter emphasises the ideological origins of Ricardo’s theory of 
comparative advantage. After a brief exposition of the theory, its criticisms are 
elaborated. The neoclassical criticism of the theory is presented in chapter three. The
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| non-neoclassical critics usually focus on the basic assumptions of the theory. It will be
argued that even though these critics reduce the relevance of the theory for justifying 
free trade, they have not been detrimental to its overall validity. This chapter will 
conclude by discussing those weaknesses of the theory which invalidate it as a policy 
guide for international trade.
Chapter three analyses the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of comparative advantage. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory is a direct application and a natural extension of 
neoclassical theory into international economics. It criticises Ricardo’s theory on the 
grounds that it is based on labour value theory, and that it assumes the existence of 
differences in comparative costs but does not explain them. Heckscher-Ohlin theory 
attempts to explain these differences based on variations in factor endowments. For 
some, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory signifies an advancement over Ricardo’s theory. The 
aim of this chapter is to determine whether or not this assertion is valid. First, this 
chapter will expose the peculiarities of the theory. Second, the empirical evidence will 
briefly be evaluated. It will be argued that the empirical literature, which usually 
attempts to predict the pattern of trade by factor endowments, is largely irrelevant in 
terms of substantiating the validity of the theory. This chapter concludes by 
questioning the theoretical efficacy of the theory by focusing particularly on the 
treatment of capital and labour as factor endowments.
Chapter four is divided into three sections. It starts with an analysis of ‘dynamic 
comparative advantage theories’. Even the most convinced adherents of comparative 
advantage theory admit that, in its static form, the theory has serious deficiencies. The 
dynamic versions of comparative advantage seek to remove the static nature of the 
theory by focusing on the future, rather than the current cost structure. This part 
acknowledges that dynamic comparative advantage theory is an advance over the static 
version. However, it challenges the assertion that the dynamic version overcomes the 
major shortcomings of the static version by questioning the assumption that 
comparative advantage can be made dynamic.
The second section of this chapter critically reviews the literature on trade 
policies. It aims to clarify the theoretical confusion surrounding the debate over 
import-substitution and export-promotion policies. These are usually considered to be 
mutually-exclusive and alternative trade policies. Export-promotion policies are also 
associated with trade liberalisation. This section postulates that this notion arises from
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a narrow and static approach where there are two sectors and all factors of production 
are employed. It argues that in a dynamic world where the static parameters of the 
neoclassical model are allowed to change and where there is unemployment, these 
policies can be seen as complementary rather than exclusive alternatives.
Finally, the last section examines the validity of the so-called ‘export 
pessimism’ arguments and their critics. These are probably the strongest arguments 
used by the protectionists and are often approved by orthodox theorists. As a result, 
temporary protectionism is accepted as the 'second-best' solution to the trade problem 
where underdevelopment exists. Most developing countries depend almost entirely on 
the export of raw materials and agricultural commodities in order to pay for their 
imports. This is often used as a justification for protectionist policies. It is asserted that 
the demand for raw materials and agricultural products tends to increase more slowly 
than the demand for industrial goods. Export pessimism, however, has come under 
increasing criticism. The critics have argued that not only is the unfolding reality a 
reason to reject export pessimism arguments, but also export pessimism, in some cases, 
has turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The aim of this section is to shed some 
light on the validity of these contrasting arguments.
Part two analyses the empirical literature on the impact of trade on economic 
development. It also comprises three chapters. Chapter five critically reviews the 
empirical literature on the impact of trade openness on economic growth, and prepares 
the ground for an alternative framework in the next chapter. It questions the validity of 
many of the empirical assertions of the export-led development thesis. It emphasises 
the difficulty of measuring openness. Economic openness is usually confused with 
trade liberalisation. This chapter evaluates the weaknesses of the methods employed in 
measuring openness. The empirical literature suffers from a number of technical and 
theoretical weaknesses. Consequently, the majority of empirical works do not provide 
meaningful evidence to support or reject the export-led development hypothesis. This 
chapter also focuses on an increasingly popular trade liberalisation index: Dollar’s 
openness index (1991). This index is based on the Hecksher-Ohlin comparative 
advantage theory and on the idea that trade barriers cause higher prices. Dollar 
adjusted national price levels with factor endowments and used the differences between 
the actual and predicted price levels as a measure of trade liberalisation. This chapter 
questions the validity of Dollar’s index as a measure of openness, trade liberalisation or
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exchange rate overvaluation. It investigates the supposed association between 
economic performance and Dollar’s index.
Chapter six offers an alternative measure of trade openness and empirically 
investigates whether trade openness accelerates economic growth. It carries out a 
formal statistical analysis of the relationship between trade openness and economic 
growth. It starts by arguing that measuring the impact of outward-orientation on 
economic performance is a valid exercise. The same cannot be said for trade 
liberalisation, as the impact of trade liberalisation on trade performance is ambiguous. 
Once openness is separated from trade liberalisation, a measure of openness can be 
selected accordingly. This chapter proposes an alternative measure of openness by 
developing Balassa’s (1985) structurally adjusted trade intensity index. This index aims 
to separate the differences between actual trade figures and trade policy objectives, by 
adjusting trade intensity according to the structural peculiarities of the countries. 
Unlike other methods, if properly formulated, this method isolates those other factors 
influencing trade performance, and indicates the extent of trade openness as a result of 
conscious policy choices. If all the factors influencing trade performance can be 
identified and controlled, then what is unexplained can be assumed to be openness by 
policy choice.
Chapter seven examines the findings of a very controversial World Bank report 
on Asian’s high performing economies. During the 1990s the World Bank came under 
increasing criticism as a result of the failures of structural adjustment policies and was 
forced to defend its comer by producing two important reports. Both The East Asian 
Miracle (1993) and the Structural Adjustment in Africa (1994) received wide 
attention. The report on Asia broke the previous neoclassical line and accepted that in 
these countries, the state intervened heavily in economic policy. Initially, experiences 
of these countries were used by neoclassical economists to argue that trade-restricting, 
import-substituting policies had failed, and should be replaced with trade-oriented, 
export-promoting policies. This line of argument was eventually discredited, and the 
experiences of these countries were increasingly used against the advocates of trade 
liberalisation. The report can be seen as a last attempt to defend the orthodoxy. It 
accepts the presence of industrial policies but argues that they were largely ineffective 
and thus should not be prescribed for other developing countries. This chapter
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examines the empirical findings of the report in order to establish their validity in 
challenging the effectiveness of industrial policies in the ‘miracle’ countries.
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CHAPTER TWO
CLASSICAL THEORY
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Before the rise of classical economics the dominant economic ideology in Western 
Europe was mercantilism. Mercantilism was based on the idea that international trade 
was a zero sum game: a loss for one nation was a gain for another.1 That is why 
mercantilists believed in protectionism. With the rise of classical economists, liberal 
ideology exerted its dominance. Smith’s idea of the ‘invisible hand’ underlined the 
notion that everybody would benefit from the functioning of the free market. Smith 
and Ricardo, like all other classical economists, witnessed the rise of a new industrial 
bourgeoisie and conflict among three dominant classes: the landed aristocracy, the 
merchant bourgeoisie and the industrial bourgeoisie. The theorists took up the role of 
spokesmen for the growing industrial bourgeoisie. Therefore, their theories should be 
seen as a consequence of these real-world developments.
Smith produced the theory of absolute advantage to justify free trade. His 
theory, however, was unable to explain trade for a country which had no advantage 
over others. Ricardo revolutionised trade theory by emphasising differences in relative 
prices rather than differences in absolute prices. The classical economists rejected any 
form of protectionism in line with the interest of the newly rising industrial bourgeoisie.
In this chapter, first, the ideological nature of Ricardo’s theory of comparative 
advantage will be emphasised. After briefly explaining the theory, critiques of it will be 
elaborated. It will be shown that, even though most critics have contributed to the 
debate surrounding the theory, they have not been able to shake the fundamentals of 
the theory.
The neoclassical theorists’ dislike of Ricardian theory2 led them to retain the 
basic ideas of comparative advantage theory while rejecting the ‘naive’ assumptions of 
labour value theory. They ‘revolutionised’ the theory by modifying it with the so-called
1 Tripathy (1985: 9).
2 Because it is based on labour value theory.
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‘factor endowment theory’. An extensive critique of factor endowment theory will be 
presented in chapter three. The literature, by and large, focuses on the assumptions of 
the theory. The assumptions are clearly unrealistic and modification of the assumptions 
changes the implications of the theory to a considerable extent. It will be shown, 
nevertheless, that this does not invalidate the most fundamental argument of the 
theory: trade, based on comparative advantage, is beneficial to all the participant 
countries.
Ricardo’s theory, however, is fundamentally flawed once its static nature is 
identified. It will be argued that a strong critique of the theory can be levelled at its 
static nature rather than its assumptions and its mechanisms. Because comparative 
advantage theory is a static theory by its nature, it cannot be a guide to the 
development process of developing countries. It will be argued that comparative 
advantage theory, at its best, is a misleading theory. At its worse, however, it can be 
very damaging to the development attempts of developing countries.
2.2. MERCANTILISM
Before classical theory it was believed that national wealth could be increased by 
maintaining a continuous trade surplus, minimising imports and maximising exports, 
thus increasing the national ownership of gold and silver. This theory, known as 
mercantilism, therefore excluded the possibility of free and equal exchange.
However, these arguments were fundamentally undermined by the free trade 
theories put forward by the classical economists, the most important of whom were 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo. They rejected the idea that one nation could enrich 
itself by impoverishing another for a long period of time and instead argued that trade 
could only benefit one country if it also benefited another through fair exchange. Thus, 
Smith wrote that,
if a nation could be separated from all the world, it would be of no 
consequence how much, or how little money circulated in it. The consumable 
goods which were circulated by means of this money would only be exchanged 
for a greater or a smaller number of pieces; but the real wealth or poverty of
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the country, they allow, would depend altogether upon the abundance or 
scarcity of those consumable goods. (Smith, 1991: 377)
Nevertheless, as Hudson (1992: 113) notes, the ‘laissez-faire doctrine was based on a 
more static analysis than the development-oriented analysis which characterised the 
preceding mercantilism and subsequent protectionism’. The Ricardians replaced the 
increasing returns assumption of the mercantilists with diminishing returns which led 
them to ignore the dynamic nature of development.
2.3. ADAM SMITH
At the beginning of Wealth o f Nations, Smith argues that the major source of the 
difference in the wealth of nations is the extent of the division of labour within each 
society. He used the famous example of a pin factory and argued that if the various 
tasks involved in making pins could be divided into distinct operations, this 
specialisation could be a great source of productivity increase. But then the question is 
why have not all countries succeeded in increasing their division of labour at the same 
rate? He believed that the extent of the market could limit the development of the 
division of labour. This is the main reason why Smith favoured free trade. He wanted 
markets to be as large as possible, not only in terms of their physical size but also in 
terms of market relations, to create the potential for exploiting the growing division of 
labour necessary for productivity increase.3 That is why he was antagonistic to feudal 
society and wanted to see the breakdown of the feudal remnants in society. In brief, he 
saw productivity increase as the result of an increased division of labour and argued 
that the increased division of labour could be achieved by the expansion of markets.
Smith was very concerned about the possibility of a fall in profitability due to 
the limitations of the markets. He argued that as capital accumulation continued 
investment opportunities would eventually be exhausted because of the constraints 
imposed by the extent of the market. He studied individual sectors and saw that as 
investment flows into a particular sector, investment opportunities in that sector are 
gradually exhausted and the profit rate falls. Then he wrongly assumed that what was
3 This view is very close to what are nowadays called ‘dynamic comparative advantage’ arguments.
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true for a particular sector was true for the economy as a whole. As capital 
accumulated and investment took place, investment opportunities would eventually be 
exhausted, and this would ultimately lead to a decline in the profit rate and the 
economy would gradually decline to a stationary state.
Smith's international trade argument was based on the theory of absolute 
advantage. It was dynamic in nature compared to Ricardo's static comparative 
advantage theory in which production costs were assumed to be constant. According 
to absolute advantage theory, commodities should be produced where the absolute 
cost of production is the lowest. This would allocate resources efficiently. The theory 
asserts that the advantage of free trade is derived from purchasing commodities 
cheaper from abroad rather than producing them more expensively at home. Thus, 
from this perspective, the international division of labour is the natural extension of the 
division of labour in domestic markets. This is the main reason why Smith was so 
enthusiastic about international trade. He saw international trade as a non-zero positive 
sum game and believed that by expanding the market, trade would create conditions 
for a deeper division of labour, productivity increase and continuous capital 
accumulation.
2.4. DAVID RICARDO
Like Smith, Ricardo also approved of capitalism, but unlike Smith, he was pessimistic 
about its future. Ricardo produced his theory of income distribution between factors of 
production in order to investigate whether capital accumulation could continue 
indefinitely. He used the labour theory of value to analyse the distribution of income 
among capitalists, landlords and workers. This analysis displayed his belief that 
capitalists were the only source of investment and capital accumulation, whereas 
landlords, a parasitic class, were the source of luxury consumption.4 Therefore, the 
important question was whether or not capitalists received enough income to maintain 
accumulation.
Even though his reasoning was different, like Smith, Ricardo also believed in a 
stationary state because of declining productivity in agriculture. Ricardo's application
4 He assumed that workers were paid wages at a subsistence level.
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of the value theory to agriculture differed substantially from his treatment of 
manufacturing. He argued that as accumulation proceeds, capitalist farmers move from 
more productive land to less productive land, and the average productivity of land 
diminishes. This would result in increased rent on more productive land. As 
agricultural production moves to less and less productive land, the rent on the more 
productive land would keep increasing. Given a subsistence wage level (which could 
not be altered), the profit rate would decline as the rent share increased. As capitalist 
accumulation proceeds, landlords would increasingly take the benefits of production. 
Thus, capitalist accumulation would stop and the economy would reach a ‘steady 
state’. This theory accounts for Ricardo’s antagonism towards landlords.
Pressurised by landlords and labourers, the best that capitalists could hope for 
was a postponement of the decline in the rate of profit. Ricardo conceived of a number 
of ways in which this decline might be postponed. One was by the application of new 
technology to agriculture. But he thought of this as an unpredictable process and not 
amenable to policy action. The alternative method was to raise labour productivity by 
intensifying work. However, making labourers work harder was not compatible with 
the assumption of a subsistence wage.
Once the improvement of British agricultural productivity was ruled out, 
Ricardo realised that the only way to postpone the decline in the profit rate was to 
import cheap food. Free trade, particularly for food grains, was a major issue in British 
politics in the first half of the 19th century. The money price of wheat in England had 
been steady for a period of about 150 years. At the end of the 18th century, it rose due 
to restrictions on com trade. The price was high through the first decade of the 19th 
century, after which a series of good harvests caused a sharp decline in price. It was in 
reaction to this sharp fall that in 1815 restrictions on wheat imports (the so-called Com 
Laws) were tightened.5
Ricardo used his analysis to show that cheap imports of wage goods lowered 
the labour time embodied in the subsistence wage and thus could permit the rate of 
profit to be maintained. Furthermore, he suggested that both trading countries would 
gain from free trade, even if both commodities could be produced in one country with 
less labour than in the other country.
5 For more detail, see Hudson (1992) and Edwards (1985).
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This background helps one to understand the ideological nature of Ricardo’s 
comparative advantage theory. He produced this theory as a justification for the 
abolition of the Com Laws, which he believed had benefited the landlord class and 
harmed the industrial bourgeoisie. Ricardo, like Smith, was the advocate of the 
industrial bourgeoisie against the domination of landlords. This underlying ideological 
affiliation led to the construction of his theory and resulted in a number of exaggerated 
assumptions. Diminishing returns on land, for example, cannot be easily supported 
when one considers the dramatic productivity increase on land, even during his own 
lifetime. Malthus, a supporter of the landlord class, argued for retention of the Com 
Laws which he thought would allow the landlords to invest in land, increase 
productivity and reduce food prices.6 ‘It is ironic that the theory of economic rent had 
first been put forth in 1777 by the Scottish agriculturalist James Anderson specifically 
in reference to increasing returns!’7 Smith and Marx also based their theories on ever- 
increasing productivity levels.8 Consequently, one may wonder whether Ricardo was 
unable to see the potential for productivity increase on land or whether he preferred 
ignoring it in order to build his theory.
2.5. RICARDO'S THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
Smith’s absolute advantage theory looked convincing but trade was impossible when 
one country produced all commodities cheaper than the other. Ricardo dealt with this 
problem by developing the theory of comparative advantage. This demonstrated that 
both countries could benefit from specialisation in particular lines of production even 
where the costs of production for all of the producers were initially higher in one 
country than in the other. What was required was for relative prices to differ. Ricardo 
revolutionised the foreign trade doctrine through a famous example: he compared the 
effects of the introduction of trade in two commodities between England and Portugal, 
where each was producing both commodities and the costs of both commodities were 
higher in England than in Portugal. Ricardo argued that even though the absolute 
prices of both commodities were lower in Portugal, trade was possible since the
6 Ironically, when Malthus argued against the ‘Poor Laws’ which increased the government’s budget 
deficit and annoyed the higher classes, he preferred not to see the productivity increase on land.
7 Hudson (1992: 113).
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relative prices were different. As can be seen from table 2.1, wine is relatively cheaper 
in Portugal and cloth is relatively cheaper in England.
Table 2.1: Ricardian comparative advantage
Production per worker Price (£)9
(productivity)
Portugal England
Wine 1.25 0.83
Cloth 1.11 1.00
Wine to cloth ratio
Portugal England
0.80 1.20
0.90 1.00
0.89 1.20
Ricardo’s model is based on a number of simplifying assumptions. Hudson (1992: 120) 
summarises these assumptions as follows:
1. Constant returns to scale.
2. The traded goods are produced in both countries.
3. No trade in common factor inputs.
4. No underutilisation of labour, capital or land, and in particular no import- 
displacement of domestic labour and capital.
5. No emigration or capital outflow.
6. No imbalance in international trade and payments.
7. No impact of monetary inflation or deflation or of domestic and foreign debt on 
comparative costs.
8. No conflict between private-sector interests and general (long-term) social utility.
To demonstrate the gains from trade, a simplified version of Ricardo’s example will be 
used. Table 2.2 shows that the productivity level and, thus, the price of cloth are the 
same in the UK and the US.10 The US, however, has an absolute advantage in wheat
8 So much so that Marx even completely excluded the agricultural sector from his analysis.
9 Commodity money (gold), expressed in pounds, i.e., ‘in England around Ricardo’s time, roughly 1/4 
ounce of gold was known as a “pound” (£).’ (Shaikh, 1979: 285)
10 In Ricardo’s original example both commodities are cheaper in Portugal than England. Here, for 
the sake of the simplicity of the graphical demonstration one commodity is kept at the same price 
level.
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production since productivity is higher and the price is lower. The relative prices 
indicate that wheat is relatively cheap in the US and cloth is relatively cheap in the UK.
Table 2.2: Ricardian comparative advantage (modified)
Production per worker Price (£)
(productivity)________ (inverse productivity) T otal production11
US UK US UK US UK
Wheat 1.8 0.6 0.55 1.66 180 60
Cloth 1.2 1.2 0.83 0.83 120 120
Wheat to 
cloth ratio
0.66 2.00
According to absolute advantage theory, there is no case for trade since the price of 
cloth is the same in both countries and wheat is cheaper in the US. Given these prices, 
the UK would benefit from importing the cheaper wheat from the US but this is not 
possible because the UK cannot export to the US. Ricardo argued against absolute 
advantage theory by demonstrating that if the US produces only wheat, in which it has 
a comparative advantage, and the UK produces cloth, both countries would gain from 
trade. Because total production would be higher. The relative price of cloth is cheaper 
in the UK and the relative price of wheat is cheaper in the US.
A graphical illustration of the gains from trade for both countries is displayed in 
figure 2 .1.12 In the absence of trade, a nation’s production possibility frontier is also its 
consumption frontier. The production patterns will be determined by domestic 
consumption patterns and productivity levels. Before trading, the US may choose to 
produce and consume a combination of the commodities at point A, and the UK at 
point A ’. With trade, the US specialises in wheat and the UK in cloth. After trading, 
the consumption pattern is different from the production pattern. There will be only 
one price for both commodities in both countries and relative prices will be the same in 
both countries.13 For the US, consumption increases from A to E, for the UK from A’ 
to E \  The total quantity of the commodities (Ricardo’s 'sum of enjoyments') is 
increased. The increased consumption is the result of increased production through 
specialisation.
11 When all workers, say 100, are employed.
12 This example is borrowed from Salvatore (1995).
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Figure 2.1: Gains from trade
UK
120
SO
40
40 60 70
US
120
£  70o
O  60
11090 160
Wheat W heat
Given the simplicity of the model and its assumptions, Ricardo believed that:
Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its 
capital and labour to such employment as are most beneficial to each. This 
pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal 
good of the whole. [...] It is this principle which determines that wine shall be 
made in France and Portugal, that com shall be grown in America and Poland, 
and that hardware and other goods shall be manufactured in England. 
(Ricardo, 1992: 81)
Even though various thinkers have developed this model, the basic principles have not 
changed. Ricardo's labour theory of value has been rejected, but his comparative 
advantage theory has become the cornerstone of neo-liberal trade theory. The idea that 
the free market's ‘admirable’ pursuit of individual advantage will produce the best 
results for each country became a quasi-religious belief. Influenced by this conviction, 
contemporary trade theories display corresponding problems and that is why it is worth 
spending a little more time analysing this model.
13 The slope of the BE line is equal to the slope of the B’E ’ line.
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2.6. CRITIQUES OF RICARDO’S THEORY
There are various critiques of Ricardo’s theory, from the Marxist left to the 
neoclassical right. The neoclassical economists accommodate Ricardian comparative 
advantage theory, but reject its ‘hopelessly naive assumptions, particularly its 
attachment to the labour theory of value and the single-factor assumption.’14 They 
have instead developed a ‘more sophisticated’ model of trade based on factor 
endowment theory. As will be discussed in the next chapter, far from being a step 
forward, the theory represents a leap backward in international trade theory. 
Neoclassical economists not only created confusion through the use of ambiguous 
concepts (e.g. capital and labour ‘endowments’), but also muddled Ricardo’s original 
theory through their confusion over how prices are formed.
Structuralist economists, such as Singer (1984), agree with the basic tenets of 
Ricardian theory and accept that international trade based on comparative advantage 
would indeed benefit all participating countries. They argue, however, that these 
benefits are unequally distributed between developed and developing countries as a 
result of the peculiarities of the commodities exported by developing countries. They 
recommend temporary protectionist measures for the industrial sector, until 
competitiveness is achieved. Their views will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
four.
One of the strongest critiques of comparative advantage theory has come from 
the dependency theorists, particularly Emmanuel (1972). He argued that developing 
countries are exploited at the level of exchange because trade is based on ‘unequal 
exchange’. This unequal exchange, he argued, occurs as a result of the wage and price 
level differentials between developing and developed countries. Whereas the 
international mobility of commodities and capital equalises the profit rate 
internationally, as a result of the immobility of labour, wage rates vary from one 
country to another according to historical conditions. Low wage levels allow 
developing countries to lower the prices of their export commodities. In developed 
countries, however, monopolistic labour and commodity markets keep export prices
14 Gomes (1987:162).
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high. As a result of these different price levels, developed countries transfer some of 
the economic surplus from developing countries and reduce the latter’s accumulation 
and economic growth rates. This section is concerned with Ricardo and therefore 
Emmanuel’s theory will not be dealt with in more detail.15
Carchedi argues that ‘[t]he theory of international trade and prices is one of the 
least developed in Marxist economics’16. One of the first systematic attempts to analyse 
Ricardo’s theory from the view of radical political economy came from Angwar Shaikh 
in 1979. Carchedi (1986 and 1991) also criticised the basic logic and internal 
consistency of the theory. Apart from Shaikh and Carchedi, however, international 
trade is one area about which classical Marxists have been very silent. Marx himself 
planned to write a volume on trade, as part of his famous work Capital, but because of 
his death, it was never actualised. In this section, Shaikh’s work on international trade 
and Ricardian theory will be analysed. Carchedi’s work will also be briefly evaluated.
The criticisms of Ricardo’s theory are mainly levelled at the restrictive 
assumptions of the model. The critics, however, have not threatened the most 
fundamental tenets of the theory. Some critics stress the importance of the assumptions 
and argue that once they are suitably modified the theory loses its explanatory power. 
This is not necessarily true, as will be discussed later in this chapter.
There is no doubt that Ricardo’s theory has serious theoretical weaknesses and 
that it cannot be used to justify the benefits of free trade to all participants. In this 
chapter it will be argued that the fundamental weakness of the theory lies in its static 
nature and its overly simplistic interpretation of labour value theory. The static nature 
of the model is recognised in the trade literature where there are attempts to create a 
more dynamic version of the theory. It will be argued in chapter four that ‘dynamic 
comparative advantage’ is a contradictory concept. Comparative advantage theory is, 
by its nature, static and cannot be dynamic.
On the other hand, not all the critiques and indeed theories that allegedly 
‘improve’ the theory have always been fair to Ricardo. He deserves some credit for his 
contribution to international trade theory for his argument against the theory of 
absolute advantage. A country can indeed trade based on its comparative advantage.
15 Good critiques of his arguments can be found in Edwards (1985), Weeks (1991) and Carchedi 
(1991).
16 Carchedi (1986).
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Whether this would benefit that country, or whether this trade is the best option open 
to the country are other matters. Given that the critiques of the theory are not always 
accurate, it will be argued that Ricardo’s contribution should be recognised and 
credited.
2.6.1. The mechanism
One obvious problem that the model faces is providing an explanation for how an 
absolute disadvantage can be transformed into a comparative advantage. Given that 
one country has absolute advantage in both commodities, how is it possible that 
consumers in that country will be willing to buy goods from the other country? When 
there is free trade, it is obvious that consumers in both countries would have the 
incentive to buy both commodities from the first country.
Ricardo produced a mechanism based on the ‘quantity theory of money’ which 
purports that when the barriers to free trade are removed, the prices will rise in the 
surplus country and fall in the deficit country until the deficit country becomes 
competitive in the commodity for which it has a comparative advantage. Before 
analysing Ricardo's mechanism, a simpler one that can work under the same 
assumptions will be considered. At this stage it is important to remember that when 
Ricardo produced his theory, money was commodity money (gold and silver) and 
exchange rate devaluations were not possible. The following mechanism is based on 
the same assumptions of Ricardo.
When free trading starts, Portuguese wine and cloth can both be exported to 
England. But which one will be first? Merchants will find it more profitable to import 
wine since the price gap is larger for wine than cloth. If they buy wine in Portugal and 
sell it in England, their profit rate will be 50 percent. But if they trade cloth it will only 
be 11.11 percent. So as the wine trade is more profitable than that of cloth, they will 
start with importing wine. As wine is exported from Portugal to England, the price of 
wine will rise in Portugal and fall in England. It will rise in Portugal because there is 
already full employment and the production of wine cannot be increased immediately. 
But as the price of wine is now higher than its value, it is more profitable to produce 
wine than cloth. The only way to increase wine production is to remove some of the 
workers from cloth production and employ them in wine production, which means a
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reduction in cloth production. In this case, price of cloth will rise in Portugal since the 
production and supply is now less than the demand, and the price of wine will fall 
gradually. If the rise in the price of cloth is high enough, Portugal will start importing 
cloth from England. Cloth production will increase in England by employing workers 
that are removed from wine production. This process will continue until the prices of 
both commodities are equalised in both countries and until Portugal specialises in wine 
production and England specialises in cloth production.
In this framework it can be seen why the assumptions on full employment and 
constant technology are necessary for Ricardo's model regardless of how unrealistic 
they are. Without these assumptions the mechanism that aims to transform the 
comparative advantage into a competitive advantage would not work.
First, if there is unemployment when the demand for wine increases, wine 
production in Portugal can be increased without a reduction in cloth production. This 
means that the price of cloth will not increase in Portugal. After the wine price is 
equalised in both countries due to free trade, the cloth trade becomes more profitable. 
In this case cloth production in England will also collapse.
Second, even if there is full employment, the wine producers can invest in new 
technologies and increase wine production without employing new workers. In this 
case, again, wine production can be increased without a reduction in cloth production 
and Portugal will not lose its competitiveness in cloth production.
Ironically, when these assumptions are rejected, there is no winner from this 
process -  at least in the long-run. In the end, England is left with ruined industry and 
massive unemployment, and has to rebuild everything until the next free trade attempt. 
Portugal also loses after the collapse of English market because the Portuguese 
economy now depends on exports to England. Consequently, there will be massive 
unemployment in Portugal too, unless domestic demand is increased to eliminate the 
deficient demand due to the loss of external markets.
Shaikh’s critique
Shaikh (1979) challenges Ricardo’s theory from a Marxist perspective. He argues that 
Ricardo’s mechanism in which comparative advantages become competitive 
advantages cannot take place. To reiterate, Ricardo's argument (which is based on the
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quantity theory of money) purports that, due to a trade deficit (surplus) there will be 
deflation (inflation) in England (Portugal). These price changes will eventually bring 
comparative advantage to a competitive advantage by increasing (decreasing) 
England’s (Portugal’s) competitiveness in cloth. Average prices in England will fall 
since the money outflow will reduce the money supply (gold). Prices in Portugal will 
rise, since the money inflow will increase the money supply. The idea is simple. If the 
supply of any commodity is higher (lower) than its demand, the price of that 
commodity will be lower (higher) than its ‘direct price’ or the price of production until 
the supply adjusts itself to the demand conditions. The same thing is assumed to hold 
for the commodity money, gold. Any increase in the supply of gold would reduce its 
price lower then its direct price. At this point Marx's objection becomes relevant. As 
Shaikh (1979: 30) puts it, the excess supply of gold is a very different thing from an 
excess supply of any other commodity since money can be hoarded or transformed into 
luxury articles without losing its value. In this sense, the commodity money does not 
have to be (and in fact cannot be) sold. Some quantity of gold is needed in circulation 
to facilitate the circulation of commodities. The gold which is not needed will be taken 
out of the circulation in order to be hoarded or transformed into luxury goods.
According to Marx's theory of money, Ricardo's inflation theory is erroneous, 
in that any increase in the money supply due to a trade surplus will not have any impact 
on the overall price level. This does not mean that any increase (decrease) in the money 
supply as a result of a trade surplus (deficit) will not have any impact on the economy. 
Marx argues that an increase in gold reserves will lower the rate of interest and 
increase demand in the economy. This is where Ricardo's full employment and constant 
technology assumptions become important again. When there is extra demand in the 
economy and production cannot be increased, then prices must go up. But Marx 
argued that full employment is a vulgar fantasy. When there is unemployment in the 
economy, extra demand can be met by increasing production. In such a case, quantities 
but not the prices adjust to the increased demand.
From this perspective, the English/Portuguese trading scenario would be as 
follows: When trading starts, Portugal exports both commodities to England. Cloth 
and wine production in England shrinks and expands in Portugal. The constant outflow 
of money from England reduces the money supply and increases the interest rate which 
has a further negative effect on production. In Portugal, on the other hand, the
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Iexpanded gold reserves increases demand, and production and decreases the interest 
rate. The excess gold which cannot be absorbed in the circulation of the commodities 
will be hoarded or used to produce luxury articles. In this model, there is no in-built 
mechanism to bring about trade equilibrium. England's absolute disadvantage will 
cause a chronic trade deficit balanced by a persistent outflow of gold, until England 
runs out of gold reserves and the system eventually collapses.
In a follow-up article in 1995, Shaikh developed his arguments further. In this 
article, he argues against the idea that when money is paper money rather than 
commodity money the currency devaluations may transform comparative advantages 
into competitive advantages. Indeed, Shaikh’s above arguments are based on a critique 
of Ricardo’s quantity theory of money. Even if Shaikh is right in his critique, it can be 
argued that in the contemporary world where money is paper money, devaluations may 
lower prices in the deficit country and allow competitiveness based on comparative 
advantage. In the next section, Shaikh’s arguments in both articles will be evaluated.
In defence of Ricardo
Shaikh does not criticise the basic tenets of Ricardo’s theory. Rather he directs his 
criticism at the inflation (deflation) mechanism of Ricardo, through which comparative 
advantages become competitive advantages. The logic of Shaikh’s arguments suggests 
that if one rejects this mechanism, then one has to reject the whole theory. In his view, 
absolute advantage is the rule for trading, not comparative advantage. If a country 
does not have an absolute advantage in any commodity, then that country cannot trade 
since any attempt to trade will destroy its existing domestic sectors.
Shaikh’s argument on Ricardo’s mechanism and the quantity theory of money 
is an important contribution.17 On the other hand, the weakness of Ricardo’s 
mechanism does not invalidate the theory altogether. As will be argued, there is 
another mechanism whereby comparative advantages become competitive ones even if 
Ricardo’s inflation (deflation) mechanism is not valid. Furthermore, when commodity 
money is replaced with paper money, a country may face no difficulty in devaluing its
17 Sau (1982:13) also agrees with Shaikh’s argument on the QTM, but argues that ‘[Shaikh] 
overlooked the totality of Marx’s views on foreign trade, which are far more complex and
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currency until some of the commodities (those that are relatively cheaper) become 
competitive in international markets.
In the following analysis, an alternative mechanism that can work with 
Ricardo’s assumptions will be shown. This mechanism does not need an inflation 
(deflation) price adjustment mechanism in order to work. Naturally, if there is such a 
mechanism, Shaikh’s critique of comparative advantage theory fails. This mechanism, 
however, requires interventionist-protectionist policies to bring about the desirable 
outcomes of trade. In the following example, Ricardo’s original static model is 
employed.
Before free trade, we assume that England has gold reserves. When free trade 
begins, England will import both commodities (wine and cloth) and the domestic 
production of both commodities will decline. Until gold reserves are exhausted, prices 
in England will fall, not because of a reduction in the domestic money supply (an 
overall deflation as Ricardo would anticipate) but because of cheaper imports. On the 
other hand, there is no inflation in Portugal as a result of money inflow because in 
Portugal quantities adjust rather than prices.18 As England cannot export anything, 
sooner or later England's gold reserves are exhausted. When the reserves are 
exhausted, the prices of both commodities will gradually rise towards their pre-trade 
levels, as imports of both commodities are restricted due to gold shortages. Thus, in 
this model, as opposed to the quantity theory of money, the first impact of a fall in 
reserves is not a fall in prices but an increase. When the prices for cloth and wine are 
high enough, the domestic production of both commodities can start in England again 
and the prices will stabilise at the pre-trade level. The only difference is that now 
England has no reserves to import cheaper Portuguese commodities. But as the price 
of wine increases more than the cloth (because the price gap is bigger for wine), it will 
be profitable for a merchant to sell English cloth to Portugal below its domestic price 
and to import cheaper Portuguese wine into England, where it can be sold at a higher 
price and still make profit.
For example, if we go back to our earlier example (see table 2.1), a merchant 
starts with £100, buys 100 units of cloth in England, sells them in Portugal for £89
fundamental. To give a minor example, in Marx’s analytical framework there is an adjustment 
mechanism which in today’s jargon would appear close to the Keynesian foreign trade multiplier’.
18 Here we drop Ricardo's controversial assumption of full employment.
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(charges £0.89 for per unit which is lower than the domestic cloth price in Portugal 
which is £0.9) and makes a loss. With that £89, he buys 111.25 units of wine and sells 
them in England for £133.5 and makes £33.5 profit.
In this scenario, trade would take place even though there is no inflation 
(deflation) mechanism involved. At the end of this process, when the profit 
opportunities for the merchants are exhausted, the prices of both commodities will be 
equalised in both countries. But what if the cloth producers in Portugal decide to fight 
back by reducing their prices? Obviously, to eliminate the competition, they can reduce 
their prices even more since they are more productive. This is not possible, however, in 
the long-run. For the merchants, there is no limit for a price cut for cloth as long as 
they make up the difference from the profit they make when they sell wine in England. 
They make losses because of lower export prices for cloth but they make extra profit 
because of higher wine prices in England. Cloth producers in Portugal can not compete 
with this.
As mentioned earlier and as will be explained later in detail, when specialisation 
takes place, England gains more than Portugal because only a small price undercut for 
Portugal’s cloth producers is required to be competitive. The price fall for wine in 
England, however, is large. Thus, the relative price change in England is larger than 
Portugal and England gains more. This scenario implies that Portugal gains from 
tariffs. As long as the gap in the wine price is still profitable for the merchants, any 
increase in tariffs will force the traders to reduce cloth prices further to be able to 
compete in Portuguese markets and the net revenue from tariffs will be the net gain of 
Portugal. In fact, Portugal can increase tariffs even higher in order to transfer most 
benefits to itself. Thus, as a rule, an intervention in trade rather than a free market 
approach would benefit Portugal most.
On the other hand, for this mechanism to work,19 England's reserves must first 
be completely exhausted. Otherwise, importing commodities into England will be more 
profitable. But if England starts with a substantial amount of gold reserves, until the 
time that all the reserves are exhausted, both sectors in England might be completely 
destroyed. There will be no sectors to compete even if the prices are high enough 
again.
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This scenario indicates the necessity of controlled trade for England. England 
must control the cheaper cloth imports, preferably by import restrictions, and Portugal 
must tax cloth imports, if there is to be some gain for Portugal from this trade.
It is important to note that this model does not require full employment in order 
to work. As long as relative prices are different, traders will find it profitable to exploit 
them and comparative advantages will become competitive advantages. In view of the 
above argument it is reasonable to conclude that there is no case for free trade but 
there is still a case for controlled trade.
The above mechanism also holds in a world economy where money is no 
longer commodity money but there exist national currencies. When free trade starts, 
the domestic prices of both commodities decline in England. The relative price of wine 
in England declines more because England has a comparative disadvantage in wine 
production. When foreign currency reserves decline, the prices of both commodities 
increase back to their pre-trade levels. Now, as the cheaper Portuguese goods cannot 
be imported as a result of foreign currency shortages,20 the demand for and price of 
foreign currency will increase. It is still profitable to sell cloth to Portugal below its 
actual price in order to obtain the currency and buy the wine in Portugal to sell in 
England. Shaikh also objects to such an exchange rate devaluation mechanism. He 
opposes the idea that exchange rate devaluations can induce balanced trade and 
comparative advantages, as exchange rate devaluations cannot alter the price of 
exportable commodities in relation to importables (the terms of trade).
Shaikh’s argument on the impact of exchange rate devaluations on the terms of 
trade (Px/Pm) is, of course, valid. Indeed, as he theoretically proves, real exchange rate 
devaluations would not have any impact on the relative prices of exportables and 
importables. The relevance of this argument on the trade balance or comparative 
advantage theory, however, is less clear. The aim of exchange rate devaluations is to 
change the prices of tradables relative to non-tradables. Indeed, when a currency is 
devalued, the relative prices of exportables and importables would both increase 
compared to home goods. Thus, the impact of devaluation is to encourage production 
of exportables as well as importables and to discourage the domestic consumption of
19 As opposed to Ricardo's mechanism where the inflation (deflation) mechanism starts working
immediately after trade begins.
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both commodities. Obviously, by definition importables refer to commodities that have 
relatively high costs. Devaluations, thus, are designed to make exportable commodities 
internationally competitive first. Hypothetically speaking, however, a country may 
become internationally competitive in all the tradable commodities that it produces by 
competitive devaluations. Whether this will be beneficial to the economy of that 
country is another matter. Once the exportable commodities can profitably be exported 
and trade is balanced, there is no reason to continue with devaluation.
It is obvious that as a result of devaluations a country must export more to be
able to import the same amount of commodities in real terms. This is indeed why 
protectionist and promotionist trade policies could be a better alternative compared to 
exchange rate devaluations. Such devaluations are the second best option to secure
competitiveness, because the cost of not trading would be even bigger.
Let us substantiate these arguments with the following example. For the sake 
of simplicity, in a country (say Portugal), the pre-trade domestic prices of exportables 
(Px), importables (PM) and home goods (PH) are assumed to be the same:21
Px =  P m =: P h
Given this domestic price structure, by definition, the international prices of 
exportables (P Xi) must be higher than importables (P mi)-
Before free trade begins, Portugal has an absolute disadvantage in both tradable goods. 
This means that the domestic prices of tradables, expressed in a common international 
currency (say in the US dollar - given the prevailing exchange rate ER), are higher than 
the international prices.
ER.Px > Pxi <md E R .P m >  P mi
20 In this case, England represents the low-productivity developing country and its currency is not 
internationally accepted.
21 Which implies the same productivity levels.
22 Or more correctly: (Pxi /  P x) >  (Pmi /Pm)-
P xi >  P mi22
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When free trade starts, Portugal either must import both commodities and in that case 
there will be a persistent trade deficit until the exchange rate is devalued,23 or the 
producers of both commodities must reduce their domestic prices (Pxi and Pmi) and 
therefore suffer from profit losses. If the exchange rate stays constant:
E R .P xi — Pxi and E R .P m i = P mi 
where
Pxi < Px and P mi < P m
As the international price of importables is lower than the international price of 
exportables, the price of importables would fall more than exportables:
Pxi >  P mi
This would increase the relative domestic price of home goods compared to tradables: 
P h > Pxi > P mi
If the exchange rate is devalued (ERi) until the price of exportables reaches its pre­
trade level,
ERi-Px = Pxi
The pre-trade price level for importables, however, would be still uncompetitive, 
ER i.Pm  >  Pmi or E R i.Pm 2 = Pmi
23 Note that a fall in the nominal exchange rate (ER) implies a depreciation of the currency.
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Thus, the domestic price of importables (Pm2) would stay lower than the exportables 
and act as a disincentive for the domestic producers.
Ph = Px > Pm2 where Pm > Pm2 > Pmi
As a result of free trade, the producers of importables would become uncompetitive 
and gradually leave the market. It is important to note that, after specialisation takes 
place, the domestic relative prices of home goods and exportables would be the same 
as pre-trade level. The relative price of importables, however, would decline compared 
to both exportables and home goods. This makes sense. A decline in the relative price 
of importables would discourage the domestic production of importables. The relative 
price of exportables and home goods would stay the same, and both would be 
produced domestically.
Theoretically, the exchange rate could be devalued (ER2) until when the 
importables also become competitive. In this case, however, the exchange rate would 
be ‘overvalued’. Producers of exportables would make extra profits (Px would rise to 
Px2)-
E R 2.Px2 = Pxi and E R 2.Pm =  Pmi 
where PX2 > Px > Pxi
The above implies that, as free trade takes place, the relative price of importables 
would change in comparison to exportables and home goods. The relative price of 
exportables to home goods would stay the same. The first impact of free trade is to 
change the relative price of tradables or the terms of trade. This is because the 
international relative prices of tradables determine the domestic relative prices. Once 
specialisation takes place, however, the terms of trade are fixed and devaluations 
cannot change them. Devaluations can only change the prices of tradables relative to 
home goods.
For example, suppose there is inflation in the economy which increases 
domestic prices. As the international prices of tradables are fixed and externally 
determined for the producers, the relative price of home goods will increase against
51
tradables. The profitability for exportables will decline and exporters will become 
uncompetitive in international markets. This ‘overvaluation’ of the exchange rate is 
good for imports as the relative price of imports is now lower. The same is not true for 
exporters. The lower prices of tradables, although they increase imports by 
encouraging people to consume more importable goods, they also decrease exports by 
discouraging the producers of exportable goods. The result is an increasing trade 
deficit. A devaluation becomes necessary to change the prices of tradables relative to 
home goods. Once the currency is devalued, the relative price of tradables would 
increase and the external balance would be restored. The devaluation would increase 
the relative prices of both tradable goods and by doing so would decrease the demand 
for importables and encourage the production of exportables. A devaluation influences 
importables in two ways. First, it decreases the consumption of importables by 
increasing their relative prices and secondly, if sufficient, it encourages the domestic 
production of importables. In other words, devaluation has two functions: it promotes 
exports and substitutes imports. These arguments, of course, go against the 
conventional views on import-substitution and export-promotion, which will be 
discussed further in chapter four.
So far it has been argued that, given the simplicity of the model, there is 
nothing wrong with Ricardo’s model. Indeed, the exchange rate mechanism works well 
to bring about competitive advantages based on comparative advantages. What is 
wrong, then, with relying on exchange rate devaluations as competitive tools? To 
demonstrate this one needs to go beyond the simple assumptions of the theory. The 
criticisms of comparative advantage theory will be covered at the end of this chapter 
and in the following chapters. Here, the problem of relying on the exchange rate 
mechanism for competitiveness will be briefly dealt with. Indeed, exchange rate 
devaluation is not the magical solution to trade imbalances. First of all, as Shaikh 
mentions, there is the elasticity problem. If the price elasticity of exports is low and the 
price elasticity of imports is high, the devaluation can only worsen the situation. In this 
case an appreciation of the exchange rate might be necessary. One related problem is 
the fallacies of composition argument. If the overall demand elasticity of an exportable 
item is low, as in the case of agricultural and primary commodities, competitive 
devaluations among producer countries will only make the situation worse. Third, even 
though the benefits of having a ‘realistic exchange rate’ is not a matter of debate,
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relying only on exchange rate devaluation is wrong. There might be many cases in 
which devaluations cannot help. For example, when there is a demand shock for 
exportable commodities, relying only on exchange rate devaluation can make matters 
worse. Fourth, devaluations make importable commodities more expensive. As many 
developing countries depend on the importation of capital goods, this may limit their 
development. Controls on imports might be a better alternative to devaluations. Fifth, 
as will be discussed in chapter four in more detail, exchange rate devaluations are non- 
discriminatory and lead countries to specialise in commodities for which they have a 
comparative advantage and that may not serve well their long-run development. What 
countries need to do is to promote specific industries by reallocating some of the 
surplus from the competitive sectors. Thus, industrial policy, as well as a realistic 
exchange rate, are necessary to change the current cost structure.
2.6.2. Internal consistency of the theory: Carchedi’s critique
Carchedi, a prominent Marxist writer, heavily criticises Ricardo’s theory. Fie argues 
that Ricardo’s theory ‘is a non-starter’ because it has logical flaws and because 
Ricardo compares ‘uncomparables’. According to him:
Ricardo’s mistake resides in comparing productivities between branches. 
Portugal, it is said, is more productive in wine than in clothing. This is why it 
specialises in wine production. The opposite holds for England. But 
productivity differences can be compared only within branches. In this case 
they do reflect profitability differentials. Such a comparison is meaningless 
between branches. It is the comparison of the productivity of wine producers 
both in England and in Portugal which can be taken as an indication of 
profitability differentials (and thus of specialisation), not the comparison 
between the relative productivity of wine and that of clothing in Portugal. 
(Carchedi, 1991: 220)
And thus,
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[t]here is no reason to assume that wine production is more efficient and thus 
more profitable than cloth production because it takes 80 hours to produce one 
gallon of wine and 90 hours to produce one yard of clothing. There is thus no 
reason to assume that capital in Portugal will move out of cloth and into wine 
production. It is therefore meaningless to hold that Portugal specialises in wine 
because Portuguese wine producers are ‘more efficient’ than Portuguese cloth 
producers. (Carchedi, 1986: 436)
Finally,
[t]he fact that, in terms of labour, in Portugal the production of wine costs less 
than the production of clothing while the production of clothing costs more 
than the production of wine is a matter of indifference to the capitalists who 
reason in terms of profitability. Capitalists move to different branches not to 
save social labour but to increase their profitability. Since there is no reason to 
assume that, when different branches are compared, labour-saving techniques 
beget higher profitability, there is no reason either to assume that Portuguese 
cloth producers will become wine producers. A similar point can be made for 
the English producers. (Carchedi, 1991: 220)
Carchedi’s criticism is hard to grasp and seems to be based on a simple 
misunderstanding of Ricardo’s theory. Ricardo did not compare uncomparables such 
as apples and pears but compared comparables like price differentials for apples and 
pears in different countries. Ricardo did not argue that Portugal specialises in wine 
because Portuguese wine producers are more efficient than Portuguese cloth 
producers. He argued that Portugal specialises in wine because Portuguese wine 
producers are ‘relatively’ more efficient than Portuguese cloth producers. According to 
his argument, Portugal is more productive in both commodities but it is also relatively 
more productive in wine production. Carchedi admits that the principle of comparative 
advantage leads to saving universal labour time, but he argues that this will not lead to 
specialisation because capitalists are only concerned with their profits and not with 
saving labour time. This argument is also obscure. It is obvious that capitalists only 
care about profit and are not concerned with saving labour time to produce
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commodities but nobody argues otherwise. The point is that the free trade mechanism 
makes it unprofitable for Portuguese cloth producers to stay in business since English 
cloth producers become more competitive through the mechanisms of the theory. The 
opposite is true for English wine producers.
2.6.3. The assumptions
As mentioned earlier, the assumptions of the theory have attracted most of the 
criticism. Hudson (1992) has summarised these assumptions and criticised them in 
detail. This section will not seek to explain all the debates surrounding the assumptions 
of the theory but it will highlight some of the problems of these criticisms. It will be 
argued that most critiques (although valid) do not nullify the theory. The theory indeed 
runs into difficulties as a result of its extreme assumptions. Nevertheless, the basic 
arguments of the theory, which aim to justify trade based on comparative cost, survive 
even when the assumptions are relaxed.
One important assumption in the model is constant returns to scale. As a 
simplifying assumption, constant returns to scale is helpful but it obviously distorts 
reality. In real life constant returns to scale are not often observed. To drop this 
assumption, however, in no way invalidates the theory. Neither increasing nor 
diminishing returns to scale would fundamentally alter Ricardo’s arguments.
Partial specialisation is the rule when there are diminishing returns to scale. 
Increasing returns to scale would in fact strengthen the case for trade. As the new 
growth theories argue, the total gain from specialisation would be even bigger. 
Increasing returns to scale, however, would violate the assumption of perfectly 
competitive markets and require short-term protectionist policies due to the fact that 
short- and long-term comparative advantages might be different. The modification 
attempts of the theory under monopolistic markets is extensive and will not be 
summarised here. The dynamic version of comparative advantage theory, which is 
based on long-term comparative cost, is nowadays very popular and will be evaluated 
in chapter four.
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However, Hudson’s argument that ‘increasing returns have steadily widened 
the cost advantages enjoyed by industrial lead-nations vis-a-vis less developed 
countries’24 is not particularly accurate. Hudson argues that
[ajgriculture and other primary production in the nineteenth century were 
characterised by moderately increasing returns while industrial productivity 
increased by leaps and bounds. [Thus] even if agricultural productivity did not 
increase, England’s production-possibility curve in the Ricardian example 
would rise in cloth-making. But Portugal, which chose to specialise in wine or 
other agricultural commodities under the dictates of free trade, would suffer an 
opportunity cost for not having industrialised. (Hudson, 1992: 123)
The fact that productivity increases more in the industrial sector than in agriculture is 
not a matter of concern for the Ricardian model. In fact the theory implies that the 
terms of trade would improve for primary and agricultural commodity producers as a 
result of the different levels of productivity increase. The prices of industrial products 
would diminish as a result of high productivity increase whereas the relative prices of 
agricultural goods would increase. The prices of non-renewable resources would also 
increase as the supply of such commodities is limited by nature and their demand 
increases with economic development. As Hudson notes, it is particularly ironic that 
when Ricardo analysed trade, he neglected diminishing returns on land which was the 
backbone of the theory he used to argue against the Com Laws. As was shown earlier 
in this chapter, however, from the logic of his theory, diminishing returns on land 
would not act against the agricultural sector because Ricardo argued that an increasing 
share of total value-added would accrue to landlords. This would reduce the share of 
profits of the industrial sector as agricultural production moved onto less productive 
lands. Thus, if anything, specialisation in agriculture would only be more beneficial.
Hudson’s above argument implies that if productivity had increased faster in 
the agricultural sector than in the industrial sector, agricultural producers would have 
been in a better position. This is not so. In fact if productivity increase in agriculture
24 Hudson (1992:122).
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had been faster, this would have reduced the relative demand for these commodities 
even faster and the producers would have been in even greater difficulty.
As will be argued later in this chapter, the real problem with specialising in 
agricultural products is not that productivity increases slower than in the industrial 
sector but rather that the agriculture in general is a low skill, low value-added activity 
and there is a limited and relatively diminishing market demand for the agricultural 
commodities.
Another important assumption of the theory is that each country can produce 
the entire range of traded commodities. In Ricardo’s example, for instance, England 
and Portugal can both produce wine and cloth. This is obviously an unrealistic 
assumption. Thus, Hudson argues that if in Ricardo’s example England and Portugal 
can only produce one of the commodities, comparative advantage theory becomes 
obscure since ‘[n]o comparative-cost lines could be constructed if England could not 
produce wine, and Portugal could not produce cloth.’25 It may also be the case that 
England could only produce cloth whilst Portugal could produce both commodities.
This argument against Ricardo’s theory, however, is irrelevant. In the first case 
both countries have absolute advantage in a particular commodity and there is a case 
for free trade. The relative cost of producing an unproducable commodity in both 
countries could be seen as infinitely high. In the second case, England has a 
comparative advantage in cloth production as the relative cost of producing wine is 
infinite.
Another often-criticised assumption of the theory is related to the idea that only 
consumption goods are traded. The theory excludes trade in common factor inputs. 
Thus, Hudson argues that this theory only applies to
trade in consumption goods not to trade in production goods or raw materials. 
Ricardo’s reasoning would be undercut by trade in capital goods, raw materials 
or any other production inputs capable either of altering international 
endowments and productivity. [...] For instance, exporting capital goods would 
violate his assumption of fixed factor productivity among nations (after all, the
25 Ibid.
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purpose of importing machinery is to improve production functions). (Hudson,
1992: 126)
This is an important critique of factor endowment comparative advantage theory. As 
will be discussed in the next chapter, factor endowment theory predicts specialisation 
based on factor endowments. If factors of production are internationally mobile, there 
can be no specialisation based on factor endowments. This critique, however, also does 
not shake the fundamental logic of Ricardo’s theory. Indeed, the post-trade relative 
cost structure in both countries might be rather different from the pre-trade relative 
cost structure. As a result of the importation of capital goods, for example, England 
may become relatively more productive in wine and Portugal in cloth. In this case, 
England would specialise in wine production even though its pre-trade comparative 
advantage was in cloth. The reverse is true for Portugal. As long as relative costs are 
different, there is a case for specialisation and trade based on comparative costs.
The most criticised assumption of the theory is that of the full employment of 
all resources (labour and capital). There are two reasons for this criticism. First, 
comparative advantage theory is based on the concept of opportunity cost. 
Opportunity cost can be defined as the opportunities foregone in undertaking one 
activity measured in terms of the other possibilities that might have been pursued using 
the same expenditure of resources. Opportunity cost is based on the assumption of full 
employment of all resources. For example, the opportunity cost of producing wine for 
England (Portugal) is cloth (wine) production that has been foregone and which could 
be more beneficial. If all resources were not fully employed, however, the opportunity 
cost would be zero as idle resources could be employed in the production of both 
commodities. That is why, it could be argued, the emphasis should be on how to 
employ these idle resources rather than on efficiency considerations.
Secondly, the full employment assumption guarantees that there is no 
employment loss as a result of free trade and specialisation. Labour and capital are 
assumed to be fully mobile between the sectors and can be shifted from one sector to 
the other without causing unemployment. It is obviously unrealistic to assume that the 
wine (cloth) producers in England (Portugal) would move from rural (urban) areas to 
urban (rural) areas, change their lifestyle and learn the necessary skills to produce cloth 
(wine). Neither is it realistic to assume that capital is homogenous and can be
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transferred from the production of wine (cloth) to the production of cloth (wine). 
Structural inflexibilities may cause long-term unemployment of factors and may 
eliminate the benefits of trade.
These critiques are indeed important and damage the free trade idea based on 
comparative advantage theory. They do not, however, completely invalidate the basic 
arguments of the theory. First, even though policies to employ unemployed resources 
might be more important than a gain from static-efficiency through specialisation, there 
still exists a static opportunity cost when the resources are employed in producing the 
commodities of which a country has a comparative disadvantage. In the case of 
England (Portugal) for example, resources would bring higher returns if they were 
employed in cloth (wine), production than wine (cloth) production. Thus, when less 
than full employment is assumed, the static-efficiency argument is weakened but not 
completely refuted.
The immobility of the resources is also a valid critique of the free market 
arguments but not of specialisation based on comparative advantage. It may indeed be 
very difficult to shift resources from the production of one commodity to another. 
However, this transition from more diversified to more specialised production might be 
a gradual process rather than a rapid one. A country may direct new resources into the 
production of commodities for which it has a comparative advantage. Thus, even 
though England (Portugal) cannot remove resources from wine (cloth) production 
immediately to cloth (wine) production, the production of wine (cloth) could gradually 
be discouraged and the production of cloth (wine) could be encouraged. The 
government of England (Portugal), for example, could initially protect the wine (cloth) 
producers from foreign competition but then gradually reduce this protection to 
discourage wine (cloth) production. Thus, it can direct new resources into the 
production of cloth (wine) rather than wine (cloth).
2.6.4. How are the benefits distributed?
In Ricardo’s theory, there is a less obvious but very important problem regarding how 
the extra ‘sum of enjoyments’ that are created as a result of trade, are distributed 
between countries. In the model, it is simply assumed that both countries benefit from 
the specialisation in specific commodities as total production increases. As long as both
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countries benefit, they will be willing to participate in international trade. Their 
willingness, however, will be very much related to how much they gain from trading. If 
all or most of the benefits from trade are captured only by one country, the other may 
not be willing to participate in trade.
The uneven distribution of the benefits of trade can be as a result of several 
factors. First, the benefits of trade are determined by the extent of the change in the 
relative prices of tradable commodities. If the relative price of tradables are the same 
after trade, no gain is attained as a result of trade. As will be shown, the theory implies 
that trade will mostly benefit a relatively unproductive country. Second, the production 
patterns after trade as a result of specialisation may not match the consumption pattern 
and may cause under or over-production.
Distribution of gains
To demonstrate clearly the arguments above, figure 2.1 is reorganised in an Edgeworth 
box.
Figure 2.2: Gains from trade (reorganised in an Edgeworth box)
180 70 60 40 30 UK
120
SZ
■4—<o
O
UK
US
90 110 18060US
Wheat
In figure 2.2, both countries are plotted into the same figure. The area between the two 
solid lines represents the possible gains from specialisation and trade. The broken line 
in the middle represents the relative prices of both commodities in both countries after
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trade. As trade takes place, both countries face the same prices for both commodities 
and move onto this line. The gain from trade for each country depends on where this 
broken line is placed between the solid lines, as it is determined by the changes in the 
relative prices of the tradable commodities. The larger the relative price change, the 
bigger the benefit will be. For example, the UK would benefit more if the broken line 
was closer to the US’s pre-trade relative price line. The same is true for the US. In the 
figure, point ‘E ’ represents a gain for both countries as they increase the consumption 
of both commodities. Obviously, the broken line could be anywhere between the solid 
lines and there are no clear-cut rules to predict where it will be. The determinant factor 
for the location of the broken line is the policy mix of the two countries.
It is possible that the broken line may be placed on any of the solid lines 
indicating that one country does not benefit from trade due to a lack of change in 
relative prices after trade. It is also possible that the broken line may lay not between 
the solid lines, indicating that one country will lose as a result of trade.
As mentioned before, the logic of the theory suggests that in the absence of any 
intervention the UK, as the less productive country, would obtain most of the benefits 
of trade. The broken line would be very close to (or on) the US’s pre-trade solid line. 
Thus the US would not benefit much from trade. The reason for this is as follows.
From the above example it is obvious that a marginal price reduction26 would 
be enough to make the UK’s cloth competitive as the pre-trade price is same in both 
countries. This can be demonstrated in table 2.3.27
Initially the price of cloth is the same in both countries and wheat is cheaper in 
the US. When the UK devalues its currency, cloth producers in the UK become more 
competitive and the UK specialises in cloth production. When specialisation occurs, 
the UK only produces cloth and the US produces only wheat. As a result of free trade, 
the prices of the commodities will converge and a single international price will be 
formed. The international price of wheat will be the same as the US’s pre-trade price 
and the international price of cloth will be marginally less than the pre-trade price in 
both countries. As the table shows, the relative price fall of wheat in the UK28 is much
26 From 0.83 to 0.82 which could be achieved by an exchange rate devaluation.
27 The first part (pre-trade price level) of table 4 is the same as in table 2.
28 From 2.00 to 0.67.
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greater than the relative price fall of cloth in the US.29 As a result, the broken line in 
figure 2.2 will move very close to the solid line of the US. Thus, if we ignore the 
marginal price change, the US will not benefit from trade. The UK will be the only 
beneficiary.
Table 2.3: Comparative advantage and the gains from trade
Price Price
(Before Trade) (After 1Tade)
US UK US UK
Wheat 0.55 1.66 0.55 0.55
Cloth 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82
Wheat to cloth ratio 0.66 2.00 0.67 0.67
The above argument suggests that the benefits of trade for the US are determined by 
the extent of the price reduction which is required to make the UK’s cloth competitive. 
If a marginal fall is enough, the US will not benefit much from trade. In such 
circumstances, one option open to the US is to put a tax on its imports to force the UK 
to reduce its cloth price further. In fact by using import taxes, the US may force the 
UK to reduce its prices to the limit where the UK only marginally benefits from this 
trade. In this case the broken line in the figure would be very close to the UK’s solid 
line. Of course, the UK may retaliate and also put an import tax on wheat.
In this model free trade is more beneficial to a country that has an absolute 
disadvantage. The other country, therefore, has every incentive to use import taxes to 
increase its share from this trade. Here, import taxes are not adopted to protect 
domestic producers but to transfer the benefits of trade. The significance of the above 
arguments is that international trade is never a smooth process based on mutual 
benefits but is essentially an unstable process exhibiting fundamental conflicts between 
countries.
29 The wheat/cloth ratio increases from 0.66 to 0.67.
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Demand side
The composition of demand after trade is another problem that Ricardo’s model 
ignores. Before trade, the production composition of the commodities is determined by 
the demand composition. In other words, the demand for cloth and wheat determines 
how much cloth and wheat will be produced in each county.30 Therefore, there can be 
no long-term over (under) supply of the commodities. When free trade begins, 
however, the production composition will be different from the demand composition 
and this may cause demand and supply imbalances. For example, in figure 2.2, if pre­
trade demand and the production composition are on point F for the US and F ’ for the 
UK, the total cloth demanded in both countries31 would be higher than the UK’s 
production capacity32 and the total demand for wheat would be below the US’s 
production capacity.33 If there is complete specialisation, the total demand for cloth 
will exceed total production and the price of cloth will increase which will benefit the 
UK. The reverse would be true for the US.
The broken line may shift beyond the US’s solid line and the US may lose as a 
result of specialisation and trade. Obviously, there may not be complete specialisation. 
Since the price of cloth is high, the US may also produce cloth. In this case, however, 
the US will produce both commodities, and as the relative prices of the commodities 
will be determined by domestic production costs, the relative prices of the commodities 
will be the same and the US will not benefit from trade. When the US produces both 
commodities, there is no gain and no case for trade for the US. Moreover, as the 
relative demand for agricultural commodities such as wheat declines, the producers of 
such commodities will find themselves under increasing pressure to withdraw from 
international trade. This is what many developing countries are facing today.
A more realistic model (i.e., more than two countries) would also not solve this 
problem. When the demand for cloth is higher than the supply, some countries will 
shift their production from wine to cloth.
30 In our example 90 units wheat and 60 units cloth in the US, and 40 units wheat and 40 units cloth 
in the UK. Total 130 units of wheat and 100 units of cloth in both countries.
31 Total 140 units. Eighty units in the US and 60 units in the UK.
32 Which is only 120 units.
33 Total demand for wheat is 90 units for both countries. Sixty units for the US and 30 units for the 
UK. The productive capacity of the US is 180 units.
63
Figure 2.3: Gains from trade with more than two countries
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In figure 2.3, there are four countries with different production possibility frontiers. 
County A is the most productive cloth producer and country D is the most productive 
wheat producer. Country B is the second most productive cloth producer and country 
C is the second most productive wheat producer. Country A will produce cloth and 
country D will produce wheat. Countries B and C will either produce wheat or cloth. 
According to the demand conditions either B or C will produce both commodities. 
When the demand for wheat is W1 and the demand for cloth is C l, countries C and D 
will produce wheat, A will produce cloth and B will produce both wheat and cloth. But 
when the demand for cloth increases to C2, country C will produce both commodities, 
whereas country B will produce only cloth.
When demand shifts from wheat to cloth, the price of cloth is expected to be 
higher as now there is a less efficient producer (average productivity falls as less 
efficient cloth producer C comes into the market) and the price must be high enough to 
keep it in the market. On the other hand, if the less efficient wheat producer (country 
B) does not produce wheat any more, overall productivity will increase and the price 
of wheat will fall.
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When there are three countries with different levels of productivity producing 
cloth, the most productive one (country A) will benefit the most from trade. On the 
other hand, country C which produces both commodities does not gain anything from 
trade because the relative prices of both commodities are the same as the pre-trade 
prices. In this case, for country C there is no case for trade. Country C, consequently, 
may decide to withdraw from international trade. If this is the case, however, country 
B will be the producer of both commodities and there will be no incentive for it to stay 
in international markets. Consequently, this process leads to the breakdown of trade.
To reiterate, when constant or increasing returns to scale are assumed, 
complete specialisation is necessary. Partial specialisation would not bring any benefits 
to a country. When there is complete specialisation, however, mismatches between 
demand and supply in international markets are quite possible. This mismatches and 
possible changes in the demand conditions may harm some countries.
2.6.5. Further critiques
So far in this chapter it has been argued that, in its simplest static form, Ricardo’s 
theory of comparative advantage holds out against the criticisms. When the extreme 
assumptions are modified, the implications of the theory change to a certain extent. As 
a justification for international trade, however, the theory remains intact. There are, 
however, two fundamental problems with the theory. The first one is its static nature 
and the second is its simplistic interpretation of labour theory of value.
A good critique of comparative advantage theory should focus on its static 
nature. Ricardo’s theory is based on a short-term static-efficiency gains through 
specialisation and ‘implies that nations should live permanently in the short-run rather 
than maximising their productive power over time. This reasoning leaves open to 
protectionists the reply that the theory of comparative cost does not help build a better 
bridge to the future but leaves less developed countries stranded in a chronic low- 
productivity present.’34 When there is free trade, developing countries may indeed 
specialise in commodities for which they have comparative advantage as the theory
34 Hudson (1992: 116).
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predicts. This is precisely why they should avoid adopting free trade policies which 
may not be to their advantage in the long-run.
The problem of the static nature of the theory is well recognised in the 
literature. The recent ‘dynamic’ versions of comparative advantage also do not 
overcome the shortcomings of the theory. As will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter four, dynamic comparative advantage is a misleading concept since 
comparative advantage is by its nature a static concept. If today’s decisions create 
future competitiveness, comparative advantage becomes an empty concept.
The second problem with the theory is related to its simplistic treatment of 
labour value theory. The theory, at the highest level of abstraction, assumes that 
commodities are exchanged according to their values.35 In turn, the value of a 
commodity is determined by the necessary labour time employed to produce it. For 
example, if it takes two hours to produce one unit of wine and it takes one hour to 
produce one unit of cloth, then one unit of wine will be exchanged for two units of 
cloth. This is, however, an abstraction as two different types of labour power are 
considered as one for simplification purposes. It is simply assumed that one labour 
hour creates an equal amount of value in wine and in cloth production. In reality, 
however, this is not true as the different types of labour power have different 
characteristics. Marx recognises this and explains it in terms of ‘complex’ and ‘simple’ 
labour.36 According to Marx, ‘[m]ore complex labour counts only as intensified, or 
rather multiplied simple labour, so that a smaller quantity of complex labour is 
considered equal to a larger quantity of simple labour.’37 For example, the value 
created by spending one labour hour in computer engineering is not equal to the value 
created by spending one hour in shoe-polishing. In reality there are high skill, high 
technology and high value-added jobs as well as low skill, low-technology and low 
value-added jobs. Some jobs bring higher income than others, not because there is an 
unequal exchange between them, but simply because some types of labour power 
create higher value than others.
35 This is obviously a simplification. Commodities are not exchanged for their exact values and their 
market prices will be modified by different capital-labour ratios, scarcities, skills, monopolies, and 
tastes. (Fine 1975: 22)
36 Or ‘skilled labour power’ and ‘unskilled labour power’.
37 Marx (1990: 135).
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From this point of view, it is possible to argue that specialisation will not 
benefit some countries and will not benefit some individuals. In societies, a division of 
labour is inevitable and it increases productivity by saving labour time. It is, however, 
not true that everybody benefits equally from this specialisation. It is probably better to 
be the worst off doctor in business than the best earning shoe-polisher. From an 
individual’s point of view, it is disadvantageous to specialise in shoe-polishing. In 
society, some members might be forced to specialise in certain professions. This is not 
necessarily true for countries. As a result of the division of labour, an individual may 
have no other option but to be a shoe-polisher. For a country, however, if it was 
possible to specialise in shoe-polishing would imply being poor forever.
This is not exploitation through exchange (or unequal exchange) but simply 
wrong specialisation. It is beneficial for individuals as well as countries to try to 
specialise in commodities that bring long-term benefits. Thus, there is a fundamental 
conflict in international markets which is similar to the conflict in society. Not all 
participants in international trade will benefit equally from specialisation in the same 
way as not everyone will benefit equally from specialising on low value-added jobs. It 
is the nature of jobs and commodities which determines how one will benefit from 
specialisation.
In reality, there are various reasons why income from different occupations 
may vary. The class structure and technological changes can be considered as the two 
most important reasons. The class struggle over the economic surplus is the basic 
focus of Marxist theory. On the other hand, new technologies may also create income 
inequality in the society by skilling and de-skilling the labour force. Increasing 
computerisation, for example, creates, on the one hand, highly skilled and well-paid 
professionals, such as computer programmers, and on the other hand, it de-skills some 
professions such as the cashiers at the checkout who are poorly paid.
The above argument implies that it is simply wrong to specialise in low-skill, 
low-techno logy and low-income commodities. It is also wrong to specialise in 
commodities for which there is no future demand. Individuals as well as the countries 
which specialise in commodities that are not and will not be demanded will suffer as a 
result of this specialisation. Consequently, what matters is not specialisation itself but 
the commodities in which individuals and countries specialise.
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2.7. CONCLUSION
This chapter argues that in its simplest static form Ricardo’s comparative advantage 
theory is fundamentally correct. Most of the criticisms that focus on the assumptions 
and the mechanism of the theory, make valid arguments and contribute to the debate 
considerably. They are unable, however, to invalidate the theory totally. Ricardo’s 
comparative advantage theory rightly pointed out that a country can trade and benefit 
from trade even if it does not have an absolute advantage in any of the tradable 
commodities in terms of the necessary labour time employed to produce them. The 
question is not whether under free trade countries specialise in commodities for which 
they have a comparative advantage but rather whether they will benefit from this 
specialisation in the long-term. The static gains in the short-term might completely be 
eliminated by specialisation in the wrong commodities in the long-run. Moreover, 
static-efficiency gains can be negligible when the dynamic nature of development is 
taken into account.
In its static form, when all the parameters are fixed and assumed to be constant, 
specialisation according to Ricardo’s model makes sense. It is also true that developing 
countries indeed gain more from trade in Ricardo’s static approach. Trade is a good 
option compared to complete autarchy. Exporting primary commodities in order to 
import manufactured commodities might not be the most desirable situation but in the 
absence of domestic capacity to produce manufactured commodities, not to trade is an 
even worse option. The consequences of not trading are severe as developing countries 
are dependent on imports for domestic production. If all international trade stopped 
suddenly, developing countries would probably suffer more than developed countries.
This, however, means neither that free trade will benefit all countries equally 
nor that developing countries should accept the rules of comparative advantage and 
specialise in primary commodities. The theory is wrong in asserting that trade 
liberalisation and the free market are the best mechanisms for trade and that all 
participants gain from free trade. If we assume that developing countries are unable to 
produce certain commodities, trade will benefit them more. If trade and specialisation 
prevents developing countries from industrialising, however, trade is a bad option for 
developing countries.
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The real difficulty with the theory is that it is static, it ignores the distribution of 
the static benefits of trade, and it is based on a rather simplistic interpretation of labour 
value theory. The static nature of the theory completely nullifies the basic arguments of 
the theory and the attempts to remove its static nature are bound to be unsuccessful. 
The theory of comparative advantage is essentially a static theory. The theory also 
ignores the possible distributional conflicts between countries regarding the static gains 
from trade. It wrongly assumes that all countries benefit equally from trade and that 
there is no conflict between them. When this assumption is dropped, however, there is 
room for a more realistic case where countries struggle with each other to maximise 
their own benefits. And finally, the theory interprets labour value theory in a simplistic 
way and assumes that all participants benefit from the division of labour. This 
assumption is wrong not only for specialisation at the international level but also 
specialisation at the national level.
Thus it can be concluded that comparative advantage theory is a very 
misleading theory and that specialisation based on comparative advantage may 
seriously damage the development process of a country. What developing countries 
need is to develop competitiveness in certain commodities that bring long-term benefits 
by employing industrial policies, including protectionist trade policies.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE HECKSCHER-OHLIN MODEL
3.1. INTRODUCTION
For Ricardo, mutually beneficial trade between two countries was possible because of 
the differences in pre-trade relative commodity prices which resulted from differences 
in labour productivity. The neoclassical critiques of Ricardo, however, argued that he 
not only failed to explain the reasons for different productivity levels in different 
countries, but also he wrongly assumed that labour was the only factor of production. 
Factor endowment theory seeks to explain not only the reasons for or causes of the 
differences in relative commodity prices by factor endowments of the countries but 
also the effect of international trade on those factors of production. For some, the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory1 is the greatest contribution to international trade theory as it 
explains comparative advantage rather than assumes it.2 The theory was later 
‘improved’ by Paul Samuelson3 who argued that not only would free trade based on 
factor endowments benefit two trading countries through increased production and 
consumption, but also it would equalize the factor prices.
In this chapter it will be argued that, far from being a step forward, Heckscher- 
Ohlin theory marks a leap backwards in international trade theory. Even though 
Ricardo failed to produce a consistent mechanism to show how trade between two 
countries is actualised and how the alleged benefits of trade are distributed, he 
persuasively pointed out the possibility for trade between two countries even if one of 
them produces both commodities cheaper than the other. Thus, the accuracy of his
1 In 1919 a Swedish economist, Eli Heckscher, published an article entitled, The Effect o f Foreign 
Trade on the Distribution o f Income. The article was hardly noticed until another Swedish economist, 
Bertil Ohlin, a former student of Heckscher, published his famous book Interregional and 
International Trade in 1933 which brought him a shared Nobel Prize in 1977. Since Ohlin’s 
arguments were based on Heckscher’s article, the theory i s  called Heckscher-Ohlin theory.
2 Salvatore (1995: 120).
3 He won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1976.
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perception deserves some credit. Moreover, the supposed contribution of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory in explaining trade patterns between capital-scarce (low- 
income) and capital-abundant (high-income) countries is flawed since, as will be 
argued, the Ricardian model would also predict the same pattern of specialisation.
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory is a direct application and natural extension of 
neoclassical analysis to international economics and suffers from all of its well-known 
deficiencies. The inability to grasp the basic tenets of the labour value theory led 
neoclassical theorists to deny Ricardo’s theory4 and replace it with a general 
equilibrium model. The production of the theory was largely driven by an ideological 
imperative: their dislike of the labour theory of value.5 Their urge to distance 
themselves from Ricardo’s theory was so great that Ohlin even refused to use the 
phrase ‘comparative advantage’.6
While criticising the classical labour value theory, Ohlin reminds us that to 
analyse the complex reality ‘[s]implifications are often appropriate and necessary. But 
they ought to be of such a nature that they can be dropped successively as we 
approach ever closer to reality.’7 The assumptions of a theory must also be justified 
before they are introduced. They must simplify the reality but not distort it. 
Unfortunately, Ohlin fails to justify his most central assumptions, particularly those 
related to the nature of capital. Heckscher and Ohlin seem to make assumptions to 
guarantee desirable outcomes, rather than for analytical or simplification purposes, 
which cannot be justified. In this chapter, the implicit and explicit assumptions of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowment theory will be challenged by emphasising its 
treatment of capital and labour.
4 A typical critique of the labour value theory is that it supposedly assumes only one factor of 
production whereas the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem ‘admits the relevance of more than one factor’ 
(Mookerjee, 1958: 7). The absurdity of this accusation requires no clarification for someone who is 
familiar with the theory at an intermediate level.
5 ‘Much of the driving force behind the critique of Ricardo and the development of neoclassical 
thought was an attempt to head off the radical interpretations of Ricardian theory by socialists, 
particularly Marx and the Marxist tradition. (Bliss, 1975, ch. 5)’ in Evans (1989: 78).
6 Gomes (1990: 114).
7 Ohlin (1991: 202).
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3.2. THE HECKSCHER-OHLIN COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE THEORY
3.2.1. The theory
Like the Ricardian model, the Heckscher-Ohlin model is also based on a number of 
very controversial assumptions:
1. Commodities are freely mobile internationally.
2. All countries use the same technology in production.
3. Factors of production are mobile domestically but immobile internationally.
4. Tastes are the same in all countries.
5. There are no scale economies.
6. There is perfect competition in all markets.
7. There are no transportation costs.
8. All resources are fully employed.
9. Countries have different factor endowments and thus factor prices. Factors of 
production are fixed and cannot be altered.
Given these assumptions, the theory asserts that ‘a nation will export the commodity 
whose production requires the intensive use of the nation’s relative abundant and 
cheap factor and import the commodity whose production requires the intensive use of 
the nation’s relatively scarce and expensive factor.’8 This means that the relatively 
‘labour-rich’ nations will export the relatively labour-intensive commodities, since the 
wage rates are relatively lower, thus labour-intensive commodities can be produced 
cheaper. Similarly they will import the relatively capital-intensive commodities, since 
capital is relatively more expensive and production of capital-intensive commodities 
will be more costly. As the theory is based on different relative factor prices, the 
reasons why different countries have different factor prices become the core issue in 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory.
The theory simply asserts that under special assumptions, the relative prices of 
these two special commodities (capital and labour) are determined by their relative
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supplies. But what determines their relative supplies then? The answer lies in the 
concept of endowment. Since all countries, the theory argues, are endowed with 
different quantities of factors of production (such as natural resources, land etc.) and 
since these endowments are naturally determined, countries will employ the best 
combination of these factors to produce commodities in the most efficient way. If we 
focus on the most important factors, namely labour and capital, it is obvious that 
different countries have different capital and labour endowments. Some countries are 
endowed with more machinery (capital) than others. To determine if a country is 
capital or labour endowed (or abundant) we need to look at their comparative 
availability, namely capital-labour ratios. If one country has a higher capital-labour 
ratio compared to another, that country is endowed with capital, in other words it is 
capital-abundant.
This last point, however, requires further clarification since the capital-labour 
ratio can be defined in two different ways: in physical and in value terms. The ratio in 
terms of physical units considers only the supply of factors (availability of capital and 
labour) whereas the same ratio in terms of value considers their prices, that is, demand 
conditions as well as supply conditions. Since the demand for capital and labour is 
assumed to be derived demand, namely determined by the demand for the final 
commodities that require their use, the price of a factor of production might be 
relatively high even though its supply is relatively abundant if the demand for the 
commodity that uses that factor of production more intensively is relatively high. In 
other words, if the demand for a labour (capital) intensive commodity is high, the price 
of labour (capital) might be high even if it is the abundant factor of production. In this 
case a country could be considered labour-abundant in terms of the physical definition 
of capital and capital-abundant in terms of the value definition of capital. To solve this 
difficulty, tastes and demand preferences are assumed to be the same in both countries 
so that the physical and value definitions of capital indicate the same level of 
abundance.
8 Salvatore (1995: 118).
73
3.2.2. Factor-price equalisation
Samuelson argued that if the Heckscher-Ohlin theory was true, then when international 
trade, based on the factor endowment, takes place, the prices of the factors would 
converge and would gradually be equalized in both countries; relatively and absolutely. 
In this respect the theory purports that international trade has the same effect as the 
international free mobility of factors. The factor-price equalization theorem (also called 
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem) holds only if Heckscher-Ohlin theory is 
proven to be true. As one country specializes in the production of labour (capital) 
intensive commodities and reduces its production of capital (labour) intensive 
commodities, the relative demand for the labour (capital) and the wage rate (interest 
rate) rises, and the demand for capital (labour) and the interest rate (wage rate) falls. 
Trade possibilities are exhausted when relative and absolute prices of the factors are 
equalized between countries.
As the relative and absolute prices are equalized, wages (interest rate) in the 
labour-abundant country rise (fall) and the wages (interest rate) in the labour-scarce 
country fall (increase). That is why in a labour-abundant country, workers would be in 
favor of international trade whereas capitalists would be against it. The opposite would 
be true for the capital-abundant country. Thus the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model 
introduces some sort of peculiar class relationship into trade theory, since not all 
classes will benefit equally from free trade. For example, workers in labour-abundant 
developing countries will benefit, and capital will lose as a result of a fall in the profit 
rate. The reverse is true for capital-abundant developed countries. Thus, capital in 
developing countries and labour in developed countries may object to trade 
liberalisation.
3.2.3. Predicting the trade pattern
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model not only attempts to predict the current 
pattern of trade under free trade conditions but it also attempts to predict dynamic 
structural change in the long-run. ‘The dynamic comparative cost theory of Johnson 
(1968) is a synthesis of the static neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin theory and several 
alternative theories, particularly the theories of the technology gap and the product
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cycle.’9 According to the theory, the sectors involved in labour-intensive production 
are the natural candidates for growth in low-income countries. As specialisation takes 
place and the production of labour-intensive commodities increases, however, the 
demand for and the price of the abundant factor of production (labour) will gradually 
increase and those countries will gradually lose their comparative advantage in labour- 
intensive commodities. Thus they will gradually move to the production of more 
capital-intensive techniques and commodities.10 A number of Asian countries, 
particularly Korea and Taiwan, can be given as examples of such a shift in comparative 
advantage.11
3.3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
As will be discussed in the next section, the theory has serious theoretical problems 
with its most fundamental assumptions. The literature, however, is dominated by 
research on its empirical validity to predict trade patterns. Puzzled by the 
overwhelming failure of the empirical works to support the theorem, researchers, for 
decades, have tried new methods to find a solution. Some found the solution in 
relaxing its ‘minor’ assumptions and making the theory more complicated in various 
ways. Few, if any, questioned the basic tenets of the theory. Here we will first 
summarise the simplest but most powerful empirical evidence which denies the 
expectations of the theory. Then, we will argue that even if the empirical literature 
supported the expectations of the theory this would not prove its validity.
There are two predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory. First, 
relatively capital (labour) abundant countries would export capital (labour) intensive 
commodities. This implies that trade possibilities are greater between countries which 
have dissimilar factor endowments.12 Thus one would expect most trade to be between
9 Gunasekera (1992: 47).
10Anderson and Smith (1981: 296).
11 See Song (1996) and Gunasekera (1992).
12 If two countries have the same relative factor scarcities ‘and the same techniques, both countries 
will have the same comparative costs for all goods’ [Heckscher (1919) in Mookerjee (1958: 7)], thus 
trade will not be beneficial to the countries. In fact, Ohlin purposefully used ‘interregional’ rather 
than international trade in his arguments since he thought that if the assumption on the immobility of 
factors of production is relaxed and replaced by ‘less than perfect mobility’, factor endowments would 
be more dissimilar between different regions since he defined regions in such a way that ‘an
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labour-abundant low-income countries and capital-abundant high-income countries. 
Second, as free trade takes place and countries specialise in particular commodities 
according to their factor endowments, the factor prices would be equalised internally 
as well as internationally.
These predictions of the model have come up against the facts of history.13 
First, trade flows are greater among the high-income countries than between the low- 
and high-income countries. Second, the famous ‘Leontief Paradox’ contradicted the 
factor-intensity criterion of the theory. Third, there is no evidence of factor-price 
equalisation. In the face of the failure of empirical works to confirm the expectations of 
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory or its variants, how are we to interpret this 
theory?
Proponents of the theory agree with the opponents that there are problems with 
the basic assumptions of the theory. For example, there are more than two factors of 
production, countries use different technologies, markets are not perfectly competitive, 
there are transportation costs, barriers to trade do exist, etc.14
Under these circumstances, advocates of the theory, however, argue that, ‘it is 
more realistic to say that international trade has reduced, rather than completely 
eliminated, the international difference in the returns to homogeneous factors.’15 
Another line of argument is that ‘even if international trade has operated to reduce 
absolute differences in factor returns among nations, many other forces were operating 
at the same time, preventing any such relationship from becoming clearly evident.’16 
Even if differences in factor prices increase between rich and poqr^ countries, this 
would still not ‘disprove the factor-price equalization theorem, since in\the absence of 
trade these international differences might have been much greater than they are
»17now.
This argument cannot be won against the proponents of the theory. Bertrand 
Russell once said that; ‘Man is a credulous animal and must believe something. In the
interregional transfer of factors of production is much more difficult than an intraregional one’.
(Ohlin, 1991: 114).
13 Sau (1982: 12).
14 A number of subsequent studies developed the Heckscher-Ohlin model theoretically and 
empirically. See Song (1996) and Martini (1996) for literature surveys of these new developments.
15 Salvatore( 1995:129).
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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18absence of good grounds for belief, he will be satisfied with bad ones.’ One may 
wonder, what the purpose of such an empirical work is if we are not able to reject the 
theory regardless of the results. A quasi-religious and unshakeable belief saves the 
theory against all possible outcomes.
Empirically, the factor endowment theory has been rejected repeatedly and, as 
Trefler (1995) argues, ‘rightly so: it performs horribly. [The theory] correctly predicts 
the direction of factor service trade about 50 percent of the time, a success rate that is 
matched by a coin toss.’19 Factor endowment theory, however, apparently has an 
incredible hypnotic effect on neoclassical economists. The logic is simple: the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model does poorly, but as ‘we do not have anything that 
does better’,20 we should stick to it.
3.3.1. Factor-price equalisation
One of the core premises of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory is that the factor 
prices will converge through free trade. The gains from trade expansion accrue to the 
abundant factors and the scarce factors will be worse off. The relative price of the 
abundant factor will increase as the demand for it will increase through specialisation 
based on the abundant factors of production. The wages in labour-abundant countries 
and the profits in capital-abundant countries will rise relatively.
In reality, this scenario fails completely. Prices of factors of production have 
not converged.21 The empirical evidence on the liberalisation of trade on wages is at 
best mixed. A number of empirical studies have found no evidence of an increased 
share of wages in low-income countries. There seems to be no meaningful correlation 
between trade and factoral income distribution.22
A simple observation of the share of wages in total value-added in the industrial 
sector sheds further doubt on the theory. Table 3.1, for consecutive five-year time
18 Bertrand Russell, Unpopular Essays, 1950.
19 Trefler (1995: 1029).
20 Bowen et al. (1987) cited in Trefler (1995: 1030).
21 Those who have observed the enormous differences between the wages of similar types of workers 
in developed and developing countries have rejected factor-price equalisation. See Bliss (1989), 
Learner (1984), and Wood (1994).
22 See Edwards (1997a), Davis (1996), Michaely, Papageorgiou and Choksi (1991), Bourguignon and 
Morrisson (1991), Krueger (1978), Bhagwati (1978).
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periods, reports the change in the share of wage. As the table shows, during the 1980s, 
when there was widespread trade liberalisation almost everywhere in world, the share 
of wages declined in most countries.
Table 3.1: Change in the share of wage in total value-added in the industrial sector 
Number of countries Percent
Increase Decrease Total
1965-70 20 33 53
1970-75 37 37 74
1975-80 39 41 80
1980-85 30 51 81
1985-90 19 47 66
Increase Decrease
38 62
50 50
49 51
37 63
29 71
Data Source: World Bank Stars Database
Note: See table A3.1 for the countries employed. Number of countries is determined by data 
availability.
Moreover, the following simple regression between a change in the share of wages in 
total value-added (A[W/VA]) and a change in the trade ratio (A[X/GDP]), from 1980 
to 1990, suggests that the impact of trade on wages is negative (but insignificant). 
More importantly, dummy variables for income groups in the regression reveal an 
interesting picture. Contrary to the expectations of the theory, dummy variables for 
low- and middle-income countries have a negative sign, and a dummy variable for 
high-income countries has a positive sign. Dummies for middle- and high-income 
countries are significant at the ten-percent level. This admittedly simple regression 
casts doubt on the basic premises of the theory. Trade seems to have a positive impact 
on wages in high-income countries and a negative impact in middle- and low-income 
countries.
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A [W/VA] = f (A[X/GDP] + low-income + middle-income + high-income)
-0.022 -0.011 -0.129 0.139
(-0.238) (-0.142) (-1.911)* (2.063)*
R-bar-squ: 0.094
F : 2.296
DF : 59
Data Source: World Bank Stars Database
Note: T-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks mean significant at ten-percent level. Variables are in 
logarithmic form for a better fit. See table A3.1 for the countries employed. Number of countries is 
determined by data availability. Countries are classified according to World Bank criteria. The low- 
income economies are those in which 1993 GNP per capita was $695 or less; middle-income 
economies are those between $695 and $8,625; and the high-income economies are those above 
$8,625.
If there is any correlation between trade liberalisation and factor prices, evidence 
should come from the European Union since trade among the European Union 
members has been liberalised considerably.
Table 3.2: Factor-price equalisation, evidence from the European Union
Coefficient Of Variation 
(W/VA)
Coefficient Of Variation 
(W/L)
Trade Ratio 
(X+M)/GDP
1967 15.8 40.2 30.5
1970 14.9 40.3 35.5
1975 15.8 38.6 41.6
1980 16.8 36.3 47.4
1985 18.9 33.9 52.0
1990 24.4 31.8 46.4
Data Source: World Bank Stars Database
Table 3.2 also provides no evidence for the existence of such convergence. The first 
column shows the coefficient of variation for the share of wages in value-added 
(W/VA) for 15 European Union countries. The second column is the coefficient of 
variation for real wages and the third column shows openness in terms of the trade 
intensity for the same countries. The second column indicates the convergence of real 
wages. This, however, cannot be interpreted as evidence which supports the theory. 
According to the theory, through free trade, in labour-abundant countries the share of 
the wages must increase relative to profits and in the capital-abundant countries it must
79
decline. Thus, one would expect convergence in the share of the wages in total value- 
added. The data, however, indicate just the opposite of what the theory predicts. 
Except between 1967 and 1970 (when there is a fall), the coefficient of variation 
increased considerably. Openness also increased consistently up until 1985 and then it 
fell between 1985 and 1990. This suggests that if there is any relationship between 
trade liberalisation and wages, it must be a negative one. In other words, the wage gap 
among countries widens as liberalisation takes place.23
3.3.2. Trade between developed and developing countries
The theory implies that the trade between developed and developing countries should 
increase faster than either trade among developed countries or trade among developing 
countries since the alleged benefits of trade are greater when factor endowments are 
dissimilar. Further, the theory predicts that developing countries would increase their 
agricultural exports to developed countries since their comparative advantage lies in 
labour-intensive commodities such as agricultural or primary products. These claims of 
the theory, however, cannot survive an examination of the simplest facts.
Table 3.3 shows the share of intra-group trade among developed and 
developing countries respectively. Contrary to the expectations of the theory, both 
developed and developing countries increased trade among rather than between 
themselves. In other words, developed countries trade more with developed countries 
and developing countries trade more with developing countries.
23 Using available data from 1967 to 1990, a regression was estimated to test if the coefficient of 
variation for the share of wages in value-added is correlated with openness and no significant
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Table 3.3: Intra-group trade among developed and developing countries
Share of exports from industrial 
countries to industrial countries 
(percent)
Share of exports from developing 
countries to developing countries 
(percent)
1958 60.2 23.5
1960 62.6 24.1
1970 67.5 21.7
1980 67.5 27.6
1990 76.3 35.8
1995 70.5 43.3
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook
Table 3.4 shows agricultural export-import ratios for developed and developing 
countries. The table illustrates a clear trend, which runs counter to the predictions of 
the theory. Developed countries were net importers of agricultural commodities during 
the 1960s while developing countries were net exporters. This has changed gradually, 
however. In the 1990s, developed countries were close to becoming net exporters of 
agricultural commodities (the European Union, for example, exported more than it 
imported in 1993) whereas developing countries have become net importers.
Table 3.4: Net agriculture exports: (X/M)*100, by region and income group
DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES
EUROPEAN
UNION
DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
SUB
SAHARAN
AFRICA
1960 69 42 190 337
1970 71 55 180 313
1980 87 76 106 143
1990 89 92 104 132
1993 94 101 96 103
Source: FAO, Agrostat Data Base
All of the above evidence is based admittedly on simple observations. This, however, 
does not reduce its validity, since the basic predictions of the theory are very clearly 
stated.
correlation was found.
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3.3.3. The Leontief paradox
In 1951, Leontief was the first to test the Heckscher-Ohlin theory by using US trade 
data. As the US was the world’s most capital-abundant country, he expected that its 
exports (imports) would be capital (labour) intensive. He estimated the capital-labour 
ratio for US import-substitutes, rather than for the imports because foreign production 
data on actual US imports were not available. Obviously, imports would be more 
appropriate than import-substitutes, nevertheless if the Heckscher-Ohlin model is true, 
then import-substitutes should have been more labour-intensive than exports.
The results of Leontief s test showed that US import-substitutes were about 30 
percent more capital-intensive than US exports. That is, the US seemed to export 
labour-intensive commodities and import capital-intensive commodities. This was the 
opposite of what the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicted. Leontief himself and his 
followers tried to rationalise the “paradox”. Leontief first argued that the US was, in 
fact, labour-abundant, since productivity of labour was three times higher than the rest 
of the world and thus the US labour force had to be multiplied by three.24 This 
argument was later withdrawn, since US capital was also at least three times as 
productive as foreign capital. After numerous attempts and the introduction of many 
different techniques, finally by including “human capital” in total US capital, Kenen 
(1965) ‘resolved’ the paradox.25 However, the most comprehensive empirical study to 
solve the Leontief paradox was done by Learner (1984) using the Heckscher-Ohlin- 
Vanek26 version of factor proportion theory. In this study, Learner created ten 
aggregate export categories27 and eleven endowment categories28 and tried to establish 
a link between resource endowment and the trade pattern of a country. He claimed that 
cross-country differences in factor endowments play an important role in determining 
patterns of international trade.
24 Salvatore (1995:132).
25 See Salvatore (1995:134) and Gomes (1990: 123-131) for the details of the various empirical works 
that have been done to resolve this ‘paradox’.
26 Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek is based on the factor content of trade rather than commodities. See 
Learner (1984) and Song (1996).
27 These are petroleum, raw materials, forest products, tropical products, animal products, cereals, 
labour-intensive manufactures, capital-intensive manufactures, machinery and chemicals.
28 These are capital, three types of labour, four types of land, coal, minerals and oil.
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3.3.4. The relevance of the empirical works
The Leontief paradox itself, of course, is important and questions the validity of the 
theory.29 What is perhaps more important, however, is the logic and analytical validity 
of such exercises. Empirical results, unless justified and supported with an accurate 
theoretical framework, do not provide meaningful results. One may get the ‘right’ 
results with the ‘wrong’ reasons. An important question still remains unanswered: can 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model properly describe the real world?
The advocates of the theory mistakenly believe that if they can find a way to 
prove that the theory can predict trade patterns, this would confirm the validity of the 
theory. This is not necessarily so. The comparative advantage theory is not about an 
anticipation of trade patterns (in the short- or in the long-run), but about promoting 
economic development through free trade and specialisation. Thus, even if the 
empirical results confirmed the expectations of the theory this would still not prove the 
proposed benefits of either free trade or specialisation. Therefore, as we will argue, the 
testing of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory empirically is a hopeless task.
First, under free trade conditions, low-income countries may indeed specialise 
in labour-intensive, primary and agricultural commodities, for which they allegedly 
have a comparative advantage. This specialisation, however, may not serve their 
interests in the long-run. This is precisely why they should not confine themselves to 
following their comparative advantage but rather, they should try to create their own 
competitiveness in other commodities.
Second, there might indeed be some similarities between a country’s trade 
pattern and its ‘endowments’. As exported commodities are part of total national 
production, their peculiarities will somewhat reflect the overall peculiarities of the total 
economy. For example, if a country has a highly skilled labour force, it is only normal 
that this country will export commodities that require skilled labour. Or, to put it other 
way round, if a country is exporting commodities that require a highly skilled labour 
force it must have a highly skilled labour force. A commodity that requires skilled 
labour cannot be produced and exported without a skilled labour force. This is no
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better than predicting that someone who has medical training will be likely to practice 
medicine or that someone practising medicine must have medical training. What the 
theory is advising to low-income countries is that since they do not have training in 
medicine, they should work as street sweepers rather than focus on getting a medical 
education, since their comparative advantage lies in street sweeping.
Departing from a possible correlation between a country’s exports and its 
endowments and claiming that this supports the factor endowment theory is nothing 
more than a tautology since it describes the reality rather than explains it. Learner’s 
work, for example, offers a series of broad generalisations, some of which are so bland 
as to be obvious and others which are controversial, but are not substantiated. What 
would an empirical work prove if it confirmed that a capital-abundant country 
exported capital-intensive commodities and imported labour-intensive commodities? 
Would one expect, for example, a primarily agricultural (industrial) commodity 
producing country (assuming that agriculture (industry) is labour (capital) intensive) to 
export industrial (agricultural) commodities? To empirically test whether a capital 
‘scarce’ country will export labour-abundant commodities is absurd. If a country 
produces capital (labour) intensive commodities it may naturally export capital (labour) 
intensive commodities and import labour (capital) intensive commodities.30 The same is 
particularly true for natural resources (endowments) like minerals, oil, land, etc. 
Nobody disputes that if a country has large oil and other mineral reserves, it will export 
oil and minerals. Similarly, if it does not have much arable land it will not produce and 
export agricultural products, and if it is producing and exporting capital-intensive 
manufactures, machinery or chemicals it must also have capital and a highly skilled and 
educated labour force. This is neither something unexpected nor something peculiar to 
the Heckscher-Ohlin theory.
The heart of the matter is that the Heckscher-Ohlin theory offers nothing more 
than a series of broad generalisations. Such observations do not tell us why and how a 
country would benefit from specialisation in its endowments. Moreover, some of the
29 One should, however, recognise the practical difficulties and underlying theoretical problems of 
undertaking such an empirical work. See Hudson (1992, ch. 8) for a detailed analysis of Leontief s 
empirical work.
30 Unless, of course, where a primarily capital-scarce country has large natural resource endowments 
(such as minerals) to export which require capital-intensive techniques to produce which is the case 
for many developing countries.
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endowments are not endowments in a literal sense, since they can be produced. Capital 
can be created, labour can be trained and educated, etc.
The arguments put forward by the advocates of the factor endowment theory 
regarding the long-term development pattern and a gradual move from the production 
of labour-intensive commodities to capital-intensive commodities31 (which is allegedly 
supported by the empirical evidence) as development takes place, is also a simple 
empiricism and a crude tautology. Johnson32 (1968) argues that economic development 
is a process of investment in ever-increasing stocks of various forms of capital and the 
condition of being ‘developed’ consists of having accumulated capital and having 
established efficient social and economic mechanisms for maintaining and expanding 
increasing stocks of capital per person in various forms. The condition of being 
‘underdeveloped’ is characterised, in contrast, by the possession of a relatively small 
stock of various kinds of capital.33 Thus, it can be argued that it is the nature of 
development to move from labour-intensive production to capital-intensive production. 
In fact, a country cannot develop unless this transformation takes place. If 
development itself is identified by this structural transformation, identifying this 
process as evidence for the dynamic version of comparative advantage theory is 
nonsensical. Recommending at low-income countries specialise in labour-intensive 
commodities is another tautology since they can only produce labour-intensive 
commodities by definition.
As argued earlier, comparative advantage theory is not about an anticipation of 
the trade pattern but about promoting economic development through free trade and 
specialisation. Free trade, as an alternative development strategy against industrial 
policy and protectionism, suggests that by specialising in the production of a number of 
particular commodities, all countries that participate in trade will increase their welfare, 
particularly the low-income countries. As development requires a move from labour- 
intensive production to capital-intensive production, the success of the trade policy
31 The logic of the theory suggests that an opposite process, a gradual move from the production of 
capital-intensive commodities to labour-intensive commodities, should occur in the developed 
countries. If development is associated with a move from the production of labour-intensive 
commodities to capital-intensive commodities (see the arguments below), ‘de-development’ should 
take place in the developed countries.
32 Johnson is the founder of the dynamic comparative cost theory.
33 Johnson (1968), cited in Gunasekera (1992: 46).
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must be judged in terms of its contribution to the speed of this change and not with the 
stages of it. In view of this, recommending that African countries focus on the 
production of agricultural and primary commodities, for example, is absurd since they 
have always produced these commodities and followed their ‘comparative advantage’ 
without being able to transform their economies from labour-intensive to capital- 
intensive production. By advising low-income countries to focus on the production of 
labour-intensive commodities, comparative advantage theory hinders their 
development process. Using the East Asian newly industrialising economies as 
evidence of this theory34 is also misleading since (as argued in chapter seven) they 
promoted industrialisation through industrial policies rather than relying on a ‘natural’ 
move from labour-intensive commodities to the capital-intensive commodities through 
liberal trade policies and comparative advantage. Moreover, there is no historical 
evidence to suggest that the industrial development process of Europe and North 
America can be explained by differences in resource endowment.
Rather, it was probably a reflection of the extent to which some late 
industrialising countries were able to bridge an institutional hiatus with the lead 
industrial economies and begin a process of catching-up through high rates of 
investment, technological progress and rapid productivity growth. (Bairoch 
and Kozul-Wright, 1996: 15)
Given the tremendous theoretical weaknesses of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory (which 
will be discussed in the next section), it is even more paradoxical that so many writers 
still persistently try to solve Leontief paradox and try to find empirical evidence for the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem (or indeed against it) even after so many unsuccessful 
attempts. In our opinion, such empirical investigations are basically irrelevant and will 
not be investigated in more detail.
The discussion should not be on how to predict a country’s export pattern but 
whether that pattern is the most beneficial for that country. The Heckscher-Ohlin 
model not only attempts to predict how countries would behave under free trade
34 See Gunasekera (1992), World Bank (1993), and Song (1993).
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conditions but it also offers a normative guide to ‘how countries should behave’.35 
How countries would behave cannot provide us with a good guide for how countries 
should behave.
3.4. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
While the endless discussions and a vast number of empirical works are devoted to 
solving the mysteries of the ‘Leontief Paradox’, and as the Heckscher-Ohlin model has 
been ‘developed’ by modifying some assumptions, one may hopelessly try to find 
anyone who questions the overall theoretical validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
This remains so even after the damning critique of Steedman which undermines the 
basics of the theory. Advocates of the Heckscher-Ohlin model simply ignore such 
criticisms or prefer to assume them away rather than dealing with them. Consequently, 
the theoretical debate over trade policies has become like a dialogue of the deaf.
The failure of the empirical work has pushed the supporters of the theory to 
adjust some of the assumptions. Although the theory has become more complicated, it 
is by no means more sophisticated. Some argue that the ‘theorem is valid only in the 
highly abstract environment of the two-factor, two-good, two-country model’ and 
beyond this, when ‘additional factors and countries are also added, it becomes difficult 
even to state the theorem, let alone to prove it.’36
A number of critiques stay within the limits of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory and 
reflect difficulties that the theory faces. For example, ‘factor intensity reversal’ refers 
to the situation in which a commodity is considered labour-intensive in a labour- 
abundant country and capital-intensive in a capital-abundant country. Factor intensity 
reversal may occur if differences in the elasticity of substitution of labour for capital in 
the production of two commodities are great. Or, if differences in initial factor 
endowments of two countries are very large relative to the variation of factor 
intensities among commodities, after specialisation the factor prices may not be 
equalised, even though they somehow converge.37 However, the most important
35 Hudson (1992: 210).
36 Deardorff (1982: 683).
37 See Edwards (1985: 31) for a comprehensive explanation of the FIR.
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objection is not levelled against the technicalities and details of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory, but against its basic approach to the economy.
That is why dealing with exceptional cases or including more countries, more 
commodities and more factors of production or relaxing some of the assumptions, such 
as introducing different tastes, scale economies, imperfect competition, transport cost, 
government intervention, etc., does not necessarily make the theory more realistic 
since the basic tenets of the theory are erroneous. Thus, we will only deal with the 
most obvious problems of the theory and will not attempt to deal with more complex 
versions of the theory. Consequently, the next section will concentrate on the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model’s treatment of capital and labour.
3.4.1. Capital as ‘endowment’
It is acceptable for a theory to simplify the observed reality by assumptions in order to 
obtain meaningful results. However, firstly, these assumptions should simplify complex 
reality, but not distort it. Secondly, the different sets of assumptions should not 
contradict each other. As far as the assessment of any theory is concerned, it is only 
fair to question whether the theory observes these conditions. In view of this, when we 
look closely at the treatment of capital in the Heckscher-Ohlin theory we can see the 
shortcomings.
The treatment of capital in the Heckscher-Ohlin theory is simplistic. In the 
theory, capital is treated as a non-produced input and is externally given to the 
economy. Since it is not produced, it can be treated as an endowment just like land,38 
natural resources and population. As Steedman argues ‘one should simply strike out 
the term ‘capital’ whenever it occurs and replace it by ‘land.” 39 Thus the price of 
capital is often treated and referred to as rent and not as the rate of profit (interest).40 It
38 ‘As Samualson cheerfully confesses, he had ‘quietly replaced the venerable pair labour and capital 
by labour and land, hoping thereby to side-step some of the intricacies involved in any discussion of 
capital.” Findlay (1995: 36)
39 Steedman (1979a: 5). Some writers indeed treated capital like land and argued that replacing land 
by capital in the familiar 2x2 trade model leaves the four basic theorems unaffected. See Metcalfe and 
Steedman (1981) for an exposition and critique of such an approach.
40 Ibid.
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is obvious that this assumption is very strong and must be justified if it is to have any 
analytical validity.
Capital is also assumed to be internationally immobile so that capital 
movements would not eliminate capital ‘scarcity’.41 In its extreme form this assumption 
is unrealistic. Even though Heckscher assumes complete international immobility of 
capital, Ohlin deals with this assumption extensively and justifies it on the grounds that, 
first, ‘less than perfect mobility’ (which means that factor prices will not completely be 
equalised) allows room for trade based on factor endowments, and second, since 
capital mobility and trade both tend to equalise factor prices (thus they are assumed to 
be substitutes), mobility of goods (trade) may equalise factor prices before the mobility 
of capital. Thus, when mobility of factors of production is allowed, the importance of 
trade may be reduced but not eliminated.42
Before we come back to this issue and criticise the treatment of capital by the 
theory, a number of important anomalies strike us immediately. First, as the same 
technology is assumed to be available to all countries, the concept of development 
itself becomes obscure since we can only identify capital and labour-abundant 
countries. Because capital is treated as an endowment and the developed countries are 
assumed to be capital-abundant, development itself is reduced to this bizarre 
endowment. As countries do not have any control over their endowments, 
underdevelopment itself is seen as something externally given to the societies and can 
not be altered, except of course, by liberalising trade. The only option open to 
developing countries is to liberalise their international trade so that factor prices can 
gradually be relatively and absolutely equalised. Because developing countries are 
capital-scarce, the theory asserts, they should give up the idea of increasing their 
capital and stick with the only trade pattern available to them. ‘In other words, 
acceptance, and adoption to, the existing differences between developed and 
underdeveloped capitalist regions is efficient from the point of view of the world-as-a- 
whole.’43 The reason why only developed countries happen to be capital-abundant or 
why capital-abundant countries are developed remains unexplained. There is less
41 Ironically, Ohlin criticised the classical theory as unrealistic since it also assumed international 
immobility of capital. (Flam and Falnders, 1991: 12)
42 See Ohlin (1991: chapter seven).
43 Shaikh (1979: 292).
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capital in developing countries, because being less developed is identified as having less 
capital. The fact that there exists no ‘labour-abundant’ high-income country and no 
‘capital-abundant’ low-income country proves the fact that the only way to develop is 
to increase capital ‘endowment’.44 History shows that nations are not endowed with 
capital either by physical nature or from without: they accumulate it by deliberate 
policies and institutions.45 Nevertheless, the theory argues that, even though developed 
countries are capital-abundant (the reverse is also true: capital-abundant countries are 
developed), developing countries can develop without ‘abandoning’ capital. But if 
developing countries can develop without ‘abandoning capital’, there would be no 
correlation between ‘capital-abundance’ and development. We should see at least some 
labour-abundant developed countries.
Second, once capital is allowed to be produced, the concepts that the theory 
uses become tautological because one cannot talk about labour-scarcity (abundance) 
independently of capital-scarcity (abundance). What determines the scarcity 
(abundance) of labour is the availability of capital. Thus one can only talk about 
availability of capital but not labour since one also implies the other. Capital may be 
plentiful or not in a country, but there is no such thing as labour-scarcity (abundance). 
Labour-scarcity can only make sense with respect to land since its availability is 
determined by nature.
The theory also ignores the dynamic relationship between factor prices. It is 
assumed that high-income countries must be labour-scarce since wages are higher. 
According to the theory, what the investors do is to look at the relative prices of the 
factors of production, which are determined by their availability, and choose the right 
combination to maximise their profits. However, what determine the price of labour 
are the availability of capital itself and the factoral distribution of income. Real wages 
are higher in high-income countries not because labour is scarce but because the 
productivity of labour is high as a result of plentiful capital. As countries produce more
44 There is an interesting conceptual similarity between Heckscher-Ohlin theory and Emmanuel’s 
“Unequal exchange” theory even though the conclusions they draw are different. Both theories assume 
that the technology is available to all countries, both theories are based on wage rate differences 
between developed countries and developing countries, both theories argue that wages are lower in 
developing countries because of excess labour supply, both theories explain development and 
underdevelopment with these wage rate differences.
45 Hudson (1992: 29).
90
and more capital, they increase labour productivity and real wages. Thus, one cannot 
just look at the actual level of real wages to determine if labour is abundant or scarce. 
The true indicator, if labour supply is lagging behind labour demand, is the factoral 
distribution of income or the share of wages in total value-added (W/VA). In terms of 
the W/VA ratio there is not a significant difference between low- and high-income 
countries. Even though the W/VA ratio tends to be a little higher in the high-income 
countries, this tendency is not a rule and this could be explained by stronger labour 
movements in these countries.
Furthermore, when capital is allowed to be produced, any increase in capital 
production (capital becomes relatively abundant) also increases abundance of labour 
by, at least in the short-term, throwing them out of employment. In this sense as capital 
endowment increases, it also increases the labour endowment by increasing the 
availability of labour. It hardly makes sense to think of high-income countries as 
labour-abundant, when there is persistent long-term unemployment. In many cases, 
unemployment is much higher than in low-income countries. If anything, high-income 
countries should be considered as both capital and labour-abundant.
Third, as the Heckscher-Ohlin theory assumes that capital can neither be 
produced nor the return on capital be reinvested, the impact on the assumed factoral 
distribution of income on capital accumulation is completely ignored. If there was such 
a correlation between trade and factor shares in total production, capital accumulation 
would be higher in low-income countries before trade (which is self-contradictory since 
low-income countries are identified by lack of, or slower, capital accumulation) and it 
would fall after trade, hindering their development.46
Fourth, the factor-price equalisation and dynamic comparative cost theories 
imply that the case for trade will gradually disappear as a result of increased trade. This 
is because all countries will have similar factor prices and endowments and 
specialisation based on factor endowments will no longer be possible.
Given the obvious correlation between development and ‘capital-abundance’ 
(which the theory has yet to acknowledge), one would expect the theory to recognise
46 Interestingly, when Heckscher analysed the possible income affects of protectionism (he was not 
primarily concerned with the income distribution implications of the theory), he argued that if 
protectionism benefits labour as opposed to capital, this would ‘undoubtedly decrease average income
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the importance of increasing capital ‘endowment’. Instead, what the architects and the 
proponents of the theory do is either to completely ignore it or to avoid the problem by 
dismissing it without any justification. Going through the writings of Heckscher and 
Ohlin, and their subsequent followers, one would look in vain for any justification for 
such an assumption.47 Heckscher recognises the problem but avoids it by saying that 
when ‘there is a change in the supply of some, but not all, of the factors of production 
[...] it becomes a complicated problem.’48 Similarly Learner states,
time is not an essential element in the static trade theorem, and the very difficult 
problems of defining and modelling capital in a dynamic world can therefore be 
avoided. Any study of dynamic changes would surely require a deeper 
treatment of capital than is evidenced by the traditional model that lists capital 
as an input along with other factors (Learner, 1984: 44).
The only possible explanation for such an ungrounded assumption lies within the most 
important premises of neoclassical theory. The production of capital takes time and 
capital is only partially consumed in the production process.49 This model assumes that 
what is true for a single firm is also true for the whole economy. Since in the short­
term a firm can only increase its output by employing more workers, the same should 
also be true for the whole economy.
Neoclassical economics is based on static-efficiency, that is, removing 
resources from less efficient to more efficient uses. This argument is derived from 
opportunity cost. The opportunity cost of employing resources in less productive uses 
means a loss of production as they can be employed in more productive uses. This 
argument is based on another unrealistic assumption of full employment of resources 
since if resources are not fully employed, the opportunity cost argument fades away 
and the definitions of factor scarcity and abundance loose their meanings. If resources
per person [since it would add] more to the population than the national income’. (Heckscher, 1991: 
66)
47 The best that some of the proponents can do is to argue that the theory still holds when ‘the factors 
of production are no longer simply regarded as a vector of constants [and] allowed to vary 
endogenously’. (Findlay, 1995: 36)
48 Heckscher (1991: 66).
49 Learner (1984: 42).
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are not fully employed, factors are all abundant regardless of their prices and physical 
combination (capital-labour ratio) in the production process.
Capital as endowment (unproduced) is the core assumption of the theory. This 
assumption is necessary for the theory, because if capital is also a product of labour as 
well as final commodity, then, in fact, output is a function of labour and technology 
alone. Capital, however, cannot be considered as an endowment since it can be 
produced and controlled. As capital is a product of labour, like all other products, its 
value is determined by the necessary labour time required to produce it, not by its 
scarcity. In this case, the capital-labour ratio becomes simply the ratio of two groups of 
labour, which are employed in different sections of the economy. If capital is produced, 
assuming all countries have the same technology, there is no reason why one country 
should have (be endowed with) more capital than another and consequently no case for 
trade based on capital endowment. This is so, because if capital is produced (given the 
assumptions and the logic of the theory), there is no such thing as capital-scarcity or 
abundance, at least not in the long-run. If there is capital-scarcity, the price of capital 
will temporarily rise until more capital can be produced. The same is also true for 
labour. The value of labour is not determined by its scarcity but, like any other 
commodity, by necessary labour time to reproduce it.50 This, in turn, is determined 
socially, in the production process by the relative power of the workers and the 
bourgeoisie.
Within the short-term assumptions of the model we are not allowed to ask why 
some countries have more capital (endowed with capital) than others,51 as this would 
be as silly as asking why some countries can produce more oil than others. But we are 
allowed to ask why some countries use more capital-intensive techniques than others. 
The answer is that capital must be cheaper in those countries that employ more capital.
50 See Marx (1990, vol 1).
51 ‘When economic jargon refers to countries having certain endowments of capital, labour, land and 
minerals, it abstracts the existing division of world labour from this historical context by brushing 
aside how today’s industrial nations originally came to acquire their own capital ‘endowments’ and 
productive powers. One looks in vain for recognition of the role played by social, political and 
economic institutions in transforming comparative costs and resource development. Whatever cost 
structures exist at a given moment in time are viewed as being inherently natural. This attitude was 
provided a century ago by Marx when he asked rhetorically whether ‘You believe perhaps, gentlemen, 
that the production of coffee and sugar is the natural destiny of the West Indies? Two centuries ago, 
Nature, which does not trouble herself about commerce, had planted neither sugar-cane nor coffee 
trees there.” (Hudson, 1992: 30)
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But why is capital relatively cheap in those nations? Because they are capital-abundant 
and labour-scarce.
When it is accepted that capital can be produced, then, there is no reason why 
capital-scarce countries should not increase their capital production. Since the price of 
capital is high, producing capital would be more profitable. If capital is produced, the 
relative price of capital will fall (it is no longer scarce) and trade based on relative 
factor prices will become irrelevant. In the absence of capital movements, there is no 
reason whatsoever, to assume why free trade should equalise the factor prices.
The ‘short-run’ assumption has some interesting features. It contradicts the 
mechanism of the model. In neoclassical theory, time is a very curious thing.52 The 
model is basically timeless but when it refers to the short-run, it is defined as not 
having enough time to produce more capital. So, in the short-run, the amount of 
capital is fixed and externally given to the economy. But what causes suspicion is that, 
in the theory apart from capital there seems to be enough time for everything else to 
adjust, and in fact it all adjusts simultaneously. The only thing that can not adjust is 
capital. The theory is based on two clear exaggerations: first, capital does not adjust, 
not even in the long-run; second, everything else adjusts simultaneously. For example, 
when free trade is allowed, countries have enough time to move resources from 
production of one commodity to another to specialize in commodities according to 
their endowments, but they do not have enough time to produce more capital. This is 
bizarre indeed, particularly considering the neoclassical insistence on the flexibility of 
markets and their criticism of structuralism. This arbitrariness of the concept of time 
gives the theory’s ideological mission away. Nevertheless, ‘short-run’ is a mental 
construction to get desirable outcomes. This theoretical construction serves well the 
neoclassical approach of analysing a pure exchange economy and the static-efficiency 
arguments.53
A number of other critiques can be directed to the theory. First, even though 
Ohlin’s argument on international capital mobility in terms of foreign direct
52 See Weeks (1989: 38) for an interesting exposition of the time concept in neoclassical economics.
53 The greatest contribution of the neoclassical economics was to p r o v id e  a way to justify profits. It 
has always been a moral dilemma how and why capitalists deserve profits if all value is created by 
labour as classical economists argued. The contribution of capital could not have been proven unless a 
mental construction, short-run-fixed capital, was invented.
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investment54 has some value, there is no reason why capital cannot be traded. It is not 
reasonable to argue that consumption goods can be traded but not capital goods. Thus, 
capital-scarcity has no real meaning.55 Second, the assumption that the factors of 
production can be moved from the production of one commodity and be employed in 
the production of another without any cost is clearly unrealistic. Third, the discussions 
based on the capital-labour ratio are increasingly irrelevant since many modem 
industrial sectors and services are increasingly labour-intensive. The right word 
perhaps is technology intensive rather than capital-intensive. As the share of services in 
developed countries’ economies increases and as services become more and more an 
item for export, developed countries tend to become less capital-intensive.
3.4.2. The capital controversy
The Capital Controversy arises because capital is not homogeneous and cannot be 
aggregated. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory argues that if capital is abundant it will be 
cheap. But how do we know if capital is abundant or not? One way to determine this is 
to look at the capital-labour ratio. If capital were homogeneous (same machinery, for 
example), we could simply count and divide by labour. But capital not only consists of 
machinery, but also includes other commodities, buildings, etc. Furthermore, the 
machinery that is used in the production process itself is not homogenous. This leaves 
us with only one option: to aggregate capital in terms of money. This solves one 
problem but creates some others. First, the international comparison of capital-labour 
ratio might be distorted because the value of domestic capital in local currency 
converted into dollars at nominal market exchange rates might understate the true 
amount of available capital, since it does not take into account the international 
differences in prices.56 Second, the market value of capital cannot be calculated
54 In his writings, it is not clear what he means by international mobility of capital. The way he argues 
suggests that he is referring to FDI rather than the trade of capital goods.
55 Of course, not all capital, particularly infrastructure, can be traded internationally. However, first, 
they can still be produced, and second, their production should be higher in labour-abundant 
countries, according to the logic of the theory, since infrastructure is usually labour-intensive.
56 This is now a very well-known fact and per capita GNP comparisons are done by using PPP rather 
than the nominal exchange rate. See Kravis (1986), Economist (1993).
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independently of the rate of interest (factor price ratio or distribution). If the interest 
rate increases, the cost of borrowing and the cost of capital also increase.
Thus the Heckscher-Ohlin theory is now faced with a logical problem. It wants 
to say that if capital is abundant, it will be cheap, that is the rate of interest (or 
profit) will be low. And yet it seems that we cannot define whether capital is 
abundant by first specifying the rate of interest. We are in a nasty vicious circle! 
(Edwards, 1985:33)
The whole theory reveals a chicken and egg dilemma. Of course, one could approach 
the problem from other way around by comparing factor prices. If the interest rate is 
low compared to the wage rate, capital must be abundant in that country. If capital 
(labour) is abundant, the capital-labour ratio must be high (low). This argument is 
based on the marginal productivity theory of income distribution. If the interest rate is 
low (high), the marginal contribution of capital must be low (high), since all the factors 
of production receive the value of their contribution. If that is the case, capital (labour) 
must be relatively abundant.
This argument is again based on the ‘short-term’ (capital fixed and not 
produced) approach. If capital is fixed and production is increased by employing more 
labour (when labour is increased, a new, labour-intensive technique is chosen), the 
marginal contribution of labour will diminish as the number of workers increases. The 
capitalists will employ more labour-intensive techniques only if the workers accept a 
lower wage rate which corresponds to their lower marginal productivity. So if all 
factors of production are fully employed, the relative prices of the factors of 
production must reflect their marginal contribution and their relative abundance.
The argument seems to be deceptively simple. It is, but it is also simply 
deceptive. It suffers from misplaced aggregation. For although the individual 
entrepreneur faces given factor prices, the economy as a whole does not. 
(Edwards, 1985: 35)
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In a two-factor and two-good model,57 it can be shown that, even if all other 
assumptions of the marginal productivity (and Heckscher-Ohlin) theory are accepted, 
the neoclassical relationships between employment and the prices of the factors of 
production break down. In the following model,58 there are two goods (cloth and 
wheat) and there are two factors of production (labour and capital). If we assume that 
each of the commodities is used in the production of both commodities, the production 
equations can be specified as:
1. (Pc . Qcc + Pw • Qcw) • (1+r) + W.Lc = Pc (cloth)
2. (Pc . Qwc + Pw • Qww) • (1+r) + W.Lw = Pw (wheat)
where:
Pc, w : prices of cloth and wine.
Lc, w : labour input required to produce one unit of each commodity.
Qcc : The quantity of cloth used in the production of one unit of cloth.
Qcw • The quantity of wheat used in the production of one unit of cloth.
Qwc • The quantity of cloth used in the production of one unit of wheat.
Qww : The quantity of wheat used in the production of one unit of wheat.
W : wage measured in units of the output and paid at the end of production
period.
r : rate of return (interest rate)
From the above equations, we see that even when the physical coefficients of the 
inputs are assumed to be constant, there are four variables (prices of the commodities, 
wages and rate of return) which cannot be solved by two equations.59 The relative 
prices of the commodities cannot be determined unless the distribution of the net 
output (value-added) between capital and labour is determined. The relative prices of 
the commodities will vary according to the factoral distribution of income. As a 
consequence, the Heckscher-Ohlin model is ‘shown to be logically flawed and unable
57Sraffa (1963).
58 Adopted from Edwards (1985: 36).
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to deal with the production of commodities by means of commodities.’60 It is not true 
to argue that the prices of the factors of production are determined by their marginal 
productivity.
Moreover, the extension of the theory proves that, when commodities are 
produced by means of commodities, the factor prices do not necessarily reflect their 
marginal productivities and the proposed correlation between wage rate and 
unemployment disappears. Therefore, it is not necessarily true that more workers will 
be employed when wages fall and the wage rate will not reflect labour ‘endowment’. 
By looking at factor prices (wage and interest rate) factor endowment cannot be 
determined.61
To sum up, the arguments put forward prove that there is no unambiguous way 
to know if a country is labour or capital-abundant since the value of capital cannot be 
determined independent of factor prices (interest and wage rates) and since factor 
prices do not reflect their marginal productivities.
Furthermore, once it is understood that factor and commodity prices are not 
independent from each other, the factor-price equalisation theory also fails. It is no 
longer acceptable that by specialising in labour-intensive commodities developing 
countries will increase their employment. Even if they do, the wage rate will not 
necessarily rise. From this perspective, the Leontief Paradox is not a ‘paradox’ any 
more. Once the capital aggregation problem is recognised, there is no longer a paradox 
to be explained.62
3.4.3. A comparison of the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian models
The Heckscher-Ohlin model is seen as an advancement over the Ricardian model for its 
predictions on the patterns of trade between low- and high-income countries. Since 
low-income countries are capital-scarce, with free trade, they find it more profitable to 
export labour-intensive commodities and import capital-intensive commodities. The 
expectations of the Ricardian model are the same. Even though the reasoning is
59 Even if the price of one commodity is normalised, there will be three variables with two equations.
60 Edwards (1985: 36).
61 See Weeks (1989), chapter ten.
62 Edwards (1985).
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different, the Ricardian model also predicts that the low-income countries should 
export labour-intensive commodities. There is no doubt that the relative prices of the 
labour-intensive commodities are lower in the low-income countries and this, in turn, 
means they have comparative advantage in labour-intensive commodities. This, 
however, is not as a result of the relative prices (or scarcities) of the factors of 
production but as a result of low average productivity in developing countries.
It was already argued that the relative prices of commodities (and the price of 
capital goods) are determined by their labour content and their capital input 
requirements, not by their scarcities. The higher real wages in the developed countries 
only indicate higher labour productivity in those countries. It is true that labour- 
intensive commodities are relatively more expensive in developed countries than 
developing countries. One of the striking examples of this is second-hand commodities, 
particularly cars. Second-hand cars in developed countries are relatively much cheaper 
compared to developing countries because their repair cost is higher in developed 
countries, and repair cost is higher in developed countries as car repair is labour- 
intensive and labour is ‘expensive’. How can this be explained?
Suppose there are two countries (England and Portugal) and two consumption 
goods (CK: capital-intensive consumption good and CL: labour-intensive consumption 
good). In order to simplify, both consumption goods are assumed to be produced by 
the same capital good (Kk) in both countries and productivity, thus price (PK), in both 
countries is the same.63
Using equations 1 and 2: 
In England and Portugal:
P k - K k + W . L k + r (P k- K k)
P k • Kck + W . L ck + r (P k- K ck)
P k • Kcl + W . L cl + r (P k- Kcl)
PK (Capital good)
Pck (Capital-intensive consumption good) 
P cl (Labour-intensive consumption good)
63 In reality one would expect developed countries to be more productive in producing capital goods, 
but this would not change the results of our arguments.
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where:
Pck: Price of the capital-intensive consumption good.
P c l ' Price of the labour-intensive consumption good.
L Ck - Labour input required to produce one unit of capital-intensive consumption good.
L c l - Labour input required to produce one unit of labour-intensive consumption good.
Kck: Capital input required to produce one unit of capital-intensive consumption good.
KcL: Capital input required to produce one unit of labour-intensive consumption good.
As already mentioned, the relative prices of the commodities are determined by their 
labour content and capital input requirements. Just for simplicity if we assume that the 
capital input requirement is the same for all commodities ( K k =  K c k  =  K c l ) ,  their 
prices will only be determined by their labour content. Therefore, the higher the labour 
content is the higher the relative prices are.
[ P ck  /  P c l ] =  [ L ck  /  L cl] 
since
Kck / Lck > Kcl / Lcl by definition, and Kck = Kcl by assumption 
then
L ck  < L c l  and P c k  < P cl
By definition, the capital-intensive (high capital-labour ratio) commodity is the high 
productivity commodity and labour-intensive (low capital-labour ratio) commodity is 
the low-productivity commodity. If England and Portugal have the same productivity 
levels in terms of Cl but England is more productive in terms of Ck, then:
P cl in England = P cl in Portugal (since L cl in England = L cl  in Portugal)
P ck  in England < P Ck in Portugal (since L c l  in England < L c l  in Portugal)
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Total prices ( P cl  +  P c k)  and relative price of capital-intensive commodity ( P ck  /  P cl)  in 
England will be lower than Portugal.
P ck  /  P cl in England < P c k / P cl in Portugal.
Thus, labour-intensive commodities in high-income countries are relatively more 
expensive, not because they are labour-scarce but because of high average 
productivity. Labour-intensive commodities are labour-intensive because of low- 
productivity. Even if England is more productive in both commodities, as long as the 
productivity gap between the low-productivity commodity (low capital-labour ratio) 
and the high-productivity commodity (high capital-labour ratio) increases, labour- 
intensive commodities and thus labour will be relatively more ‘expensive’ in England. 
Thus, as productivity increases in developed countries faster than developing countries, 
so does the gap between a low-productivity commodity and a high-productivity 
commodity. That is why, in developed countries, labour-intensive commodities and 
labour seem to be more expensive. But this ‘expensiveness’ is relative, not absolute. As 
a result, the Ricardian comparative advantage theory also predicts specialisation in 
labour-intensive commodities for developing countries and in capital-intensive 
commodities for developed countries. Thus, one can conclude that the assumed 
theoretical advance of the Heckscher-Ohlin model over the Ricardian model is false.
3.5. CONCLUSION
The Heckscher-Ohlin model was produced as an alternative to the Ricardian model. It 
had an ideological mission: elimination of the labour value theory and incorporation of 
the neoclassical price mechanism (where the prices of factors of production are 
determined in a general equilibrium system) into international trade theory. Ohlin 
directly attacked the basic tenets of Ricardian labour value theory and argued that it 
breaks down once ‘labour and capital are used in different proportions’ in the 
production of all goods, since ‘if the proportions are not the same, then comparing
101
quantities of labour gives inaccurate results, since those commodities using much 
capital will have higher costs of production’64. This critique of labour value theory is 
based on a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the theory. In the Ricardian 
model, capital is also a product of labour and when the quantities of labour are 
compared for different products, the quantity of labour that is used to produce capital 
is also taken into account.
The Ricardian theory was also blamed for assuming rather than explaining the 
reasons for comparative advantage. This, however, is an exaggeration. Ricardo’s 
model was based on the different productivity levels, which in turn required an 
understanding of how these different productivity levels were historically created. 
Underdevelopment is associated with lower productivity and an explanation of this is 
controversial. Ricardo was not prepared to explain these productivity differences 
between countries, but at least he was aware of them. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory, 
however, offered an ideological opportunity to avoid such basic questions and 
disguised fundamental differences in productivity levels by focusing on factor 
endowments. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory not only succeeded in justifying free trade, 
but also avoiding serious development issues by excluding them from discussion.
Once the invalid assumptions of the theory are identified, and once the 
unreasonable silence of the advocates of the theory on these assumptions is 
understood, the ideological mission of the theory becomes clearer. The heavy 
theorisation and mathematicisation of the theory by its advocates cannot save it. The 
basic tenets of the theory are unrecoverably flawed. As Steedman argues, it is not that 
‘more work needs to be done on further refining an already elaborate theoretical 
structure; it is that the basic vision and presuppositions of the theory render it 
incapable of dealing with important facts about production, trade and growth.’65
Almost twenty years ago the most prominent critique of the theory predicted 
that ‘[i]t is inevitable that, over the next few decades, some writers will continue to 
make more and more ‘internal’ modifications to Heckscher-Ohlin theory, in the 
attempt to make it relevant to real world growth and trade. [However] the basic vision 
and emphasis of Heckscher-Ohlin theory are such that that attempt, while welcome,
64 Ohlin (1991: 200-201).
65 Steedman (1979a: 6).
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will have somewhat limited success until the ‘modifications’ result in the effective 
abandonment of the basic framework.’66 Twenty years after, the advocates do not seem 
to have given up and they are not likely to give up until they find another general 
equilibrium model that performs better. The ideological convenience of the theory is so 
great that unless the dominant ideological paradigm in the international political 
economy changes, the neoliberals are unlikely to abandon the theory regardless of its 
lack of theoretical and empirical validity.
66 Ibid.
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APPENDIX
Table A3.1. Countries used in table 3.1 and in the regression
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe
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CHAPTER FOUR
DYNAMIC COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, TRADE POLICY 
AND EXPORT PESSIMISM
4.1. INTRODUCTION
The first two chapters criticised the shortcomings o f two versions o f the theory o f 
comparative advantage. It was argued that Ricardian comparative advantage theory is 
static and based on a simplistic interpretation o f labour value theory. The Heckscher- 
Ohlin-Samuelson model, that claims to improve the Ricardian model, in fact has even 
more serious theoretical problems. In particular, the treatment o f capital in the model 
was criticised.
Currently, even the most prominent proponents o f comparative advantage 
accept that, in its static form, the theory is inaccurate. They argue, however, that 
dynamic versions o f the comparative advantage overcome the shortcomings o f the 
static version. They argue that as a result o f scale economies, the long-run cost 
structure might be different from the short-run. Thus, sectors that have short-run 
comparative advantage may not possess a long-run advantage. This means that 
specialisation based on current cost structures may not always be beneficial in the 
long-run. In this view, short-term interventionist policies which aim at changing the 
cost structure are justified. Nevertheless, trade and specialisation based on 
comparative advantage are still seen as the best option for developing countries. The 
aim o f the first section o f this chapter is to expose and criticise the different versions 
o f dynamic comparative advantage theory. It will be argued that the theory o f 
comparative advantage is static by nature and cannot be made dynamic. Dynamic 
comparative advantage is a contradiction. Therefore, the whole concept o f 
comparative advantage is fundamentally misleading and should be abandoned.
The second section o f this chapter will briefly evaluate the theoretical 
arguments regarding trade policies, namely the debate over import-substitution and 
export-promotion policies. The theoretical confusion surrounding the definitions o f
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import-substitution and export-promotion will be clarified. In the literature, import- 
substitution and export-promotion policies are mistakenly considered as mutually 
exclusive and alternative trade policies. Moreover, export-promotion policies are 
associated with trade liberalisation. This chapter will argue that the ‘import- 
substitution -  export-promotion’ dichotomy results from the static neoclassical model 
where there are two sectors and all factors o f production are fully employed. In a 
dynamic world where the static parameters o f the neoclassical model are allowed to 
change and where there is unemployment, however, import-substitution and export- 
promotion policies can be seen as complements rather than substitutes. Import- 
substitution policies can be seen as a precondition for export-promotion policies, and 
both policies can be implemented simultaneously.
Finally, this chapter will briefly summarise and evaluate the arguments related 
to so-called export pessimism. Particularly after World War II, a number o f 
economists expressed their pessimism about the export performances o f developing 
countries and the possibility o f development based on exports. These ideas were 
expressed in a number o f different ways. Pessimism about the terms o f trade, 
protectionism of developed countries, and the fallacies o f composition were offered as 
arguments against relying excessively on exports. These arguments were used in 
many developing countries as justification for import-substitution and protectionist 
policies. Even though these ideas were discredited theoretically and empirically, 
particularly during the 1980s, the debate continues. In this chapter, it will be argued 
that, the ‘export pessimists’ made undeniable contributions to our understanding o f 
the problems o f developing countries and even though not all o f their arguments are 
accurate, they provide a substantial critique o f the current dominant neoclassical 
paradigm.
4.2. DYNAMIC COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
Recognising the limits o f static comparative advantage theory has led to a wide range 
o f studies attempting to develop a dynamic version of the theory. These new ideas are 
based on the possibility o f structural changes in the long-run as a result o f scale 
economies. There are a number o f diverse arguments that can be grouped under the
106
heading o f dynamic comparative advantage theories. These theories seek to remove 
the static nature o f typical comparative advantage theory by focusing on the future 
rather than the current comparative cost structure.
Static comparative advantage theory is based on the assumption o f constant (or 
diminishing) returns to scale. This assumption implies the existence o f perfectly 
competitive markets and avoids the complications arising out o f uncompetitive 
markets as a result o f economies o f scale. Static comparative advantage theory is 
unsustainable unless perfect competition is assumed. Endorsing the importance of 
scale economies, the so-called ‘new growth theories’, however, argue for the 
possibility and possible benefits o f trade. The new growth theories assert that 
domestic markets in many instances are too small to exploit scale economies.1 They 
perceive the limitations o f traditional comparative advantage theory (classical and 
neoclassical versions) o f trade and bring forward a more realistic case for international 
trade. Focusing on the endogeneity o f technological change (a traditionally exogenous 
variable in neoclassical growth models) and increasing returns to scale,2 they argue 
that an open economy can
raise growth, first, by increasing access to embodied technology at world 
prices, and therefore by boosting the rate o f technical progress; second, by 
raising productivity in sectors subjected to increasing returns due to the 
integration to the world market; and finally by optimising allocation and 
therefore freeing resources to be allocated in research and development. 
(Moreira, 1995: 8)3
The new growth theories propose a link between openness and the long-run growth 
rate o f output rather than a rise in the level o f output.4 This can arise through the 
favourable impact o f openness on technological change. Openness increases the 
growth rate by allowing countries to earn foreign exchange which can be used to 
import those necessary inputs and new technologies that cannot easily be produced by
1 See Pio (1994).
2 ‘There are now models which endogenise technical progress, fertility choices, human capital 
formation, even policy decisions resulting from political processes’ (Pio, 1994: 277).
3 See also Pio (1994: 281, 289).
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developing countries. With openness, it is possible to use external capital for 
development without causing serious debt problems.5
These arguments produce a powerful incentive for trade but create more 
problems for free trade. For example, increasing returns to scale and the recognition of 
imperfect competition are the primary arguments for the protection o f ‘infant 
industries’.6 Moreover, recognition o f endogeneity o f technological change is also an 
indirect recognition o f uneven development. The proponents o f the theory argue that 
‘endogenous growth theory predicts that increased openness will result in dynamic 
advantages which can positively affect the growth rate.’7 But they also recognise that
the gains will be considerable if  (a) there is in fact a different stock of 
knowledge in the countries which reach closer integration, or if  information 
flows improve as a result o f integration, and (b) if  integration leads to 
economies o f scale. If  on the contrary, a country cannot compete in terms o f 
quality or marketing capacity, it risks seeing its market shrink and 
diseconomies o f small scale set in. (Pio, 1994: 290)
Furthermore,
in order to reap the maximum benefits from increased openness, developing 
countries need to obtain access to markets which will allow them to achieve 
economies o f scale, and need to be able to expand their production also in 
some sectors which are both R&D and human capital intensive. This last 
objective seems particularly difficult to achieve, given their competitive 
disadvantage in high technology industries on the international stage. (Pio, 
1994: 291)
4 Matin (1992: 6).
5 Dollar (1991: 523).
6 ‘Krugman (1986) emphasises that the ‘perfect competition’ assumption underlying the comparative 
advantage theory is clearly unworkable in today’s world and that the magnitude and nature o f  
externalities and dynamic economies are far more significant than is recognised. In the presence o f  
oligopoly and scale economies, import protection is not only compatible with, but may even be 
instrumental to export-promotion (Krugman, 1984).’ (Liang, 1992: 449)
7 Pio (1994: 290).
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Separating free trade policy from comparative advantage theory, Schydlowsky (1984) 
argues that there is no real contradiction between structuralism and comparative 
advantage theory. He states that ‘[comparative advantage theory is well-known in 
Latin America, but not by that name. Rather it is called industrialisation policy, 
associated with structuralism, ECLA and Prebish.’8
Another important concept developed by the dynamic comparative advantage 
theorists is ‘leaming-by-doing’. Leaming-by-doing is also related to market size but 
differs from economies o f scale. The notion o f scale economies ‘involves moving 
down a long-run average cost curve as the size o f the market grows. Leaming-by- 
doing [on the other hand] involves shifting the long-run average cost curve downward 
through time.’9
Grabowski (1994a) argues that both leaming-by-doing and scale economies 
depend on the size o f the market and both import-substitution and export-promotion 
policies guarantee the size o f the market in turn. Initially, import-substitution policies, 
by protecting the domestic market, allow demand for selected industries to grow faster 
than domestic consumption, ‘owing to the fact that imports o f the particular product 
are being replaced with domestic production.’10 When the limits o f the domestic 
market are reached, however, export-promotion policies allow demand to grow faster 
than domestic consumption. ‘Both o f these mechanisms allow for more rapid 
productivity growth through greater investment (embodying new technology), 
increasing returns to scale and learning through experience.’11 This is a dynamic 
structuralist approach to trade theory and implies that openness in terms o f trade ratio 
(the share o f exports and imports in total GDP) is a function o f economic 
development. Countries trade more as development takes place but not vice versa. In 
other words, they do not necessarily develop if  they trade more.
A similar version o f dynamic comparative advantage theory, put forward by 
Dodaro (1991 and 1993) and Yaghmaian (1994), is the ‘stage o f development’ 
comparative advantage theory. They argue that during the earlier stages o f 
development, economic growth promotes export growth since a country's ability to
8 Schydlowsky (1984: 447).
9 Grabowski (1994a: 542).
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
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export depends, essentially, on its ability to produce products which are competitive in 
world markets. In later stages o f development, however, export growth is more likely 
to promote overall economic growth. Dodaro (1991) has argued that the export sector 
may not play as important a role in development as is generally believed -  at least not 
directly and not until some degree o f development and domestic productive efficiency 
has been achieved. Yaghmaian (1994) argues that both exports and economic growth 
are caused by the process o f development and structural change. Exports and 
economic growth are both the results o f the same forces. Thus, while the correlation 
between the two may be quite strong, no causal relationship may exist between them.
Assuming that developing countries are usually demand constrained, this 
argument suggests that the greater a nation's per capita income, the greater is its 
ability and propensity to competitively produce a more varied menu o f manufactured 
goods for which demand exists in the international market. Thus, ceteris paribus, the 
greater the level o f development, the greater is the proportion o f manufactures in total 
merchandise exports. Put another way, the greater the level o f development, the 
greater is the level o f processing a country's export basket. Following the basic tenets 
o f international trade and comparative advantage theory, a reversed causal sequence 
can also be envisaged, that is, economic growth leads to export growth, particularly 
for those countries still at the early stages o f the economic development process.
The infant industry argument, perhaps, is the most well-known form of 
dynamic comparative advantage theory and provides the strongest rationale for short­
term protectionism. Based on the assumption o f increasing returns to scale and 
leaming-by-doing, it is argued that developing countries should protect their 
industries from foreign competition and allow them to exploit scale economies until 
they become strong enough to compete in international markets. This diversion from 
static comparative advantage theory is very important. The theory argues that, as a 
result o f the existence o f scale economies and leaming-by-doing, an infant industry 
may reduce its average cost low enough to become competitive in international 
markets if  it is given the opportunity and if  it is protected against free market 
competition for a period of time. Because the ‘start-up costs for plants in a less 
developed country’s infant industries are thought to exceed those for identical plants
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in economies where these industries are well established,’12 there is an initial cost that 
a country must bear since importation o f that commodity would cost less to the 
customers. If, however, average cost eventually falls lower than average international 
cost, the country will benefit in the long-run.
Before deciding whether an infant industry should be protected or not, a 
number o f important questions must be answered: ‘Are the start-up cost higher [than 
the competitors]? How much higher? [Will] production costs eventually fall to levels 
below those in well established industries? After how long?’13 Will the performance o f 
the infant industry match the expectations? The following figure will help to clarify 
the reason for these questions.14
Figure 4.1: Cost structure o f infant industries
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In the figure, FBG represents unit international cost and ABC is the unit cost o f the 
protected infant industry. Initially the infant produces at a higher cost but gradually it 
matures (at T) and becomes internationally competitive. The area FAB illustrates the 
social cost that has to be paid before maturation and BGC represents the benefits after 
maturation.
It is important to know how long it will take for an infant industry to mature so 
that these two areas can be compared for each industry and those that maximise total 
benefit can be promoted. I f  it takes too long for the infant industry to mature the social
12 Bell et al. (1984: 101).
13 Ibid.
14 Taken from Bell et al. (1984: 104).
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cost might be higher than the discounted future benefits, or alternatively the infant 
industry may not mature at all. There are three reasons why an infant industry may fail 
to mature. First, it may fail to increase productivity. Second, even when the industry is 
experiencing high productivity growth, international competitors may increase their 
productivity faster. Third, the infant industry may be growing faster but the initial cost 
might be so substantial that it might have difficulties in achieving international 
competitiveness.15 Thus, according to the logic o f this argument, an infant industry 
should only be protected if  there is scope for positive net benefits.
The infant industry argument has been widely criticised because o f these 
required conditions. Many have argued that infant industries have a tendency never to 
grow up even though society pays the cost o f protection, the assumed benefits may 
never materialise. There is a growing empirical literature which shows that in many 
countries protected infant industries have failed to mature.16
Finally, by pointing out the interaction between present and future production 
decisions, Schydlowsky focuses on the dynamic nature o f comparative advantage. He 
argues that
[s]ince most production decisions commit a country for more than a single 
period, the future is relevant to present comparative advantage. However, the 
future is shaped in part by the actions o f the present rather than being entirely 
exogenous. The past also affects present comparative advantage through the 
legacy o f installed productive capacity. (Schydlowsky, 1984: 439)
He points out that unless one postulates a static, unchanging world, ‘production 
decisions which commit the country for more than a short period o f time need to take
15 For details see Alavi (1996: 108) and Bell, et al. (1984: 115).
16 Bell (1984: 111), however, argues that the majority o f the empirical works have serious deficiencies 
and ‘throw little light on the issue’. See Bell, et al. (1984) for a brief exposition and evaluation o f the 
literature. Even though some o f the arguments about the failures o f infant industry theory are valid, 
they do not necessarily invalidate the theory. The aim o f this section is not to defend the theory against 
the critiques, or to do an extensive literature survey on the debate about whether infant industry theory 
is a good justification for protectionism. A good exposition and evaluation o f the arguments in defence 
o f the theory can be found in a number o f excellent articles published by Bell, et al. (1984), Jacobsson 
(1993) and Grabowski (1994a and 1994b). In fact, the aim o f this section is to criticise infant industry 
theory and all the other dynamic versions o f comparative advantage theory from another angle. It will 
be argued that comparative advantage theory is a static theory and cannot be made dynamic.
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into account future comparative advantage as well as present comparative 
advantage.’17 The same point was made by Findlay (1987) who argued that static 
comparative advantage theory does not take ‘momentary’ and ‘long-run’ comparative 
advantage into account.18 Momentary comparative advantage is based on factor 
endowment at a given instant. In the long-run, however, endowments are not fixed.
The sector that has a momentary comparative advantage may or may not have 
long-run comparative advantage. [...] An export-promotion strategy that 
focuses exclusively on the expansion o f the traditional export sector with 
momentary comparative advantage may not always be the best choice. (Liang, 
1992: 456)
A critique of dynamic comparative advantage theories
Surely, dynamic versions o f comparative advantage theory are an advancement over 
static versions, since they recognise the possible changes in long-run comparative 
cost. In this section, however, it will be argued that dynamic comparative advantage 
theory is an extension o f the static theory and even though it strives to eliminate the 
shortcomings o f the static version, it cannot escape from its overall deficiencies. 
Comparative advantage theory is a static theory by its nature, and cannot be made 
dynamic. Thus, dynamic comparative advantage theory is a contradiction.
First, the meaning o f comparative advantage needs to be clarified. For 
Schydlowsky, comparative advantage is no more than that a country chooses to 
produce which it can produce best. In this sense, it implies neither free trade nor 
protection.19 However in the literature this is not how comparative advantage is 
generally understood. Since the concept was first introduced by Ricardo, it has almost 
always been associated with free markets and laissez-faire. This is quite reasonable 
given the assumptions o f the theory. In a world where there are only exportables and 
importables, and where there is full employment o f all resources, production o f
17 Schydlowsky (1984: 440).
18 Findlay (1987: 97) cited in Liang (1992: 456).
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exportables requires importation o f importables and this necessarily brings about 
import liberalisation. When we drop these assumptions, however, the case for 
comparative advantage as well as free trade falls. Saying that ‘a country chooses to 
produce those things which it can produce best’ is no more than a tautology. It is 
obviously so and no one disputes it. The theory, however, tells us something more. It 
tells us that a country will benefit from specialisation according to its comparative 
advantage whatever the commodity is -  be it a primary or a high-tech commodity.
Schydlowsky recognises that, in the real world, things are not so simple as the 
theory suggests. He states that
the equivalence between a free trade policy and a comparative advantage 
policy only holds under very restrictive and idealised conditions. In most real 
world situations, market prices do not fully reflect social scarcities, countries 
can affect some prices to some extent, externalities and leaming-by-doing 
exist, and markets are not fully competitive. Evidently, under such real world 
conditions a free trade policy is no longer equivalent to a policy o f production 
according to comparative advantage. (Schydlowsky, 1984: 439)
However, the free market as described in neoclassical theory is not so much a special 
case, but it simply does not and cannot exist.
Second, even though dynamic comparative advantage theory attempts to 
eliminate the static nature o f static comparative advantage by introducing ‘relative 
future cost’ into the analysis, it nevertheless remains a static concept as it relies on 
static parameters like the production function and factor endowments.20 The infant 
industry argument, for example, is a ‘dynamic’ version o f comparative advantage 
because specialisation is based not on current but on future comparative cost. The 
argument is that today’s comparative advantage (comparative cost) may not reflect 
real (future) comparative advantage. In the figure above, the falling cost o f the product
19 Lai and Rajapatirana (1987: 189) make the same point. They argue that static comparative advantage 
does not involve any commitment to laissez-faire. The ‘law’ of comparative advantage applies to both 
socialist and capitalist economies.
20 See Bell et al. (1984: 124). All dynamic versions o f neoclassical models are in fact static in nature. 
Introducing a time factor into a model (i.e. calculating the present discounted value o f investment) does 
not necessarily make the model dynamic.
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below the international cost is anticipated. The long-run production function tells us 
that the sector will have a comparative advantage in the future. In the infant industry 
argument, protection is justified only temporarily and only if  an industry has potential 
competitiveness in the future. Otherwise the market should be liberalised. When an 
industry (or a firm) ‘matures’, then no protection is required. In this view, the 
argument is not against the basic tenets o f comparative advantage. The argument is 
revolves around which commodities will have long-term comparative advantage as 
opposed to the current comparative advantage. Therefore this approach continues to 
carry the static characteristics o f mainstream comparative advantage theory. To put it 
another way, the ‘static-dynamic’ version o f the theory is not about creating 
competitiveness in a dynamic sense by conscious policies, but rather it is about 
accepting passively the possibility o f low future comparative cost and protecting such 
industries until they grow up and become competitive in international markets.
Third, Schydlowsky argues that ‘[u]nder such realistic conditions 
[uncompetitive markets etc.] the policymaker needs to adopt an explicit comparative 
advantage oriented policy.’21 This implies that the decisions o f the policymaker create 
future comparative advantage. If  competitiveness is created by the policymaker’s 
conscious decisions, however, this cannot be called comparative advantage. 
Comparative advantage refers to specialisation based on static (short- or long-run) 
relative cost which conditions the options o f policymakers. It is something that guides 
the policymakers in the production o f a particular commodity. It is based on 
‘endowments* which cannot be altered. Before production takes place, those 
commodities that have potential for future comparative advantage must be identified 
based on the static long-run production function.
If  the endowments and competitive advantages were created dynamically by 
the decisions of the policymaker, however, countries would not have any comparative 
advantages at any given time. What determines future comparative advantage is the 
relative future cost structure. The relative future cost structure, however, is determined 
by the decisions taken today. There may not be any other apparent current 
‘comparative advantage’ apart from the decisions taken today which may bring future 
competitiveness. A country may not have any comparative advantage in the
21 Schydlowsky (1984: 439).
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production o f a particular commodity when a decision is taken to produce it, but 
competitiveness can be developed through a combined process o f production and 
protection. If  a country decides to promote and protect a commodity, and if  the cost o f 
this commodity falls relative to others and become internationally competitive, this 
cannot be called comparative advantage, because future competitiveness is solely 
determined by the decisions taken today.
In this sense, the success o f a country in international markets is determined by 
its ability to develop competitiveness by reducing cost through a combination of 
successful industrial policy, experience, ability to produce and develop technology 
and good luck (in the sense that someone else is not more successful). Thus, 
competitiveness is not based on any comparative advantage at the beginning but 
instead is based purely on the success o f policymaking. In a dynamic world one 
cannot talk about comparative advantage because competitive advantages keep on 
changing. Countries create (or fail to create) their own competitive advantages. 
Whichever country is more successful in promoting selected industries will establish a 
competitive advantage in those selected commodities. The theory o f comparative 
advantage is necessarily a static theory, as one could never truly predict future 
conditions. Thus, arguably, the only comparative advantage a country has is a 
successful industrial policy. As Hudson argues ‘[historically the first endowment 
required for industrialisation has been a policy o f protectionism.’22
In this sense talking about comparative advantage is nothing more than saying 
that a chameleon in reality is blue but it changes colour in different circumstances. If  
the chameleon changes colour under different circumstances, it does not have a 
colour. That is why this chapter suggests that the term ‘comparative advantage’ 
should be abandoned and the term ‘competitiveness’ should be used instead.
Fourth, even in a dynamic version o f the theory, a country may have 
comparative advantage in primary and low value-added commodities. The logic o f the 
theory suggests that if  the future comparative advantage o f a country is the same as 
the current comparative advantage, then the country should specialise in those 
commodities. In chapter one, it was argued that countries must avoid specialisation in 
low skill, low productivity and low value-added commodities, or commodities that
22 Hudson (1992: 31).
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have a very low income/demand elasticity and no future demand, whether or not they 
have short- or long-term comparative advantage. It is simply wrong to specialise in 
such commodities. Specialisation should be based on greater market opportunities, 
high elasticity o f income, rapid technological progress, increased labour productivity 
and greater value-added in the future. Dynamic comparative advantage theory 
suggests that current relative cost may not be a good indicator o f future relative cost, 
but does not question the logic o f the theory itself. It does not question whether it is a 
good idea for a country to specialise in a commodity that has no future market 
opportunities. Dynamic comparative advantage accepts that countries benefit from 
trade based on their comparative advantage and only asserts that a long-term 
comparative advantage might be different than a similar short-term advantage. Once, 
however, the alleged benefits o f static comparative advantage theory are rejected, the 
arguments for the benefits o f dynamic comparative advantage theory also become 
doubtful.
In the static as well as dynamic versions o f the theory a problem arises from 
the assumption that specialisation benefits everyone equally and there is no conflict in 
this process. This is, however, an unrealistic assumption. As argued in chapter one, 
specialisation and the division o f labour might be beneficial from the society’s overall 
point o f view but not necessarily from an individual’s point o f view. Earnings in some 
professions and the value-added o f some commodities are higher than others. Some 
jobs require more skills and training and thus pay well. In fact it is well-known that 
the new technologies require higher skills but at the same time adaptation o f these 
technologies in production ‘deskills’ some people causing an increase in the income 
gap between skilled and deskilled workers. For example, extensive computerisation 
requires highly educated and trained professionals, such as computer programmers. 
The same computerisation, however, undermines the skills needed for other jobs, such 
as cashiers at the check-out. Thus, from the individual’s point o f view, it is preferable 
to be a computer programmer than a cashier. The move to such a division o f labour 
might be inevitable and some individuals might have no other alternative but to accept 
certain jobs that provide a low income. This is not, however, necessarily true and 
acceptable for countries. Countries may want to avoid specialisation in such 
commodities even if  they have short- or long-term (dynamic) comparative advantage.
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The important thing is to determine the best possible commodity and try to produce it 
whether there is a short- or long-term comparative advantage in that commodity. In 
this sense, it can be argued that the static cost o f protection might be smaller than the 
cost o f non-protection. It might be preferable to avoid specialisation in the low value- 
added commodities and protect the high value-added commodities even if  it involves 
an on-going static cost and continuous protection.
Finally, the usefulness o f dynamic comparative advantage theory for industrial 
policy, and as a guide for the implementation o f trade policy can be questioned. Static 
or dynamic, comparative advantage requires specialisation in those commodities for 
which a country may have short- or long-run comparative advantage. This requires 
information on the cost structure o f domestic commodities as well as those o f foreign 
competitors. Obviously, future ‘comparative advantage* is not only shaped by the 
policymaker’s own current actions but also by the actions o f other possible 
competitors. In the static case, the relative cost structure is relatively easy to observe. 
In the dynamic case, however, it is almost impossible to observe future cost structure 
o f potential competitors.
In conclusion, it can be argued that, static or dynamic, comparative advantage 
theory is misleading. Countries should avoid specialisation based on their short- or 
long-run comparative advantages but adopt sensible trade policies to develop 
competitiveness in carefully selected commodities which will bring long-term 
benefits. The next section investigates the theoretical arguments for the various 
alternative trade policies that developing countries might adopt.
4.3 IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION VERSUS EXPORT-PROMOTION
Despite the ongoing debate regarding the impact o f import-substitution and export- 
promotion policies on economic development, these terms are not accurately defined 
in the literature. It is generally assumed that import-substitution and export-promotion 
policies are opposites and mutually exclusive. Consequently, they are presented as 
alternative trade strategies at a country’s discretion.
During the 1980s and 1990s, export-promotion policies became popular and 
gained predominance among economists and in international organisations concerned
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with ‘development’. The popularity of the export-promotion strategy was boosted by a 
myth created about the development experiences o f a number o f Asian countries. 
Their success was attributed to the liberal trade policies that they allegedly adopted. 
Haberler (1987: 62), for example, argued that their success is fully explained by, and 
confirms, the neoclassical paradigm. Owing to the confusion over the concepts of 
export-promotion, trade liberalisation and import-substitution
the conventional wisdom among economists has swung from import- 
substitution strategy to export-promotion strategy. [...] By the late 1960s, and 
particularly the late 1970s, professional opinion had indeed moved away 
completely from import-substitution and in favour o f export-promotion 
strategy as a desirable option. (Bhagwati, 1986: 91)
Subsequent research, however, proved that neoclassical economists have been overly 
optimistic about the validity of their arguments in explaining this ‘miracle’. 
Discussions about import-substitution and export-promotion as trade policies embody 
two related but distinct issues. The first is whether import-substitution and export- 
promotion policies are substitutes or are complements. The second is whether export- 
promotion is necessarily associated with trade liberalisation and a reduction in the role 
of the state. The experiences o f the same Asian countries are increasingly employed 
against the neoclassical interpretation of the relative benefits o f export-promotion and 
import-substitution policies. Their development experiences are now understood to be 
incompatible with the simplistic views o f neoclassical economics. Based on the 
experiences o f these countries, there is an increasing consensus that import- 
substitution and export-promotion are not mutually exclusive alternatives but rather 
complements. The import-substitution -  export-promotion dichotomy derives from 
the static, two-sector neoclassical model. In a more dynamic model where the static 
parameters o f neoclassical economics are allowed to change, however, import- 
substitution strategies are not considered as the opposites o f export-promotion 
strategies. Firstly, import-substitution is seen as a precondition for export-promotion, 
and secondly, import-substitution and export-promotion can be implemented together. 
Therefore, import-substitution is sometimes called ‘import protection as export-
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promotion.’23 The aim o f this section is to clarify the confusion surrounding the 
definitions o f these strategies.
Import-substitution strategies aim to promote production by substituting 
domestic goods for previously imported consumer goods with the help o f a wide 
range o f tariff and non-tariff barriers and exchange rate policies. Looking at it from a 
short-term, static-efficiency point o f view, neoclassical economists believe that 
import-substitution policies, by creating barriers to free trade and preventing 
specialisation, reduce incentives o f the local firms to cut costs and increase 
productivity; lead to monopolistic structures; distort prices and misallocate 
resources.24 As will be discussed later in this chapter, this view originates from a 
misunderstanding o f the meaning and the aims o f such a strategy.
The concept o f export-promotion is more controversial than it at first appears. 
For some, export-promotion requires a neutral strategy with no bias against exports.25 
According to others, however, export-promotion refers to policies which promote 
exports and does not suggest neutrality. Moreira (1995) points out the apparent 
definitional differences between two prominent neoclassical thinkers, Balassa and 
Krueger. Balassa defines outward-orientation as:
Neutrality in the system of incentives, with effective rates o f protection being 
on the average, approximately equal in import-substituting and in export 
activities.26 (Balassa, 1989: 1667, cited in Moreira, 1995: 7)
From this perspective, import-substitution is seen to involve inward-looking policies 
with state intervention while export-promotion focuses on outward-looking policies
23 Krugman (1984: 180).
24 The argument that import-substitution also precludes ‘firms from taking advantage o f economies o f  
scale and specialisation’ (Moreira, 1995: 5) is not an original neoclassical argument since neoclassical 
trade theory assumes constant returns to scale. This argument is produced later by the ‘new growth 
theories’.
25 According to Bhagwati (1986: 92), by export-promotion ‘the literature now simply means a policy 
such that, on balance, the effective exchange rate for exports (EERx) is not significantly different from 
that o f imports (EERm)’. There is no agreement, however, even among the neoclassical economists on 
this approach.
26As will be discussed later on, this view ignores the ‘non-tradables’ sector and the possibility o f  
promoting both import-substitution and export-promotion. Thus, an equal level o f effective rates o f  
protection for both import-substitution and export-promotion activities simply means a zero level o f
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without state intervention. This approach allows us to locate individual economies 
along a continuum from open and liberal economies to close and heavy state 
intervention economies. The question then becomes one o f simply determining 
whether or not liberal and open economies grow faster. This approach is based on an 
international free market price mechanism which allows countries to specialise in the 
production o f particular commodities according to their comparative advantage. Static 
allocative efficiency gains suggest that greater openness yields better economic 
performance in terms o f a higher level of output or income, if  not in terms o f a higher 
long-run rate o f growth.27 The removal o f trade barriers expands the production and 
consumption possibilities by providing more efficient technology to transform 
domestic resources into goods and services. Thus, the efficiency gains from a better 
allocation o f resources raises the level o f national output.28 From this perspective, 
export-promotion policies beyond neutrality are seen as ineffective as import- 
substitution since they also distort prices.
Kruger’s argument, however, is clearly biased towards promoting exports:
It is a set o f policies that leaves relative domestic rewards for exporting 
(compared to importing) at least equal to, and possibly greater then, the 
rewards that would exist under free trade. (Krueger, 1985:197, cited in 
Moreira, 1995:7)
However, ‘if  one accepts Krueger’s definition o f export-promotion regime, the case 
for the free-trade argument looks muddled, since [...] there is no clear reason for a 
regime biased towards exports to have emulated the free-trade allocation.’29 Thus, 
Balassa’s definition is more compatible with the neoclassical model o f international 
trade. The neoclassical approach can be demonstrated with the following figure,
protection since both sectors cannot be protected at the same time according to the logic o f the 
argument.
27 Matin (1992: 5).
28 A reduction o f trade barriers also reduces other costs such as dead-weight losses arising from 
domestic monopolies; costs arising from scale inefficiency; technical inefficiency or X-efficiency and 
costs o f rent-seeking and directly unproductive activities.
29 Moreira (1995: 8).
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borrowed from Bhagwati (1988), where classification o f trade strategies is based on 
the standard two-sector production-fimction type framework.
Figure 4.2 illustrates, with a two-good model, the definitions o f export- 
promoting (EP), import-substituting (IS), and ultra-export-promoting (ultra-EP) trade 
strategies. As Bhagwati explains,
AB is the country’s production possibility curve. With given international 
prices P*S, equilibrium production would be reached at P* under unified 
exchange rates which ensure that the relative goods prices domestically are 
equal to P*S. Therefore, at P*, we have EERx=EERm, where EER refers to 
the effective exchange rate. This is defined as the EP strategy. [...] When the 
incentive to produce the import-competing good exceeds that to produce the 
exportable good, because o f a tariff or overvalued exchange rates, for example, 
production shifts to Pm. Here, EERx<EERm. This is the IS strategy. [...] I f  the 
biased incentive goes in the other direction, the relative incentives imply 
EERx>EERm and production shifts to the right o f P*, to say Pm. This is 
defined as the ultra-EP strategy. (Bhagwati, 1988: 49)
Figure 4.2: Import-substitution and export-promotion
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From this figure it is apparent that import-substitution and export-promotion are 
necessarily substitutes and that export-promotion necessarily requires trade 
liberalisation. For example Bhagwati argued that a country can employ either an 
export-promotion or an import-substitution trade strategy but not both because 
resources can only be employed to produce either exportables or importables.30 Thus,
there is a built-in negative relationship between EP and IS activities, and an IS 
strategy is necessarily an anti-export one. If  importable-goods production 
increases, exportable-goods production will have to decrease, and vice versa. 
Consequently, if  a country wants to promote exports, it will have to liberalise 
its import controls. (Liang, 1992: 451)
Such categorisation o f trade theories is more problematical than neoclassical writers 
recognise. The above approach is proven to be too simplistic to deal with the complex 
realities o f developing countries and displays logical inconsistencies. The 
complication arises from the narrow definition o f these strategies in the neoclassical 
approach.
First, to call neutrality o f incentives (EERx=EERm) export-promotion is 
contradictory since neutrality implies that neither sector is protected or promoted.31 
Furthermore, trade liberalisation and export-promotion should be separated from each 
other. Export-promotion, by definition, requires promotion o f exports and thus is not 
compatible with the free trade argument o f the neoclassical approach.32 Thus, it would 
be more convenient to classify policies as ‘import-substitution -  free trade -  export- 
promotion’ rather than ‘import-substitution -  export-promotion -  ultra export- 
promotion’. From the figure, it is clear that any point beyond P* towards B (which 
represents export-promotion or ultra-EP according to Bhagwati’s classification) is as
30 Bhagwati (1986 and 1988).
31 Moreover, neutrality o f incentives does not necessarily mean imports are not substituted since, as 
will be argued later on, exports and imports can be both protected and promoted. In this case, neutrality 
policy (EERx=EERm) means both sectors are equally protected and promoted.
32 Bhagwati tries to justify this classification by arguing that ‘export-promotion strategy came to be 
defined in the academic literature as the one with bias-free incentives simply because the empirical 
studies o f the four Far Eastern economies [...] strongly suggested that these successful outward- 
oriented developers were closer to neutrality than to a substantial positive bias in favour o f exports.’ 
[Bhagwati (1988: 32)] This argument, however, is not only logically inconsistent but also empirically 
flawed. Recent research has shown undeniably that these countries promoted exports.
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inefficient as import-substitution according to the logic o f neoclassical trade theory 
because market prices are distorted. Indeed, as Streeten (1982) argues, in its static 
form ‘[i]t is just as possible to have inefficient export policies as it is to have 
inefficient import-substitution.’33 Moving from an import-substitution strategy to an 
export-promotion strategy may eliminate some distortions but it may also create 
others. Thus, it can be argued that even though conceptually more accurate, Kruger’s 
approach is incompatible with the neoclassical approach.34 The ultra-EP strategy 
(what should be called export-promotion) is just a theoretical possibility, not a 
pertinent option, according to the basic tenets o f the neoclassical approach and 
contradicts the principles o f the theory. This simply means that export-promotion as 
well as import-substitution strategies make sense once the short-term, static approach 
of the neoclassical model is abandoned and a long-term dynamic perspective is 
adopted.
Once this important point is clarified, export-promotion strategy, like import- 
substitution strategy, is incompatible with the neoclassical approach. As non-free 
market (interventionist) policies, their relationship should be analysed from a more 
dynamic perspective. Since both policies require state intervention, they are 
structuralist in their nature. As they both require state intervention, it is possible to 
argue that they are compatible with each other and therefore should be seen as 
complements rather than substitutes. Many rightly argue that trade orientation in terms 
of the trade ratio should be divorced from trade liberalisation.35 As the ‘East Asian 
Miracle’ countries demonstrate, strong state intervention and outward trade 
orientation are not only compatible, but also state intervention is essential for a 
successful and sustainable outward trade orientation.36 They can be considered as
33 Streeten (1982: 162).
34 Bhagwati (1988: 33) who also argues in favour o f state intervention to promote exports, contradicts 
the basic logic o f his own theoretical argument. It is not clear in his argument why an import- 
substitution strategy should be harmful to the economy whereas export-promotion should be beneficial 
even though they both distort prices equally.
35 See for example Liang (1992) and Moreira (1995).
36 Schydlowsky (1984) went further than this and suggested that even comparative advantage theory 
should not be confused with either trade liberalisation or protection. He argues that ‘for a country to 
produce those things in which it has a comparative advantage means nothing more than that the 
country is doing what it can do best. [...]; it does not imply adoption o f free trade or the imposition o f  
protection.’ (Schydlowsky, 1984: 439)
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different levels o f the same development strategy. The static neoclassical perspective 
ignores this dynamic aspect o f trade orientation.
Moreover, even if  Balassa’s definition is accepted, outward-orientation in 
terms o f trade ratio should still be disassociated from trade liberalisation, because 
trade liberalisation does not guarantee more openness. When liberalised, an economy 
may become even more closed. It is apparent from figure 4.2 that a country’s 
openness in terms o f trade is determined by world prices when a country adopts 
liberalisation policies. This means that a country may adopt a liberalisation strategy 
(EP in the figure) and export less if  initial export-promotion policies are removed or if  
world prices change and shift nearer to point A. In the above figure, the world price 
line is drawn nicely to be tangent to the AB curve in the middle (point P*). World 
prices, however, might be tangent to the AB curve anywhere, i.e. at Pm or even closer 
to A.37 In this case liberalisation would mean no exports. Thus, many advocates o f 
export-promotion admit that ‘there is indeed an important role for government even in 
an export-promotion strategy.’38
Finally, as Liang (1992) shows, the production o f exportables does not 
necessarily require a reduction in the production o f importables once the two-sector 
model is replaced with a more realistic three-sector model. In a model where economy 
is divided into three sectors; exportables, importables and non-tradables, not only is it 
possible to promote both import-substitution and export-promotion,39 but it is also 
possible to have anti-import-substitution and anti-export-promotion policies which 
would benefit the non-tradables sector.
Liang also separates the ‘intended policy incentives’ from the ‘actual trade 
patterns’. He argues that ‘in a three-sector model, a positive import-substitution 
incentive does not always lead to an increase in the production o f importable 
(exportable) goods, as is the case in the two-sector model.’40 For example,
37 This is often the case for developing countries when, for example, a fall in the terms o f trade occurs 
as a result o f a fall in prices o f exportables.
38 Bhagwati (1986: 94).
39 ‘... with the home goods sector bearing the burden o f both import protection and export subsidy’ 
(Liang, 1992: 453)
40 Ibid.
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a forced increase o f exports combined with a sharp reduction o f imports, a 
pattern commonly seen in an austerity programme during the time o f balance 
o f payments crisis, does not represent positive incentives for either export- 
promotion or import-substitution activities. Under such an austerity program, 
there is no real increase o f export incentives and that kind o f ‘export at any 
cost’ is neither effective nor sustainable. (Liang, 1992: 453)
He then identifies five mutually exclusive incentive structures. In Figure 4.3, the 
horizontal axis represents the policy incentives (+) or disincentives (-) for import- 
substitution activities whereas the vertical axis indicates the policy incentives (+) or 
disincentives (-) for export activities. At the centre, the two incentives are neither 
positive nor negative.
Figure 4.3: Liang’s classification o f trade policies
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Quadrant 1 represents a pure export-promotion strategy where export activities are 
promoted while import activities are liberalised. This quadrant corresponds to 
Krueger’s export-promotion definition. Quadrant 2 represents coexistence o f positive 
incentives for import-substitution and export-promotion which Liang calls ‘protected 
export-promotion’. Here domestic firms are protected in their home markets, but 
encouraged to export and compete internationally. Quadrant 3 represents a bias
126
against export-promotion as well as a bias against import-substitution. Liang calls this 
‘de facto import promotion’ which is a ‘debt-led’ growth strategy that cannot be 
sustained in the long-run. Quadrant 4 represents a typical import-substitution regime 
where imports are restricted and exports are discouraged. The centre point represents 
Bhagwati’s definition of a neutral, free trade strategy.
A critique of L iang’s approach
Liang’s model is more realistic compared to Bhagwati’s two-sector model in that it 
allows a country to choose from a wide range o f policy options. However Liang’s 
model suffers from the following weaknesses.
First, his three-sector model suggests that a country can increase the 
production o f exportables without reducing the production o f importables if  the 
production o f non-tradables (home goods) is reduced. However, first, a reduction in 
the production o f non-tradables may not be possible. Second, if  it is possible it may 
not be desirable. Third, even if  possible and desirable there must be a limit to this and 
that limit could probably be consumed rather quickly. After the limit is reached, the 
possibility o f producing more tradables will be quickly exhausted. Thus, Bhagwati’s 
two-sector model where more exportables can only be produced by reducing the 
production o f importables will be relevant again. For tradables, however, there is no 
such limit. In theory, a country can reduce the production o f importables to zero and 
produce only exportables.
The reason why a reduction in the production o f home goods might be difficult 
is that the price elasticity o f demand o f the home goods might be rather high and 
therefore large price changes might be needed to prompt small quantity changes. 
Since home goods cannot be traded, any reduction in their production means a 
reduction in consumption, thus a change in consumption pattern. This may be 
undesirable, unnecessary or impossible. The benefits o f reducing the production of 
non-tradables to produce more tradables are not clear. This is not the case for 
tradables since a shift from importables to exportables does not require a change in the 
consumption pattern.
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Greenaway and Milner (1987), in an earlier article and using a similar three- 
sector model, rightly argue that when cross elasticities between tradables and home 
goods are considered, it may be impossible to promote both exports and import- 
substitutes. This is because an increase in the prices o f tradables (through import 
tariffs and export subsidies) will reduce the supply and increase the demand for home 
goods and thus increase the price o f home goods in relation to tradables and restore 
the initial relative prices. For example, a devaluation which increases the prices o f 
importables and exportables relative to home goods would promote production of 
both importables and exportables. Thus, a devaluation is the simplest way to 
implement both import-substitution and export-promotion strategies, assuming that all 
importables can be produced domestically. This, however, cannot be sustained for 
long since it causes domestic inflation and restores the initial level o f relative prices. 
Liang only considers cross elasticities o f tradables against each other and ignores it for 
home goods.41
Greenaway and Milner, however, go to another extreme and argue that 
implementation o f both import-substitution and export-promotion strategies will be 
unsuccessful because such diverse and conflicting policies neutralise each other and 
leave the final outcome unaltered. Even if  their general equilibrium model is assumed 
to be accurate, this argument can be discredited by the following example. Greenaway 
and Milner’s arguments (and this is also true for Liang) are primarily concerned with 
the relative price changes of the protected/promoted sectors. It is however, 
theoretically possible to promote sectors without changing relative prices and thus 
avoid all the complications involved due to substitution and cross price elasticities. 
Given the free market relative price levels, a non-distortionary unified tax on all 
sectors (which would leave the relative prices unaltered) would raise funds to 
subsidise/promote import-substituting and export-promoting sectors without changing 
the relative prices of the promoted sectors. Since free market determined relative 
prices do not change, we do not need to be concerned with the cross elasticities 
between tradables and home goods.
41 Greenaway and Milner, however, use a general equilibrium model which makes the use o f protection 
or promotion unnecessary to start with.
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Moreover, under free market conditions export-promoting and import- 
substituting sectors are considered to have less than average profitability by definition. 
Their profitability might be increased by transferring some part o f the profitability of 
the home goods sector without reducing its supply since the home goods sector is still 
the most profitable sector.
What is more, Liang and Greenaway & Milner consider the sectors as a whole: 
export-promotion involves the whole export sector that is promoted and import- 
substitution means that the whole import competing sector is protected. This does not 
allow for export-promotion and import-substitution within the sectors. Export- 
promotion does not, however, necessarily imply the promotion o f all export sectors. If  
all export sectors were to be promoted, a devaluation would be enough. Devaluations, 
however, are non-discriminatory. The aim of a strategy that promotes exports without 
devaluations is to discriminate among the sectors and to promote only selected ones. 
For example, profitable traditional exports can be taxed to promote non-traditional 
exports. The overall promotion o f export sectors, such as through devaluation, does 
not discriminate between profitable and unprofitable export sectors. The promotion of 
exports would increase exports not only by increasing the profitability o f existing 
export items but also by making other items profitable to export. Thus, devaluation 
would make existing export items more profitable and unprofitable items just 
profitable to export. When there exists a wide range o f items to export, their 
profitability will be different. Export-promotion in the form of selective subsidies 
would increase exports without a devaluation o f the currency. In this case the export 
sector is financed by other areas o f the export sector rather than through import- 
substituting or non-tradable (home) sector. Thus, in reality it is possible to promote 
certain industries in all three sectors by financing them with the proceeds from 
profitable industries.
A second problem with both approaches is the terminology used. The concepts 
o f exportables and importables are rather vague and are derived from static 
comparative advantage theory where all countries have comparative advantage in the 
production o f some commodities and comparative disadvantage in others. In the 
dynamic case, however, the distinction between importables and exportables becomes 
ambiguous. The whole point o f protection might be to turn importables into
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domestically produced commodities or if  possible into exportables.42 When the aim of 
a country is to turn importable commodities into exportables, the arguments that treat 
import-substitution and export-promotion as mutually exclusive alternative strategies 
lose their meaning. In static comparative advantage theory exportables and 
importables are seen as exagonously determined and to export more, exportables must 
be promoted. To promote domestic production o f importables, they must be protected. 
In this case, export-promotion only refers to those commodities that are classified 
under ‘exportables’ while import-substitution only refers to commodities classified 
under ‘importables’. Once the relationship between static comparative advantage 
theory and this categorisation (importables and exportables) is understood, however, 
there is no point in talking about import-substitution and export-promotion since free 
trade is the best strategy. However, the aim o f protection and promotion might be to 
turn importables into exportables rather than to increase the production o f already 
‘exportable’ items. In this case, the distinction between importables and exportables 
as well as between import-substitution and export-promotion disappears.
As argued earlier, once trade is seen as a dynamic process where today’s 
decisions determine tomorrow’s competitiveness, exportables and importables cannot 
be taken as given but are created in the development process. Static comparative 
advantage theory suggests that specialisation is based on the assumed comparative 
advantages o f today. The concepts o f exportables and importables are strictly related 
to static comparative advantage theory. Once static comparative advantage theory is 
rejected, the concepts cannot be used for analytical purposes.43 Although Liang’s 
arguments add another dimension to static comparative advantage theory, they do not 
remove its static nature.
Third, both Liang’s and Greenaway & Milner’s arguments are based on the 
assumption that all o f the imported commodities can be produced domestically. 
Imported commodities, however, can be divided into two categories. The first 
includes those items that cannot be produced domestically and the second includes
42 When, for example, devaluations are used to promote exports, not only do already ‘exportable’ 
commodities become more profitable but also (assuming that they can be produced domestically) some 
of the previously ‘importable’ commodities may become profitable to export. The increase in exports 
does not usually come from increased production o f the same ‘exportable’ commodities but from new 
commodities that become exportable.
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those items that can only be produced more expensively. An overall, non-selective 
protectionist policy, such as a devaluation, would harm a country by making the 
imported commodities more expensive if  it fails to turn some o f the imported 
commodities into exportable commodities as they cannot be produced domestically. 
In many developing countries, for example, the capital goods sector is either small or 
non-existent and these goods need to be imported. One way to encourage domestic 
investment by keeping the price o f capital low is to have multiple exchange rates or an 
‘overvalued’ (compared to ‘market determined’) exchange rate rather than to rely on 
competitive devaluations.
Fourth, both Liang’s and Greenaway & Milner’s arguments are based on the 
assumption o f full employment o f resources. That is why the production o f tradables 
can only be increased by reducing the production o f non-tradables. But when 
unemployment is allowed, the production o f tradables as well as non-tradables can be 
increased at the same time. If  this is the case, however, the relationship between 
import-substitution and export-promotion is rather different than that which is 
depicted in the above models. Here it will be argued that not only are import- 
substitution and export-promotion compatible, but also the production o f importables 
(import-substitution) and the importation o f importables are not mutually exclusive, 
not at least after a certain level of international competitiveness is achieved.
A low-income country may have only few ‘exportables’ and many 
‘importables’. If  one allows for less than full employment and rejects the assertion of 
comparative advantage theory that all countries have at least some commodities to 
export at all times, then it is reasonable to argue that a country can implement import- 
substitution and export-promotion policies simultaneously. As argued earlier, 
‘importables’ can be divided into items that cannot be produced domestically and 
other items that can only be produced less efficiently. The importation o f items that 
cannot be produced domestically may not be avoided, particularly if  these items are 
essential for domestic production. If  at the earlier stage o f economic development, a 
country cannot export enough to import necessary items which cannot be produced 
domestically, the production o f other ‘importables’ and ‘exportables’ can be increased
43 ‘Exported goods’ and ‘imported goods’ should be used as alternatives to ‘exportables’ and 
‘importables’.
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without reducing the production o f home goods. The country could try to develop 
competitiveness in some commodities by promoting exports and at the same time try 
to produce more ‘importables’ by protecting its domestic market since ‘importables’ 
cannot be imported because o f a lack o f sufficient exports and foreign currency. In 
this case, import restrictions might be necessary not only to encourage domestic 
production but also to discourage luxury imports. At this stage, export-promotion and 
import-substitution are adopted simultaneously. The production o f exportables and 
importables can be increased together either by reducing non-tradables (Liang) or 
without reducing the production o f non-tradables if  resources are not fully employed.
To sum up, at the beginning o f the development period, a country with little 
‘exportables’ and many ‘importables’ may find itself unable to import ‘importables’ 
because it cannot export enough. On the one hand, the production o f ‘exportables’ 
and on the other hand, the production o f ‘importables’ must be increased since there is 
not enough currency for necessary imports. In this process, some ‘importables’ may 
become exported or non-traded goods due to foreign currency shortages. Ironically, in 
this process o f increasing both ‘exportables’ and ‘importables’ (adopting both import- 
substitution and export-promotion), the country can also increase the importation o f 
‘importables’ as its foreign currency reserves accumulate.
When (or if) a country increases its competitiveness in international markets 
and secures sufficient exports, it does not have to (but it can for full employment 
purposes) ‘import-substitute’ everything since this would mean a permanent trade 
surplus. To secure full employment, it may try to export as much as possible and 
import as little as possible.44 But this will mean a permanent trade surplus and would 
be unsustainable internationally because other countries would retaliate against such 
actions. I f  the country decides to maintain a balanced trade when enough exports are 
secured, imports can be liberalised since a foreign exchange shortage no longer exists. 
But trade (import) liberalisation first requires a solid base o f competitiveness. In this 
case, supporting import-substituting and export-promoting sectors may help the home 
goods sector by reducing the cost o f imported commodities (such as machinery) 
which might be required in the production o f home goods.
44 This would be a sort o f mercantilism. Taiwan, for example, pursues such a policy. Taiwan is said to 
have the largest foreign reserves in the world.
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Taken together, this means that trade liberalisation can only be possible when 
international competitiveness is secured. But in ever competitive international 
markets, long-term competitiveness can never be guaranteed and therefore even 
industrial countries are inclined to be protectionist. There might be times when 
countries may adopt more liberal trade policies, but free trade as described by 
neoclassical economists can exist only in theory.
4.4. EX PORT PESSIM ISM
Development economics was bom in an atmosphere o f export pessimism at the end o f 
the World War II.45 Export pessimism, which was put forward by Prebish, Singer, 
Myrdal, Hirschman and Nurkse, argued that there existed an unequal distribution o f 
the benefits o f international trade and diminishing external opportunities for 
developing countries. These ideas were very influential among post-war intellectual 
thinkers and policymakers. Proponents o f export pessimism put forward two broad 
and important arguments involving the demand elasticity o f exports from developing 
countries and growing protectionism in developed countries.
Prebish and Singer were concerned with a structural tendency for the terms o f 
trade o f primary products (the main exports o f developing countries) to fall relative to 
manufactured products. The underlying economic argument in explaining this 
tendency can be divided into four sections: 1. Primary products have low price 
elasticities o f demand and supply which make exporters o f these commodities more 
vulnerable to external shocks and fluctuations. 2. Demand for primary products 
expands less than for manufactured commodities (particularly agricultural products - 
Engel’s Law) since primary commodities also have low income elasticities o f demand 
and thus total income earned by exporting these commodities will tend to fall 
relatively. The tendency towards a balance o f trade deficit, which is caused by the 
relative demand fall, may also cause further deterioration in the net barter terms o f 
trade (NBTT). 3. The technological superiority o f the industrial countries means that 
the prices o f their manufactured exports embody a rent element for innovation. 4. The 
monopolistic structure o f labour and commodity markets in industrial countries means
45 Bhagwati (1988: 27).
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that the results o f technological progress and increased productivity generates higher 
wages and profits rather than lower prices. In developing countries, where labour is 
less organised and markets are more competitive, however, increased productivity is 
more likely to lower prices, benefiting foreign consumers rather than domestic 
producers.
Nurkse put more emphasis on the new technologies that may economise on the 
use o f primary commodities and may shift demand from natural products to synthetic 
substitutes. He also argued that markets in industrialised countries simply cannot 
accommodate imports from developing countries on a sufficient scale. As economic 
development and exports accelerate, industrial countries become increasingly more 
protectionist, particularly against developing countries. He argued that as long as 
developing countries’ exports remained heavily dependent on primary products and 
that the rate o f growth o f industrial countries’ demand for primary products declined, 
developing countries would find it increasingly difficult to sustain their export and 
economic growth rates. Nurkse concluded that ‘it is no longer so certain that the less 
industrial countries can rely on economic growth being induced from the outside 
through an expansion o f world demand for their exports o f primary commodities.’46
A more sophisticated version o f export pessimism in terms o f protectionism by 
developed countries argues that developed countries may be able to adjust to the 
export potential of manufactures from developing countries in the long-run but this 
adjustment will not be rapid enough.47 A growing number o f non-tariff barriers, which 
replaced tariffs in developed countries, are considered to be evidence which supports 
this argument.
The ‘fallacies o f composition’ is another important argument produced by 
export pessimists who argue that there is a limit to the level o f developing countries’ 
manufactured exports which can be absorbed by developed countries. Even if  some 
developing countries (i.e. ‘East Asian Miracle’ countries) can succeed in increasing 
their manufactured exports substantially and rely upon outward-orientation strategies, 
for all or a large number o f countries (particularly larger ones) it would probably be 
self-defeating. This could occur as a result o f the elasticity o f export demand for
46 Nurkse (1961: 246).
47 See Yeats (1977), Laird and Yeats (1988) and Winters, Nogues and Olechowski (1985).
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developing countries’ exports and a possible increase in developed countries’ 
protectionism. Faini and Clavijo (1992) have argued that the elasticity o f export 
demand for developing countries is smaller than the same elasticity for an individual 
country. Thus, ‘export competition occurs to a large extent among developing 
countries. As a result, exchange rate policies lose, globally, much o f their 
effectiveness and demand from industrial countries is again a major determinant of 
LDCs’ export performance.’48
The protectionist version o f export pessimism argues that a substantial 
increase in developing countries’ export activity which targets developed countries 
would be met by more protectionist measures (‘neo-protectionism’) by developed 
countries. This is particularly important given the rise o f trading blocs, such as the 
European Union and others.49 Thus what is plausible for one (or some) is not 
necessarily plausible for all. That is why, it is argued, the experiences o f the East 
Asian Miracle countries cannot be generalised or used to produce the same results for 
other developing countries. Cline (1982) analysed the consequences o f export 
expansion o f developing countries on the scale o f the East Asian countries in a 
simulation exercise and concluded that ‘it would result in untenable market 
penetration into industrial countries.’50 A hypothetical expansion o f exports from 
developing countries at the same level as the ‘Four Tigers’51 would mean a seven-fold 
expansion o f total exports from developing countries and a rise in their share o f the 
market for manufactured imports from 1.7 to 60.6 percent for all seven industrial 
countries.52 Lutz and Singer (1994) also provide empirical evidence to reject the 
‘small country’ and ‘exogenous traded-goods prices’ assumptions and argued that 
terms o f trade considerations should be taken into account when several countries 
liberalise their trade simultaneously.
Another argument for export pessimism was put forward by Lewis (1980). He 
argued that falling economic growth rates in developed countries, which once 
increased demand for developing countries’ primary commodities, would have a
48 Faini and Clavijo (1992: 866).
49 According to the Financial Times (1996) more than 100 regional trade arrangements have been 
formed, 29 since 1992 and almost all o f the roughly 120 members o f the World Trade Organisation 
belong to one or more o f them.
50 Cline (1982: 88).
51 Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.
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negative impact on developing countries’ export performances. Thus, South-South 
trade now has to be an alternative to South-North trade.
In conclusion, all the export pessimism arguments suggest that 
underdevelopment in low-income countries is largely the result o f their dependence 
on primary and agricultural exports, and the solution is to replace these commodities 
with industrial commodities through import-substitution policies behind protective 
barriers. ‘[T]he structure o f the economies o f the developing countries had to be 
changed in fundamental ways if  they were to compete on equal terms in the world 
markets, and a market mechanism could not bring about this sort o f structural 
change.’53
The critiques of export pessimism
Critics o f export pessimism are not in short supply. Their argument is not only that 
‘[t]he export pessimism following Word War II was to prove unjustified by the 
unfolding reality’54 but also that ‘[t]he trade pessimism that underlay the import- 
substituting industrialisation policy has turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy: 
neglect o f exports has led to poor export performance.’55 Including the 1950s and 
1960s, world trade has grown much faster than world production and countries like 
the ‘Four Tigers’ have proven that ‘the economies that shifted quickly to an export- 
promotion strategy experienced substantial improvements in their export 
performance.’56
The critics o f export pessimism challenge the empirical validity o f the 
declining terms o f trade argument. Prebish’s work was criticised on a number o f 
points.57 First, he based his argument only on the NBTT of the UK which was not 
representative o f the industrial countries as a whole. Second, the primary commodities 
that were imported from industrialised countries were not separated. Third, exports 
were valued fo .b .  whereas imports were valued c.i.f, thus the improvement in the
52 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States.
53 Bruton (1998: 906).
54 Bhagwati (1988: 28).
55 Streeten (1981: 214).
56 Bhagwati (1988: 28).
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UK’s NBTT could be due to a fall in transport costs. Fourth, quality improvements in 
manufactured commodities were ignored. Schydlowsky (1984), argued that ‘the 
historical evidence regarding long-run decline in the terms o f trade o f primary 
producers is very much in doubt. Price trends o f different primary products are so 
divergent as to render any broad generalisation virtually impossible.’58 Schydlowsky 
also suggested that ‘even if  the historical record o f declining terms o f trade could be 
firmly established, its usefulness as a guide to future price trends is doubtful. This is 
because the recent popular observation that the world is entering an era o f increasing 
resource scarcity argues for a break with past trends in favour of improving terms of 
trade for primary producers.,59
Streeten (1981) argued that not only is there no evidence o f a secular 
deterioration o f the NBTT of primary products in relation to manufactured products 
but also that the measured NBTT between them tends to overstate the deterioration or 
understate the improvement.60 This is due to three reasons: 1. Product innovation and 
quality improvements occur mainly in industrial products and thus what appears as a 
worsening o f the terms o f trade reflects in many cases new and better industrial 
products. 2. New industrial products subject to increasing returns often have initially 
high prices and become cheaper as they become more plentiful. 3. Export price 
statistics o f agricultural products o f developing countries are often based on 
commodity markets in London or New York. As a result, lower freight costs 
combined with constant f.o.b. prices will show up, misleadingly, as lower prices of 
agricultural products. He also suggested that uneven distribution o f the benefits of 
trade due to the movement in relative prices can be remedied by more inflation or an 
appreciation o f the exchange rate which would change the relative prices o f these 
commodities in the periphery.
Grilli and Yang (1988) argued that a decline in the NBTT for primary 
commodities was largely the result o f rapid productivity increase. Panoutsopoulos 
(1992) also recognised the decline in NBTT but argues that ‘countries that stimulated 
exports o f primary products have benefited from increases in long-term real earnings’
57 See Spraos (1980: 108-119) and Tandon (1985: 156) for details o f these critiques and their 
evaluation.
58 Schydlowsky (1984: 447).
59 Ibid.
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since ‘declining prices o f primary exports have frequently been offset by improving 
income (and single factoral) terms o f trade.’61
Critics o f export pessimism are not impressed by the argument o f rising 
protectionism in the developed countries either. Bhagwati (1988) argued that it is 
worth looking at the actual trade flows. He suggested that, adjusting for the income 
effects o f the last recession, it is not clear that the actual protectionist effect on trade 
has been sufficiently severe to make us fear that the world trade order has begun to 
collapse.
Streeten (1981) argued that it is not consistent to argue that the rich countries, 
on the one hand, condemn the poor countries to remain producers o f agricultural 
commodities and, on the other hand, that they do not buy enough o f these 
commodities because they want to protect their own producers. He also argued that a 
reduction in agricultural protection for advanced countries may hurt developing 
countries since first, it may increase world food prices by reducing production and 
thus food importing poor countries may lose, and second, an accelerated shift o f 
resources into manufacturing in the advanced countries might make manufactured 
exports from developing countries less competitive and industrialisation more 
difficult. Thus, he argued, if  trade pessimists are right in their argument that reducing 
dependency on agricultural exports and promoting industrialisation would benefit 
developing countries in the long-run, they should have recommended even higher 
agricultural protectionism in the industrial countries which, in turn, would give the 
poor countries the incentives to industrialise.
Many critics o f export pessimism admit that industrialisation is necessary for 
successful economic development and for a successful and sustainable outward- 
orientation. They argue, however, that export pessimism arguments regarding the 
level o f industrialisation in developing countries is not acceptable because many 
developing countries have managed to increase the share o f manufactures in their total 
exports.62
Bhagwati notes that the post-war period was marked by a dramatic shift in the 
export composition o f developing countries toward manufactures. He argues that
60 Streeten (1981: 216).
61 Panoutsopoulos (1992: 14).
62 See Panoutsopoulos (1992).
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[t]he most compelling aggregate statistics show that during the prosperous 
1960s, developing countries’ exports o f manufactures grew nearly twice as fast 
as the industries’ income. The expansion o f developing countries’ trade over 
the 1950s and 1960s occurred as protection in the industrial countries was 
diminishing sharply as a consequence o f first the elimination o f quotas and 
then the reduction in tariffs. Even during the troubled 1970s, developing 
countries’ exports o f manufactures grew more than four times as rapidly as the 
industrial countries’ income. (Bhagwati, 1988: 30)
The fallacies o f composition argument was also targeted by the critics. Martin (1993), 
for instance, criticised Faini and Clavijo’s arguments for adopting a partial 
equilibrium model ‘even though the problem [was] patently general equilibrium in 
nature and involves interlinkages between imports and exports.’63 Hill and 
Suphachalasai (1992) dismissed export pessimism arguments by focusing on 
Indonesia and Thailand. They argued that even under ‘multi-fibre arrangements’ these 
countries managed to increase their exports. Hughes and Waelbrock (1981) dismissed 
Cline’s idea o f a link between increased market share o f developing countries exports 
and protectionism in developed countries by arguing that such a link is not so strong 
since the market share o f developing countries in many important export products is 
very small. Panoutsopoulos (1992: 14) also criticised Cline’s model for failing to 
incorporate changes in the composition o f demand and supply in either the developing 
or the industrial countries and failing to take into account rising real wages in rapidly 
growing developing countries.
Bhagwati (1986 and 1988) was not impressed with the fallacies of 
composition arguments either. His criticism was based on the following reasons: 1. 
Export-promotion strategy simply implies eliminating the bias against exports. There 
is no reason to expect that all developing countries will increase their exports to the 
same share o f GNP as Korea or Taiwan. 2. The share o f developing countries’ exports 
in developed countries’ markets is relatively small. Thus, absorptive capacity is not a 
plausible source o f worry. 3. Policymakers usually focus on already existing markets
63 Martin (1993: 160).
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and this creates export pessimism. When import-substitution policies are removed and 
incentives to export exist there is an enormous capacity o f wholly unforeseen markets 
to develop. 4. Export pessimists ignore the potential for intra-industry specialisation 
which leads to increased mutual trade in similar products rather than to massive 
reductions in the scale o f output in industry groups, as trade opportunities open. 5. 
Trade possibilities among the developing countries should not be ignored.
Poon (1994) recognises the difficulties that might be caused by unfavourable 
demand conditions. He dismisses export pessimism, however, by arguing that tropical 
countries can offset unfavourable demand conditions by being competitive in their 
exports. Lewis’s argument on the influence o f declining economic growth in 
developed countries was dismissed by Riedel (1984 and 1988) who argued that the 
export performances o f developing countries are determined by supply rather than 
demand factors. Many others argued that developing countries’ exports were in fact 
highly responsive to price changes and thus competition among developing countries 
would not only redistribute the same amount o f exports among them but also would 
increase total exports.64
The counter arguments
The critics o f export pessimism raised important issues which were aimed at 
weakening the arguments o f the export pessimists. Nevertheless, in this section it will 
be argued that the theoretical foundations o f export pessimism is, in general, correct 
and that the empirical evidence supports the argument.
The arguments on the NBTT are inconclusive and there is no agreement 
among economists about whether there is a long-term tendency for the prices o f 
primary products to decline. The majority o f recent empirical works, however, seem 
to support the declining NBTT argument, particularly for the post-1980 period.65 
Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) argue that the ratio o f primary product prices to those
64 See Rittenberg (1986) and Moran (1988).
65 See J. Spraos (1980), Malhotra (1988), Lucke (1993), Sapsford and Balasubramanyam (1994), Gafar 
(1995), Karshenas (1998). Cuddington (1992) on the other hand argues that the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis should not be considered as a universal phenomenon. Interestingly, even some World Bank 
and IMF publications recognised the relevance o f the declining NBTT argument (see Sapsford and 
Singer (1998) for details).
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o f manufactured goods was stable from 1925 to 1980, after which there was a 
significant fall.66 They argue, however, that generalisations about the relative prices o f 
primary products as a group might be misleading since separate component series 
(metal, food, non-food) display dissimilarities. Karshenas (1998) argues that primary 
commodity exporters generally witnessed violent adverse terms o f trade movements 
during the 1980s.
Whatever the empirical validity o f the declining NBTT argument, it can be 
argued that the logic o f the arguments still holds. In other words, even if  it is proven 
that the NBTT is not declining for the products o f primary and agricultural producers, 
this does not invalidate the falling terms o f trade argument itself for the reasons set 
out in the following pages.
First, Schydlowsky’s argument on the terms o f trade for primary commodities 
(that increasing scarcity in the availability o f the primary products may increase their 
terms o f trade) is overoptimistic, if  not misleading. The future is unknown and even 
though one cannot rule out the possibility o f an increase in the prices o f such products 
(particularly non-renewable ones), it remains as a small theoretical possibility. As 
Nurkse (1953) argues, the possibility of new technologies (such as new recycling 
techniques or a shift from natural to synthetic materials) which may reduce demand 
even further for primary commodities is perhaps a more realistic scenario. For 
example, since the invention o f synthetic rubber, absolute demand for natural rubber 
has fallen.
Second, one cannot realistically expect the NBTT for primary commodities to 
decline forever. There must be a limit to this decline, and an absence o f a further 
decline cannot be evidence against the theory. Indeed Cuddington and Urzua (1989) 
argue that ‘primary commodity prices (relative to manufactures) experienced an 
abrupt drop after 1920. Apart from this one-time structural shift, however, there is no 
evidence o f an ongoing, continual downtrend in the relative price o f primary goods.’67 
Whether or not there is a further tendency for primary commodity prices to decline, 
the fact remains that the NBTT did not recover from its sharp drop after 1920 and that 
the dominant feature o f primary commodities is their low value-added. Therefore,
66 Reinhart and Wickham (1994) confirm this findings and add that this weakness in commodity prices 
is mostly secular, stressing the need for export diversification.
67 Cuddington and Urzua (1989: 441).
141
specialisation in the production o f such commodities is not advisable for developing 
countries.
Third, the NBTT, which only compares the prices o f commodities, must be 
separated from the factoral terms o f trade (FTT) which takes productivity increase 
into account. There are two types o f FTT: single factoral terms o f trade (SFTT) and 
double factoral terms of trade (DFTT). The formulas for these are as follows:
SFTT = (Px.Zx)/Pm and DFTT = (Px.Zx) / (Pm.Zm)
where Px and Pm are export and import prices, Zx and Zm are indices o f productivity 
in the production o f exports and imports. The DFTT can also be written as
DFTT = (Px/Pm).(Zx/Zm),
in terms o f the relative prices (or NBTT) and relative productivity changes. Normally, 
relative prices must change according to relative productivity changes. For example, if  
productivity in export items increases, the price o f export items would decrease in the 
same proportion to leave DFTT unchanged. If  export prices do not decrease according 
to the productivity increase, DFTT would increase. In other words, simple 
observations o f the NBTT do not provide any meaningful results because the causes 
o f the change in the relative prices o f primary and industrial commodities may take 
different forms. A fall in export prices because o f a productivity increase is a rather 
different thing than a fall in export prices because o f a demand fall. In this sense, a fall 
in the terms o f trade due to a productivity increase must be separated from a fall in the 
terms o f trade due to demand deficiency. This means that the NBTT for primary 
commodities in relation to manufacturing may (and should since productivity increase 
in manufacturing is assumed to be larger than in the primary sector) increase due to a 
productivity increase in manufacturing. However, the DFTT may decrease if  prices 
for manufactures decline less than the productivity increase. Indeed, Sarkar (1994) 
argues that technical progress in the South has a declining impact on the Southern 
NBTT while technical progress in the North does not have a similar impact on the 
Northern NBTT. In the absence o f an increase in the NBTT for primary commodities
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the fact remains that the DFTT might be decreasing and consequently the benefits o f 
trade may be unequally distributed. Thus, Streeten was right in arguing that ‘in the 
world economy there are forces at work that make for an uneven distribution o f the 
gains from trade and economic progress generally, so that the lion’s share goes to the 
lions, while the poor lambs are themselves swallowed up in the process.’68
Fourth, as argued above a decline in the terms o f trade for primary and 
agricultural commodities may come from a productivity increase or demand decrease 
which have different effects. Moreover, a terms o f trade decline for such commodities 
due to a productivity increase may overlap with a relative demand fall (if these 
commodities are assumed to have inelastic demand) which would aggravate the fall in 
the terms o f trade. If  demand is restricted, any increase in productivity may reduce the 
relative prices by increasing production beyond total demand. This means that efforts 
to improve the productivity o f primary goods export industries are self-defeating.
Fifth, a demand fall for primary commodities may take two forms. The first is 
a short-run demand shock while the second is a long-run continuous demand decline. 
Even if  there is not a long-run tendency for the terms o f trade to fall for a particular 
primary commodity, the nature o f primary commodity prices involves sharp 
fluctuations that can be very damaging to an economy.69 As can be seen from table 4.1 
and figure 4.4(a), NBTT for manufactured goods exporters fluctuate less than for 
primary commodity exporters.
Table 4.1: NBTT instability index (1968-93)
Agriculture Primary Metal Manufacture
172 213 315 100
Note: The NBTT are calculated for 26 years for the major producer countries for the above 
commodities. Thus the above figures do not refer to commodities themselves but major producer 
countries which are reported in table A4.1. Fluctuation in the NBTT index is calculated by averaging 
absolute values o f changes and then indexed to manufacture.
68 Streeten (1981: 217).
69 Even though some recent research confirms this argument [see J. Love (1992), M. Lutz (1994) and 
D. Dawe (1996)], the causes and impacts o f the terms o f trade and export instability are controversial 
issues and the empirical evidence is rather mixed and inconclusive. See Athukorala and Huynh (1987) 
for a literature survey on the causes and impacts o f export instability.
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In relation to the long-run general demand fall (relative or absolute) for a particular 
commodity, Liang (1992), for example, argues that sectors differ in their market 
characteristics and growth potentials.
The low cost sectors may not coincide with the sectors with high growth 
potentials. [...] For most developing countries, their comparative advantages 
are typically found in the export o f traditional commodities whose demand is 
often inelastic and sluggish in expanding. Developing countries face 
comparative disadvantages in their import-competing, manufacturing sectors; 
these are precisely the industries where income and price elasticity o f demand 
are high, technological progress is rapid, and labour productivity increases 
fast. Liang (1992: 456)
Relative demand for agricultural products falls as economic development takes place. 
As agricultural productivity increases, given a constant level o f demand, the necessary 
labour force to produce the same amount o f production decreases. This process forces 
rural labour to migrate towards urban areas, in search for employment. 
Transformation o f a country from rural to urban is inevitable and can be very painful. 
The faster the productivity increase on the land, the faster is the transformation.70 This 
transformation may be relatively easier in a country where there is a dynamic 
manufacturing sector. However this is not so for countries that are specialised in 
agriculture and where there is no dynamic manufacturing sector to absorb these 
surplus workers. When relative demand falls for agricultural commodities in 
international markets, all agriculture producing countries may first try to capture a 
larger market share by price competition. But since the market is not big enough for 
all producers, some will lose out.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrate these obvious facts. Table 4.2(a) shows that 
the share o f agriculture in total exports is lower everywhere. Table 4.3(a) shows the 
share o f agriculture and primary commodity producer countries’ total exports in total
70 The reason that the European Union has such high subsidies for agriculture is this fast productivity 
increase. When productivity on land increases very fast, rural workers and farmers are released from 
land. If the urban sector is unable to accommodate them quickly (given their lack o f skills for
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Figure 4.4(a): Net barter terms of trade (NBTT) for manufactures, metal, primary
commodities and agriculture exporting countries
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Figure 4.4(b): Net barter terms o f trade (NBTT) for metal, primary commodities and 
agriculture exporting countries, relative to manufactures
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employment in the urban sector), there will be considerable misery. The idea is to subsidise agriculture 
and keep people employed until there is time for this transformation to take place less painfully.
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Table 4.2(a): Agriculture exports as a percentage o f total exports, by region and
income group
World Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Latin
America
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Asia
&
Pacific
European
Union
1961 26.0 19.6 50.0 47.9 69.4 43.7 15.0
1970 16.5 12.8 32.8 43.7 49.6 23.5 11.7
1980 11.6 11.3 12.3 27.7 19.9 7.7 11.3
1990 9.3 8.8 11.1 26.4 19.8 7.5 10.4
1993 8.9 8.8 9.3 23.9 19.4 6.5 10.9
Source: FAO, SOFA Database (1994)
Table 4.2(b): Agriculture exports as a percentage o f total world agricultural exports,
by region and income group
World Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Latin
America
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Asia
&
Pacific
European
Union
1961 100 59.3 40.7 15.0 7.8 15.2 20.8
1970 100 63.0 37.0 14.7 7.5 12.9 27.2
1980 100 68.9 31.1 13.6 4.4 12.4 34.0
1990 100 72.4 27.6 10.8 2.7 13.6 44.4
1993 100 72.2 27.8 9.9 2.2 15.3 44.5
Source: FAO, SOFA Database (1994)
Table 4.2(c): Total exports as a percentage o f total world exports, by region and
income group
World Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Latin
America
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Asia
&
Pacific
European
Union
1961 100 78.8 21.2 8.2 2.9 9.0 36.1
1970 100 81.3 18.7 5.6 2.5 9.1 38.3
1980 100 70.8 29.2 5.7 2.5 18.7 34.8
1990 100 76.8 23.2 3.8 1.3 16.9 39.9
1993 100 73.4 26.6 3.7 1.0 21.1 36.4
Source: FAO, SOFA Database (1994)
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Table 4.3(a): Share o f agriculture and primary commodity exporter countries’ total 
exports in total world exports, (percent)
Agriculture exporters Primary commodity exporters
Exports 
(Current prices)
Exports 
(Constant prices)
3.27 2.58
3.17 2.33
1.87 1.57
1.86 1.49
1.44 1.32
1.15 1.11
1.13 1.19
Exports 
(Current prices)
Exports 
(Constant prices)
1968 1.81 1.39
1970 1.71 1.29
1975 1.28 0.83
1980 1.19 0.83
1985 1.03 0.78
1990 0.75 0.70
1993 0.71 0.65
Source: World Bank Stars Database
Table 4.3(b): Trade ratio o f agriculture and primary commodity exporters, (percent)
Agriculture exporters Primary commodity exporters
Exports/GDP 
(Current prices)
Exports/GDP 
(Constant prices)
Exports/GDP 
(Current prices)
Exports/GDP 
(Constant prices)
1968 8.74 8.47 16.35 16.87
1970 9.17 8.63 17.44 17.17
1975 9.84 6.07 14.74 12.95
1980 12.37 7.33 18.32 15.07
1985 10.14 8.74 16.99 15.20
1990 10.34 9.91 16.31 15.86
1993 6.91 8.88 13.71 17.51
Source: World Bank Stars Database
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Table 4.4(a): Trade ratio and the net barter terms of trade (NBTT), by income group
X/GDP
current
World
X/GDP
constant
NBTT
1968 9.6 10.4 1.00
1970 10.4 11.5 1.01
1975 14.3 12.1 1.02
1980 17.7 14.0 0.98
1985 15.3 14.5 0.96
1990 16.2 16.5 1.00
1993 15.2 17.7 1.00
Oil exporters
X/GDP X/GDP NBTT
current constant
1968 23.5 58.5 0.35
1970 22.5 61.5 0.35
1975 35.8 43.5 0.97
1980 42.7 37.3 1.56
1985 25.3 22.2 1.60
1990 32.4 27.3 1.08
1993 27.3 31.3 0.88
Middle-income (non-oil)
X/GDP
current
X/GDP
constant
NBTT
1968 9.3 11.1 1.24
1970 9.5 11.0 1.30
1975 10.7 9.2 1.34
1980 14.9 12.5 1.16
1985 17.6 16.4 1.06
1990 16.3 19.4 1.01
1993 15.9 23.1 0.99
Upper-middle-income (non-oil)
X/GDP
current
X/GDP
constant
NBTT
1968 8.3 9.6 1.26
1970 8.4 9.6 1.33
1975 9.6 8.5 1.30
1980 14.2 12.1 1.14
1985 18.0 16.9 1.06
1990 15.6 19.4 1.00
1993 15.1 22.8 0.99
Source: World Bank Stars Database
World (non-oil) 
X/GDP X/GDP NBTT 
current constant
1968 9.2 9.0 1.13
1970 10.0 9.9 1.13
1975 13.2 11.1 1.02
1980 16.0 13.1 0.92
1985 14.7 14.2 0.92
1990 15.7 16.1 0.99
1993 14.8 17.2 1.01
Low-income (non-oil)
X/GDP
current
X/GDP
constant
NBTT
1968 6.2 11.0 1.32
1970 5.6 9.4 1.41
1975 6.8 9.2 1.18
1980 9.4 9.6 1.13
1985 8.5 9.9 1.06
1990 12.3 11.1 1.00
1993 15.3 12.4 1.01
Lower-middle-income (non-oil)
X/GDP
current
X/GDP
constant
NBTT
1968 13.1 17.1 1.18
1970 13.9 16.8 1.22
1975 15.7 11.9 1.48
1980 17.9 14.3 1.25
1985 15.7 14.2 1.07
1990 20.0 19.1 1.02
1993 20.0 24.1 0.98
High-income (non-oil)
X/GDP
current
X/GDP
constant
NBTT
1968 9.4 8.7 1.12
1970 10.5 9.8 1.12
1975 14.0 11.3 1.00
1980 16.5 13.3 0.90
1985 14.9 14.2 0.90
1990 15.8 16.1 0.99
1993 14.7 16.9 1.01
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Table 4.4(b): Trade ratio and the net barter terms of trade (NBTT) index (1968 = 100),
by income group
X/GDP
current
World
X/GDP
constant
NBTT
1968 100.0 100.0 100.0
1970 108.7 109.9 100.7
1975 149.3 116.3 102.3
1980 184.7 134.4 98.3
1985 159.8 139.0 95.7
1990 169.1 157.8 99.5
1993 159.0 169.4 100.1
Oil exporters
X/GDP X/GDP NBTT
current constant
1968 100.0 100.0 100.0
1970 95.8 105.1 100.7
1975 152.2 74.5 279.2
1980 181.6 63.7 450.7
1985 107.3 38.0 464.0
1990 137.8 46.7 312.1
1993 116.2 53.6 253.1
Middle-income (non-oil)
X/GDP
current
X/GDP
constant
NBTT
1968 100.0 100.0 100.0
1970 102.2 99.2 104.9
1975 114.8 82.7 108.4
1980 160.1 112.6 93.8
1985 188.5 148.1 85.5
1990 174.5 174.9 81.3
1993 170.6 208.0 80.2
Upper-middle-income (non-oil)
X/GDP
current
X/GDP
constant
NBTT
1968 100.0 100.0 100.0
1970 101.7 100.1 105.2
1975 115.3 89.1 102.5
1980 171.5 126.0 90.0
1985 216.9 176.7 83.6
1990 187.5 202.8 79.3
1993 182.0 237.9 78.7
Source: World Bank Stars Database
World (non-oil)
X/GDP X/GDP NBTT 
current constant
1968 100.0 100.0 100.0
1970 109.3 110.3 100.6
1975 143.8 124.0 90.6
1980 173.9 146.0 82.0
1985 160.5 158.4 82.0
1990 170.7 179.2 88.1
1993 161.6 191.4 89.7
Low-income (non-oil)
X/GDP
current
X/GDP
constant
NBTT
1968 100.0 100.0 100.0
1970 89.9 85.3 106.8
1975 110.4 83.5 89.5
1980 152.7 87.2 85.2
1985 137.1 90.2 79.9
1990 198.8 100.8 75.7
1993 247.5 112.4 76.0
Lower-middle-income (non-oil)
X/GDP
current
X/GDP
constant
NBTT
1968 100.0 100.0 100.0
1970 106.5 97.9 103.8
1975 119.6 69.4 125.9
1980 136.8 83.2 105.8
1985 120.0 82.9 91.0
1990 152.6 111.7 86.7
1993 153.1 140.7 83.6
High-income (non-oil)
X/GDP
current
X/GDP
constant
NBTT
1968 100.0 100.0 100.0
1970 111.3 112.3 100.1
1975 148.7 129.6 89.8
1980 175.2 153.3 80.3
1985 157.7 163.8 80.9
1990 167.3 184.9 88.6
1993 155.6 194.8 90.7
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world non-oil exports. There is a clear and continuous fall in the current and constant 
price export share for these countries. Table 4.3(b) shows their trade ratio. The trade 
ratio in constant prices for these countries was barely higher in 1993 than in 1968.
When these figures are compared with the world trade ratio figures in table 
4.4(a), it looks obvious that these countries have been left behind o f the overall 
growth o f world trade. Average world real total trade has been continuously 
increasing faster than total income and thus the world trade ratio was much higher in 
1993 than in 1968.
Table 4.4(a) also shows the trade ratio for low-, middle- and high-income 
countries. As the table illustrates, low-income countries were barely more open in 
1993 compared to 1968. The trade ratio in constant prices in 1993 (12.4 percent) was 
only slightly higher than 1968 (11.0 percent). The middle- and high-income countries 
are clearly trading more. In particular, upper-middle-income countries increased their 
openness spectacularly. The difference between the current and constant price trade 
ratios indicates the relative prices o f exportables and domestic goods. This is a result 
o f the real exchange rate devaluations which increase the relative price o f exportables 
to the home goods. The increase in the current price trade ratio is higher for the low- 
income countries in comparison with the others. Particularly after 1986 when most of 
these countries adopted structural adjustment policies, they suppressed their domestic 
markets and adopted ‘beggar-my-neighbour’ competitive devaluations to increase 
their exports.
Sixth, as argued earlier, in a dynamic sector like industry where the use of 
modem technologies and innovations are more important compared to, say a relatively 
static sector like agriculture, value-added will be higher. Without getting into the 
arguments about the complex nature and relations o f rural and urban areas, it is true to 
say that, domestic or international, the relative value-added and wealth o f rural areas 
have always been (and probably will always be) lower compared to urban areas.71 In 
this sense, a country cannot rely on exports o f agricultural or primary commodities 
and industrialisation is not a choice but a necessity for economic development.
71 Marx, for example, argued that ‘most agricultural people are forced to sell their product below its 
value [that is, below the high-cost margin o f production, especially in the industrial nations] whereas in 
countries with advanced capitalist production the agricultural product rises to its value.’ (Marx, 1972, 
cited in Hudson, 1992: 158)
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Finally the figure 4.4(a) shows that there is a certain pattern o f decline in the 
NBTT for primary commodities at least for the period stated. Until 1974 the NBTT of 
primary commodities fluctuated around the starting year (the NBTT are indexed to 
1968), and after the oil shock they gradually declined. The terms o f trade also 
declined for manufactured good exporters between 1974 and 1986. Since a sharp 
increase in oil prices reduced the NBTT for all non-oil exporters alike, it is difficult to 
see if  the primary commodity NBTT have a tendency to fall relative to manufactures. 
However, in figure 4.4(b), where the NBTT of primary commodities are presented 
relative to manufacture NBTT, the relative fall in the NBTT for primary commodities 
is clearer.
In table 4.4(a), the NBTT for low-, middle- and high-income countries are also 
presented. The figures show that the NBTT for oil exporters rose sharply between 
1970 and 1985, as a result o f the oil shocks o f 1973 and 1979, and then declined 
gradually. During the same period, non-oil producing countries (world-nonoil) faced a 
sharp fall in the NBTT. After 1985, the NBTT gradually rose with a sharp fall in oil 
prices. In 1993, however, they were still below the 1970 level. The NBTT for low- 
and middle-income countries continued falling even after 1985 and picked up a little 
towards 1993 for low-income countries. At the end o f 1993, the fall in the NBTT for 
low-income countries was more than for middle- and high-income countries (see table 
4.4(b)). Only high-income countries have managed to increase their NBTT during the 
1980s.
Streeten’s (1981) argument on the reasons why measured NBTT overstates the 
deterioration or understates the improvement does not make sense. First, as Spraos 
(1980) argued, it is not necessarily true that primary products do not lend themselves 
to quality improvements, once two types o f quality improvements are identified: (i) 
the product mix is altered in favour o f higher quality goods within a group, and (ii) 
technical progress imparts superior properties to a given good. He argued that quality 
improvements for primary commodities occur in terms o f (i), thus even though ‘the 
NBTT series are [not] free o f quality bias, the alleged direction o f the bias is a matter 
which cannot merely be asserted; it needs to be demonstrated.’72 Second, even if  
product innovation and quality improvements occur mainly in industrial products, this
72 Spraos (1980: 118).
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does not necessitate a rise in the NBTT for these products in the long-run. Quality 
improvements could change the relative prices o f the same kinds o f commodities 
(such as price o f a digital camera against an ordinary camera) in the long-run but not 
the relative prices o f industrial commodities against agricultural commodities. The 
quality improvements that are usually associated with higher initial costs would not 
also change this fact for two reasons. Firstly, the initial price increase and decrease of 
the individual commodities would be eliminated when all commodities are taken 
together. Secondly, since the initial cost rise would decline gradually, there would be 
no long-term tendency for the NBTT to fall against agricultural products. Thus, 
neither quality improvements nor initial high costs o f production o f industrial 
commodities are good explanations o f any deterioration o f the agricultural NBTT. 
Streeten’s argument on remedying the uneven distribution o f the benefits o f trade due 
to the movement in the NBTT by more inflation or an appreciation o f the real 
exchange rate does also not make sense since it does not take into account the 
structural peculiarities o f the commodities that developing countries export. As a 
result o f the specific characteristics o f the commodities that are exported by 
developing countries, there is severe competition among them and ‘beggar-my- 
neighbour’ competitive devaluations are frequently used to increase competitiveness 
and capture larger markets.
Whatever the critics o f export pessimism claim, there is a great deal o f 
evidence o f a wave o f new protectionism in the form o f non-tariff barriers, particularly 
during the late 1970s. Nevertheless, as argued earlier, it is certainly true that the 
volume o f exports is increasing much faster than volume o f production in almost all 
countries. However, as table 4.4(a) clearly shows, this is particularly true for the 
upper-middle-income countries and high-income countries. Most low-income 
countries are left out of this process. Even though some writers like Panoutsopoulos 
(1992) argue that ‘the actual experience o f developing countries during the past forty 
years has justified the neoclassical approach* since developing countries’ exports have 
grown rapidly, particularly in manufactures,’73 his own figures refute this argument. 
He has to admit that ‘[t]he developing countries’ participation in exports of
73 Panoutsopoulos (1992: 9).
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manufactures has been extremely uneven.’74 According to the table he provides75 only 
nine countries account for 76 percent o f developing country exports o f manufactures 
in 1987.
Table 4.5 makes the same point. Table 4.5(a) shows the share o f different 
regions in total world trade. The share o f industrialised countries increased from 69.2 
percent in 1975 to 72.1 percent in 1990 and than declined to 65.2 percent in 1995. The 
share o f developing countries stayed around the same level until 1990 (about 27 
percent) and then increased to 33.6 percent in 1995. This sharp increase (6.6 percent) 
is partially a result o f a decrease in the share o f industrial countries (4 percent) and a 
decrease in the share of former-socialist countries (2.6 percent) classified as ‘USSR 
and other non-members n.i.e.’76
These figures, however, do not challenge the above arguments since the 
‘developing countries’ category includes the so-called ‘High Performing Asian 
Economies’ (HPAE).77 Indeed, when they are excluded from the ‘developing 
countries’ category, the share for the rest o f the developing countries falls from 22.1 
percent in 1975 to 16.5 percent in 1995.
The reasons for their failure to participate in this process is very complex in 
nature. Tables 4.2 and 4.6 suggest that, this failure, at least partially, might be due to 
protectionism in developed countries. Agriculture, according to orthodox trade theory, 
is where developing countries are supposed to have comparative advantage as it is 
labour-intensive and developing countries are labour-abundant. If  the theory holds and 
there is no protectionism, developed countries are expected to import agricultural 
commodities from developing countries. However, tables 4.2 and 4.6 indicate just the 
opposite. Table 4.2(b) shows that developed countries’ agricultural exports as a 
percentage o f total world agricultural exports increased from 59.3 percent in 1961 to 
72.2 percent in 1993, whereas the same ratio for developing countries fell from 40.7 
percent to 27.8 percent. In particular, the European Union has increased its share 
considerably from 20.8 percent to 44.5 percent. The fall in the same ratio for Latin 
America and particularly for Sub-Saharan Africa is dramatic. Table 4.6 shows net
1AIbid.t p. 31.
75 Table 2.9, p. 32.
76 For details o f the classification o f countries see IMF Direction o f Trade Statistics.
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Table 4.5(a): Share o f world exports (percent), by region and income group
Developed
countries78
Developin 
g countries
USSR
7 9
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Asia Latin
America
HPAEs
8 0
Asia
(without
HPAE)81
LDCs
(without
HPAEs)
1975 69.2 27.0 3.8 2.8 5.9 5.6 4.9 1.0 22.1
1980 68.3 28.6 3.1 2.7 7.8 6.4 7.6 1.1 21.0
1985 70.7 27.0 2.3 2.9 11.2 4.5 10.2 1.1 16.8
1990 72.1 26.6 1.3 2.2 12.8 3.9 11.3 1.5 15.3
1995 65.2 33.6 1.2 1.9 18.9 5.0 17.1 1.8 16.5
Source: IMF, Direction o f Trade Statistics
Table 4.5(b): Share o f exports from developed countries (percent), by region and
income group_____________________________
Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Asia Latin
America
1975 67.5 26.3 3.1 5.1 4.8
1980 67.5 27.3 3.0 6.4 5.3
1985 72.7 24.1 3.1 9.2 4.5
1990 76.3 23.0 2.3 9.9 12.4
1995 70.2 29.2 2.0 14.8 8.4
Source: IMF, Direction o f Trade Statistics
Table 4.5(c): Share o f exports from developing countries (percent), by region and
income group_____________________________
Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Asia Latin
America
1975 61.3 27.0 2.6 8.3 5.4
1980 56.9 30.1 2.7 11.2 5.8
1985 61.0 29.9 2.3 15.2 4.5
1990 61.0 35.8 2.0 20.2 3.9
1995 55.0 42.5 1.8 27.4 4.5
Source: IMF, Direction o f Trade Statistics
Table 4.5(d): Share o f exports from Sub-Saharan Africa (percent), by region and
income group
Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Asia Latin
America
1975 66.6 16.8 6.7 2.7 1.7
1980 57.5 16.9 6.0 2.8 5.9
1985 71.6 14.6 5.1 3.2 4.6
1990 69.3 16.6 7.3 4.2 1.3
1995 64.6 25.0 9.9 9.0 2.1
Source: IMF, Direction o f Trade Statistics
77 These countries are China; “Asian Tigers”, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan; Newly 
industrialising countries (NICs) Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines.
78 ‘Industrial Countries’ in IMF Direction o f Trade Statistics.
79 USSR & other nonmembers n.i.e. For details o f classification of countries see IMF Direction o f  
Trade Statistics.
80 High Performing Asian Economies: Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand.
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Table 4.6(a): Net agriculture exports: (X/M)*10082, by region and income group
Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Latin America Sub-Saharan
Africa
Asia & Pacific European
Union
1961 69 190 347 337 120 42
1970 71 180 332 313 106 55
1980 87 106 220 143 73 76
1990 89 104 240 132 78 92
1993 94 96 171 103 82 101
Source: FAO, SOFA Database (1994)
Table 4.6(b): Net agriculture exports: (X/M)*10Q (Index: 1960 = 100), by region and
income group
Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Latin America Sub-Saharan
Africa
Asia & Pacific European
Union
1961 100 100 100 100 100 100
1970 104 95 96 93 88 132
1980 126 56 63 43 61 182
1990 129 55 69 39 65 220
1993 137 51 49 30 69 241
Source: FAO, SOFA Database (1994)
agricultural exports for the same income groups and regions. In 1993, the European 
Union became a net exporter o f agricultural products and Sub-Saharan Africa in 1992 
became a net importer. The Asia and Pacific region became a net importer during the 
mid-1960s. Latin America, even though there is a sharp fall, is still a net exporter. 
This data convincingly shows that at least one o f the above arguments must be true (or 
perhaps both). Either comparative advantage theory is wrong or developed countries 
are protectionist.
Finally, table 4.5(b) provides evidence to suggest that developed countries 
increased trade more among themselves than with developing countries. The share o f 
total exports among developed countries increased from 67.5 percent in 1975 to 76.3 
percent in 1990. It fell back to 70.2 percent in 1995 but this was completely due to 
increased trade with Asian countries. Table 4.5(c) shows that the share o f exports 
from developing countries to industrial countries declined from 61.3 percent in 1975 
to 55 percent in 1995.
81 Excludes Japan.
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Streeten’s argument on the protection of the agricultural sector in developed 
countries which supposedly helps developing countries to industrialise by blocking 
their agricultural exports is difficult to grasp. As Prebisch himself argued ‘the growth 
of domestic industry is not incompatible with a sustainable expansion o f primary 
production and exportation. Hence, the standard o f living could be raised through the 
process o f industrialisation without any decline in the volume or efficiency o f primary 
production.’83 Successful implementation o f an import-substitution strategy requires 
the protection o f the industrial sector by de-protecting some others (namely 
transferring the surplus from one sector to another), possibly traditional exports. 
Traditional exports also bring the vital foreign currency needed for the importation o f 
capital goods. Protectionism by developed countries not only reduces the actual 
volume o f traditional exports and thus the foreign currency available for the 
importation o f the capital goods, but also by reducing the available transferable 
surplus, it reduces the possibility o f developing industry. Import-substitution policies 
in developing countries requires a relative, not absolute, decline in the production of 
traditional exports by increasing non-traditional exports. Thus, the industrial sector in 
developing countries would certainly benefit from an increase in the NBTT for 
primary commodities.
It is true that the commodity composition o f exports by developing countries 
has undergone a major change in the direction o f increased share o f manufactures. 
Table 4.7 shows that most countries indeed increased the share o f manufactures in 
their total exports. This, however, does not completely invalidate the Prebish-Singer 
hypothesis for the following reasons.
First, even though there is an undeniable tendency for developing countries to 
increase their industrial exports, primary commodities still account for the bulk o f 
exports by many developing countries. In 1990, the share o f manufactures in total 
exports for 64.5 percent o f countries was still less than 50 percent. This means that if  
the Prebish-Singer hypothesis is right many developing countries may still suffer 
(though less than before) from declining NBTT. Second, most manufactured 
commodities exported from developing countries consist o f processed primary
82 A figure lower than 100 means imports are greater than exports.
^ in Marco (1972: 6).
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commodities. They are relatively unsophisticated manufactured commodities which 
may still carry most o f the characteristics o f primary commodities.
Table 4.7: Share o f manufacture exports in total exports
Number of 
countries
Percentage 
of the total
Cumulative
percentage
Share o f  
manufacture 
exports in 
total exports
1970 1990
0 to 9 % 72 24
10 to 19 % 17 28
20 to 29 % 10 23
30 to 39 % 7 15
40 to 49 % 4 1
50 to 59 % 7 8
60 to 69 % 6 13
70 to 79 % 7 11
80 to 89 % 5 9
90 to 100% 6 9
Total 141 141
Share of  
manufacture 
exports in 
total exports
1970 1990
0 to 9 % 51.1 17.0
10 to 19 % 12.1 19.9
20 to 29 % 7.1 16.3
30 to 39 % 5.0 10.6
40 to 49 % 2.8 0.7
50 to 59 % 5.0 5.7
60 to 69 % 4.3 9.2
70 to 79 % 5.0 7.8
80 to 89 % 3.5 6.4
90 to 100 % 4.3 6.4
Total 100 100
Share o f  
manufacture 
exports in 
total exports
1970 1990
0 to 9 % 51.1 17.0
10 to 19 % 63.1 36.9
20 to 29 % 70.2 53.2
30 to 39 % 75.2 63.8
40 to 49 % 78.0 64.5
50 to 59 % 83.0 70.2
60 to 69 % 87.2 79.4
70 to 19 % 92.2 87.2
80 to 89 % 95.7 93.6
90 to 100% 100 100
4.7a 4.7b 4.7c
Source: World Bank Stars Database
Third, the last two o f the four underlying economic arguments o f the Prebish-Singer 
hypothesis for explaining the tendency of the NBTT to decline are related to the 
characteristics o f countries rather than the characteristics o f commodities. Thus, the 
industrialisation process, as a move from the exportation o f primary commodities to 
that o f manufactured commodities, may eliminate the first two arguments but not the 
last two. Indeed, Sarkar and Singer (1991) showed that not only for primary and 
agricultural products but even for manufactured products, there is a tendency for the 
NBTT to weaken for developing countries.84 Lucke (1993) confirms this finding.
Finally, neither a rapid industrialisation process nor an increased share of 
industrial products in total exports supports the critics o f export pessimism, unless 
they demonstrate that this process is the result o f liberalisation. Export pessimists did 
not argue against exports but they argued for the necessity o f industrialisation and the 
improbability o f achieving this by relying on primary commodity exports. The
84 These arguments, however, are criticised by Bleaney (1993) who has argued that Sarkar and Singer’s 
findings primarily reflect changes in the real exchange rates o f developing countries. Athukorala 
(1993) also criticised them for not paying adequate attention to appropriately adjusting the data and for 
misinterpreting the results.
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relative industrialisation in developing countries might have resulted from import- 
substitution policies which would prove export pessimists’ points. The recent 
extensive literature has proven the critics to be wrong in arguing that the successful 
Asian countries increased their trade as a result o f trade liberalisation. In reality their 
success, as export pessimists suggest, was a result o f initial successful import- 
substitution and export-promotion policies.
The demand for primary commodities, like other commodities, are responsive 
to prices. However, once the low price and the income elasticities o f the demand for 
these commodities are accepted, the necessary fall in price to increase total real 
exports might be too high. What is gained by exporting more might be lost because o f 
low prices.
Even though there is a certain amount o f scepticism about Lewis’s (1980) 
argument for South-South trade,85 developing countries increased trade among 
themselves from 27 percent in 1975 to 42.5 percent in 1995. This might be interpreted 
as an encouraging sign.
The above discussion, though not conclusive, suggests that export pessimism 
at least for primary commodity exports is credible and challenges the view that 
‘[c]ountries that have stimulated exports o f primary products have benefited from 
increases in long-term real earnings.’86 Even though the theoretical arguments o f 
export pessimism were not always accurate and convincing, the proponents were right 
in pointing out the necessity o f protectionism and industrial policy for promoting 
industrialisation. They successfully challenged the view that free markets and 
specialisation would benefit all participants equally and they called for a 
reorganisation o f international markets and for ‘positive discrimination’ in favour o f 
developing countries.
Some export pessimists argue ‘that the ‘unequal exchange’ arising out o f the 
prevailing international trade structure is solely to blame’87 for the problems o f 
developing countries. Others focus primarily on the issue o f distributive justice or 
fairness and do not deny the existence o f static gains from trade. They also do not
85 This is because, it is argued, developing countries need developed countries’ markets to sell their 
manufactured commodities and developing countries themselves can create only limited opportunities 
for trade.
86 Panoutsopoulos (1992).
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claim that deteriorating NBTT is direct evidence of a welfare loss for developing 
countries.88 They do not ‘question the basic doctrine o f comparative advantage theory 
which states that trade is a positive-sum game resulting in gains to the trading 
partners.’89 Thus, they suggest a temporary delinking until a better basis for trade with 
more evenly distributed gains can be developed.
4.5. CONCLUSION
This chapter complements the arguments produced in the first two chapters. The first 
two chapters criticised the classical and neoclassical versions o f comparative 
advantage theory. This chapter evaluates the arguments regarding dynamic versions of 
the theory. It argues that attempts to make static comparative advantage theory 
dynamic are bound to be unsuccessful because they are based on static parameters 
such as the production function and factor endowments. In a dynamic world where 
competitiveness is created by the decisions o f policymakers, comparative advantage 
theory loses its meaning. Dynamic comparative advantage is supposed to guide 
policymakers in their decisions to implement industrial policies given the available 
information on the future relative cost structure. The future relative cost structure, 
however, is impossible to foresee and it is by and large a consequence o f 
policymakers’ decisions. The only ‘comparative advantage’ is the accurateness and 
the ability o f policymakers to implement successful industrial policies. Thus, dynamic 
comparative advantage theory as a policy guide for the policymaker is redundant.
The second part o f this chapter has argued that the separation o f import- 
substitution and export-promotion as alternative trade policies is erroneous. The idea 
that import-substitution and export-promotion are alternative and contradictory 
policies only makes sense if  one accepts the unrealistic assumptions o f the 
neoclassical model. In a world where there is less than full employment and where 
dynamic scale economies exist, the relationship between import-substitution and 
export-promotion can be complementary. Import-substitution can be seen as a
87 Wickramasinghe (1994: 17).
88 Singer (1984: 284).
89 Ibid., p. 287.
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precondition for export-promotion with a sequential relationship between them. 
Alternatively, both import-substitution and export-promotion policies can be 
implemented simultaneously. As interventionist trade policies, they are both 
incompatible with free market trade policy. They both distort prices, and change the 
cost structure. They aim at changing specialisation based on comparative advantages. 
They protect and promote specific selected industries to develop competitiveness with 
the hope o f bringing about long-term benefits.
Finally, this chapter summarised and critically evaluated the debate 
surrounding ‘export pessimism’. The export pessimists argue that the benefits o f trade 
are usually acquired by developed countries as a result o f the characteristics o f the 
commodities they trade. Export pessimism is an important justification for import- 
substitution and industrial policies. Developing countries usually produce and export 
primary and agricultural commodities and import advanced industrial commodities as 
a result o f comparative advantage. Specialisation in such commodities has certain 
disadvantages and protectionist/promotionist policies are introduced to change 
specialisation based on comparative advantage. Export pessimists argue that primary 
commodities have low price elasticity of demand and supply, and the demand for such 
commodities expands less than for manufactured commodities. This means that the 
producers o f such commodities will find it increasingly difficult to export and earn 
sufficient foreign currency to import necessary imports. The ever-increasing 
competition among primary commodity producers with diminishing demand will 
drive down prices and worsen the terms o f trade. The only alternative is 
industrialisation within the domestic market to break the cycle o f poverty caused by 
specialisation in the primary commodities. Increasing protectionism in developed 
countries and the fallacies o f composition mean that developing countries can only 
rely on their domestic markets for industrial products. Even though the sceptics 
criticise export pessimism arguments theoretically and empirically, their attempts to 
weaken the argument are unsuccessful. In this chapter it was argued that there is 
indeed a tendency for the terms o f trade to decline and that specialisation based on 
primary commodities cannot be sustained in the long-run. As the proponents o f export 
pessimism argue, a structural transformation behind protective barriers and a change 
in comparative advantage is necessary for developing countries.
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The three chapters in the theoretical section have challenged the notion of 
trade based on free market ideas. It has been argued that there are important 
theoretical problems surrounding these free market ideas. The different versions o f 
comparative advantage theory which are used to justify the free trade ideology are 
highly problematical, and specialisation based on comparative advantage may 
severely damage the development attempts o f developing countries. The only policy 
option open to developing countries, it is argued, is the sound industrial policy. The 
aim o f the next two chapters is to empirically investigate the export-led development 
hypothesis. Chapter five will evaluate the empirical literature while chapter six will 
develop an alternative framework to evaluate the accuracy o f export-led development 
theory.
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APPENDIX
Table A4.1: Country groups used in empirical investigations 
Low-income countries
Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, China, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
India, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Note: Low-income countries are those in which 1993 per capita GNP was $695 or less. (WB, Starts 
database categorisation)
Middle-income countries
Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, 
Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jamaica, Republic o f Korea, Libya, Malaysia, 
Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Suriname, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Note: Middle-income countries are those in which 1993 per capita GNP was between $696 and $8,625. 
(WB, Starts database categorisation)
Lower-middle income countries
Bolivia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Jamaica, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Senegal, Suriname, Thailand, Tunisia
Higher-middle income countries
Argentina, Barbados, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Fiji, Greece, Republic o f 
Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Panama, South Africa, Turkey, Uruguay
High income countries
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States
Note: High-income countries are those in which 1993 per capita GNP was above $8,625. (WB, Starts 
database categorisation)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Zaire, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe
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Latin America
Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, 
Venezuela
East Asia_______________________________________________________________
Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic o f Korea, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand
OECD___________________________________________________________________
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
Agriculture exporters________________________________________________________
Argentina, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo 
Note: Agriculture exporters are those in which the share o f agricultural exports is higher than 50 
percent o f total exports
Primary commodity exporters_________________________________________________
Benin, Bolivia, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras,
Iceland, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Togo, Zaire, Zambia
Note: Primary commodity exporters are those in which the share o f primary commodity exports is 
higher than 70 percent o f total exports
Metal exporters
Bolivia, Chile, Mauritania, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Sierra Leone, Togo,
Zaire, Zambia
Note: Metal exporters are those in which the share of primary commodity exports is higher than 40 
percent o f total exports
Manufacture exporters
Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, China, Finland, Germany, Haiti, Hong Kong, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Malta, Nepal, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States
Note: Manufacture exporters are those in which the share o f primary commodity exports is higher than 
80 percent o f total exports
Oil exporters
Algeria, Congo, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela
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CHAPTER FIVE
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF OPENNESS AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH
5.1. INTRODUCTION
There is continuous interest and debate, but no consensus, regarding the impact of 
trade policies on economic development. The prevalent view is that export-promotion 
policies produce better results for developing countries and therefore they are superior 
to import-substitution policies. Even though some recent literature1 has contested 
these ideas, the vast majority o f work2 attempts to produce theoretical and empirical 
justification for an export-led development strategy. It is argued that outward- 
orientation promotes economic growth by
(a) increasing specialisation and expending the efficiency-raising benefits of 
comparative advantage, (b) offering greater economies o f scale due to an 
enlargement of the effective market size, (c) affording greater capacity 
utilisation, and (d) inducing more rapid technological change.’ (Ram, 1987: 
51)
International organisations, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, 
have been consistent advocates o f these ideas. They have continually required 
developing countries to adopt liberal policies by attaching such conditions to loans. 
Many World Bank publications have argued for trade liberalisation and produced 
empirical evidence in support o f these ideas.3 ‘Getting the basics right’ has been the 
prime slogan o f the World Bank. Among the ‘basics’, the elimination o f price
1 Dodaro (1991, 1993), Evans and Alizadeh (1984), Helleiner (1986), Jung and Marshall (1985),
Levine and Renelt (1992), Pack (1992,1988), Schmitz (1984), Sheehey (1990), Timmer (1988), 
Westphall (1978), Yaghmaian (1994).
2 Balassa (1978, 1985), Dollar (1991), Fajana (1979), Feder (1983,1985), Heller and Porter (1978), 
Kavoussi (1984), Krueger (1980,1978), Matin (1992), Michaely (1977,1978), Moschos (1989), Ram 
(1985, 1987), Salvatore and Hatcher (1991), Tyler (1981), Voivodas (1973), and Williamson (1978).
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distortions, particularly those that were caused by protectionism, has been the World 
Bank’s main concern. The World Bank's 1987 World Development Report concluded 
that ‘rapid growth and efficient industrialisation [are] usually associated with 
outward-oriented policies on trade.’4
By dividing 41 developing countries into four categories in terms o f their trade 
orientation, the report sought to produce empirical evidence for the export-led 
development strategy.5 According to the report, ‘outward-orientation’ and ‘export- 
promotion’ have the same meanings as do ‘inward-orientation’ and ‘import- 
substitution’. The report argued that those countries classified as ‘strongly outward- 
oriented’ performed better than the others, particularly from those that were classified 
as ‘strongly inward-oriented’. Critics o f the report objected to the way in which the 
countries were classified. Particularly, the inclusion o f Korea in the ‘strongly outward- 
oriented’ category was regarded as highly controversial since Korea’s trade policy has 
never been ‘liberal’.
Classification o f countries is inevitably subjective, and there is no 
uncontroversial way to measure trade orientation. As mentioned earlier, this is partly 
because o f definitional problems -  that is, the confusion o f trade liberalisation with 
export-promotion. But the real difficulty lies in measuring trade orientation. To 
measure trade orientation across countries and through time is immensely difficult. In 
many studies, a trade orientation index is used but is based on the author’s subjective 
judgements. That is why it is incomparable across countries and cannot be used for 
econometric investigation. Therefore, the first task is to find a relatively 
unproblematic way to measure trade orientation or ‘openness’.
The aim o f this chapter is to evaluate the existing empirical work regarding the 
impact o f exports on economic growth, and by doing so, prepare the ground for an 
alternative framework in the next chapter. As will be argued in detail, the empirical 
literature suffers from a number o f technical and theoretical weaknesses. Most o f  the 
empirical work in the literature is irrelevant to the arguments about the relationship
3 World Development Report, 1983, 1987, 1991; Reports on Africa (1994) and Asia (1993).
4Ibid., (1987: 92).
5 These categories are: strongly outward-oriented countries, moderately outward-oriented countries, 
moderately inward-oriented countries and strongly inward-oriented countries.
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between openness and economic growth and therefore do not provide any persuasive 
evidence to support or reject the export-led development hypothesis.
5.2. M EASURING OPENNESS
A survey o f the literature proves that there is no easy and unambiguous way to 
measure openness. There are a number o f methods to measure openness which can 
roughly be classified as either ‘incidence’ or ‘outcome’ based measures.
Each o f these [measures] have their strengths and weaknesses. [...] Incidence- 
based measures attempt to measure the trade policies by direct observation o f 
the policy instruments. [...] Outcome-based measures o f trade policy assess the 
deviation o f the actual outcome from what the outcome would have been 
without the trade barriers. (Pritchett 1996: 308)
While tariffs and non-tariff barriers are the most common incidence-based measures, 
outcome-based measures are usually based on a comparison o f international price 
levels and trade flows. Earlier studies used actual trade figures, either export growth 
rates or the share o f exports in total GDP, as a measure o f trade orientation. These 
studies will be summarised below. First the more complex measures o f trade 
orientation will be considered.
Two important points should be made clear from the outset. First, even though 
many studies that utilised different measures of openness demonstrate a positive 
correlation with economic growth rates, these measures themselves are uncorrelated.6 
Second, different measures attempt to determine either trade intensity or trade 
liberalisation. They are not the same thing even though many researchers still assume 
them to be. For example, price-based measures are concerned with trade liberalisation 
while actual trade flows measures are concerned with trade intensity. Since they 
measure different things, it is not surprising that they are uncorrelated. I f  these 
different measures were all ‘accurate’ indicators o f trade liberalisation and trade 
intensity, the lack o f correlation between them would suggest that outward-orientation
6 See Pritchett (1996) for further details.
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is not synonymous with trade liberalisation. If  they were all ‘accurate’ measures, one 
would expect them to be correlated at least within these two broad categories, i.e. the 
measures that intended to measure trade liberalisation would be correlated. Given that 
different measures o f trade liberalisation are uncorrelated, only one o f them (and 
probably none) could be considered ‘accurate’.
Pritchett (1996) identifies ‘six trade policy stance measures’: structurally 
adjusted trade intensity (SATI); Learner’s Openness Index; average tariffs; non-tariff 
barriers frequency; price distortion; and Learner’s trade distortion indices. Assuming 
that protectionist policies reduce the actual proportion o f traded goods in total 
production, the SATI index is based on trade intensity adjusted by the structural 
characteristics o f an economy such as size o f the market, transport costs, resource 
endowments, etc. Learner’s (1988) openness and trade distortion indexes are based on 
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model. Given a country’s endowments,7 Learner 
calculated the sum of the deviations o f the predicted from the actual level o f trade 
across each o f 182 three-digit SITC commodity classes. Dollar’s price distortion index 
is based on the hypothesis that trade barriers cause higher prices. After adjusting the 
average price levels with the countries’ factor endowments, Dollar (1991) used the 
differences between the actual and expected price levels as a measure o f trade 
liberalisation.
In addition to these six measures o f openness, different studies adopted a 
number o f other measures or a combination to determine openness. The first attempts 
to measure trade orientation were Krueger’s (1978) and Bhawati’s (1978) effective 
exchange rate ratio between exports and imports. The effective exchange rates for 
exports and imports were calculated by correcting the nominal exchange rates for 
exports and imports by policy instruments such as export subsidies, export 
encouragement schemes, import tariffs, import surcharges and import licenses. 
Following Krueger’s and Bhagwati’s work on exchange rates, real exchange rate 
devaluations have also been considered as an important indicator o f trade 
liberalisation since in the presence o f quantity restrictions, a real ‘devaluation will 
reduce the rents accrued to those with imports license allocations.’8 The black market
7 Such as capital, land, labour, oil, coal and minerals.
8 Edwards (1993: 1367). See also Bhagwati (1988).
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premium and the coefficient o f variation o f the black market premium have also been 
used frequently as measures of trade policy.
Michaely et al. (1991) created an index o f liberalisation for 19 developing 
countries. Recognising the difficulties o f creating an objective index o f trade 
liberalisation, directors o f the World Bank financed a comparative study asking the 
authors o f the individual country reports to construct an index o f trade liberalisation 
from zero to twenty. Using qualitative and quantitative indicators o f trade 
liberalisation whenever possible, the indexes mainly reflected the authors’ subjective 
judgements. Because of this subjectivity, the index was ‘inherently not comparable 
across countries.’9
The World Development Report (1987) classified 41 countries into four groups 
by combining the following quantitative and qualitative indicators: 1. effective rate o f 
protection; 2. direct controls such as quotas and import licensing schemes; 3. export 
incentives; 4. degree of exchange rate overvaluation.10
Sachs and Warner (1996) used five criteria to determine the classification o f 
trade policies: 1. Non-tariff barriers covering 40 percent or more o f trade; 2. average 
tariff rates o f 40 percent or more; 3. a black market exchange rate that is depreciated 
by 20 percent or more relative to the official exchange rate, on average, during the 
1970s or 1980s; 4. a socialist economic system; and 5. a state monopoly on major 
exports. A country is qualified as liberal if  it does not have any o f these 
characteristics. Matin (1992) used four measures o f openness to test the export-led 
hypothesis in Sub-Saharan Africa: 1. the black market premium; 2. Dollar Index of 
outward-orientation (price distortion index); 3. Halevi-Thomas index o f trade 
liberalisation; and 4. actual trade share.
Balassa (1985) and Heitger (1987) adjusted the trade ratio with the economic 
structure o f the countries, such as market size. Heitger also used effective rates o f 
protection in manufacturing for 37 countries. All these measures have important 
deficiencies. Some are difficult to calculate, some are subjective measures reflecting 
the authors’ judgements on trade regimes and others are more objective but suffer
9 Michaely et al, (1991: 28), Volume 7.
10 Using this classification Alam (1991) empirically tested the correlation between trade orientation 
and economic growth, saving rates, investment rates and export growth and found a strong positive 
correlation between them.
168
from theoretical weaknesses. In this chapter only Dollar’s price distortion index will 
be investigated in depth. This is because the weaknesses o f the other indexes are well 
documented in the literature and also because a critique o f the Dollar index will also 
be an indirect critique o f Learner’s indices, as both indices are based on the 
assumptions o f the Heckscher - Ohlin theory o f comparative advantage.
Learner’s openness and trade distortion indices are based on the Heckscher- 
Ohlin-Vanek model and Dollar’s price distortion index is based on the Heckscher- 
Ohlin-Samuelson model. Consequently, they display similar deficiencies. Though 
these indices have an overall superiority over many others,11 nevertheless, the validity 
o f them is limited by the validity o f the theoretical framework upon which they are 
built. Once the underlying theoretical framework is rejected, it is hard to agree with 
the results. Price distortion indices are also problematic since ‘they may capture 
distortions from both import barriers and domestic market imperfections.’12
Calculating average tariff rates may seem a straightforward way to measure 
trade policy, but tariffs are not the only, nor even the most important, barriers to trade. 
The importance o f non-tariff barriers13 makes tariffs an unreliable measure o f trade 
policy. One way to solve this problem would be to calculate tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers separately and combine them in a joint index. Unfortunately, this is extremely 
difficult, because many non-tariff barriers cannot be measured. Furthermore,
even if  tariffs were the only trade intervention used, one could measure at best 
weighted averages o f varying tariff rates across commodities. These would 
provide a poor idea o f the marginal protective effect o f the tariff structure. 
Also because o f differing elasticity o f demand and supply across goods, 
aggregate duty rates or total tariff revenue as a percent o f imports are a poor 
measure o f the degree of restrictiveness. (Matin 1992: 9)
Another important measure of trade policy is the effective rate o f protection whereby 
the total value-added is calculated using both domestic and international prices and
11 Because they are constructed as a result o f considerable intellectual input and complex analytical 
and theoretical work.
12 Matin (1992: 9).
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the difference between them is then interpreted as a measure o f protection. 
Theoretically, the effective rate of protection is one o f the most satisfactory measures 
o f trade liberalisation. However, it is extremely time consuming to calculate and the 
number o f studies based on this approach is very limited. There are several country 
studies14 which cover one or two years. This limited coverage makes it impossible to 
consider the evolution o f trade policies through time. Moreover, since different 
country studies cover different time periods they are also not comparable. The 
reliability o f these studies is also doubtful because different studies, covering the same 
countries over the same years, ‘generated important differences in effective rate o f 
protection calculation.’15
Structurally adjusted trade intensity (SATI) is a more sensible way to measure 
trade intensity. Given the structural conditions o f countries, one can measure whether 
a country is trading more or less than is expected. Evidently, SATI does not measure 
trade liberalisation. As Pritchett (1996: 313) argues, ‘[a] major weakness o f structure- 
adjusted trade intensity is that the regression adjustment is ad hoc and atheoretic.’ In 
the next chapter a measure o f openness and a measure o f trade liberalisation will be 
developed. The next section, however, will summarise the earlier literature regarding 
the relation between economic growth and export growth.
5.3. PRODUCTION FUNCTION
Rather than seeking a measure o f openness, earlier empirical work usually regressed 
export growth rates on economic growth rates, to determine whether they were 
correlated, and any correlation was interpreted as evidence o f the benefits o f 
promoting exports. Before the production function type o f tests were introduced, 
‘Bivariate Spearman Rank Correlation’ was the main method. This method was 
criticised on the grounds that exports were a component o f GDP, (therefore, 
autocorrelation between them would be expected) and it excluded other important
13 ‘They include restrictive licensing, quotas, outright prohibitions, controls on foreign exchange 
transactions, advance import deposits, customs valuation pricing and more.’ (Matin, 1992: 9).
14 See for example Alavi (1996) on Malaysia.
15 Edwards (1993: 1363).
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determinants o f economic growth.16 Michaely (1977) argued that ‘[s]ince exports are 
themselves part o f the national product, an autocorrelation is present; and a positive 
correlation o f the two variables is almost inevitable, whatever their true relationship to 
each other.’17 He suggested that a change in the trade ratio should be used instead o f 
the change in exports.
This criticism was dismissed and the proponents o f export-promotion 
defended the method by employing Balassa’s (1978) argument that ‘import-replacing 
domestic production, too, is part o f the national product, so that in an intercountry 
framework export growth rates reflect alternative uses o f resources.’18 In other words, 
exports and import-substituting production compete for limited resources, and a 
positive correlation demonstrates a positive efficiency gain by redirecting resources 
from the inefficient import-substituting sectors to the export sectors. Insisting on 
employing the bivariate model, Kavoussi (1984) made the same point by arguing that,
In a country where resources have not been growing rapidly and technical 
progress has been slow, RY [GNP growth rate] cannot be very high regardless 
o f the level o f RX [export growth rate]. In such a situation, a high RX will 
simply cause a very low RF [non-export growth rate]. That is, a high rate o f 
growth o f exports can be accomplished only through a slowdown o f import 
competing sectors. A positive correlation between growth rates o f exports and 
GNP will occur, if  and only if  export expansion is accompanied with a rapid 
growth o f resources and/or major gains in factor productivity. Although there 
are ample a priori reasons why a high rate o f export growth may stimulate 
capital accumulation and technical progress, contrary to Michaely’s assertion, 
the correlation between export growth and economic performance is by no 
means automatic simply because exports are themselves part o f the GNP. 
(Kavoussi, 1984: 243, footnote 9)
16 Michalopoulos and Jay (1973).
17 Michaely (1977: 50).
18 Balassa (1978: 182, nootnote 3).
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As a response to the second criticism, exports were introduced into the production 
function.19 Following particularly the work o f Balassa (1978) and Feder (1983), the 
production function models, where exports are included in the production function 
with capital and labour, became popular. Inclusion o f exports in a Cobb-Douglas 
production function was meant to prove that the marginal productivities o f labour and 
capital were higher in the export sector. Initially, the regressions took the following 
form :20
RY = a + bRK + cRL + dRX 
where
RY : growth rate o f GNP
RK : growth rate o f capital stock
RL : growth rate o f labour
RX : growth rate o f exports
This model, however, was criticised heavily, and the proponents o f the theory were 
forced to provide a justification for the inclusion o f exports. Feder (1983) provided 
this justification by dividing the economy into export (X) and non-export (N) sectors 
and, assuming that marginal productivity was higher in the export sector, he
introduced exports as an additional factor into the production o f the non-export sector. 
A significant coefficient indicated that exports had positive externalities for the non­
export sector.
The production functions for the sectors are:
N = F (Kn, Ln, X) (1)
X = G (Kx, Lx) (2)
19 Taking endogenous growth theory as a starting point, some later studies included exports in 
regressions with some other variables such as: the domestic saving ratio, the budgetary share o f  
expenditure on human capital and the cost o f external borrowing in real terms, etc. See Otani and 
Villanueva (1990).
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Where
Kn, Kx = respective sector capital stocks 
Ln, Lx = respective sector labour forces
Partial derivatives give the productivity differentials with the following equation: 
(Gk/Fk) = (Gl/Fl ) = 1 + 5  (3)
Where GK and FK are the marginal productivity o f capital in two sectors and GL and FL 
are the marginal productivity o f labour. Then, 5 captures the productivity differential 
in favour o f the export sector. I f  5 is zero, resources are distributed efficiently.
Differentiation o f equations 1 and 2 gives:
N = FK . In + FL . Ln + Fx . X (4)
X = GK . Ix + GL . Lx (5)
where In and Ix are the sectoral gross investments, Ln and Lx are the sectoral changes 
in the labour force, and Fx describes the marginal externality effect o f exports on the
* t ^
output o f non-exports. Since Y = N + X and Y = N + X, and assuming FL = p(Y/L) 
and Fk = a , using the above equations and manipulating them one gets:21
Y/Y = a  . (I/Y) + p (L/L) + [5/(l+5) + F x ] . (X/X).(X/Y) (6)
When the above regression is estimated, [5/(1+5) + Fx] is found to be highly 
significant, indicating the existence o f externalities and efficiency differences. Feder 
then developed his formulation further to disentangle export productivity from export 
externalities.
20 See Kavoussi (1984: 246).
21 See Feder (1983: 62) for the details o f this derivation.
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Sheehey (1990 and 1993), on the other hand, argued that these empirical tests 
have no relevance for the export-promotion -  import-substitution controversy. He 
reached this conclusion by applying the same test for each o f the major subcategories 
o f GDP (government consumption; private consumption; agriculture; manufacturing; 
construction; and electricity, gas and water services), and demonstrating that all give 
similar results. Sheehey replaced exports with other components o f GDP in the above 
equation and found them all to be significant. Thus, he concluded that ‘[sjince it is 
true [...] that the link between sectoral growth and growth o f GDP is common to all 
sectors, it clearly cannot be due to relative productivity differences and externality 
effects.’22
In a later article, Sheehey (1993) used the same formulation for the non-export 
sector as a whole. He placed the non-export sector into the equation instead o f exports 
and obtained similar results which proved that Feder’s test was inconsistent. At the 
same time both export and non-export sectors could not be more productive than each 
other.
He then argued that the failure o f the widely accepted interpretations o f the 
production function analysis is based on the assumption o f full employment o f all 
resources. A typical assumption o f neoclassical economics is that all countries are on 
their production possibility frontiers and in order to increase production in one sector, 
resources must be shifted from the others. When this assumption is dropped, it is 
feasible to increase production in all sectors (including exports) by putting 
unemployed resources into production.
An alternative test for the externalities of exports
Testing the impact o f exports on home goods, however, should be less complicated 
than the above. A simple Granger causality test between home goods and exports 
should provide some ideas.23 If  Balassa is right in arguing that exports and the import- 
substituting production compete over limited resources, there must be, first, a negative
22 Sheehey (1990: 115).
23 Past values o f dependent and independent variables are regressed against the current value of  
dependent variable. We will also include current values o f the independent variables for our own 
purpose. See Gordon and Sakyi-Bekoe (1993) for details o f the model.
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correlation between a change in current exports and a change in current home goods. 
And if  the proponents o f export-led development are also right about the externality 
effects o f exports, there must be a positive correlation between the past values o f 
exports and current values o f home goods. We estimate the following linear regression 
for low-, middle- and high-income countries. The model is written as:
Ht = a  + Pi Ht_i + P2-H t-2 + P3-Xt + P4-Xt-1 + P5*x t-2 + u 
where
Ht and Xj : Growth rates o f current values o f home goods and exports
Ht_i, Ht_2, x t-l> x t-2 : First and second lags o f  Ht and Xt
Table 5.1: Causality test for the externalities o f  exports
R -B ar-
Square
D W F -test D F a P i P2 P3 P4 P5
L o w -in c o m e 0 .2 7 9 1.930 2 .7 0 4 17 + + - - -
M id d le -in co m e 0 .4 5 5 2 .0 1 5 17 + + + - - -
H ig h -in co m e -0 .0 3 4 1.918 0 .8 5 5 17 + - + + + -
O E C D 0 .0 4 4 1.941 1.203 17 + - + T + -
O il exporters 0 .551 1.723 6 . 4 1 5 17 + H H H i m w + -
Prim ary exporters -0 .0 1 9 1.467 0 .9 1 4 17 + + + - + +
A gricu ltu re exporters -0 .0 1 9 1.749 0 .9 1 6 17 - - - + -
M anufacture exporters -0 .0 1 8 1.943 0 .9 1 9 17 + - + + - -
A s ia  (e x c . C hina, India) -0 .0 6 9 1 .745 0 .7 1 2 17 + + + + + +
Su b  Saharan A fr ica 0 .1 9 2 1.944 2.048 17 + - - U - +
L atin A m erica 0 .4 2 8 1 .863 4 .2 9 9 17 + + + - + -
Source: W orld  B ank  Stars D atabase.
N o tes: A ll o il exp ortin g  countries are ex clu d ed . D ata series co v er  2 6  years (1 9 6 8 -1 9 9 3 ) .  
on e-p ercen t s ig n ifica n ce  lev e l 
ten -percent s ig n ifica n ce  lev e l
The results in general do not support Balassa’s argument. Only for the middle-income 
countries does current export growth slightly reduce home goods production. For the 
low- and high-income countries, the correlation is insignificant and for the high- 
income countries it is positive. The externality argument is only supported for the 
low-income countries since the second lag o f exports is significant at the one-percent 
level. This result is expected and cannot be considered as confirmation o f  the export-
1 7 5
led development hypothesis since the low-income countries are usually import 
dependent and export constrained. In other words, this positive correlation is not the 
result o f a static-efficiency gain from specialisation.
The same regression was estimated for oil, primary commodity, agriculture 
and manufacture exporting countries. Only for the oil exporting countries is the 
growth rate o f current exports negatively and significantly correlated with the home 
goods. The others are negative but insignificant except for the manufacture exporters 
where the coefficient is positive.
The same regression was also estimated for regional groups: Asia (excluding 
China and India), Sub-Saharan-Africa, Latin America, and the OECD countries. With 
the exception o f the OECD countries, the current and past values o f exports were not 
correlated with home goods production. For the OECD countries, the current value of 
exports are positively correlated with the home goods at the ten-percent level o f 
significance. From the above results one can conclude that home goods are by and 
large independent o f exports and thus the inclusion o f exports into the production 
function is not justified.
5.4. CAUSALITY
Another important argument concerning the relationship between export growth and 
economic growth is causality. A strong correlation proves neither the existence o f 
causality between the two variables, nor (if there is causality) does it mean causality 
runs from exports to economic growth. Most empirical studies, explicitly or 
implicitly, assume that causality runs from exports to economic growth. As Jung and 
Marshall (1985) have pointed out, there are several reasons why one should expect 
export growth to stimulate economic growth:
First, export growth may represent an increase in demand for the country’s 
output and thus serve to increase real GNP. Second, an increase in exports may 
loosen a binding foreign exchange constraint and allow increases in productive 
intermediate imports and hence result in the growth o f output. Third, export 
growth may result in enhanced efficiency and thus may lead to greater output.
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Several possible source o f enhanced efficiency present themselves. Contacts 
with foreign competitors that arise from exporting may lead to more rapid 
technical change, the development o f indigenous entrepreneurship, and the 
exploitation o f scale economies. In addition, this competitive pressure may 
reduce x-inefficiency and may lead to better product quality. (Jung and 
Marshall, 1985: 3)
Even though some recent studies have challenged the above view, few have shown an 
awareness o f the importance o f causality. For example, Ram (1985: 416) states that ‘it 
is evidently important to be able to make a reasonably satisfactory transition from 
statements about the correlation patterns to some judgement about the causal 
structure’. Dollar (1991: 536) recognises ‘the possibility that the causation runs in the 
other direction: from poor growth performance to inward-orientation’. He argues that 
an external factor, such as a debt crisis, may cause both slow economic and export 
growth. World Bank researchers are also aware that ‘[t]he links between trade strategy 
and macroeconomic performance are not entirely clear’ and raise the question of 
whether ‘outward orientation leads to better economic performance or [...] superior 
economic performance paves the way for outward orientation.’24 Nevertheless, the 
vast majority o f the literature fails to establish the direction o f causality.
Arguments for export-led development have been challenged empirically as 
well as theoretically. The ‘stage o f development’ comparative advantage theory, for 
example, argues that some minimum level o f economic development is required prior 
to export-led development. Economic development tends to stimulate exports at the 
earlier stages o f development, whereas exports tend to stimulate economic 
development after some level o f development is attained. It is argued that higher 
growth rates are not necessarily determined by exports, but some other processes 
independent o f trade policy.25 The strong correspondence between development level 
and trade policy orientation suggests that export performance is related to the level o f 
development. As development takes place, the economy becomes stronger, markets 
become more efficient, and fewer bottlenecks occur. This well functioning economy
24 World Development Report (1987: 83).
25 See Pack (1992 and 1988).
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facilitates greater penetration into world markets. Thus, Yaghmanian (1994: 1979) 
argues that economic growth and successful export performance are both determined 
by the process o f development and structural change. Exports and GNP growth may 
or may not reinforce each other. But as countries become more developed, they are 
more likely to ‘get the prices right’, and to follow a more neutral policy stance both 
with respect to exports and to the domestic economy. Criticising the World 
Development Report (1987), Singer argued that,
the fact that the category o f inward-oriented countries, and specially the 
strongly inward-oriented countries, consists o f poorer countries than the 
outward-oriented countries [proves that] poorer countries find it more difficult 
to progress than countries already further up the development ladder, such as 
the NICs and middle-income countries. (Singer, 1988: 233)
Dodaro also makes the same point by arguing that,
[t]he fact that it is the better-off countries that are generally classified as 
outward oriented [...] suggests that some degree o f economic development and 
efficiency is necessary before a country can make any significant inroads in 
the world market. [...] It may be only when a level o f economic development is 
reached that export promotion -  or a neutral policy predicated on getting the 
prices right -  becomes both possible and feasible. (Dodaro, 1991: 1154)
Jung and Marshall argue that even if  it is true that the export growth can cause 
economic growth, it is equally plausible that economic growth may also cause export 
growth.
Consider a growing economy where learning and technical change are 
proceeding rapidly in a few industries. The learning and technical changes that 
are taking place may have very little to do with any conscious government 
policy to promote exports or even to promote production in those industries. It 
may be more related to the accumulation o f human capital, cumulative
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production experience, technology transfer from abroad through licensing or 
direct investment, or physical capital accumulation. That is, important primary 
causal factors behind this unbalanced growth may be unrelated to any special 
export promoting incentives and may foster growth even in the absence o f 
such incentives. [...] Given this unbalanced growth, it is highly unlikely that 
demand for goods from these boom industries will grow as rapidly as their 
production. Thus producers are likely to turn to foreign markets to sell their 
goods. The causal relationship in this instance is one that proceeds from output 
growth to export growth. Although output growth and export growth are likely 
to be correlated, it would be inappropriate to characterise this situation as one 
in which export promotion has induced growth. Ordinary correlations between 
export growth and output growth are unable to discriminate between the 
export promotion hypothesis and the internally generated exports hypothesis. 
(Jung and Marshall, 1985: 5)
Using the causality test developed by Granger, Jung and Marshall analyse the 
direction o f causality between export growth and economic growth for 37 countries. 
The results in general do not support the export-led growth hypothesis. For only four 
countries,26 exports seem to promote economic growth. In three countries the reverse 
is true; economic growth led to higher export growth. For five countries however, the 
growth o f the economy resulted in lower export growth.
Similar results were also obtained in a study o f 87 developing countries in a 
paper by Dodaro (1993). Using the same methodology as Jung and Marshall but 
employing a different time period and more countries, Dodaro also found no support 
for neoclassical theory in any of the countries known as the ‘Newly Industrialising 
Countries’. Dodaro's results were in favour of the export-led growth hypothesis only 
in seven low-income countries. His result also shown only weak support for the 
contention that GDP growth promotes export growth.
In his research on African and other ‘poor’ countries, Helleiner (1986) found 
no correlation between export performance and overall economic performance. Even 
the advocates o f export-led development often admit that, at least for very low-income
26 Indonesia, Egypt, Costa Rica, and Ecuador.
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countries, such correlation is ambiguous and a certain minimum level o f development 
is necessary to see any meaningful correlation between exports and economic 
growth.27
Using the Sims technique, Chow (1987) tests the causality between 
manufactured exports and manufactured output for eight ‘Newly Industrialising 
Countries’ and finds a reciprocal causal relationship.28 Only for Argentina, which is 
considered to be one o f the most inward-oriented countries, does there seem to be no 
correlation while only for Mexico, an oil exporter, does causality run from exports to 
GDP growth.
Studying 66 developing countries, Yaghmanian (1994) estimated cross-section 
and time-series regressions, by including typical neoclassical variables, share o f 
investment in GDP, population growth rate (as a measure o f the labour force) and 
export growth rate, as well as other variables to take into account o f the impact of 
structural transformation and the process o f development on the growth o f output. 
Export growth in his cross-section and time-series analysis was first proven to be 
significant. But when he replaced population with employment (for 30 countries) to 
take into account unemployment and underemployment, which are very common in 
developing countries, exports became insignificant. Consequently, he concluded that 
his final set o f estimations failed to support the neoclassical export-led growth model.
Greenaway and Sapsford (1994) first estimated a production function type 
growth model using time-series data for 14 countries and found no evidence to 
support the export-led growth hypothesis. Then, to solve the simultaneity between 
exports and output and to separate the ‘economic influence’ o f export growth on 
output growth, they estimated a similar regression by replacing GDP with ‘GDP net o f 
exports’ (Y-X) and found not only that coefficients were not significant but also that 
many o f them changed sign and became negative.
Before moving to a criticism of time-series analysis and introducing an 
alternative measure o f openness, we will do our own causality tests employing three 
different causality tests (Granger, Sims and Modified Sims) for different categories of 
countries. The general procedure for Granger causality tests is to regress the past
27 See Michaely (1977: 52), Heller and Porter (1978: 192), Tyler (1981: 192).
28 These are: Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Singapore and Taiwan.
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values of the dependent and independent variables on the current value of the 
dependent variable. The Sims model regresses the current, past and future values of 
the independent variables against the current value of the dependent variable. The 
Modified Sims model also adds past values of the dependent variable into the Sims 
model.29 A third variable, terms of trade (ToT), is also included into equations 2 and 4 
since it is assumed to influence both exports and economic growth.
The models can be written as:
Granger:
1. Xt = a  + Pi.Xt_i + p2-Xt_2 + P3-Yt-1 + P4-Yt-2 + u
2. Xt = a  + Pi.Xt_i + P2-Xt_2 + P3-Yt-1 + P4-Yt-2 + P5-ToTt + P6 ToTYt-l +
p7.ToTYt_2 + u
3. Yt = a  + Pi-Xt-i + P2 x t-2 + P3-Yt-1 + P4-Yt-2 + u
4. Yt = a  + Pi-Xt-i + P2-x t-2 + P3*Yt-l + P4-Yt-2 + P5-ToTt + P6-ToTYt-l +
p7.ToTYt_2 + u
Sims:
5. Xt = a  + pi.Yt + p2-Yt-l + P3-Yt-2 + P4-Yt+1 + P5-Yt+2 + u
6. Yt = a  + Pi.Xt + P2-Xt-1 + P3-x t-2 + P4-Xt+1 + P5-x t+2 + u
Modified Sims:
7. Xt = a  + Pi.Xt_i + P2-x t-2 + P3*Yt + P4-Yt-1 + P5-Yt-2 + P6-Yt+1 + P7*Yt+2 + u
8. Yt = a  + Pi.Yt_i + p2-Yt_2 + P3-Xt + P4.Xt_i + P5-Xt_2 + P6-Xt+1 + P7*x t+2 + u
29 For detail o f the models see Gordon and Sakyi-Bekoe (1993: 555).
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where
Yt and X{ : Growth rates o f current values o f GDP and exports
Yt-1> Yt_2> Xt_i, Xt_2 • First and second lags o f Y^ and X{
ToTt, ToTt_i, ToTt_2 • Change in the current and past values o f terms o f trade
The regressions are estimated for: the low-income, middle-income, high-income 
countries, the world as a whole, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, East Asia, the 
OECD, oil exporters, agriculture exporters, primary commodity exporters and 
manufacture exporters. The results are presented in the table 5.2(b) and summarised in 
table 5.2(a).
Table 5.2(a): Summary of the causality tests for exports and GDP growth
From Export Growth 
to Economic Growth 
(Xgr => GDPgr)
From Economic Growth 
to Export Growth 
(GDPgr => Xgr)
Low-income countries Strong (+) Weak (+)
Middle-income countries
High-income countries Weak (-) Strong (+)
OECD Weak (-) Strong (+)
Oil exporters Strong (+) Strong (+)
Primary exporters Weak (-)
Agriculture exporters Weak (+)
Manufacture exporters Weak (-) Strong (+)
East Asia Strong (+)
Sub Saharan Africa Weak (+)
Latin America
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The results are interesting, but not surprising. For the low-income countries, there is 
strong support for causality running from exports to GDP growth. The second lag o f 
exports is consistently positive and significant at the one-percent level in equations 3, 
4, 6 and 8. Future values of GDP growth in equations 5 and 7 also make the same 
point. This is not surprising and confirms the earlier empirical work on externalities.30 
As was argued earlier, low-income countries usually are import dependent and export 
demand constrained and a positive causality from exports to GDP growth is not the 
result o f a static-efficiency gain. Equation 1 also suggests a weak causality from GDP 
growth to exports at the ten-percent level. The current values o f exports and income 
are not correlated and the terms o f trade do not appear to have a significant impact.
For the middle-income countries, there seems to be no causality between 
exports and economic growth. The only slightly significant item is the terms o f trade 
which have a negative impact on exports. The current values o f exports and income 
are not correlated.
For high-income countries and the world as a whole,31 there is clear causality 
running from GDP growth to export growth. And there is a weak negative causality 
from exports to GDP growth. The current values o f exports and income are strongly 
correlated.
With regard to the other categories, not surprisingly, there is a similar pattern 
for the OECD, the manufacture exporting and the high-income countries. The OECD 
countries are high-income countries which usually export manufactured commodities. 
The causality runs clearly from GDP growth to export growth. For Sub-Saharan 
Africa, there seems to be a very weak causality from exports to income growth. The 
terms o f trade, however, seem to have a positive impact on income growth. For Latin 
American countries, there is no clear pattern. There is clear causality from income to 
exports for the East Asian countries. For the oil producing countries, there seems to be 
correlation both ways and the current values are also strongly correlated. The terms o f 
trade for these countries have a negative sign which is very difficult to interpret. For 
the agriculture and primary commodity exporting countries, causality between the two 
variables seems to be very weak. For the agriculture exporting countries there is a
30 See Table 5.1.
31 The high-income countries account for around 70 percent o f total world production.
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very weak causality from exports to GDP growth and for the primary commodity 
exporters a negative causality from GDP growth to exports growth. The terms o f trade 
also appear to have a negative impact on exports.
5.5. CRITIQUE OF TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS
In the literature, cross-country analyses usually produce more favourable results for 
the export-led development hypothesis than time-series analysis. This inconsistency 
has puzzled many researchers. Why should the two different methods give conflicting 
results? In the next chapter we will attempt to solve this puzzle by arguing that there is 
no real inconsistency between the results o f these two techniques. The argument will 
be that the results reveal fallacies o f composition. Indeed, relatively better export 
performance may result in relatively better economic performance. This does not 
mean, however, that when all the countries increase their export performances they 
will all grow faster. In this section, however, it will be argued that time-series analysis 
is more problematical than cross-sectional analysis.
Econometricians usually favour time-series to cross-country analysis. This is 
particularly true when the causality between variables is not clear. Cross-country 
analysis can only provide evidence for the correlation but not for the causality. Cross­
country analysis is also believed to overgeneralize, failing to account for the specific 
circumstances o f the countries. Ram argues that,
[estim ates obtained from cross-section data are useful in many ways, 
especially when the number o f observations for individual countries is small. 
However, there is evidence o f tremendous parametric variations across 
countries in regard to estimates o f the growth equations typically used in such 
contexts. Imposition of a common structure in the form o f cross-section 
models can be a drastic simplification and important parametric differences 
could be masked in cross-section estimates even when the samples chosen 
look fairly homogeneous with reference to certain prior criteria. It seems 
important, therefore, to make a beginning toward an assessment o f the export-
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growth nexus for individual countries on the basis o f time-series data. (Ram, 
1987: 52)
Moreover, the availability o f data for countries included in analyses can cause serious 
problems. For example, as Ram also points out, some studies cover various groups o f 
developing countries for different time periods which reduces their validity in 
deducing meaningful results.
Most cross-sectional studies, as well as time-series analyses, are irrelevant to 
the question o f the benefits o f export-led development. Cross-sectional studies usually 
indicate a strong positive correlation between economic growth and export growth. 
This is mistakenly interpreted as evidence for the export-led development hypothesis. 
Without providing causal evidence, however, these results can be interpreted in either 
way. Time-series analysis, on the other hand, has the advantage o f providing evidence 
o f causality which is sufficient to reject or accept the hypothesis.
Despite its shortcomings, cross-country analysis may provide better 
information about the nature of the trade-GDP growth relationship if  the model is 
carefully constructed. Time-series analysis, however, has more problems than are 
recognised in the literature.
First, as argued earlier, the bivariate as well as the production function type o f 
regressions used to verify the benefits o f export-led development miss a fundamental 
point. Exports are, indeed, part of total GDP, and there is autocorrelation. When 
exports are introduced into the production function, the problem is assumed away but 
not solved.
Second, time-series analysis focuses on the short-term relationship between 
exports and economic growth. The real benefits o f an open economy, however, may 
be actualised in the long-run as endogenous growth theories suggest.32 A narrow focus 
on the immediate effects o f trade might be misleading.
32 To give an example, there probably is a very strong correlation between one’s diet and one’s health 
but this does not mean that one’s health will deteriorate immediately if  one fails to intake enough 
nutrients for a short period of time. Thus the real impact o f diet can only be seen in the long-run. And 
since health is also affected by many other factors (such as age, social class, genetic factors, etc), a 
cross-sectional analysis where many individuals are observed (and other factors are controlled) would 
provide more meaningful results than simply observing one’s eating habits and health through time.
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Third, as most developing countries are export demand constrained and import 
dependent, a positive correlation between export performance and economic growth is 
inevitable and causality may run from exports to GDP growth. This, however, does 
not necessarily prove export-led development hypothesis since the impact o f trade on 
economic growth is not a result o f a static-efficiency gain but o f increased effective 
demand.
Fourth, fluctuations in both variables can be caused by a third, external factor, 
such as a demand shock, an oil price shock or a debt problem, which would produce a 
positive correlation between them, even if  they were uncorrelated.
Fifth, exports may be important for domestic production for many developing 
countries since many of them are import dependent. But exports, particularly in the 
short-run, are not the only source o f foreign exchange. Aid and borrowing may reduce 
the observed correlation, obscuring the impact o f exports on GDP growth. For 
example, in a particular year, were exports to fall dramatically, a country might be 
able to import by borrowing, and, in the next year when exports increase, the debt 
could be paid back. Consequently, there would be no observed correlation between 
export growth and GDP growth.
Sixth, a weak or a strong correlation may indicate the size o f exports compared 
to the economy, rather than a meaningful relationship between exports and 
development. It is well-known that more open economies are more vulnerable to 
external shocks. I f  a country trades very little, there will be a very weak correlation 
between exports and GDP growth. However, this cannot be interpreted as evidence 
against export-led development. The same can be said for an open economy in which 
there is a strong positive correlation between export growth and GDP growth. If  the 
demand for exports o f a very open economy declines as a result o f a demand shock 
and GDP follows it, there will be a positive correlation between them. A negative 
correlation is almost impossible between exports and GDP unless exports remove 
resources from other alternative uses and waste them. But a positive correlation can be 
observed even if  exports reduce GDP growth. Thus neither a weak correlation nor a 
strong correlation in time-series analysis can be considered a good evidence for or 
against the export-led development.
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Seventh, if  one accepts the ‘stage o f development’ argument, the causality 
tests become hollow as the impact o f exports depends on the level o f development of 
the economy. It is argued that competitiveness in international markets depends on the 
strength of the economy which is a function o f its development level. It is also argued 
that, due to the existence o f scale economies, external trade will become more 
important only after domestic markets are exhausted. Thus, the impact o f trade will 
depend on the level of development as well as the size o f the economy. As the 
contribution o f exports to overall development depends on the conditions o f the 
economy, time-series causality tests will be misleading. Even if  one could establish a 
strong correlation and causality for one country, this cannot be evidence for or against 
the export-led development thesis, since the results would depend on the specific 
circumstances o f the country in question.
Finally, time-series analysis has specific technical problems; for example, 
when variables are not stationary even after taking the first difference.33 Results also 
depend on the length of the time-series. The number o f observation is often an 
important problem, particularly for the causality tests in which degrees o f freedom are 
lost. Moreover, as Gordon and Sakyi-Bekoe (1993: 561) point out, the causality 
conclusions are sensitive to the different tests used, to the lag specification o f the 
variables, and to the structure of the error terms. Though there are techniques to deal 
with these problems, they complicate regressions, and it is difficult to interpret the 
results.
In brief, since the benefits o f an open economy may be actualised in the long- 
run, since the structure o f the economy is an important factor and since external 
factors cannot be controlled in time-series analysis, the results cannot provide 
adequate evidence to support or reject the export-led development arguments.
5.6. A CRITIQUE OF DOLLAR’S OPENNESS INDEX
As argued earlier, measuring openness or ‘outward-orientation’ across countries is a 
considerably difficult task. There are technical and conceptual problems. In a 1992 
article, Dollar produced an ‘index o f trade liberalisation’, which subsequently became
33 This is the case for GDP growth for some countries.
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popular and was widely used. The index is based on Hecksher-Ohlin comparative 
advantage theory and on the view that trade barriers cause higher prices. Dollar 
adjusted national price levels with factor endowments, and used the difference 
between actual and predicted price levels as a measure o f trade liberalisation. In his 
study, Dollar defined outward-orientation (or liberalisation) as a combination o f two 
factors: a low level o f protection, especially for inputs into the production process; 
and, relatively little variability in the real exchange rate, so that incentives are 
consistent over time.
Recognising the difficulties in measuring trade liberalisation, Dollar developed 
a new technique based on a cross-country index o f real exchange rate distortions. He 
argued that if  there was free trade, the prices o f tradable commodities would be 
equalised across countries. However, average prices would not be completely 
equalised, as a result o f price differences in nontradable commodities. The prices of 
nontradables are determined by factor endowments. As developed countries are 
labour-scarce and most nontradables are labour-intensive, the wages and the prices of 
nontradables are higher in developed countries compared to developing countries. 
Dollar argues that this could be used as a benchmark to measure real exchange rate 
distortions. Given its factor endowments, if  a country has a higher price level than 
predicted, the country is assumed to have an overvalued real exchange rate, reflecting 
protectionist trade policies.
To calculate real exchange rate distortions, Dollar used the international 
comparison of prices prepared by Summers and Heston (1988). Summers and Heston 
calculated the overall price level of countries by pricing the same basket o f 
consumption goods in domestic currency in different countries and converting it into 
US dollars. By using the United States as the benchmark country, a relative price level 
(RPL) index was calculated as:
RPLi = 100 * e (Pi/Pus)
where ‘e’ is the nominal exchange rate, Pi is the consumption price index for country 
ci* and ‘Pus* is the consumption price level in the United States. This formulation is
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similar to the usual measure of the real exchange rate, except that price indices 
employed have the same weights in each country.
I f  there were no barriers to trade and no nontradable commodities, this 
measure would be 100 for all countries should the ‘Law of One Price’ hold. Hence, 
the price level could be taken as a measure o f trade orientation. However, the 
existence o f nontradables makes the calculation more complicated. Even if  there was 
complete free trade, the price levels o f the countries would not all be 100, but would 
vary according to factor endowments. Price level can only be used to measure trade 
orientation after the variation in prices due to different factor endowments is taken 
into account. This can be done by regressing the price level on the country’s 
endowments. Dollar used GDP per capita and population density as measures of 
endowments. GDP per capita is a measure o f the relative per capita factor availability 
and population density is a measure o f land availability. One would expect more 
densely populated countries to have higher prices for nontradables, as nontradables 
include housing services.
The residuals from this regression were used as the measure o f trade 
orientation. A country above (below) the line has a higher (lower) price level than can 
be justified by its endowments and is considered to be relatively inward (outward) 
oriented. Dollar's regressions indicated a strong positive relationship between per 
capita income and price level as he expected. On the other hand, there was no clear 
relationship between the price level and population density. Assuming that orientation 
is achieved through a low level of protection and a stable real exchange rate, he 
addressed the question o f whether outward-oriented economies grow more rapidly. To 
control other variables that may influence growth, investment was included in the 
regression along with exchange rate distortion and variability. His regressions showed 
that growth was positively associated with the investment rate and negatively 
associated with distortion and variability o f the real exchange rate.
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Theoretical problem s of D ollar’s approach
Even though Dollar’s index has become increasingly popular, it has serious theoretical 
weaknesses. The empirical work presented in this section raises doubts about the 
validity and consistency o f the index. The problems o f the index are as follows.
First, even though Dollar’s objective was to provide evidence that outward- 
oriented developing countries grow more rapidly, the index he produces does not 
measure trade orientation. It attempts to measure trade liberalisation. As argued 
earlier, whether more open economies grow faster is a separate issue from whether 
trade liberalisation brings about a more open economy.
Second, the Dollar index does not even measure trade liberalisation, but it 
attempts to measure real exchange rate distortions. Trade policies cannot be reduced 
to exchange rate policies. A country may not have real exchange rate distortions, but 
may have various types o f protectionist and promotionist, non-free trade policies. 
Moreover, as Rodrik (1994) argues, different types o f trade-restricting policies may 
have different influences on the Dollar index. For example, a tariff will raise the 
domestic price o f tradables as a whole, and an export tax will reduce it. ‘Judging by 
the Dollar index, the country that restricted trade through export taxation will appear 
as if  it has just become more open.’34
Third, the Dollar index does not even measure real exchange rate distortions, 
since the correlation between per capita GNP and the price level has a more complex 
nature than that which he presumes. A country might have a higher or lower price 
level than can be justified by its ‘factor endowments’, yet it may have a competitive 
real exchange rate. This section shows that the relative average price levels between 
countries are determined by the relative productivity levels o f tradables and 
nontradables. This relationship is complex and will be explained in detail. First, 
however, the theoretical foundations o f the Dollar index will be criticised.
The Dollar index is based on the Hecksher-Ohlin theory o f comparative 
advantage. Consequently, its theoretical foundations are weak and misleading. 
Hecksher-Ohlin theory argues that prices in developed countries are higher as a result 
o f higher wages, and wages are higher because developed countries are capital-
34 Rodrik (1994: 49).
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abundant and labour-scarce. From a non-orthodox point o f view, however, the level o f 
wages is irrelevant to price determination. According to labour value theory, the 
relative prices o f commodities are determined by relative productivity. I f  money is 
‘commodity money’, such as gold and silver, and competitive devaluations are not 
possible, a lower average price level is expected in a highly productive developed 
county. That is the reason why Ricardo, in his famous example,35 assumed a high 
price level for the low-productivity country (England), and a low price level for the 
high productivity country (Portugal). In Ricardo’s model, the price level is determined 
by the overall level o f productivity. The level o f real wages is determined by the 
overall productivity level and the factoral distribution o f income. Any increase in 
wages beyond an increase in productivity would reduce the profit rate and not have 
any impact on the price level.
Dollar argues that when a free trade policy is adopted,36 the prices o f the 
tradables are determined by the international price levels and are the same for all 
countries. This implies that the prices o f tradables are independent o f the domestic 
wage level. The prices o f domestic goods, however, are determined by the level of 
wages. Thus, differences in the international average price levels can only be 
explained by the relative prices o f nontradables, which, in turn, depend on factor 
endowments and wages. Since it is difficult to obtain detailed information for factor 
endowments o f many countries, Dollar uses GNP per capita as an indirect measure.
Dollar uses per capita GNP as a measure o f relative factor endowments, rather 
than as a measure o f the relative productivity level.37 He expects a positive correlation 
between GNP per capita and the price level since high-income countries are assumed 
to be labour-scarce and real wages are higher. As argued earlier, from the Ricardian 
point o f view, one would expect a negative correlation between the price level and
35 See chapter one.
36 Assuming that countries are small and unable to influence international prices.
37 It is obvious that average productivity and real wage levels are strongly correlated. Moreover, higher 
productivity is a result o f a higher capital-labour ratio and thus reflects ‘capital-abundance’. If one 
assumes the factoral distribution to be the same in all countries, the real wage level would reflect the 
overall productivity level. Nevertheless the terminological differences between these two approaches 
are clear. In the Ricardian model, the prices and the wage levels are determined by the average level o f  
productivity. The price level is negatively and the real wage level is positively correlated with 
productivity. In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, however, the real wage level and prices are determined by 
factor endowments. Dollar uses GNP per capita for not what it is (average productivity level) but what 
it represents (factor endowment).
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GNP per capita, as higher productivity means lower prices in general. How can this 
contradiction be explained? The answer to this question is related to exchange rate 
devaluations for competitiveness.
The assertion that, under free trade conditions, the prices o f nontradables (and 
thus average prices) are determined by the level o f wages cannot be justified unless 
one assumes completely different profit rates for exportables and nontradables. 
According to the logic o f Dollar’s approach, since prices are externally determined 
(and fixed) for exportables, any increase in the wage rate would result in a reduction 
in the profit rate o f exporters. This is not so for nontradables. Producers o f 
nontradables can pass on the increase in wages to prices and maintain their profit 
rates. This is the reason why Dollar argues that in developed countries, where wages 
are higher, average prices are also higher. Even though there is no reason why profit 
rates for all commodities should be exactly the same in both sectors, there must be a 
limit to this profit rate differential. I f  production o f nontradables is more profitable, 
then the production o f exportables will decline. This, however, cannot be sustained in 
the long-run and a devaluation of the exchange rate which increases the profitability 
o f the export sector compared to nontradables would distribute the cost o f an overall 
wage increase in the economy equally to both sectors. Thus, even under free trade 
conditions, the relative prices o f exportables and nontradables are determined by their 
relative productivity levels. It is a false argument to suggest that free trade would 
equalise the prices o f tradables and leave the prices o f nontradables intact.
A change in the nominal exchange rate (in order to keep a competitive real 
exchange rate) is the only plausible explanation for a positive correlation between per 
capita GNP and the average price level. International competitiveness can be achieved 
either by increasing the productivity o f exportables or by devaluing the currency. 
When competitiveness is achieved as a result o f productivity increase, the nominal 
exchange rate tends to appreciate. Developing countries rely more on competitive 
devaluations. Devaluations, however, reduce average domestic prices in international 
currency units (i.e. US dollar).38 This can be explained by the following:
38 This fact is very well-known and unless price differences as a result o f exchange rate devaluations 
are taken into account, per capita GNP underestimates the level o f economic development in 
developing countries. In order to have a more accurate measure o f economic development, per capita
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The average domestic price level can be calculated as:
P a.Px + b.PM + c.PHG (1)
where
P : Average domestic price level
Px : Domestic price o f exportables
PM : Domestic price of importables
Phg : Domestic price o f nontradables
a, b, c : Share of the sectors ( a  + b + c = l )
The above equation consists o f three parts. The first part is the average price o f 
exportables, the second part is the average price o f importables and the third part is 
the average price o f home goods. The average price level in international currency is:
ER.P = ER.a.Px + ER.b.PM + ER.c.PHG (2)
where ER is the nominal exchange rate.39 Under free trade conditions, the first and the 
second parts are determined by the international prices o f the tradables:
ER.Px = Pxi (3)
ER.Pm = Pmi (4)
where
Pxj : International price of exportables 
PMI : International price of importables
GNP levels need to be adjusted with the price level. This measure is called purchasing power parity 
(PPP).
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Equations 3 and 4 imply that, as long as the international prices o f tradables stay 
constant, their average domestic price level in international currency is independent o f 
the domestic price changes. The domestic prices o f importables are determined by 
their international prices and by the nominal exchange rate. Any change in the 
domestic prices o f exportables will be matched by a change in the nominal exchange 
rate. The competitive exchange rate is given by:
ER = PXI/ P X (5)
Equation 5 implies that any change in the price o f exportables (both P ^  and Px) 
requires an adjustment o f the nominal exchange rate. For example an increase 
(decrease) in Px would require a depreciation (appreciation) o f the nominal exchange 
rate. An increase (decrease) in P^, however, would require an appreciation 
(depreciation) o f the nominal exchange rate.
Given the nominal exchange rate, an increase in productivity o f home goods 
would reduce the average price level. Thus one would expect a lower (higher) average 
price level for developed (developing) countries. However, equation 5 suggests that 
the impact o f a productivity increase for exportables on the average price level is 
rather different than a productivity increase in home goods. A productivity increase in 
exportables would require an appreciation o f the nominal exchange rate, which in turn 
would increase the average price level. An appreciation is required to keep the first 
part (exportables) of equation 2 constant (otherwise the exchange rate would be 
undervalued). An appreciation o f the nominal exchange rate, however, would increase 
the third part (home goods) of the equation, and increase the average price level. The 
second part (importables) o f the equation would stay constant as an appreciation o f the 
nominal exchange rate would be matched by a decrease in the domestic prices o f 
importables.
From the above, it is clear that a country’s average price level is formed in a 
complex manner. An increase in the productivity o f exportables would increase the 
average price level in international currency, and a productivity increase in home 
goods and importables would reduce it. A number o f other factors, such as the trade
39 Note that a fall in the nominal exchange rate (ER) implies a depreciation o f the currency.
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ratio, the elasticity o f demand for exportables and the structural characteristics o f the 
economy, may also contribute to the determination of relative prices. The trade ratio 
(the coefficients in equation 2) differs from country to country and also needs to be 
taken into account. Demand conditions for exportables may also be an important 
factor in determining the level o f necessary devaluation and thus the price level. 
Demand conditions may differ from commodity to commodity. For primary and 
agricultural commodities, where relative demand tends to decline, one may expect 
competitive devaluations, and lower average price levels for those countries that rely 
heavily on the exportation of such commodities. The sectoral structure o f the 
economy may also be an important factor. For example, if  a country has a very large 
and powerful financial sector, the currency might be ‘overvalued* and the average 
price might be higher. The same is true for oil exporting countries.
The above arguments have important implications for the Dollar index. If 
productivity changes for exportables and home goods influence the average price level 
in opposite ways, and if  there are a number o f other factors that may influence the 
average price, one should not expect a simple correlation between per capita GNP and 
the average price level. The residuals from such correlations cannot be interpreted as 
real exchange rate distortions. A country might have a perfectly competitive exchange 
rate and higher (or lower) average price level than ‘can be justified’ by its 
endowments. Consequently, it is not surprising that Dollar’s results indicate very high 
exchange rate distortions for Korea and Taiwan and a low exchange rate distortion for 
Peru. When the complex nature o f price formation is recognised, there are no 
‘anomalies’ to explain.
Empirical validity of the Dollar index
Dollar’s arguments can also be challenged empirically. In his regressions, the 
significance levels o f the coefficients between the Dollar index and economic growth 
rates are surprisingly and suspiciously high. This is suspicious because if  the 
‘realistic’ exchange rate has any impact on GDP growth, it must come from increased 
trade. If  the Dollar index is an accurate measure o f openness, trade liberalisation or 
real exchange rate distortions, it must first be correlated with trade performance: trade
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policy improves economic performance through trade performance. His regressions 
between the Dollar index and economic growth rates is based on two assumptions. 
First, it is assumed that the index is a good measure o f real exchange rate distortions. 
Second, it is assumed that real exchange rate distortions significantly reduce trade 
performance. The real exchange rate, however, is only one o f many factors that can 
influence export performance. Moreover, as will be argued in chapter seven, the 
relationship between the real exchange rate and export performance is not as simple as 
is usually assumed. Thus, to prove that the Dollar index has any impact on GDP 
growth, one first must prove that the index has an impact on trade performance.
Before the possibility o f a correlation between the Dollar index and trade 
performance is investigated, an anomaly o f the index should be noted. Dollar’s 
argument is based on a positive correlation between the price level and per capita 
GNP. If  these two are not correlated, the Dollar index cannot be calculated. Even 
though there is a strong correlation between the variables when all countries are 
included in the regression, when countries are sub-divided into categories according to 
their level o f income (low, middle and high), the correlation disappears for the low- 
and middle-income countries. A strong correlation only holds for high-income 
countries. Figure 5.1 shows that in the earlier periods (i.e. 1960-64), there is no 
apparent correlation even for the high-income countries. Even though, through time, a 
positive correlation appears for the high-income countries, there is no such correlation 
for the low- and middle-income countries, even in the last period (1985-89). This 
simply means that when the developed countries are excluded, the Dollar index cannot 
be calculated. If  we want to see, for instance, whether more open African economies 
grow faster, we will not be able to calculate the Dollar index by using only African 
countries since prices and GDP per capita are uncorrelated for that region. 
Nevertheless, one could still argue that, even though there seems to be a lack of 
correlation between the price level and GDP per capita for the low- and middle- 
income countries, this itself might be evidence o f a very strong overvaluation for 
some countries. Thus, one could take the estimating line when all the countries are
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included in the regression as a bench-mark and calculate a Dollar index for the low- 
and middle-income countries as Dollar does.40 Alternatively, the low- and middle- 
income countries can also be categorised according to their actual price levels rather 
then price levels that are adjusted by the per capita income.
A good criteria for accurateness o f the Dollar index as a measure o f the real 
exchange rate overvaluation is to check whether it is correlated with export 
performance. If the Dollar index is a good measure o f real exchange rate distortion, 
one would expect a very strong correlation between the Dollar index and export 
performance, and a somewhat weaker correlation between the Dollar index and the 
GDP growth rate as export performance is only one o f many factors that contribute to 
overall economic performance. To investigate the accuracy and the consistency o f the 
Dollar index, the following regressions were estimated for different time periods and 
for different country groups.
1. GDPgr = f  (DI + I/GDP)
2. Xgr = f  (DI)
where
GDPgr : GDP growth rate
I/GDP : Share o f investment in total production
Xgr : Export growth rate
DI : Dollar index
The first regression is similar to Dollar’s regressions in table 5, except that real 
exchange rate ‘variability’ is not included. The second regression captures the impact 
o f the Dollar index on export performance. The Dollar index is calculated for different 
time periods and different country groups using the same technique as Dollar used. 
The results are presented in table 5.3.
40 Inclusion o f the square root o f GNP per capita in the regression or using the logarithmic form allows 
the non-linear function to be linear in the parameters.
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The message from the table is clear. There seems to be no consistent 
relationship between the Dollar index and GDP growth rates. The coefficients are in 
some cases positive and in the earliest period (1961-75) insignificant except for the 
middle-income countries. The correlation becomes significant towards the 1980-90 
period. For the middle-income countries the correlation is negative and significant for 
all periods. For the high-income countries, however, it is positive and significant. For 
the low-income countries, it is positive and significant for the 1961-75 period and then 
it becomes negative and significant.
When Dollar calculates his index, he includes the high-income countries in his 
regression (because otherwise the index cannot be calculated), but when he estimates 
the regressions between the Dollar index and GDP growth, he excludes them. This is 
because inclusion would reduce the significance level o f the regressions. Dollar 
justifies the exclusion of the high-income countries by arguing that the impact of 
openness on them would be different than on developing countries. It is not clear, 
however, why the high-income countries should benefit from ‘overvalued’ exchange 
rates. The results o f the first regression shed further doubts on the validity o f the 
Dollar index as a measure of real exchange rate distortion.
The second regression creates even bigger problems for the Dollar index. As 
argued earlier, if  the Dollar index has any impact on GDP growth, it must be through 
its impact on export performance. The evidence presented in the table is disappointing 
for the index. Not only is the correlation not always negative but also in no case it is 
negative and significant at the one-percent level. For example, for the Tow- and 
middle-income’ countries in 1975-90 period, there is a strong negative correlation 
between the Dollar index and GDP growth, but no significant correlation between the 
Dollar index and export growth. Thus, it is very difficult to justify the conclusion of 
Dollar’s article.
How can one explain the strong correlation between the Dollar index and the 
GDP growth rate? A correlation does not prove causality. Dollar assumes causality 
running from the Dollar index to GDP growth. We have established, however, that 
causality does not run from the Dollar index to GDP growth. It could be argued that 
causality may run from GDP growth to the Dollar index. Perhaps the fast-growing
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Table 5.3: Regressions to test the validity and consistency of the Dollar index.
All countries
G D P gr =  f  (D I +  Igr) X g r  =  f  (D I)
T im e per iod s DI Igr D I
1 9 6 1 -7 5 1.604 5.699 -1 .4 2 8
1 9 6 5 -8 0 -0 .9 6 2 3.144 1 .523
1 9 7 0 -8 5
1 9 7 5 -9 0
-1 .4 6 3
... T T ‘  4.351 ? ~
-0 .2 4 5
-1.846
Low- and middle-income countries
G D P gr =  f ( D I  + Igr) X gr =  f  (D I)
T im e per iod s DI Igr D I
1 9 6 1 -7 5 0 .8 9 8 4.092 - 1 . 7 5 1
1 9 6 5 -8 0 -1 .8 4 4 • ■;*: 2;66S * * •:* 0 .9 4 9
19 7 0 -8 5 -2 .6 4 5 2.256 -0 .2 8 1
1 9 7 5 -9 0 .-H-.m- -4 .6 5 9  P. MINI 4.239 ~ -1 .3 6 6
Middle- and high-income countries
G D P gr =  f ( D I  +  Igr) X gr =  f  (D I)
T im e period s DI Igr D I
1 9 6 1 -7 5 -1 .4 1 8 6.047 -0 .2 8 1
1 9 6 5 -8 0 0 .5 8 4 2.426 0 .2 2 8
1 9 7 0 -8 5 0 .1 6 0 3.827 • ' -0 .3 2 8
1 9 7 5 -9 0  f A  -2 .3 6 8 4,359 -1 .8 6 0
Low-income countries
G D P gr =  f  (D I +  Igr) X gr =  f  (D I)
T im e p eriod s D I Igr D I
1 9 6 1 -7 5 2 .0 6 6 ______ l_____________ -1 .4 1 5
1 9 6 5 -8 0 -1 .9 4 8 1.953 1 .4 5 0
1 9 7 0 -8 5 - a .203 1 .9 3 6 -0 .1 1 9
1 9 7 5 -9 0 , , 1 7 4 1 .487 -0 .7 3 5
Middle-income countries
G D P gr =  f ( D I  + I g r ) X g r  =  f  (D I)
T im e p eriod s DI Igr D I
1 9 6 1 -7 5 -1 .8 4 8  - ■ 2.985 • * ■ -0 .2 3 7
1 9 6 5 -8 0 -1 .7 7 8  2.740 0 .001
1 9 7 0 -8 5
1 9 7 5 -9 0
-1 .8 7 4  U p ;
-2 .6 2 6  | 3.816 •
0 .1 3 8
High-income countries
G D P gr =  f  (D I +  Igr) X g r  =  f  (D I)
T im e p eriod s DI Igr DI
1 9 6 1 -7 5
1 9 6 5 -8 0
1 9 7 0 -8 5
1 9 7 5 -9 0
__[ ISLi_____
-0 .1 7 6
1.917
0 .8 5 7
-1 .1 5 8
N o te: F igu res are t-statistics. T he price lev e l data are from  Sum m ers and H eston . T he rest o f  the data  
are from  the W orld  B ank  Stars D atabase.
S ig n ifica n t at ten-percent lev e l  
S ig n ifica n t at on e-p ercen t lev e l
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countries have lower Dollar indices rather than countries that have lower Dollar 
indices grow faster. This makes sense given the above discussion on the determinants 
o f the average price level. I f  the productivity level for nontradables increases faster 
than the productivity level of exportables, one might observe a high level o f GDP 
growth and a lower price level.
In conclusion, whatever the Dollar index measures and whatever the 
relationship between the Dollar index and economic growth might be, it may have 
little to do with the trade policies that countries adopt. The Dollar index measures 
neither openness nor trade liberalisation. It does not even measure real exchange rate 
distortion.
5.7. CONCLUSION
This chapter summarised the empirical literature on the impact o f international trade 
on economic growth. It argued that measuring openness is an immensely difficult 
task, and that anyone attempting to measure it must be aware o f these difficulties. 
Some measures have theoretical weaknesses and produce misleading results. Others 
are theoretically more accurate, but difficult to calculate, particularly for a long period 
o f time and across countries. They are non-comparable across countries and it is not 
possible to see a trend through time. Consequently, they cannot be used for time- 
series analysis.
Further, there is confusion over the term. The theoretical confusion over the 
characteristics o f trade regimes are reflected in the measures o f openness. Empirical 
works use either trade intensity or trade liberalisation as a measure o f openness, even 
though they are not the same thing. This confusion is clear in Dollar’s increasingly 
popular ‘openness index’. Though it is an attempt to measure real exchange rate 
overvaluation, it is presented as a measure o f trade liberalisation and openness. The 
fact that different measures of ‘openness’ are uncorrelated proves that only one o f 
them or none o f them may be a good indicator o f openness.
The earlier literature interpreted the positive correlation between exports and 
economic growth rates as evidence of the benefits o f an export-led development 
strategy. This view was discredited, however, since exports were a component o f GDP
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and a positive correlation between them was to be expected. ‘Causality’ sparked 
another important disagreement in the literature regarding the relationship between 
exports and GDP growth.
The empirical work in the literature overwhelmingly rejects the export-led 
development thesis. It provides evidence for causality running from GDP growth to 
export growth. The empirical work in this chapter confirms these results. Three 
different tests were employed to test causality and the results do not support the 
export-led development thesis. Causality runs from GDP growth to export growth for 
high-income countries. There is no causality for middle-income countries. For low- 
income countries, causality runs from exports to GDP growth. These results, however, 
cannot be interpreted as evidence for the export-led development hypothesis as low- 
income countries are usually import dependent and export demand constrained and 
thus, the benefits o f export do not result from a static-efficiency gain.
Dollar’s openness index was criticised in this chapter. Its theoretical 
weaknesses and empirical problems were presented. It was argued that its 
interpretation o f the relationship between average price and per capita GDP is 
misleading. The relative average price level o f a country is determined by the relative 
productivity levels of exportables and home goods in a complex manner but is not 
determined by factor availability. Thus, a country might have an average price level 
that is higher than what can be justified by its endowments and still have a perfectly 
competitive real exchange rate. Moreover, even though the Dollar index seems to be 
strongly correlated with GDP growth rate, it is not strongly correlated with export 
growth rates. This is confusing since any impact o f real exchange rate overvaluation 
can only influence GDP performance through its impact on export performance.
As a result, it can be argued that most o f the existing empirical work is 
irrelevant to the arguments about the relationship between openness and economic 
growth and does not provide persuasive evidence to support or reject the export-led 
development hypothesis. Consequently, the next chapter will attempt to provide an 
alternative measure o f openness based on a structurally adjusted version o f trade 
intensity. An alternative measure of trade liberalisation will also be introduced.
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APPENDIX
Table A5.1: Country groups used in causality tests for exports and GDP growth 
Low-income countries
Tanzania, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Nepal, Malawi, Myanmar, Chad, Rwanda, 
Bangladesh, Guin.-Bissau, Madagascar, Zaire, Kenya, Niger, Haiti, Nigeria, India, 
Burkina Faso, Mali, Sudan, S.T. & Principe, Nicaragua, Gambia, Togo, Zambia, Cent 
Afr Rep, Benin, Ghana, Guyana, Pakistan, China, Mauritania, Zimbabwe, Honduras, 
Sri Lanka, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt.
Note: Low-income economies are those in which 1993 GNP per capita was $695 or less. 
Middle-income countries
Senegal, Bolivia, Cameroon, Philippines, Cape Verde, Congo, Morocco, Suriname, 
Guatemala, Syrian A. Rep. P. N. Guinea, Ecuador, Dom Rep, El Salvador, Colombia, 
Jamaica, Peru, Paraguay, Tunisia, Algeria, Thailand, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Fiji, 
Panama, Botswana, Venezuela, South Africa, Brazil, Turkey, Mauritius, Malaysia, 
Chile, Mexico, Trin & Tobago, Uruguay, Gabon, Oman, Libya, Barbados, Seychelles, 
Argentina, Greece, S. Korea, S. Arabia, Malta.
Note: Middle-income economies are those in which 1993 GNP per capita was between $695 and 
$8,625.
High-income countries
Portugal, New Zealand, Ireland, Spain, Israel, Australia, United Kingdom, Hong 
Kong, Finland, Italy, Canada, Singapore, Kuwait, Netherlands, Belgium, France, 
Austria, Germany, Sweden, US, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Japan, Switzerland.
Note: High-income economies are those in which 1993 GNP per capita was above $8,625.
Sub Saharan Africa
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Zaire, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe
Latin America
Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, 
Venezuela.
East Asia
Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic o f Korea, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand
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OECD______________________________________________________________________
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
Oil exporters________________________________________________________________
Algeria, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Indonesia, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Norway, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela
Agriculture Exporters________________________________________________________
Togo, Burundi, Malawi, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan, Rwanda, Mali, Kenya, Paraguay, 
Tanzania, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Burkina Faso, Chad, Honduras, Domin Rep, 
Somalia, Costa Rica, Madagascar, Panama.
Note: Agriculture exporters are those in which the share o f agricultural exports is more than 50 percent 
o f total exports in 1993.
Primary commodity exporters_________________________________________________
Guyana, Burundi, Bolivia, New Zealand, Ghana, Zaire, Peru, Panama, Madagascar, 
Rwanda, Cape Verde, Paraguay, Chile, Honduras, P. N. Guinea, Myanmar, Tanzania, 
Benin, Zambia, Chad, Togo, Nicaragua, Mali, Iceland, Malawi, Niger, Mauritania, 
Sudan, Somalia.
Note: Primary commodity exporters are those in which the share o f primary exports more than 70 
percent o f total exports in 1993.
Manufacture exporters________________________________________________________
USA, Belgium, Bangladesh, Finland, United Kingdom, Portugal, Nepal, China, Haiti, 
Sweden, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Israel, Germany, Hong Kong, Republic o f Korea, 
Malta, Japan
Note: Manufacture exporters are those in which the share o f manufactured exports is more than 80 
percent o f total exports in 1993.
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Table A5.2: Countries used in regressions to test the validity and consistency o f the
Dollar index.
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, 
Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Iceland, 
India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic o f Korea, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Reunion, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, 
Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Note: The sample excludes the oil exporting and the former socialist countries. Different numbers of  
countries are used for different time periods and the number o f countries is determined by data 
availability. The countries are divided into three income groups. Each group includes roughly an equal 
number o f countries for degree of freedom reasons. In the regressions, country dummies are included 
when necessary to improve the quality of the results.
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CHAPTER SIX
AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK
6.1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter the theoretical and technical difficulties in the existing 
empirical literature on openness and economic development were discussed. The 
theoretical difficulties are connected to a confusion o f outward-orientation with trade 
liberalisation. This confusion derives from the basic assumptions o f neoclassical 
economics. Once these assumptions are accepted, outward-orientation naturally 
involves liberal policies. If  one rejects these assumptions, however, a separation o f 
outward-orientation from trade liberalisation is necessary.
Once this separation is made, the relationship among outward-orientation, 
trade liberalisation and economic growth requires further elaboration. Measuring the 
impact o f outward-orientation on economic performance is a valid exercise.1 The 
same cannot be said for trade liberalisation. The only meaningful exercise would be to 
investigate the impact of trade liberalisation on openness, since the impact o f trade 
liberalisation on economic performance is transmitted through its impact on 
openness.2 Therefore, the questions become whether outward-orientation promotes 
economic growth and whether trade liberalisation promotes outward-orientation. 
These two questions should be answered separately. From this point o f view, any 
attempt to regress the measures o f trade liberalisation on economic growth is 
inappropriate. The separation o f outward-orientation from trade liberalisation also 
requires a separation o f their different measures.
1 For example, if  one measured openness by the trade ratio, it could be argued that there are direct 
mechanisms via openness to economic growth.
2 In other words, it is not possible to argue for a direct link between liberalisation and growth. If one 
defines liberalisation as deregulation o f markets, presumably any growth enhancing effect would work 
through intermediate mechanisms, such as export growth.
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The technical difficulties of measuring trade orientation and liberalisation are 
substantial and were discussed in the last chapter. As Balassa (1985: 29) points out 
‘[t]he classification of countries into groups according to the development strategy 
pursued necessarily involves a certain degree o f arbitrariness.’ Measuring 
liberalisation is tremendously difficult and there are no perfect methods. Measuring 
outward-orientation is also more problematical than it first appears. The latter 
involves a separation between actual results and policy orientation. One cannot 
compare the trade intensity figures of different countries and determine which is more 
open. Structural factors should be taken into account.
In this chapter two alternative measures will be produced. The first index is a 
measure o f trade orientation based on the structurally adjusted trade intensity (SATI) 
index. This index aims to separate the differences between the actual trade figures and 
the trade policy objectives. It will be used to test whether outward-orientation 
promotes economic growth. This chapter is also concerned with solving the puzzle 
created by the different results of the time-series and cross-country analysis regarding 
the impact o f outward-orientation on economic growth. The second index is a measure 
o f trade liberalisation based on an alternative measure o f the effective rate o f 
protection.
6.2. MEASURING TRADE ORIENTATION: STRUCTURALLY ADJUSTED 
TRADE INTENSITY (SATI)
The earlier studies, which adopted trade intensity (X/GDP) as a measure o f openness, 
did not support the ‘export-led development’ hypothesis.3 These studies, however, did 
not disprove the hypothesis, since they did not account for the other structural factors 
such as the size o f the economy and the availability o f natural resources. There are 
also theoretical considerations. For example, the ‘stage o f development’ theory argues 
that development level and trade orientation are highly related. Thus, trade intensity 
should first be manipulated to take into account the structural characteristics o f a 
country before it can be used as a measure o f openness.
3 See, for example, Choi (1983: 138-39).
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The earlier work of Syrquin and Chenery inspire this line o f research.4 Their 
work draws on time-series data to examine whether the patterns emerging from cross­
country comparisons o f the structure and level o f development actually reflect the 
transformations that occur over time. A number o f studies adopted SATI as a measure 
of openness. Heitger (1987), for example, adjusts trade intensity for market size by 
estimating a regression between trade intensity and GDP. He takes the residuals from 
this regression as the trade orientation, or the openness index, and uses them in a 
simple growth equation in which the other components are: per capita income relative 
to the ‘industrial leader’ (the United States), as a measure o f the technological gap 
between the countries; the adult literacy rate as a measure o f human capital; the share 
of investment in GDP as a measure of capital formation; and, the population growth 
rate as a proxy for the labour force.
In this equation, the investment share and the labour force were as in the 
typical neoclassical case. The relative per capita initial income is assumed to capture 
the ‘convergence’ between poorer and richer countries since poorer countries were 
expected to grow faster than the richer ones.5 The adult literacy rate was assumed to 
capture human capital, which is important for adopting imported technologies. When 
human capital is low, the adaptation of new technologies is assumed to be difficult.
The results of this regression indicate no correlation between economic growth 
and openness. Therefore, Heitger (1987) argues that since openness and investment 
rates (the investment rate was significant in the regression) were strongly correlated,6 
‘the contribution of a high export share [is] insignificant only due to 
multicollinearity’. He concludes that ‘a high export share favoured capital 
accumulation and this in turn promoted economic growth.’7 This explanation is 
unsatisfactory, since a positive correlation between the two variables does not
4 See, for example, Syrquin and Chenery (1989).
5 The justification for this expectation is as follows: ‘[T]he technological progress o f a country -  i f  it is 
not the technological leader -  is merely a function o f technological adaptation possibilities, since 
technological progress is not only achieved by domestic discovery and application, but to a large extent 
by transfer from abroad. Thus, because the production o f technological knowledge is more costly than 
its imitation and duplication, the lesser-developed country is in a more favourable position than the 
producers o f technological knowledge.’ (Heitger, 1987: 252)
6 He estimated a regression between investment and openness and found them to be positively 
correlated.
7 Heitger (1987: 255).
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establish causality. Causality may run from investment to openness through economic 
growth.
Balassa (1985) also adopts the SATI model in a more complex manner. He 
uses the deviation o f actual from hypothetical per capita exports as a measure o f trade 
orientation. The hypothetical values are derived from a regression that includes per 
capita income, population and the ratio o f mineral exports to GDP where the 
independent variable is per capita exports. The residuals from this regression are 
interpreted as the trade orientation index and are used in another equation as one o f 
the independent variables where the economic growth rate is the independent variable. 
Other independent variables are assumed to capture other factors such as external 
shocks,8 the level o f economic development,9 and the extent o f reliance on 
manufactured exports.10
In this section, a similar approach will be employed, since this method allows 
one to ‘separate the effects o f the country’s initial policy stance from those o f policy 
responses to external shocks.’11 Unlike the other approaches, if  properly formulated, 
this approach enables one to isolate the other factors that may influence trade intensity 
and to determine whether an open economy, as a result o f conscious policy, promotes 
faster economic growth. If  the other factors that influence trade intensity can be 
identified and controlled in this regression, the residuals can be assumed to measure 
policy. Trade intensity is only one o f a number o f other factors that can influence the 
economic performance of a country. Thus, the other policy variables (such as the 
investment level), as well as external shocks (such as external demand shocks, the 
impact o f oil shocks, debt problems), must also be controlled.
Initially, an accurate measure of trade intensity must be constructed. This can 
be done by modifying the actual trade intensity measure by other structural 
characteristics o f the economy such as the size o f the manufacturing sector, the size o f 
the economy, and the availability of natural resources. When this is done, the residuals
8 These variables were: EP/ES, IS/ES, ANEF/ES, ES/Y where ES is the balance o f payments effects o f  
external shocks, EP is the balance o f payments effects o f export-promotion, IS is the balance o f  
payments effects o f import-substitution, ANEF is the balance o f payments effects o f additional net 
external financing, and Y is gross national product. See Balassa (1985: 29-30) for further details.
9 Per capita GNP.
10 Share o f manufactured commodity exports in total exports.
11 Balassa (1985: 29-32).
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from the regression can be used as the openness index, for they will indicate whether a 
country is trading more (or less) than predicted, given its structural characteristics. 
Then, this index can be used in a regression as an independent variable (with GDP 
growth as the independent variable) to determine whether or not outward-orientation 
stimulates economic growth. The other variables include policy variables, as well as 
ones that are assumed to capture the external shocks.
Step 1:
Trade intensity will be modified according to the structural characteristics o f  the 
countries by estimating the following regression. The residuals will be used as the 
modified ‘trade intensity’ or SATI index.12
(X/GDP) = f  (Manufacture + Oil + GNPpc + Population)
Table 6.1: Trade intensity as a function o f the manufacturing sector, oil and mineral 
trade, per capita GNP and population (five-year average, 1987-91)
0 .6 4 9
(2 .4 3 1 )
0.533
O il G N P pc
0 .4 0 3
(8 .4 9 8 )
0 .0 5 4
(1 .8 4 3 )
-0.124
:907)
0 .7 0 5
m  sig n ifica n t at on e-p ercen t lev e l  
sig n ifica n t at ten -percent lev e l
N o tes: D ep en d en t variab le is trade intensity. V ariab les are in logarith m ic  form . F igu res in paren th eses  
are t-sta tistics. N in e ty -tw o  countr ies are in clu ded  (se e  table A 6 .1 ) . C ountry d u m m ies for: B urkina  
F aso , H o n g  K o n g , Iran, Ireland, M auritania, Panam a, Papua N e w  G uinea , S e y c h e lle s .
Source: W orld  B ank Stars D atabase
where
M a n u f a c t u r e : This is the share o f manufacturing value-added in total national value- 
added. This variable measures the structural change in an economy according to the 
‘stage o f development’ theory. That theory argues that a country's ability to export 
depends on its ability to produce commodities which are internationally competitive.
1.807
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Thus, one might expect a strong economy with a strong manufacturing sector to be 
relatively more open. Before the share o f manufacturing in total value-added was 
selected as a variable in this regression, separate regressions were estimated for the 
share of agriculture and services in total value-added. They were negatively correlated 
with trade intensity, indicating that low-income agricultural commodity producers and 
high-income countries13 tend to have a lower trade intensity. However, these variables 
were omitted because their coefficients were insignificant. A number o f other 
alternatives, such as the share o f primary exports and manufacturing exports in total 
exports, were also tested and omitted since they did not improve the explanatory 
power o f the regression.
Oil: This denotes the ratio of oil and mineral trade (exports and imports) to total GDP. 
It can be argued that for large producers of raw materials such as oil and minerals, a 
certain degree o f trade is not a policy option but an inevitability. The same is true for 
raw material importing countries. For a country that is just self-sufficient in terms of 
raw materials, trade is more of a policy option.
GNPpc: Per capita gross national product is another measure o f structural change and 
is very closely correlated with the share o f manufacturing in total value-added. 
Nevertheless, it measures something different and has two contradictory effects on 
openness. It first measures competitiveness as in the ‘stage o f development’ theory 
and might have a positive impact on the level of openness. On the other hand, it is 
also a measure o f market size. High-income countries have bigger domestic markets 
and combined with the next variable (population) might have a negative impact on 
openness.
Population: This is used as a measure o f market size. As argued in chapter four, 
market size is important for economies o f scale. Countries that have larger domestic 
markets tend to be more closed, because companies in large domestic markets can 
make use o f scale economies and grow rapidly. Companies in small countries,
12 Some researchers (such as Dollar, 1991) included population density as a measure o f factor 
intensity, but since it is proven to be insignificant it was excluded from our regression.
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however, need external markets to grow larger. Thus the larger a country is, the 
smaller will be its share o f exports in total GDP.
Step Two:
The residuals from the first regression will be used as an openness index because they 
reflect the relative openness o f countries given their structural characteristics. The 
openness index, as one o f many other factors that might have an influence on 
economic growth, will be included in a regression with the other variables. A number 
o f variables might have an influence on economic growth. They can be divided into 
the following categories:14
Orthodox instruments are: the real exchange rate, the average inflation rate and 
the real interest rate. Heterodox instruments are: export subsidies, the average 
effective rate o f protection and the share of public investment in GDP. New growth 
theory variables are: the initial level of GNP per capita, the investment rate, export 
growth and the change in literacy rate. The list can be increased to capture external 
shocks such as a sharp fall in exports demand or the terms o f trade; an input price 
shock such as the oil shocks of 1974 and 1979, the debt crisis o f the 1980s, etc. All o f 
the above variables might be important to some extent as determinants o f economic 
performance. However, this thesis is interested in the impact o f trade openness on 
economic performance and is not concerned with the details o f the specific impact of 
the above variables. In other words, it is not the aim o f this thesis to prove the 
importance o f the above variables for economic development. They will be included 
in the regression to obtain a more accurate picture o f the impact o f trade openness. 
Thus, in the following regression, the most important variables (growth rates o f 
investment and exports, which also indirectly capture the impact o f some other 
variables) will be included alongside the measure o f trade openness. A second 
regression will also be estimated to include other variables that are not in the first 
regression.
13 Where the share o f services is relatively higher.
14 See Mosley, Subasat and Weeks (1995: 1468).
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GDPgr = f  (01 + Xgr + Igr)
where
GDPgr : Gross domestic product, annual average growth rate
01 : Openness index
Xgr : Exports, annual average growth rate
Igr : Investment, annual average growth rate
In this regression, the export growth rate is assumed to capture the external shocks to 
the economy. A sudden external demand shock or a gradual decline in export demand 
will have a negative impact on the economy. The inclusion o f exports with the 
openness index will allow us to see the impact o f trade policy independently o f the 
external shocks. So far, no one has included a measure o f openness alongside the 
growth rate o f exports.15
The investment growth rate is assumed to capture the impact o f all the internal 
policy variables,16 external shocks,17 and duties and official transfer receipts o f the 
countries.18 As alternative indicators, the share o f investment in GDP (I/GDP) and the 
investment growth rate modified with the share o f investment in GDP (Igr * [I/GDP]) 
are also introduced into the regression but the investment growth rate is proven to be 
more significant and improves the quality of the regression. It is usually argued that 
the share o f investment in the GDP is a more appropriate indicator19 because of 
demand and capacity utilisation considerations. This is so because investment growth 
rates are more volatile compared to the rate o f capital growth. In this regression, 
however, ten-year averages of all variables are used which satisfy such considerations. 
Moreover, I/GDP might be a more problematical indicator than is recognised in the
15 An alternative way to separate the impact o f external shocks from trade policy is to include export 
growth rates in the first regression (since trade intensity is correlated with external demand conditions) 
rather than in the second one. Both regressions give similar results.
16 Such as the level o f the real interest rate, inflation rate and other variables which may have an 
impact on investment.
17 Such as an import price increase for inputs, oil shocks o f 1974 and 1979, etc. which may reduce the 
investable funds.
18 Such as debt repayments and external net resource transfers (i.e. aid).
19 See Ukpolo (1994: 446).
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literature as both components of the I/GDP ratio are strongly correlated. For example, 
if  a sharp fall in the investment rate is associated with a sharp fall in GDP growth, the 
I/GDP ratio may stay fairly high. If the fall in GDP growth is higher than the fall in 
investment, one might observe a shrinking economy with an increasing I/GDP rate. 
Table 6.6 provides evidence for this argument. World economic and investment 
growth rates declined from the 1985-89 period to the 1990-93 period. But since the 
decline in investment growth rates was larger (from 4.8 percent to 1.0 percent) than 
the decline in GDP growth rates (from 3.5 percent to 2.0 percent), the share o f 
investment in GDP increased from 22.0 percent to 22.5 percent. Though there is a 
clear positive correlation between investment growth and GDP growth, there is a 
negative correlation between I/GDP and GDP growth.
In the second regression, other variables that are not captured by the above 
variables will be included:
GDPgr = f  (01 + Xgr + Igr + GNPpc1983 + Government + Unrest + Population + 
Enrolment)
where
GNPpcl983: This is the initial level o f per capita GNP in 1983 which is included to 
see whether there is convergence between developed and developing countries.
Government: This denotes the real government share o f GDP.
Unrest: The recent literature puts emphasis on social peace as one o f the most 
important factors for development. Country dummies are included for countries that 
had social unrest during the period.20
Population: In typical neoclassical regressions, the population growth rate is included 
as a rough measure o f the labour force, the other component o f the production 
function along with capital. In many studies, however, it has proven to be insignificant
20 See Sachs and Warner (1996) for further details.
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and even negatively correlated with economic growth rates. It will nevertheless be 
included first, in order to be consistent with the existing literature, and second, it may 
indeed be negatively correlated with economic growth since rapid population growth 
may reduce the level o f investable net resources.
Enrolment: The primary school enrolment rate is used as a measure o f human capital. 
This measure is preferred to other possible candidates such as the secondary 
enrolment rate and the adult literacy rate for purely a degree-of-freedom 
consideration.
These two regressions will be estimated first for all countries. The same regressions 
will also be estimated for the following different country groups: low-income 
countries, middle-income countries, high-income countries, low- and middle-income 
countries, middle- and high-income countries, low- and high-income countries, Latin 
American countries and Sub-Saharan African countries.21
Em pirical results
The calculations produce some interesting results. First o f all, the classification o f 
countries according to their ‘openness’ based on the SATI method shows differences 
from the classification o f the World Development Report (1987). As can be seen from 
table 6.2, countries that are classified as strongly inward, such as Nigeria, Tanzania, 
Ghana and Bangladesh, or moderately inward-oriented, such as Sri Lanka and Cote 
d’Ivoire, in the World Development Report are much more open according to the 
SATI. On the other hand, countries such as Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Turkey, 
Tunisia and Uruguay that are classified as moderately open in the World Development 
Report do not appear to be so in this classification. More interestingly, Japan and the 
United States are two o f the strongly inward-oriented countries. Table 6.3 presents full 
rank of countries according to the World Development Report (1987) and the SATI.
Secondly, the regression results, which are reported in tables 6.4 and 6.5, 
suggest that openness is only significant for the middle-income countries. In the first
21 See table A6.1 for the classification of countries.
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regression it is significant at the ten-percent level and in the second regression it is 
significant at the one-percent level. For the low- and high-income countries, however, 
openness does not have any significant impact on economic growth. As expected, 
investment and exports are significant at the one-percent level. An interpretation o f 
the results for the other variables is beyond the scope o f this chapter. What is 
important for the purposes of this chapter is the fact that in both regressions, the 
results for the openness index are consistent. The above analysis provides evidence to 
suggest that relatively more open middle-income economies grow faster than 
relatively closed middle-income economies. Given their structural peculiarities, 
middle-income countries that prefer to trade more will grow faster than countries that 
prefer to trade less.
Table 6.2: Rank order o f countries according to ‘openness* level: a comparison o f the 
World Development Report (1987) and the SATI.
WDR SATI WDR rank -  WDR SATI WDR rank -
rank rank SATIrank rank Rank SATIrank
Hong Kong 1 1 0
South Korea 2 8 -6
Singapore 3 2 1
Brazil 4 31 -27
Chile 5 22 -17
Thailand 6 6 0
Tunisia 7 21 -14
Turkey 8 25 -17
Uruguay 9 19 -10
Cameroon 10 23 -13
Colombia 11 17 -6
Costa Rica 12 5 7
Cote d ’Ivoire 13 3 10
El Salvador 14 28 -14
Honduras 15 10 5
Indonesia 16 12 4
Kenya 17 18 -1
Mexico 18 13 5
Nicaragua 19 32 -13
Pakistan 20 15 5
Philippines 21 16 5
Senegal 22 24 -2
Sri Lanka 23 7 16
Argentina 24 27 3
Bangladesh 25 14 11
Bolivia 26 34 -8
Burundi 27 20 7
Domin. Rep. 28 29 -1
Ghana 29 11 18
India 30 30 0
Nigeria 31 4 27
Sudan 32 26 6
Tanzania 33 9 24
Zambia 34 33 1
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Table 6.3: Classification of countries according to World Development Report (1987)
and SATI
W orld D evelopm ent R eport (1987) classification
Strongly outward oriented Moderately outward oriented Moderately inward oriented Strongly inward oriented
Hong Kong Brazil Cameroon Argentina
South Korea Chile Colombia Bangladesh
Singapore Thailand Costa Rica Bolivia
Tunisia Cote d’Ivoire Burundi
Turkey El Salvador Dominican Republic
Uruguay Honduras Ghana
Indonesia India
Kenya Nigeria
Mexico Sudan
Nicaragua Tanzania
Pakistan Zambia
Philippines
Senegal
Sri Lanka
SATI classification
Strongly outward oriented Moderately outward oriented Moderately inward oriented Strongly inward oriented
Hong Kong Nigeria Honduras Senegal
Singapore Costa Rica Ghana Turkey
Cote d’Ivoire Thailand Indonesia Sudan
Sri Lanka Mexico Argentina
South Korea Bangladesh El Salvador
Tanzania Pakistan
Philippines
Colombia
Kenya
Uruguay
Burundi
Tunisia
Chile
Cameroon
Dominican Rep.
India
Brazil
Nicaragua
Zambia
Bolivia
SATI classification (al sample)
Strongly outward oriented Moderately outward oriented Moderately inward oriented Strongly inward oriented
Chad South Africa Colombia Argentina
Hong Kong Canada Kenya El Salvador
Ireland Honduras Uruguay Australia
Central Afr. Rep. Ghana Mali Spain
Singapore Benin Burundi Dominican Rep.
Malawi Sweden Togo India
Cote d’Ivoire Congo Tunisia Haiti
Guyana Indonesia Norway Brazil
Mauritius Gambia Chile United States
China France Ecuador Nicaragua
Netherlands Austria Niger Jordan
Nigeria Mexico Jamaica Zambia
Papua New Guinea Uganda Iceland Bolivia
Mauritania New Zealand Venezuela Cyprus
Germany Zimbabwe Finland Guinea-Bissau
Costa Rica Bangladesh Trinidad & Tobago Japan
Switzerland Sierra Leone Cameroon Greece
Thailand United Kingdom Morocco Rwanda
Sri Lanka Pakistan Senegal Iran
South Korea Italy Paraguay Egypt
Denmark Philippines Algeria Burkina faso
Malta Gabon Turkey Panama
Tanzania Portugal Sudan Seychelles
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Table 6.4: GDP growth as a function of openness, export growth and investment
growth (ten-year average, 1984-93)
All LIC MIC HIC LIC + 
MIC
MIC + 
HIC
LIC + 
HIC
LA SSA
Constant 0.095
(0.102)
0.342
(0.204)
-1.709
(-1.020)
0.758
(1.853)
-0.260
(-0.215)
0.065
(0.069)
0.413
(0.397)
-1.767
(-0.769)
0.976
(0.827)
Openness
index
0.658
(2.085)
0.586
(1.040)
1.465 
(2.156)
0.012
(0.036)
0.812
(1.936)
0.717
(1.823)
0.579
(1.560)
1.514
(1.596)
0.529
(1.311)
Export
growth
0.211
(5.563)
0.235
(3.699)
0.194
(2.898)
0.403
(3.024)
0.209
(4.675) (3.956)
4 .0,235,■ 
(4,717)
0.077
(1.116)
0.106
(2.007)
Investment
growth
0.121
.-(6.052)
• 0.085 0.089
(3.943)
0.123
(1.861)
0.0!)?
(4.843)
0.088
(4.493)
. 0-066 
(3.331)
9 177
(4.010)
atifi
(3.879)
R-Bar-Sq 0.529 0.54! 0.414 0.469 0.497 0.408 0.530 0.646 0.454
DW 1.967 2.292 1.620 1.389 1.743 1.770 2.170 1.580 2.654
DF 88 29 32 19 65 55 51 16
| F-test 35.143 13.588 .. 9.273 7.491 23.467 14.367 21 32? ■- 17,590'' 1 8.762 |
significant at one-percent level significant at ten-percent level
Notes: Dependent variable is GDP growth. Variables are in logarithmic form. Figures in parentheses are t- 
statistics. Ninety-two countries arc included (sec table A6.1). L1C: Low-income countries, MIC: middle-income 
countries, HIC: high-income countries, LA: Latin America, SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa 
Source: World Bank Stars Database
Table 6.5: GDP growth as a function of openness, export growth, investment growth, 
initial level o f GNP per capita (1983), government share in GDP, social unrest, 
population, primary enrolment and political system (ten-year average, 1984-93)
All LIC MIC HIC LIC & 
MIC
MIC & 
HIC
LIC & 
HIC
LA SSA
Constant 1.654 
(1.309)
0.633
(0.306)
-0.931
(-0.454)
7.283
(2.051)
1.023
(0.617)
2.114
(1.597)
1.261
(0.937)
2.352
(0.700)
2.101
(0.858)
Openness
Index
0.623
(1.907)
0.512
(0.932)
2.076
(3.049)
0.153
(0.475)
0.915
(1.959)
0.804
(2.343)
0.337
(0.979)
1.051
(0.913)
0.777
(1.365)
Export
Growth
0.175
(4.638)
0.227
(3.599)
0.056
(1.164)
0.180
(1.143)
0.176 1 
(3.970) 1
0.073
(1.994)
0.229
■(4#6):;
0.060
(0.824)
0.097
(1.229)
Investment
Growth
0.122 0.065
(2.766)
0.218
(6.374)
0.082
(1.227)
0.096
(4.653) *
0.198..
(7.302) ■(3.617) ( m i l
0.079
(2.689)
GNPpc
(1983)
-0.020
(-2.482)
-0.012
(-0.351)
-0.024
(-0.670)
-0.251
(-2.347)
-0.016
(-1.077)
-9.061 -0.010
(-0.939)
-0.068
(-1.064)
-0.012
(-0.391)
Govern­
ment
-0.143
(-3.154)
-0.123
(-1.354)
-0.154
(-1.305)
-0.185
(-1.046)
-0.133
(-2.189)
-0.212
(-2.396)
-0.141
(-2.385)
-0.310
■
(-2.331)
-0.032
(-0.244)
Unrest -0.017
(-1.063)
-0.009
(-0.324)
-0.007
(-0.135)
NA -0.015
(-0.718)
-0.056
(-1.130)
-0.012
(-0.521)
-0.015
(-0.252)
-0.002
(-0.074)
Population -0.213
(-1.207)
0.179
(0.471)
-0.219
(-0.879)
0.717
(1.682)
-0.270
(-1.171)
-0.190
(-1.040)
0.151
(0.628)
-0.105
(-0.234)
-0.551
(-1.007)
Primary
enrolment
-0.001
(-0.062)
-0.001
(-0.002)
-0.094
(-0.584)
-0.945
(-1.492)
-0.013
(-0.314)
-0.095
(-0.673)
0.001
(0.044)
-0.232
(-0.675)
0.009
(0.165)
Socialist 0.083
(1.864)
0.120
(1.954)
NA NA 0.093
(1.648)
NA 0.115
(2.373)
NA 0.047
(0.661)
R-Bar-Sq 0.594 0.581 0.694 0.549 0.556 0.632 0.614 0.646 0.317
DW 2.247 2.360 2.601 1.953 2.292 2.158 2.182 2.313 2.088
DF 78 22 24 15 55 47 45 11 19
F-test 15.172 5.786 10.097 4.838 ! 12.833, 5.35L. ■ 2 444
significant at one-percent level significant at ten-percent level
Notes: Dependent variable is GDP growth. Variables are in logarithmic form. Figures in parentheses are t- 
statistics. Eighty-eighth countries are included. LIC: Low-income countries, MIC: middle-income countries, HIC: 
high-income countries, LA: Latin America, SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: World Bank Stars Database except the unrest variable which is taken from Sachs and Warner (1996)
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Does this result confirm the alleged superiority o f the export-led development 
strategy? Can all countries grow faster if  they trade more? The answer to both 
questions is no. First o f all, the results shed doubt on the overall validity o f the export- 
led development hypothesis for low- and high-income countries. Secondly, even 
though more open middle-income countries grow faster, this does not necessarily 
mean that if  all middle-income countries increased their openness they would all grow 
faster. It is important to note that this is a relative openness index; it shows the 
openness o f the countries in comparison to one another.22 The position o f a country is 
not only determined by its own policies but also by the policies o f the others. I f  all 
other countries become more open, a country with the same policies will become less 
open. Thus, the results do not necessarily mean that all countries grow faster when 
they are more open.
Considering table 6.6, it can be observed that from the 1960s to the 1990s 
GDP growth rates for middle- and high-income countries declined, while their 
openness in terms o f trade intensity increased substantially. The openness o f low- 
income countries declined sharply from 22.5 percent in 1965 to 12.0 percent in 1982 
and then increased slightly to 13.7 percent in 1993. Even though growth rates depend 
largely on changes in investment rates, this fall in trade must have had adverse effects 
on these countries. During the 1980s, they have increased their export levels. 
Economic performance, however, has not been particularly impressive, and followed a 
close fit with weak investment rates.
The openness o f middle-income countries fluctuated around 13 percent from 
1960 to 1973, and after the oil shock declined to about 10 percent in 1975. 
Subsequently, however, it increased dramatically to 25.1 percent in 1993. GDP 
growth rates declined from an average of seven percent in the 1970-74 period to 2.6 
percent in the 1980-84 period and then picked up slightly to 3.6 percent in 1990-93.
22 This is a relative index because it is calculated by adjusting the trade intensity (which is an absolute 
indicator) by the structural characteristics of the countries. A regression was estimated between the 
trade intensity and four independent variables and openness was measured as deviation from the 
regression line. If the level o f trade intensity could be explained perfectly by the independent variables, 
the residuals would be zero and all countries would be at the same level o f openness. A positive 
(negative) residual means a country is more (less) open than expected as a result o f conscious policy. 
Thus, openness index (residuals) does not give any information about a country's absolute level o f  
openness but it gives information about its relative level o f openness compared to the others given its 
structural characteristics.
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The impact o f the oil shocks of the 1970s obviously played an important part in this 
process.
Table 6.6: Investment ratio, export ratio, GDP growth, investment growth and export
growth, by income group.
L o w -in c o m e  
(E x c lu d in g  C hina +  India)
I/G D P X /G D P G D P gr Igr X gr
N A N A N A N A N A
18.6 19.5 4 .0 3 .3 -0 .6
19.1 17.5 3 .9 7 .4 -0 .2
19.2 14 .0 3 .5 1.5 1.7
18.5 12.6 2 .8 0 .3 0 .9
16.9 13.1 3 .4 4.1 4.1
16.6 13.5 2 .7 2 .7 4 .4
18.2 14.9 3 .4 3 .2 L 7
W orld
I/G D P X /G D P G D P gr Igr X gr
1 9 6 1 -6 4 2 2 .0 8.2 5.3 7.1 7.2
1 9 6 5 -6 9 2 3 .2 9.1 5.2 6.3 8.2
1 9 7 0 -7 4 2 4 .4 11.1 4.1 4.5 8.3
1 9 7 5 -7 9 2 2 .8 12.3 3.3 2.5 5.2
1 9 8 0 -8 4 2 1 .5 13.3 2.1 0 .7 3.5
1 9 8 5 -8 9 2 2 .0 14.3 3.5 4 .8 5.4
1 9 9 0 -9 3 2 2 .5 16.0 2 .0 1.0 4 .2
1 9 6 1 -9 3
A v era g e
2 2 .7 12.0 3 .6 3 .8 6.0
H ig h -in co m e
I/G D P X /G D P G D P gr Igr X gr
22 .1 7 .2 5 .4 7 .3 7 .5
2 3 .3 8 .3 5 .2 6 .2 9 .2
2 4 .3 10.5 3 .9 3 .9 9 .2
22.1 12.1 3.1 2 .3 5 .0
2 0 .9 13.2 2 .0 0 .9 3 .6
2 1 .8 14.1 3 .4 5 .0 5.1
2 2 .3 15.5 1.8 0 .6 3 .4
2 2 .4 11.5 3 .5 3 .7 6 .2
M id d le-in co m e
I/G D P X /G D P G D P gr Igr X gr
1 9 6 1 -6 4 2 1 .3 12.9 5 .2 6.1 4 .4
1 9 6 5 -6 9 2 3 .3 12.1 6.1 9.1 5.1
1 9 7 0 -7 4 2 6 .3 12.1 7 .0 9 .6 6.3
1 9 7 5 -7 9 2 7 .4 12.7 5.3 4 .3 10.3
1 9 8 0 -8 4 2 5 .2 14.9 2 .6 -1 .2 6.0
1 9 8 5 -8 9 2 2 .4 18.6 3 .8 4 .9 8.7
19 9 0 -9 3 25 .1 2 2 .6 3 .6 6 .0 8.6
19 6 1 -9 3
A v era g e
2 4 .5 15.0 4 .8 5.5 7.1
N o tes: L o w -, m id d le - and h ig h -in co m e  countries exclu d e  o il exporters. L o w -in c o m e  coun tr ies e x c lu d e  
C hina and India. S ee  table A 6.1  for details o f  the c la ssifica tio n  o f  the countries. A ll  va lu e  data is in 
constan t dollar  term s.
Source: W orld  B an k  Stars D atabase.
Table 6.7 shows that developing countries in general increased their trade more with 
industrial countries than among themselves. The declining trade intensity o f  low- 
income countries indicates that middle-income countries must be trading more with 
high-income countries. This export penetration o f some middle-income countries into 
the markets o f high-income countries would have a positive impact on the form er’s 
economic performance.
Finally, the openness of high-income countries has increased continuously 
from seven percent in 1960 to 15.7 percent in 1993. Except during 1985-89 when 
there was a sharp increase in investment, GDP growth rates have declined steadily.
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Although there was a clear decline in export growth rates, total exports have grown 
faster than investment and GDP. As a result, trade intensity increased year by year. 
Figures for the high-income countries are very close to world figures, as they produce 
almost 80 percent o f the world’s total production.
Table 6.7: Exports from developing countries and exports from industrial countries,
by region (percent)
Exports from industrial
countries
to industrial to developing
countries (%) countries (%)
61.3 27.0
56.9 30.1
61.0 29.9
61.0 35.8
Exports from developing 
countries
to industrial 
countries (%)
to developing 
countries (%)
1975 67.5 26.3
1980 67.5 27.3
1985 72.7 24.1
1990 76.3 23.0
Source: IMF, Direction o f  Trade Statistics Yearbook.
The figures in table 6.6 suggest that if  there is any correlation between openness and 
GDP growth rates, it must be a negative one, since declining GDP growth rates are 
associated with increasing openness. Whatever miracle openness is supposed to 
perform, it has not worked. On the contrary, there seems to be a very close fit between 
investment growth rates and GDP growth rates. The above arguments can also be 
tested statistically. Using the available data summarised in table 6.6, the following 
time-series regression were estimated, in which GDP growth is a function o f trade 
intensity, investment growth,23 and export growth, for low-, middle- and high-income 
countries:
GDPgr = f  (X/GDP + Xgr + Igr)
where
GDPgr : GDP growth rate
23 A number o f other regressions were estimated using different variables such as the share of  
investment in GDP. But the above regressions proved to be more appropriate. Two-year lags o f  the 
variables were also introduced into the regression but did not improve the quality o f the regression and 
thus were eliminated.
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X/GDP : Trade intensity
Xgr : Export growth rate
Igr : Investment growth rate
The results o f the regression (reported in table 6.8) support the above arguments. For 
all groups the investment growth rate is significant at the one-percent level.24 The 
export growth rate is only significant for the middle-income countries. The trade 
intensity has a negative and significant sign for the middle- and high-income countries 
and an insignificant positive sign for the low-income countries.
Table 6.8: GDP growth as a function o f trade intensity, export growth and investment
growth.
L o w -in c o m e  countries  
(1 9 6 5 -9 3 )
M id d le -in co m e  countries  
(1 9 6 0 -9 3 )
H ig h -in co m e  cou n tr ies  
(1 9 6 0 -9 3 )
C onstant I  2 -3 5 8  1
1  1  (5 .0 7 1 ) (1 5  7 6 7 ) ^ W ^
2.981
(17.513)
Trade in tensity  
(X /G D P )
0 .1 0 9
(0 .8 1 5 )
:V -0.448 . 
40. (-6.380)
: -0.30$ : ;  .;'
(-7.991)
E xport grow th -0 .0 2 7
(-1 .2 4 6 )
,w  0.106
mm
0 .0 2 5
(0 .7 6 1 )
In vestm en t grow th 0 .081
4:,7:.V {3.4o i ) ' . (9 .5 4 6 )
0 279
Y ear d u m m ies 1974  and 1981 1975
R -B ar-Sq 0 .3 4 7 0 .8 3 5 0 .9 5 7
D W 1.658 1 .870 2 .0 6 3
D F 24 27 28
F -test 5 .7 9 7
-  J M 25 r ' 180.740 " ' '7
N ote: S h aded  areas are sign ifica n t at the one-percent lev e l. L o w -, m id d le - and h ig h -in co m e  cou n tr ies  
e x c lu d e  o il exporters. L o w -in c o m e  countries ex c lu d e  C hina and India. D ep en d en t variab le  is G D P  
grow th . V ariab les are in logarithm ic form . F igures in parentheses are t-sta tistics.
Source: W orld  B an k  Stars D atabase.
The empirical work presented does not favour the export-led development hypothesis. 
The results lead to the conclusion that there may be fallacies o f  composition. The 
cross-country analysis suggests that the more open middle-income countries do grow 
faster than the more closed countries. The time-series analysis, on the contrary, 
suggests that they do not grow faster when they increase their overall openness. These 
results have a clear message. Relying on export growth as an engine o f growth is not a 
realistic option for reversing a decline in GDP. The strong correlation between
24 A llth o u g h  the s ig n ifica n ce  lev e l d ec lin es from  h ig h -in co m e  to lo w -in c o m e  countries.
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investment and economic growth suggests that investment rates are the main 
determinant o f economic growth, and that ‘investment-led development’ is the real 
alternative needed to reverse this trend. Nevertheless, one should not go so far as to 
suggest that declining growth rates result from trade openness. It is more likely that 
increased openness is an unsuccessful response to declining GDP growth, rather than 
the cause o f it. It is certain, on the other hand, that increased openness has not been 
successful in counteracting this tendency.
6.3. TRADE LIBERALISATION INDEX
As argued earlier, measuring trade liberalisation is a difficult task and existing 
measures have serious problems. This section develops an alternative measure o f trade 
liberalisation based on a modified version o f the effective rate o f protection. This 
method is theoretically more accurate and easier to calculate. It can be developed in 
various ways and provides scope for further research. This section will provide the 
foundations o f the method.
The effective rate of protection
The comparison o f domestic value-added with ‘free trade’ value-added is a common 
way to measure trade liberalisation. Total value-added is calculated with domestic and 
international prices, and the difference between them is interpreted as a measure o f 
trade protectionism. It is argued that when free trade is allowed, domestic value-added 
will be equal to the free trade value-added and that any deviation from this 
equilibrium should be interpreted as an indicator o f protectionism. The reasoning is 
that protective measures allow domestic companies to increase their value-added 
above the free trade value-added. This measure is called the ‘effective rate o f 
protection’. Alavi defines it as ‘the percentage excess o f domestic value-added, 
obtainable by reason o f the imposition of tariffs and other protective measures on the 
product and its inputs, over the foreign or the free trade value-added.’25
25 Alavi (1996: 67).
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The formula for the effective rate of protection is:
ERP = ((VAd - VAFT) / VAFT)* 100 or ERP = T / (1 - a )26
where
ERP : Effective rate o f protection
VAd : Domestic value-added with a tariff or other protective measures on imports
VAFT : Free trade value-added
T : Nominal tariff rate
a  : Input-output coefficient or productivity (= total input / total output)
Domestic and free trade value-added are calculated as 
VAd = P (1 + T - a )  and VAFT = P ( l - a )
When T = 0, VAd = VAFT
In view o f this formula, the measurement o f trade liberalisation is straightforward. 
Whenever domestic value-added exceeds free market value-added (a positive effective 
rate o f protection), some form of protection exists. For this conclusion to hold a 
number o f assumptions must be made. Alavi (1996: 66) lists these assumptions:
1. A state o f perfect competition prevails where the economy is in full 
employment, balance of payment equilibrium is maintained and no domestic 
distortions other than those due to government interference exist. These 
assumptions ensure the uniformity o f factor prices in the economy. Hence, 
they ensure that a tendency for factor prices to rise in any activity will attract 
factors o f production into it.
iii
26 If there is a tariff rate for imported inputs, the formula would be: ERP = T - a*Ti /1  - a , where Ti is 
the nominal tariff rate on imported inputs.
230
2. Fixed input-output coefficients - i.e. input-output coefficients remain 
unchanged after tariff imposition. Fixing input-output coefficients implies that 
the imposition o f protection would not induce producers to reduce or increase 
the amount of any one input used per unit o f output. Thus, the input-output 
coefficients observed under actual policies would be equal to those under free 
trade, and the physical ratios o f each of the inputs are assumed not to vary 
when the protection structure changes.
3. Small country assumption - i.e. it faces an infinitely elastic world demand 
for its exports and world supply for its imports. This implies that the country 
concerned faces given prices o f its exports and imports (the terms o f trade 
being exogenous).
4. The level o f trade is not affected by the imposition o f tariffs and other taxes 
and subsidies, so that the internal price o f each importable is given by the 
foreign price plus the tariff.
The effective rate o f protection remains one o f the most accurate measures o f trade 
liberalisation despite its broad assumptions. The calculation o f the effective rate of 
protection, on the other hand, is extremely difficult and time consuming. Existing 
studies are limited and insufficient for time-series analysis, because the effective rate 
of protection is generally calculated for only one or two years. It is also unsuitable for 
cross-country analysis as most studies cover different time periods, and thus they are 
incomparable. Moreover, most of the calculations appear to be unreliable because 
different studies that cover the same countries and the same years usually produce 
different results. In this section, an alternative measure o f the effective rate o f 
protection (or the price distortion) index will be developed. This index is calculated 
for individual sectors in the economy (such as textiles, iron/steel), and based on a 
comparison o f the change in value-added in different countries after accounting for the 
change in their productivity and cost levels. From a non-orthodox point o f view, one 
would expect value-added to be positively correlated with productivity and negatively 
correlated with cost. Thus, the equation would be:
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VA/L = f  (Productivity, Adjusted Cost/L)
where
VA/L : value-added per worker
Productivity : Labour productivity27
Adjusted Cost/L : Adjusted non-wage cost per worker
The non-wage cost must be adjusted since an increase in cost might come from two 
sources: an increase in inputs (such as investment in new machinery which increases 
productivity) and an increase in input prices. An increase in inputs would increase per 
capita value-added whereas an increase in input prices would reduce it. As we are 
only interested in the cost of inputs (because the first independent variable in the 
regression accounts for an increase in inputs), the non-wage per worker cost should be 
adjusted in such a way that it only reflects a change in the prices o f inputs. This can be 
done by estimating a regression between non-wage per worker cost and productivity, 
and saving the residuals as the adjusted non-wage cost index. The residuals would 
reflect an increase in cost beyond any productivity increase. In other words, they 
would reflect an increase in input prices.
The residuals from the former regression can be interpreted as a price 
distortion index. If all countries adopt complete free trade policies,28 all variations in 
the value-added would be perfectly explained by the variations in productivity and 
cost, and the residuals would be zero. Thus, the positive residuals can be interpreted as 
representing protection while negative residuals can be interpreted as ‘negative- 
protection’. Before the effective rates o f protection for two industrial sectors (textiles 
and iron/steel) are calculated by using this alternative method, the theoretical 
foundations o f the method and its potential problems will be discussed.
27 Labour productivity is used as a measure of productivity rather than total factor productivity as the 
latter has theoretical weaknesses. See ul-Haque et al. (1995: 24-27) for a good critique o f total factor 
productivity.
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Theoretical foundation
This section provides a theoretical justification for the model proposed above. A 
simple Sraffian model will be used to provide an understanding o f the relationship 
between productivity, cost and value-added. In a typical Sraffian model there is one 
input (capital good - K) and one output (consumption good - C). The model can be 
specified as follows:
1. PK . Kk + W . Lr + r (PK . Kk) = PK (capital good)
2. PK . Kc + W . Lc + r (PK . Kc) = Pc (consumption good)
where:
PK>C : Prices of the commodities.
Lk c : Labour input required to produce one unit of each commodity.
Kk,c : Capital input required to produce one unit of each commodity.
W : Wage measured in units of output and paid at the end of the production period,
r : Rate of return (interest rate).
The above Sraffian model will be modified in the following manner:
1. In this model there are two commodities: one exportable good (X) and one home 
good (H) which are produced by employing labour (L) and capital (K). There are also 
two countries: Portugal (P) and England (E).
2. Both countries are assumed to import the capital good (K). Thus the price o f capital 
is externally given to both countries. For the sake o f simplicity, the capital input 
requirements are assumed to be the same for both commodities in both countries;
= = Kxp = Kjjp. This means that the capital cost for all commodities is the same
and can be denoted as K.
28 Ignoring other factors that might have influence on the level o f value-added such as improvements
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3. The productivity level for the home good (H) is assumed to be the same in both 
countries.
4. The wages and profit rates within the countries for both sectors may not necessarily 
be equal at all times, but it is assumed that the differences cannot be extreme and 
persistent. There is a tendency for them to converge in the long-run.
First, the pre-trade production structure o f the countries will be investigated.
Because o f assumption 2 on capital goods, equations 1 and 2 can be written as:
ENGLAND
1. PK . Kxg + WXE . LXE + rXE (PK . K ^ ) Pxe (Export good)
2. PK . Khe + Whe . Ljje + rHE (PK • Kjje) Phe (Home good)
3. K + Wxe • Lxe + r ^  . K Pxe
4. K + WHE . Lhe + Tjje • K = PHE
(Export good) 
(Home good)
If the wages and profit rates in both sectors are equal,
and rXE rHE
Then, the relative prices are determined by the relative productivity level.29
in quality.
29 In this model L is inverse productivity since it is the labour necessary to produce one unit o f output.
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PORTUGAL
5. PK. Kxp + Wjg,. Lxp + Txp (PK . Kxp) — Pxp (Export good)
6. PK . Knp + Whp . Lnp + r ^  (PK . K^,) — PHP (Home Good)
Because o f assumption 2 on capital goods, equations 5 and 6 can be written as:
7. K + WXP . Lxp + r ^  . K = Pxp (Export good)
8. K + Whp . L1{P + %>. K = Php (Home Good)
If  the wages and profit rates in both sectors are equal,
Wxp = Whp and rOT — r^p
Then, the relative prices are determined by the relative productivity level.
P xp /  P hp =  ^ (L x p  /  L HP)
Where
PK : Price of capital.
P xe , xp : Price of export good in England/Portugal.
P h e , hp : Price of home good in England/Portugal.
K-x e , xp : Capital input required to produce one unit of export good in England/Portugal.
-^ ■HE, HP : Capital input required to produce one unit of home good in England/Portugal.
K : Total value of capital (from assumption 2).
L xe , xp : Labour input required to produce one unit of export good in England/Portugal.
L he , HP : Labour input required to produce one unit of home good in England/Portugal.
W x e , xp : Wage rate for export good in England/Portugal.
^ h e , HP : Wage rate for home good in England/Portugal.
r XE, XP : Rate of return for export good in England/Portugal.
r HE, HP : Rate of return for home good in England/Portugal.
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If  nominal wages30 and profit rates are the same in both countries for both sectors, the 
relative prices of tradables will be determined by labour productivity. I f  we assume 
productivity to be higher in England, the price o f the exportable good will be higher in 
Portugal before free trade is allowed.31
Lxp •> Lxe and ? xp ^  ^ xe
also
PXp / PHP > P Xe / Phe (since Pra, = PHE by assumption 3)
When free trade is allowed, however, there will be only one international price for the 
export good:32
9. K + . LXE + rXE . K PXE K + + r ^  . K.
and
10. K ( rXE - r ^ ) W ^. LXP - WXE . Lxe
If we assume profit rates to be equal in both countries: rXE = r ^
30 Real wages depend on domestic prices (W/P).
31 That is why real average wages and profits will be lower in Portugal. In this sense before free trade 
the burden o f low-productivity in tradable commodities will be shared by home goods producers (since 
wages and profits rates are equal in both sectors) and result in overall low-income in Portugal. As will 
be shown, after free trade, however, the price o f tradables will decline to the level o f England, thus the 
low-productivity in tradable commodities will result in the lower wages and profit rates for the 
producers o f tradable commodities only. It will later be shown that this cannot be sustained in the long- 
run unless a devaluation equalises the real profitability and the wage level o f both sectors.
32 It is assumed that the international price for the export good in the long-run will be determined by 
the most efficient producer, in this case England. In the short-run, however, the international price 
might fluctuate between the pre-trade prices in England and Portugal. If this is the case however, 
exporters in England will make extra profits over the producers o f the home good. Since it is assumed 
that there is a tendency for profit rates to equalise, the price o f the export good will eventually be 
equalised to England’s pre-trade price. Whether this argument is true or not will not change the basic
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then
11. WXP. LXP WXE . Lxe
and since we assume England to be more productive, the wage level will also be 
higher:
Lxp > Lxe and WXE > Wxp or Wxe / Wxp — LXP / Lxe ^
However if  we assume wage rates to be equal in both countries (Wxe = Wxp), the 
profit rate in England will be higher than in Portugal:
12. K (rXE ■ rxp) = W ( Lxp - Lxe ) 
and
rXE " rxp = (W/K) ( Lxp - Lxe ) 
since Lxp > Lxe than rXE > rx?
After free trade is allowed, at least one of the components o f value-added, the wage or 
profit rates (probably both), will decline for the producers o f the export good in 
Portugal. The producers o f the home good will benefit from free trade since the price 
o f the export good is now lower, and the burden o f the lower productivity in the 
export goods sector which was shared between the home and export sectors is now 
carried only by the export sector.
I f  we assume productivity levels for export and home goods to be the same in 
Portugal, the prices will also be the same before trade:
tenets o f the argument. The important point is that there will only be one international price and it will 
certainly be between pre-trade prices in England and Portugal.
33 If we assume that wages also represent total VA, this equation shows that relative VA in two 
countries is a function of the relative productivity o f these countries.
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Pxp Php since LXP Lnp
After free trade, however, the price of the export good will decline in Portugal to the 
level o f England and the profit rate for the producers o f the export good will decline. 
Before free trade, given that
W x p  — W h p and LXp —
then
r XP /  f HP — P x P  /  PHP
After free trade, however, the price o f the trade good in Portugal will be equal to 
England:
Php > Pxp ~ Pex then r ^  > rXP
Now that the production o f the home good is more profitable, resources will be shifted 
from the production o f the export good to the home good unless profitability in the 
export good is restored by a devaluation or by other protectionist measures. A 
devaluation makes the export good profitable again by reducing the relative price o f 
the home good. After the devaluation, the relative price o f the home good and the 
profit rate would decline and the profitability of the export good would be restored:
f t ( r XP ! r HPll) =  ft(PxP! P h p Ii)
Equally, a tariff rate would have the same impact. I f  a tariff rate (T) is introduced:
*xp / rHP — 1 only if  Pxp — Pxe (1 ~*~T)
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and
r xp /  rHP P xe ( 1 + T )  /  Ppjp
The required tariff rate which equalises the profit rates in both sectors will be 
determined by the productivity differences between England and Portugal. The larger 
the productivity differences, the larger would be the price differences and the 
necessary tariff rate.
The cost structure
So far in this analysis it has been assumed that the cost o f the capital is the same in 
both countries. This, however, is an unrealistic assumption. The cost o f capital varies 
from country to country and this must be taken into account. In this section the impact 
o f the relative cost on relative prices will be shown.
This time, for the sake of simplicity again, we will assume that total wages 
represent total value-added (i.e. zero profits). Equation 9 can then be rewritten as:
13. Ke + WXE . Lxe — PXE — K P  +  Wjqj . LXP
It is clear that total value-added (W) in both countries is positively related to 
productivity (inverse L) and negatively related to the cost o f inputs (K). From the 
above equation the following can be written:
14. (Wxb / = f  ( 1 ^  / , K P  / Ke )
or
15. ( V A x e  /  V A x p )  =  f  ( L x p  /  L x e  ,  K p  /  Ke )
where relative value-added is a function o f relative productivity and relative costs.
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From this discussion it is clear that under free market conditions, there must be 
a positive correlation between productivity and value-added, and a negative 
correlation between total cost and value-added. In other words, the higher the relative 
productivity and the lower the relative cost for a country is, the higher the relative 
value-added. This can be used as a benchmark to detect any market imperfections, 
including protectionist measures. For example, given the cost structure, if  a sector in a 
country can increase its relative value-added more than its relative productivity, one
would suspect a market imperfection which can be captured by estimating a
*
regression between a change in value-added against a change in productivity increase 
and a change in cost, and saving the residuals from this regression as a distortion 
index. Before the alternative trade liberalisation index for the textiles and iron/steel 
industries are calculated, the problem of the index will be discussed.
Problems of the index
This method, like all the others, faces some considerable problems. First, it only 
measures a relative change in the price distortions and cannot be used to compare the 
level o f protectionism across countries. For example, a country might become 
relatively more (less) protectionist compared to another country. In reality, however, it 
might still be less (more) protectionist.
Second, this method reflects all market distortions, not only distortions from 
protectionist measures. This is, however, a common problem for price distortion 
indices. Moreover, this index should only be used to calculate the distortions for 
tradable commodities. If  the proponents o f free trade are right in arguing that free 
trade tends to eliminate other forms o f market distortions (such as private 
monopolies), it will nevertheless reflect the trade policies adopted.
Third, as this is a ‘relative’ index, the positions o f countries are not only 
determined by their own policies, but also by the policies o f the other countries. This 
implies that countries are ranked from the most protectionist to the least protectionist. 
For example, if  some countries become less protectionist, some others will look more 
protectionist without changing their trade policies.
240
Fourth, this index cannot take quality differences into account since no 
measure of quality exists. The share o f a sector in total industrial production (the 
actual size o f the output or the share o f the country in total world production) can be 
used as a very rough indicator of quality. A higher level o f production is assumed to 
indicate better quality. Such variables are included in the regressions, and found to be 
positive but insignificant.
And finally, this method can only produce useful results at a disaggregated 
level, where the commodities are relatively similar. This results from the difficulties 
of calculating an average labour productivity index for industrial sectors that includes 
a very diverse range of commodities. This is the reason why the industrial sectors like 
textiles and iron/steel are chosen rather than sectors such as machinery and 
electronics. For the latter industries, more disagregated data (4-digit level) should be 
used.
Many of these listed problems are common to all indices that are based on 
price distortions. The advantages of this approach override its disadvantages. First, 
this index is easier to calculate and more accurate than the others. Second, it can be 
calculated for shorter time periods (five-year periods or even annually) and therefore it 
is possible to detect a trend. This may allow us to estimate time-series regressions 
which is impossible for the other price distortion indices. Third, an international 
liberalisation tendency can be detected through time by averaging the absolute values 
of the distortion index for all countries for many years. If  there is trade liberalisation, 
the residuals would, on average, be smaller. And finally, this method can also allow us 
to see which sectors are protected and promoted more within a country by comparing 
their ranks in their separate indices.
Results of the empirical work
The following regressions were estimated for two sectors, iron/steel and textiles:
1. VA/L = f  (Productivity, Adjusted Cost/L)
2. VA/L = f  (Productivity, Adjusted Cost/L, RER)
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where
RER : Real exchange rate
The second regression includes changes in the real exchange rate, because changes in 
value-added might also be related to changes in the exchange rate. The UNIDO 
database34 provides relevant data categories for different industrial sectors. Value- 
added is readily available. Labour productivity and the per worker non-wage cost 
must be calculated. The database provides index numbers o f real production. The 
index of labour productivity can be calculated by dividing this index by the index o f 
employment. Since this is only an index, it is not directly comparable between 
countries. That is why a change in these variables for ten years (from 1980 to 1990) 
will be used instead of the real values. This means that the higher the relative 
productivity increase and the lower the change in the relative costs o f a country, the 
higher should be the change in relative value-added. The per worker non-wage cost 
can be calculated with the following formula:
Cost/L = (GO-VA)/L
The rank orders o f the countries according to their ‘protection and promotion’ rates 
are presented in the tables 6.9 and 6.10. Both regressions give very similar results. On 
one hand, the results are encouraging as some well-known ‘protectionist and 
promotionist’ countries such as Taiwan and Korea are at the top o f the list. On the 
other hand, it is impossible to confirm these results as there is no other comparable 
work in the literature. As mentioned earlier, this index can be developed in various 
ways and provides scope for further research. It can be calculated in shorter time 
periods and can be used in time-series analysis in order to analyse the impact o f 
liberalisation on economic performance. This, however, is beyond the objectives o f 
this dissertation.
34 UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database 1996 (INDSTAT 3)
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Table 6.9: Iron and steel, rank of the countries according to their protection rates
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 1 Reg 2
Sri Lanka 1 1 Finland 27 25
Uruguay 2 3 Portugal 28 20
Indonesia 3 2 Sweden 29 27
Morocco 4 4 Spain 30 29
Korea 5 5 Iran 31 24
Austria 6 7 Australia 32 30
Algeria 7 6 Bangladesh 33 32
Taiwan 8 NA India 34 37
Netherlands 9 9 Panama 35 28
Guatemala 10 14 Mexico 36 34
Japan 11 8 Colombia 37 36
Philippines 12 12 Jordan 38 NA
Denmark 13 13 Belgium 39 39
United Kingdom 14 11 Singapore 40 31
Ireland 15 10 Italy 41 38
Egypt 16 15 Hungary 42 40
France 17 17 Kenya 43 44
Greece 18 16 Norway 44 41
South Africa 19 21 New Zealand 45 45
Hong Kong 20 19 Syria 46 46
Chile 21 33 Turkey 47 42
Luxembourg 22 NA Iceland 48 47
United States 23 23 Israel 49 43
Germany 24 26 Bolivia 50 35
Canada 25 18 Ecuador 51 48
Malaysia 26 22 Czech Republic 52 NA
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Table 6.10: Textiles, rank of the countries according to their protection rates
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 1 Reg 2
Taiwan 1 NA South Africa 31 36
Zimbabwe 2 1 Mexico 32 29
Burundi 3 3 France 33 35
Cyprus 4 2 Bangladesh 34 30
Korea 5 6 Turkey 35 31
Netherlands 6 8 Belgium 36 39
Singapore 7 4 Canada 37 32
Jordan 8 NA Sweden 38 38
Algeria 9 5 Malaysia 39 33
Ireland 10 7 Egypt 40 37
Uruguay 11 12 Finland 41 41
Germany 12 13 United States 42 42
Indonesia 13 10 Hungary 43 43
Morocco 14 14 Chile 44 49
Iceland 15 11 Spain 45 40
Austria 16 24 Philippines 46 47
Zambia 17 9 India 47 53
Australia 18 16 Bolivia 48 34
United Kingdom 19 15 Ecuador 49 45
Hong Kong 20 18 Kenya 50 52
Denmark 21 19 Panama 51 44
Norway 22 21 Israel 52 46
Colombia 23 22 Italy 53 48
Sri Lanka 24 26 Jamaica 54 50
Iran 25 17 Syria 55 54
Greece 26 20 Czech Republic 56 NA
Japan 27 25 Senegal 57 51
Portugal 28 23
Malta 29 28
Zealand 30 27
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6.4. CONCLUSION
Based on the criticisms of the existing measures in the last chapter, in this chapter two 
alternative measures, one for trade orientation and one for trade liberalisation, were 
developed. The trade orientation index is based on the SATI index. The simple trade 
intensity figures were adjusted with the structural characteristics o f the countries to 
find out whether they are more open compared to others. The results o f the SATI 
showed some differences in terms of the ranking o f the countries according to their 
openness from the ranking o f the World Development Report (1987).
One other regression was estimated to find out whether more open countries 
grow faster. Changes in investment and exports were included to take into account the 
external shocks and internal policy choices (other than trade policy). This has never 
been done before and allows us to separate countries’ policy choices from their 
external shocks. The results of this exercise indicate a positive correlation between 
openness and economic growth only for the middle-income countries. There is no 
such correlation for the low- and high-income countries.
Some time-series regressions were also estimated, including trade intensity, 
and changes in exports and investment rates. The results showed a significant negative 
correlation between economic growth and trade intensity, and a positive correlation 
for investment and the exports for middle-income countries. Based on these results, it 
is concluded that there must be fallacies o f composition. In other words, more open 
middle-income countries indeed grow faster. However, when they are more open, they 
do not grow faster altogether, hi fact, the time-series regression indicates that they 
grow slower.
As a result, it is fair to conclude that no evidence is found in this analysis to 
support the export-led development hypothesis. On the contrary, both the cross­
country and the time-series analysis strongly suggests that the investment rate is the 
only consistent and strong factor which promotes economic growth in all income 
groups. Thus, an investment-led development strategy seems to be a more realistic 
alternative.
In this chapter, an alternative measure o f trade liberalisation was also 
developed, based on a comparison of changes in value-added in sectors, after taking
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into account changes in cost and productivity. The results are encouraging but it is not 
possible to verify their consistency as there is no other reliable index with which to 
make a comparison. This index, however, has the potential to be developed further to 
make it more accurate.
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APPENDIX
Table A6.1: Country groups used in empirical investigations.
Low-income countries
Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, China, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe
Note: Low-income economies are those in which 1993 GNP per capita was $695 or less. 
Middle-income countries
Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Congo, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, 
Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uruguay, Venezuela
Note: Middle-income economies are those in which 1993 GNP per capita was between $695 and 
$8,625.
High-income countries_______________________________________________________
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
Note: High-income economies are those in which 1993 GNP per capita was above $8,625.
Latin America
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela
Sub Saharan Africa
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE 
7.1. INTRODUCTION
Since the Second World War, a number of Asian countries have undergone a process 
of late industrialisation: Japan in the 1950s; Hong Kong in the 1960s; Taiwan, Korea 
and Singapore in the 1970s and 1980s; and possibly Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand 
today.1 The average growth rates of these countries have been so impressive that it has 
been called a ‘miracle’. Even though, due to the recent financial crisis, the ‘Asian 
miracle' has now lost some of its inspiration, the remarkable sustained growth for 
decades requires an explanation. The impact of this development has been so great that 
‘[it] forced a major rethinking of the relationship between global capitalism and Third 
World economic development.’2
The ever-growing literature and the arguments surrounding this miracle cover a 
wide range of social, economic and historical factors. From ‘good luck’ to Confucian 
culture, from land reform to repressive labour systems, from foreign aid and 
investment to historically strong states, various factors have been offered as 
explanations. The economic arguments centre around industrial policy (role of state) 
and export-led development. All of these arguments, though not exhaustive, are 
important and contribute to the explanation of this miracle. However, what one can 
learn from the experiences of these countries for development policy is less clear.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, two consistent 
advocates of liberalisation policies, have fostered stabilisation and structural 
adjustment policies in developing countries. The apparent failure of these policies, and 
the increasing dissatisfaction with them have put these institutions on the defensive. 
They have produced a number of reports to justify their positions and to prove that 
their policies do, in fact, work. A 1994 report on Africa argued that the failure to 
reverse economic decline in Africa was not as a result of stabilisation and the structural
1 Henderson and Appelbaum (1992: 3).
2 Ibid.
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adjustment policies, but the failure of governments to implement them. The report 
argued that countries that implemented the advised policies did relatively better than 
the others. The results may not be satisfactory, the report argued, but if these policies 
had not been implemented, things would have been much worse.
Another important report, ‘The East Asian Miracle’ ( ‘the Report’ thereafter), 
published in 1993, partially broke from the previous noeclassical line. The Report 
accepted that there had been heavy state intervention in these countries and that state 
intervention had contributed to their strong performance. Though this was a step 
forward for the World Bank, compared to the ‘previous arguments that portrayed 
these countries [...] as paragons of market liberalism,’3 this was not enough to 
convince the authors of the Report that state intervention might play a positive role. 
They argued that ‘although intervention [...] could be effective, it was neither a 
powerful nor a necessary element of the East Asian miracle.’4 As Kwon argued,
The report makes an all-out effort to assert that east Asian economic success 
has nothing to do with government. If government is to deserve any credit, it 
only does so because its myriad interventions (in pricing, interest rates, wages, 
bank credit, monetary and fiscal policy, protection of domestic industries, 
export promotion and subsidies and industrial policies, and so forth) must have, 
by some magical coincidence, jellied into a neo-classical formulation. (Kwon, 
1994: 635)
The Report argued that it was ‘very difficult to establish statistical links between 
growth and a specific intervention and even more difficult to establish causality.’5 The 
East Asian success was a result of getting the ‘basics’ or ‘fundamentals’ right. The 
arguments produced in this report were a mirror image of the arguments produced in 
the report on Africa. Since state intervention is ineffective, success must have been 
achieved despite state intervention. If these countries had had less state intervention, 
they could have done even better. This, however, is not a credible scientific argument.
3 Rodrik (1994: 27).
4 Fishlow and Gwin (1994: 5).
5 World Bank (1993: 6). Amsden answers this argument well: ‘But speaking of the devil! If it is not 
possible to establish statistical links “between growth and a specific intervention,” then neither is it 
possible to establish statistical links between growth and non-intervention.’ Amsden (1994: 628)
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Given their miraculous performance, one may wonder how they could have done better 
than they already did.
The ‘basics’ meant macroeconomic stability, particularly control of inflation 
through fiscal and monetary policies, and stable and ‘realistic’ exchange rates. 
According to the Report the ‘high performing Asian economies’ (HPAEs) owe their 
success to good macroeconomic policies. This argument, however, is meaningless 
since ‘no one proposes bad macro policies’. No one would like to have high inflation 
or a budget or balance of payments deficit. The theoretical disagreement centres on the 
characteristics of what are deemed good and bad macroeconomic policies. The World 
Bank argued that these are the causes of slow growth. Alternative theories, however, 
argue that macroeconomic imbalances are the symptoms of the disease rather than the 
disease itself, and a focus on the symptoms may make the situation even worse. From 
this perspective one can argue that HPAEs succeeded not because they kept inflation, 
budgets and balance of payment deficits under control, but they were able to keep 
them under control because they succeeded in developing a healthy and growing 
economy through industrial policies. The Report was
almost a textbook example of neoclassicists visibly confused but too proud to 
admit their failure -  having been so quick to blame the governments for 
economic failures in the past, they are now reluctant to admit a positive role for 
the governments in a successful economy.’ (Kwon, 1994: 635)
The Report was financed by Japan and published in the context of criticisms of the 
World Bank’s structural adjustment policies.6 Japanese opposition to World Bank 
policies was expressed openly during the 1980s and the 1990s. Japan wanted the 
World Bank to pay more attention to the experiences of the HPAEs and particularly to 
the role of state.
The aim of this chapter is not to solve the ‘mysteries’ of the miracle. Causes of 
the miracle are complex and beyond the limits of this dissertation. Instead the objective 
of this chapter is a modest one: to eliminate the fictitious reasons in order to 
understand the real reasons behind the miracle. This chapter will challenge the
6 Fishlow and Gwin (1994: 3), Wade (1994: 56).
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arguments presented in the Report. It will be argued that despite all of its efforts, the 
Report failed to distort the reality of the experiences of these countries. The Report’s 
empirical work was not only analytically wrong but also did not support the basic 
arguments of the Report. Thus, as Amsden (1994: 627) rightly points out, ‘because the 
Report cannot prove its own major conclusion, it is quintessential^ political and 
ideological.’ Before the arguments and the problems of the Report are demonstrated, a 
brief summary of the important historical factors that might have helped these 
countries in their development process will be presented.
7.2. HISTORICAL LEGACIES
There is extensive emphasis on export-orientation in the neoclassical interpretation of 
the successes of these countries. According to Little,
the major reasons [for their success] is their labour-intensive export-oriented 
policies [...] Nothing else can account for it. Taiwan and Korea do not have 
very good capital markets. Their tax systems are not very good. [...] Planning 
[...] has not played a key role. Moreover, the nonhuman resources of Taiwan 
and Korea are not notably favourable to high income growth. [...] Luck has 
played little part in their development. Aid was [...] not important during the 
high growth period. Borrowing has remained very important for Korea but not 
for the others. Private foreign investment has played a major role in Singapore; 
though elsewhere it has played a useful but only minor role. (Little, 1981: 43, 
cited in Chow and Kellman, 1993)
Development, however, is not a simple technical matter and cannot be analysed as 
such. One cannot simply look at some economic measures such as investment rate or 
trade ratio in these countries and by estimating simple regressions determine the 
factors behind their rapid economic development. The high level of investment and the 
high trade ratio may have contributed significantly to the development of these 
countries. However, the high levels of these variables themselves require explanation. 
One should also analyse the factors behind the high level of investment and trade. Why 
have only these countries achieved such high levels of investment and trade? Why did
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other developing countries fail to do the same? To answer these questions, the social, 
political and historical circumstances of these countries must be taken into account. As 
Mason et al. (1980: 2) point out ‘[t]here is much more to [these countries’] economic 
development than sensible monetary, fiscal, and foreign exchange policies.’
Given the diversity of their backgrounds and their performances, the grouping 
of the eight countries under the umbrella of HPAEs is problematical. As Perkins points 
out there are
at least three quite distinct models even though all three have some features in 
common. There is the manufactured export-led state interventionist models of 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan; the free port service, commerce-dominated model of 
Singapore and Hong Kong; and models of those economies rich in natural 
resources (at least at the beginning) but not in human resources (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand). (Perkins, 1994: 655-656)
If the successes of these countries were, at least partially, based on their export 
performance, one should explain under what particular circumstances these countries 
were able to increase their exports. For example, as many writers agree, the beginning 
of industrialisation in the newly industrialising countries coincided with an remarkable 
expansion in world trade. Without such an historical coincidence, ‘it is highly doubtful 
that Hong Kong and Singapore could have achieved their double-digit growth rates, or 
that Korea and Taiwan could have made the switch from import-substituting to the 
export-oriented industrialisation strategies, in the late 1950s and early 1960s.’7 When 
one analyses the development processes of these countries, one cannot ignore the 
impact of the particular historical circumstances. As Henderson and Appelbaum put it 
clearly:
[W]e can argue that history so infuses the present and sets the parameters for 
the emergence of the future that any social science that does not place it at the 
heart of its explanatory system is doomed to deliver woefully inadequate 
accounts of whatever phenomenon happens to be under scrutiny. Not
7 Henderson and Appelbaum (1992: 10); see also, Hersh (1993: 57), Fishlow and Gwin (1994 : 9).
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withstanding the fact this is precisely one of the central epistemological 
problems of much which passes for economic science in the contemporary 
world, history is one of the factors that has been utilised quite heavily in 
explanations of East Asian economic transformation. (Henderson and 
Appelbaum, 1992: 3)
This section will briefly summarise the historical circumstances that contributed to the 
rapid development of the East Asian countries, particularly those that have been the 
most successful: Japan, Taiwan and Korea. The impact of the Cold War and the 
influence of the US policies on their development are fairly obvious: ‘The economies 
of Japan, Taiwan, and Korea -  and the militaries of the latter two countries -  were 
deliberately built with US aid and technology transfer as bulwarks against 
communism.’8 The historical circumstances of the two tiny city states, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, might have also contributed to their development process and will be 
summarised briefly.9
The Cold War and the emergence of Chinese power in the region were 
important incentives for the United States to help the countries in the region and 
particularly Japan. The isolationist policy of the United States prevented Japan and 
other countries from developing trade relations with China. If something was not done 
to compensate for the loss of trade with China, Japan and the other countries in the 
region could have been lost to the so-called communist threat. ‘Under the 
circumstances finding outlets for Japanese production was a primordial issue.’10 
President Eisenhower marked this clearly:
Japan cannot live and Japan cannot remain in the free world unless something is 
done to allow her to make a living. Now, if we will not give her money, if we 
will not trade with her, if we will not allow her to trade with the Reds [...] what 
is to happen to Japan? It is going to the Communists. (Eisenhower, 1954/1960, 
cited in Hersh, 1993: 30)
8 Ibid., p. 9.
9 The surface areas (in sq. km) of Hong Kong and Singapore are 1040 and 620 respectively, and their 
populations were 5.8 and 2.8 million in 1994.
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Thus, Japan was chosen as a partner in the region to support the policies of the United 
States. The United States was willing to help Japan to become a dominant power in the 
region as long as Japan’s loyalty to the United States was secured. The Korean War 
was a ‘lucky’ incident that helped the Japanese economy greatly. ‘Japan became the 
supplier [...] of military provisions to the war effort, thus alleviating the difficulties of 
logistics for the US armed forces.’11 As Schaller argued,
[t]hese expenditures not only helped balance the still chronic dollar gap and 
compensated for the barriers imposed on trade with China, but they created for 
the first time since 1945 an assured market for heavy industrial and high 
technology exports for which no other customer existed. (Schaller, 1985: 288, 
cited in Hersh, 1993: 24)
The injection of American money into the Japanese economy helped to reduce the 
currency shortage. More importantly, the technology and the know-how transfer was a 
major contribution to Japanese take-off. For example, Okimoto, Sugano and Weintein 
(1984) have argued that development of the Japanese semiconductor industry in the 
1950s would have been inconceivable without the ability to acquire the technology 
from companies of the United States under licensing arrangements.12
The United States supported Japan through favourable trade relations. For 
decades, the United States has been Japan’s number one trading partner whereas Japan 
is the number two trading partner for the United States. After the Vietnam War, trade 
relations between the United States and Japan experienced serious confrontation due 
to the trade gap in favour of Japan and Japanese protectionist policies. As Beckstead 
has argued ‘pure and simple, the situation reflected unfair trade practices on the part of 
Japan.’13 Furthermore, the United States ‘acted as Japan’s broker in Europe; the logic 
being that if the Japanese could not find takers for their wares in Europe, their cheap 
products would flood the United States and there would be little chance of keeping 
them away from the Chinese market.’14
10 Hersh (1993: 30).
11 Ibid., p. 24.
12 Okimoto, Sugano, and Weintein (1984), reported in Henderson and Appelbaum (1992: 12).
13 Beckstead (1993: 250).
14 Hersh (1993: 31).
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The political motivation of the United States was not less obvious in the case of 
Korea and Taiwan. The United States economically and militarily supported South 
Korea against North Korea and Taiwan against China. Between 1945 and the end of 
the 1970s, Korea and Taiwan received US$ 13 and US$ 5.6 billion, respectively. 
Between 1953 and 1962, US aid financed 70 percent of Korean imports and 80 
percent of total fixed capital formation. During the same period US aid financed 85 
percent of the current account deficit and 38 percent of gross domestic investment. 
During 1946-78, Korea received around US$ 6 in US economic grants and loans. The 
same figure was only US$ 6.86 billion for all of Africa and US$ 14.8 billion for Latin 
America. In Taiwan, the US aid financed 95 percent of its trade deficit and 40 percent 
of its gross domestic capital formation in the 1950s. Military aid was also high. After 
the Korean war, between 1955 to 1978 ‘Taiwan and Korea received 9.05 billion 
dollar15 while the whole of Africa and Latin America received 3.2 billion dollar; only 
Iran got more, especially in the period after 1972 (CIA Handbook, 1979).’16 The 
amount of financial aid was so substantial that arguably ‘only the most corrupt of 
political economies could have failed to develop in the face of such massive amounts of 
governmental assistance.’17 The US also supported Korea and Taiwan through 
favourable trade relations. Korea steadily became the number seven trading partner of 
the US. The US contribution was not limited to financial aid but included close 
collaboration between American and Korean officials.18 Aid from the US was the 
largest but by no means the only one. Smaller contributions came from the UN (US$ 
1.9 billion) and from Japan (US$ 1 billion) as a result of the normalisation of the 
political relationship.19
The necessary technology for the semiconductor and consumer electronics 
industries in these countries has been obtained through strategic alliances with US and 
Japanese companies.20 This argument is confirmed by Mason et al. (1980: 47), who
15 US$ 11.6 billion, in Henderson and Appelbaum (1992 :11).
16 Hersh (1993: 49). See also Bello and Rosenfeld (1990: 438), Cumings (1987: 67), Eckert (1992: 
295), Henderson and Appelbaum (1992: 11), So and Chiu (1995: 194).
17 Henderson and Appelbaum (1992: 11).
18 For more details see Mason et al. (1980), chapter six.
19 Ibid., p. 3.
20 ‘Alice Amsden in her work on Korea (1989) argues that the key to late industrialisation has been 
the ability to learn and adopt technologies and labour processes developed elsewhere. While 
‘industrialisation through learning’ has been central, the point remains that if it were not for the 
willingness of foreign corporations to transfer their technology in various ways, the ‘learning process’
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argued that compared to Latin America, the early import-substitution phase of the 
Korean and Taiwanese industrialisation processes was shorter as a result of the US 
influence in the region. According to them, the export-led programmes adopted by 
Taiwan and Korea were actually imposed by the United States.
The Vietnam War was also an important factor in the development of Korea as 
well as Taiwan. The Vietnam War for Korea played the same role as the Korean War 
played for Japan.21 The war gave a boost to both economies in the form of US 
purchases of agricultural and industrial commodities. As was the case for Japan, the 
United States was also willing to open its markets to these countries in order to 
promote export-led industrialisation. The United States has been their number one 
trading partner for decades.
The colonial pasts of Korea and Taiwan also played an important part in their 
development.22 Japanese colonialism and the close economic integration with Japan 
after decolonisation were influential. Japan’s imperial ambitions and the need for a 
secure and continuous supply of agricultural commodities which could not be 
guaranteed by domestic production forced Japan to reform and expand agricultural 
production in Korea and Taiwan by transforming their agricultural systems. Successful 
land reform after decolonisation, which is considered to be one of the most important 
factors in Korean industrialisation, was a result of Japanese colonialism and the Cold 
War. Land reform, which is an extremely complicated and difficult social phenomenon, 
was relatively easier in the absence of a strong landlord class to resist it. Land reform 
in North Korea also made the land reform more desirable in South Korea.
The colonial bureaucracy destroyed the traditional, inefficient state structures 
of these countries, and created strong states upon which subsequent developments 
would be based. Moreover, close economic integration with Japan provided a base for 
their industrialisation processes. Because of increasing militarization and rising wages 
during the 1930s, the Japanese state encouraged Japanese companies to invest into 
industrial capacity in these countries ‘particularly in food processing, textiles, wood 
pulp and paper, fertilisers, aluminium and copper refining, and shipbuilding.’23 The
would have been more difficult and much slower than was in fact the case’. (Henderson and 
Appelbaum, 1992: 12)
21 See Hersh (1993: 50).
22 For details see Mason et al. (1980).
23 Henderson and Appelbaum (1992: 8).
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export-led developments of these countries started with the transfer of Japanese 
technology in textiles and gradually moved to heavy industry and high-tech 
commodities. Japanese investment into these countries and the exports to Japan also 
required considerable investment in infrastructure.
Moreover, following colonialism, both countries benefited from the ‘Japan 
factor’; the arrival of Japanese capital in East Asia. In the early 1970s, there was an 
expansion by Japanese companies into the newly industrialising countries as a result of 
both rising production costs in Japan and US protectionism against Japan. Japan 
benefited both from lower labour costs and the privileged access of the newly 
industrialising countries to the huge American market. Korea and Taiwan, as well as 
Singapore and Hong Kong, benefited from this expansion. The newly industrialising 
countries became a base for the relocation of Japan’s labour-intensive industries. Japan 
also developed trade relations with these countries and gradually replaced the US as 
their main trading partner. For example, during the 1950s, the United States was the 
dominant exporter to Taiwan as a result of tied aid. Japan, however, became the 
dominant supplier to Taiwan in 1964. By 1971, Taiwan obtained 44.5 percent of its 
total imports from Japan, compared to only 22.1 percent from the US.24
The relevance of the social, political and historical circumstances of Hong 
Kong and Singapore to their development is less obvious but not insignificant. They 
owe their ‘existence to the British interest in trading with China and the East Indies.’25 
As entrepots and naval stations, they were not the sort of places to be developed for 
productive purposes by British colonialism. However, the British provided
efficient and relatively liberal bureaucratic and legal systems, which remain -  
particularly in the case of Singapore -  probably the least corrupt in the entire 
region. Furthermore, by being nurtured as key regional nodes for intra-empire 
trade, both territories benefited from extensive pre-existing networks of trading 
houses and specialised services as they began to develop their export-oriented 
industrialisation strategies in the 1950s (Hong Kong) and 1960s (Singapore). 
(Henderson and Appelbaum, 1992: 8)
24 Baldwin, Chen and Nelson (1995: 19).
260
Britain also left ‘a century of experience of trade and finance, a large presence of 
expatriate British trading and financial enterprises (which over time transmitted their 
skills and information to locals.’26 As a result, ‘Hong Kong was second only to Tokyo 
in East Asia as a financial, insurance, shipping, and business-service centre.’27 
Manufacturing in Hong Kong benefited from two important historical events in the 
region. The first was the US military involvement in Vietnam. The tourist industry 
started during the Vietnam War, bringing a large inflow of US dollars into the 
economy. The second was the formation of socialist China, which initially led Hong 
Kong to lose its entrepot function but resulted in its emergence as East Asia’s second 
industrial power. This was a result of the development of a relatively advanced textile 
and garment industry, based on highly experienced refugee labour and capital from 
Shanghai utilising state-of-the-art technology. The development of Hong Kong’s 
textile and garment industry and the pre-existing trading networks contributed to the 
initial industrialisation process.28 Moreover, Hong Kong benefited from the support of 
the socialist regime in China. The trade with China, which is based on cheap Chinese 
products, subsidised the Hong Kong economy by lowering the cost of living and 
strengthening its competitiveness in world markets. Because Hong Kong ‘was the only 
port where China could gain the foreign currency to buy necessary foreign 
equipment,’29 China was very willing to supply food products, raw materials, drinking 
water, etc., at relatively cheap prices. The foreign currency gained from the trade with 
Hong Kong ‘was sufficient to pay for 30-50 percent of China’s imports.’30 Lastly, like 
the other newly industrialising countries in Asia, Hong Kong also benefited from easy 
access to the US market. During the 1960s and 1970s, exports to the US accounted 
for 30.5 percent of Hong Kong’s exports.
In case of Singapore, there are four important reasons that can explain its rapid 
development. The first is its colonial past, which produced efficient and relatively 
liberal bureaucratic and legal systems. The second is its exceptionally advantageous 
geographical location: Singapore is placed along the world’s main East-West 
transportation and communications route which has enabled it to develop service
25 Geiger and Geiger (1973: 4).
26 Lall (1994: 649).
27 Geiger and Geiger (1973: 11).
28 Henderson and Appelbaum (1992: 9) and So and Chiu (1995: 194).
29 So and Chiu (1995: 206).
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exports.31 By the 1980s, internationally traded services became the most dynamic 
component of the economy. As Huff (1995: 737) argues, the ‘Republic’s “natural 
resource” of location and uniqueness as a city-state have particular relevance to the 
Singapore model’s likely replicability.’ The third is its exceptionally high level of 
foreign direct investment. Indeed, during the 1980s, Singapore was the largest 
developing country recipient of foreign direct investment.32 In 1992, only 16.2 percent 
of its total manufacturing output was produced by wholly local firms which accounted 
for only 8.4 percent of exports. A massive 83.8 percent of manufactured output33 was 
produced by foreign companies, which accounted for 91.6 percent of exports. And 
lastly, Singapore’s industrialisation was initiated by very heavy state intervention and 
advanced industrial policies. Apart from the unusually high rate of FDI, Singapore’s 
high growth rate since the 1960s is largely the result of unusually high savings and 
investment rates, which averaged 28.8 percent and 40.5 percent respectively during the 
1970s. The driving force behind this high level of savings was the public sector, which 
contributed 66.8 percent of total savings in 1985.34
Regardless the role of social, political and historical circumstances in the 
development of Hong Kong and Singapore, it is not clear what kind of guidance these 
two small countries (city-states) can provide regarding development policy. The 
development of these countries owes a lot to the specific circumstances of the post­
war capitalist world economy. A large amount of American financial and technological 
aid, as well as privileged access to the US market helped them to move to export-led 
development. Other historical and geographical factors were also important. The 
impact of the colonial period as well as favourable geographical locations helped these 
countries to develop rapidly. Finally, the emergence of Japan as a world economic 
power in the region also benefited the development of these countries.
30 Kelly (1987: 92).
31 Huff (1995).
3213 percent of all FDI in developing countries.
33 74.2 percent wholly or majority foreign company and 9.6 percent majority local company, see Huff 
(1995), table 6.
262
7.3. STATE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY
According to the Report, ‘[m]acroeconomic stability and rapid export growth were 
two key elements’ in East Asian success and ‘governments achieved macroeconomic 
stability by adhering to orthodox policy prescriptions.’35 They kept the public deficit 
low which helped to control inflation. The low inflation and manageable debt in turn 
facilitated realistic exchange rates that elsewhere undermined export performance. 
According to the Report, exchange rate policies played a pivotal role in promoting 
exports. Even though most HPAEs started their industrialisation with protectionist 
policies, they quickly moved to more liberal ones. The aim of this section is to 
challenge the views of the Report on the exchange rate and trade policies adopted by 
these countries. The evidence that will be presented suggests that their exchange rate 
policies were not different from those of other developing countries.
7.3.1. Exchange rate policy
The World Bank has been a consistent advocate of so-called ‘exchange rate 
protectionism’ as opposed to other forms of protectionism. This is because exchange 
rate devaluations do not discriminate against the ‘winner’ sectors and allow the 
comparative advantage principle to decide which sectors will be competing in 
international markets. According to the World Bank, this is the best option for 
developing countries wishing to stay competitive and eliminate the possible negative 
effects of trade liberalisation. Governments should not intervene with trade in any 
other way; try to stay competitive by devaluations and let the markets decide which 
sectors will be the winners and losers.
According to the Report, ‘several HPAE governments used exchange rate 
policies to offset the possible adverse impact of trade liberalisation on producers of 
import-substitutes. A few went beyond this objective [...] and used deliberately 
undervalued exchange rates to assist exporters.’36 The Report argues that during the
34 See Huff (1995), table 8.
35 World Bank (1993: 105).
36 Ibid., p. 125. The Report, however, also argues that before the trade policies were ‘liberalised’ 
gradually ‘[ejxport prices [in these countries] were set in the international market and were often 
substantially less than current marginal average costs. Losses on export production offset profits in the
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1980s, particularly Taiwan, Korea and Indonesia deliberately undervalued their 
currencies to boost their exports and ‘[o]ne can see a fairly clear relationship between 
devaluations and export growth in the 1980s.’37
However, the Report does not provide empirical evidence to support this 
argument, except by using Dollar’s (1991) openness index to show that the HPAEs 
avoided severe exchange rate appreciation compared to Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America. As demonstrated in chapter five, Dollar index has theoretical weaknesses and 
cannot be used as a measure of real exchange rate devaluations. Moreover, no 
justification is provided as to why the Dollar index should be preferred over more 
straightforward measures such as real exchange rate devaluations.
In this section it will be argued that the Report is not only wrong in terms of 
the exchange rate policies followed by the HPAEs, but also its arguments with regard 
to exchange rate policies appear self-contradictory. The Report even made mistakes on 
the basic facts. An inspection of the real exchange rates of these countries proves that 
the Report’s assertion is unsubstantiated. To pursue this argument, a discussion of the 
measurement of the real exchange rate is required.
Measuring the real exchange rate
There are two main competing measures of the real exchange rate which yield different 
results. The conventional measure is called the purchasing power parity real exchange 
rate (hereafter multilateral real exchange rate or MRER) which is defined as:
MRER = E R .P!/P
protected market, while competition in the international market ensured that the firm would not suffer 
from loss of cost discipline’ (World Bank, 1993: 295) This statement however, is an implicit 
admission of the fact that these countries had ‘overvalued’ exchange rates at least at the beginning of 
their industrialisation period. Because, if these countries had used ‘realistic’ exchange rate policies 
and had followed their comparative advantages, the exporters would not have made losses with the 
prevailing international prices and would not have to be compensated in the protected domestic 
markets. The fact that export prices did not cover even their average costs simply means that they did 
not follow their ‘comparative advantage’ but they created their own competitiveness based on the 
anticipation of scale economies.
37 Ibid., p. 126.
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where ER is the nominal exchange rate, Pi and P are international and domestic prices 
measured as the consumer price index or wholesale price index. The second measure is 
called the ‘internal’ real exchange rate (IRER) and can be defined as:
IRER = Pt/Ph
where PT is an index of prices of tradable goods, and PH is an index of prices for 
nontradables or home goods.
Though the MRER is a more conventional measure and is used widely, the 
IRER is more accurate since the MRER does not take into account the commodity 
composition of exportables.38 The MRER would only be accurate if all countries 
produced and exported the same bundle of commodities. Conventionally, the real 
exchange rate is used to measure changes in competitiveness. It is assumed that if a 
country’s inflation rate is above the world inflation rate, that country will be 
uncompetitive in terms of its exports. To increase the competitiveness and profitability 
of exporters an exchange rate devaluation is required to keep the real exchange rate 
constant.
The MRER, however, does not refer to the prices of the specific commodities 
that are exported. A country may become uncompetitive not only as a result of higher 
overall inflation but also as a result of changes in the prices of exportables in 
international markets. The prices of the exportables in international markets may 
change as a result of demand and supply conditions, various shocks and productivity 
increases. This is particularly important for developing countries which usually export 
a limited number of primary commodities. Since the prices of exportables fluctuate 
sharply and frequently, using a comparison of international and domestic inflation rates 
to adjust the nominal exchange rate instead of using the prices of exportable 
commodities would substantially distort the real exchange rate and would not reflect 
the real changes in competitiveness.
The IRER, however, reflects the impact of relative overall price changes 
(inflation) as well as the impact of the relative price changes of tradables. This can be
38 For a more in-depth discussion of the alternative measures of the real exchange rate see Masters 
and Ianchovichina (1998) and Holden (1991).
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shown by the following. When the law of one price holds, the domestic and 
international prices of tradables will be related through the nominal exchange rate:
Pj = ER . Pti
(where PTi is the international price of tradables) 
and
IRER = ER. Pti/P H
Thus, the IRER varies as a result of changes in the exchange rate, changes in the 
domestic average price level and changes in the international prices of tradables. The 
IRER reflects changes in the international prices of tradables as a result of fluctuations 
and productivity changes.39 The differences between the two measures of the real 
exchange rate matters because they may give substantially different results. For 
example, the works of Masters and Ianchovichina (1998) on Zimbabwe and Holden 
(1991) on South Africa show some notable differences between the two measures. In 
Zimbabwe, the MRER shows a depreciation between 1967 and 1987 whereas the 
IRER, in contrast, shows a sharp appreciation.40 In the case of South Africa, the 
opposite is the case. The MRER shows an appreciation between 1973 and 1987, 
whereas the IRER shows a depreciation.41 The empirical work presented in this section 
also shows similar contradictory results particularly for African countries.
The IRER is also not a perfect measure of the real exchange rate. This is 
because of the so-called Ricardo-Balassa effect42 which suggests that the real exchange 
rate may appreciate as a result of faster productivity growth in the production of 
tradables than of home goods. The index could also be improved by using a trade- 
weighted average of several trading partners. Nevertheless, the IRER is a fairly good 
measure of the real exchange rate and has an additional advantage: it is possible to
39 This formula can also be adjusted to take into account the ad valorem taxes and marketing margins. 
See Masters and Ianchovichina (1998: 466).
40 Masters and Ianchovichina (1998: 469).
41 Holden (1991: 8-9).
42 Masters and Ianchovichina (1998: 467).
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calculate a composite IRER index for many countries. This allows for a comparison of 
different regions or country groups.
In the following section, IRER will be used as a measure of the real exchange 
rate. In same cases, MRER will also be used to confirm the consistency of the results. 
The IRER can easily be calculated by using the price levels of home goods and 
exportables. These price levels can be calculated by dividing the nominal values by the 
real values. A weighted average price for tradables can be used to construct a 
composite index for the price of tradables. Alternatively, the relative price of 
exportables to home goods ( P x / P h)  can be used since a change in the nominal 
exchange rate would not alter the relative price of exportables and importables 
(Px/Pm).43
The empirical evidence
In the case of Korea, (see figure 7.1-A), the IRER appreciated continuously between 
1975 and 1993 (except for 1978-80) after a period of depreciation between 1970 and 
1975.44 Thus the Report’s argument that ‘Korea used exchange rate protection from 
1986 to 1989 when it ran a current account surplus’45 is not supported by the evidence. 
In fact this argument is surprising because not only the IRER but also the MRER and 
the nominal exchange rate appreciated during this period. An investigation of 
Indonesia’s IRER reveals similar results (see figure 7.1-B). Even though the MRER 
depreciated continuously during the 1980s, the IRER first depreciated from 1967 to 
1980 and then it fluctuated around a slightly declining trend which indicates an 
appreciation of the IRER. The same is true for the other HPAEs. An investigation of 
their individual IRERs proves that these countries did not use real exchange rate 
devaluations for competitive purposes. In almost all HPAEs, the real exchange rate 
appreciated during the 1980s.
However, this does not necessarily disprove the argument that the exchange 
rate may have played an important part in promoting exports. During the 1980s, the 
exchange rates of almost all countries appreciated after a decade of depreciation in
43 In other words, a nominal exchange rate devaluation would change (Px/P h) and (Pm/P h) equally.
44 Note that an increase in the ER, MRER and IRER implies a depreciation.
45 World Bank (1993: 126).
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response to the 1970s’ oil crisis. Many countries responded to the oil crises of 1973 
and 1979 by dramatically devaluating their currencies and then, after the decline of oil 
prices during 1980s, reversing the policy. This is why one should also consider the 
relative performances of the HPAEs in terms of real exchange rate devaluations. Even 
though their currencies appreciated during this period, the level of this appreciation 
might have been lower than for the other countries.
Before the HPAEs’ exchange rate policies and exports are empirically 
investigated, a brief note should be made on the theoretical arguments of the Report 
about devaluation and competitiveness. The Report appears not to criticise the 
‘undervalued exchange rates’ in these countries. This clearly contradicts the free- 
market exchange rate approach and implies ‘mercantilism’. From the logic of 
neoclassical static-efficiency, undervalued exchange rates are as inefficient as 
overvalued exchange rates. Moreover, though no one disputes the importance of 
keeping a ‘realistic’ exchange rate, relying on devaluation as a competitive tool is not 
the best, or even a good, option for developing countries. There are fallacies of 
composition involved. What is true for one country is not necessarily true for all. When 
all developing countries devalue their currencies they may not be able to increase their 
aggregate exports since the demand elasticities for most of their commodities are low. 
Fixed exchange rates (fixed to the US dollar) were designed to avoid competitive 
devaluation, which were thought to be destabilising.
Observation of the IRER and MRER seems to contradict the Report’s view. 
When countries are ranked according to their degree of real exchange rate devaluation 
by using both measures of the real exchange rate for the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, 
HPAEs are not high on the list (see tables 7.1 and 7.2). For example, table 7.1 (IRER) 
indicates that during the 1960s, out of 91 countries, Malaysia was number 88, Japan 
87, Indonesia 86 and Thailand 84. Only Korea ranked a relatively high, 38. This means 
that, during the 1960s, 35 out of 91 countries devalued their currencies more than 
Korea. During the 1970s, most countries felt the impact of oil shocks. The relative 
export prices of Indonesia and Malaysia were high as a result of the increased oil prices 
since they were oil exporters. Table 7.1 suggests that during the 1980s, only Japan 
among the HPAEs radically devalued its currency.
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During the same periods, the much criticised Latin American and African countries 
devalued their currencies more than the HPAEs. Interestingly, the Report specifically 
mentions Bolivia and Ghana as examples of countries that severely appreciated their 
currencies during the 1980s.46 During this decade Bolivia was number 118 out of 122 
countries and Ghana was ranked 119. This is particularly important when one 
considers that Bolivia was ranked sixth and 17th in the 1960s and 1970s and Ghana was 
ranked 17th and 26th respectively. However, the Report does not mention that both 
countries did much better in the 1980s in terms of their export performances compared 
to the 1970s. By export performance, Bolivia was ranked 35th in the 1980s (as 
opposed to 108th in the 1970s) and Ghana 56th (as opposed to 98th in the 1970s). 
Consequently, by looking at these figures, one cannot simply argue that their ‘poor’ 
export performances were the result of their overvalued exchange rates.
Table 7.2 supports the findings of the table 7.1. The relative real exchange rate 
devaluations of the HPAEs in terms of MRER are not particularly impressive. A 
comparison of table 7.2 with the table 7.1 reveals additional information about these 
two measures. The rank order of the African countries during the 1980s differ 
substantially. In terms of the MRER they ranked very high, but by the IRER they 
ranked very low. For example Zaire, Tanzania and Zambia ranked third, fourth and 
ninth according to MRER devaluations, whereas they are ranked 65th, 109th and 32nd 
according to IRER devaluations. This is probably as a result of a fall in the prices of 
their export commodities. As the international prices of exportables declined, they 
responded by devaluing their currencies. Even though the devaluations were 
substantial, they were unable to eliminate the fall in the relative price of exportables 
and the IRER declined.
46 Ibid., p. 114.
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Table 7.1: Rank order of countries according to internal real exchange rate (IRER)
devaluations and export growth rates (average rates across years)
Rank
accc
c
Drder of countries 
>rding to IRER 
evaluations
Rank order of countries 
according to export growth 
rates
HPAE 1960s 1970s 1980s 1960s 1970s 1980s
Japan 87 95 17 6 18 53
Hong Kong NA 86 55 NA 12 8
Korea 36 68 53 4 3 12
Singapore NA NA 87 NA NA 17
Taiwan NA NA NA NA NA NA
Indonesia 86 14 100 66 42 61
Malaysia 88 19 104 58 58 18
Thailand 84 43 68 50 11 10
Latin America
Argentina 64 89 76 64 23 52
Bolivia 6 17 118 28 108 35
Brazil 21 60 96 54 21 37
Colombia 16 44 110 83 57 24
Peru 4 92 62 77 46 108
Africa
Ghana 17 26 119 27 98 56
Tanzania 47 38 109 69 107 85
Zaire 3 103 65 87 83 48
Zambia 1 108 32 90 80 114
Number of countries 91 111 122 91 111 122
Source: World Bank Stars Database
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Table 7.2: Rank order of countries according to multilateral real exchange rate
(MRER) devaluations and export growth rates (average rates across years)
Rank
acco
c
Drder of countries 
rding to MRER 
evaluations
Rank order of countries 
according to export growth 
rates
HPAE 1960s 1970s 1980s 1960s 1970s 1980s
Japan 67 87 103 1 18 44
Hong Kong NA 47 73 NA 13 5
Korea NA 26 90 NA 2 8
Singapore NA NA 86 NA NA 12
Taiwan NA NA NA NA
Indonesia NA 35 13 NA 40 52
Malaysia 14 31 49 40 56 13
Thailand 31 37 59 32 12 6
Latin America
Argentina 45 9 81 43 23 43
Bolivia 66 8 76 18 97 28
Brazil 51 11 102 35 21 30
Colombia 6 40 15 60 55 19
Peru 65 12 108 53 44 100
Africa
Ghana NA 59 35 NA 88 47
Tanzania NA 60 4 NA 96 77
Zaire NA 99 3 NA 76 40
Zambia 56 39 9 66 73 105
Number of countries 67 100 110 67 100 110
Source: World Bank Stars Database
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Finally, table 7.3 provides a composite index of the IRER for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America and the HPAEs. The figures show that all three regions responded to 
the oil crises of the 1970s by substantially devaluing their currencies. During this 
period, the IRER depreciated more for Latin America than Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
HPAEs. During the 1980s, however, the IRER appreciated for Latin America and the 
HPAEs. For Sub-Saharan Africa, it continued to depreciate until 1990 and then 
appreciated. For Japan, however, the IRER as well as the MRER and the nominal 
exchange rate all appreciated. Overall, between 1968 and 1993 Sub-Saharan Africa 
had the highest level of depreciation compared to Latin America and HPAEs.
Table 7.3: Internal real exchange rate index (IRER), by region
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Latin
America
HPAEs
(without
Japan)
HPAEs47 WORLD
1968 100 100 100 100 100
1975 108 187 149 101 125
1980 124 226 160 95 140
1985 116 207 142 83 120
1990 139 155 125 65 108
1993 126 120 105 54 94
Source: World Bank Stars Database
The above evidence is enough to reject the Report’s assertion that the strong export 
performances of the HPAEs was derived from real exchange rate devaluations. There 
is no empirical evidence to suggest that they have used ‘exchange rate protectionism’ 
for competitive purposes. What is more interesting, however, is that the correlation 
between devaluation and export growth is not as clear as the World Bank asserts, 
either for the 1980s, 1970s or the 1960s. If the relationship between exchange rate 
devaluation and export performance was as clear as the World Bank believes, one 
would expect a positive correlation. The following simple regressions, however, reveal 
opposite results.
To see the correlation between real exchange rate devaluation and export 
performance, two separate regressions are estimated for different time periods. The
47 Excludes Taiwan and Singapore due to lack of complete data.
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first one is the change in the share of exports in total GDP against the IRER 
devaluation and the second is the export growth rate against the IRER devaluation.
Reg 1: A (X/GDP) = f (AIRER)
Reg 2: A (X) = f (AIRER)
where
A (X/GDP)
A(X)
AIRER
The results reported in table 7.4 are surprising and clearly show a strong negative 
correlation between export performance and devaluation. The significance level of this 
correlation first increases substantially during the 1970s, and then diminishes during the 
1980s, but stays negative. This negative correlation need not be interpreted as evidence 
against devaluation. One cannot make the simple argument that exports decrease as a 
result of devaluation. They clearly demonstrate, however, that devaluations cannot 
guarantee good export performance. A possible interpretation of these results is that 
countries respond to external shocks by devaluating their currencies to slow down or 
to stop the negative impact of the shocks on their exports instead of using devaluation 
as a competitive tool. The higher significance level of the correlation for the 1970s 
(crisis years) compared to the 1960s and 1980s support this argument. This suggests 
that real exchange rate devaluation is usually a ‘panic’ response to fluctuations in 
exports rather than a reliable tool to increase exports and that the real exchange rate is 
determined by the changes in exports but not necessarily vice versa.
: change in the share of exports in total GDP 
: change in real exports.
: change in IRER.
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Table 7.4: Correlation between internal real exchange rate devaluation (IRER) and
export performance
Time
Period
Dept.
Var.
Cons IRER
Deval.
R-
Bar-
Squ
DW F-test & 
DF
Country dummies
1961-
70
X/GDP 3.003
[6.510]*
-0.540
[-3.042]*
0.921 1.923 150.975*
[83]
Algeria, Burkina Faso, Korea, 
Libya, Mauritania, Rwanda
1961-
70
X gr 8.156
[16.355]*
-0.645
[-3.356]*
0.938 1.852 195.978*
[83]
Algeria, Burkina Faso, Korea, 
Libya, Mauritania, Rwanda
1971-
80
X/GDP 4.041
[5.885]*
-0.227
[-7.068]*
0.594 2.156 24.063*
[103]
Guinea-Bissau, Korea, Niger, 
Panama, Tanzania, Togo
1971-
80
X gr 7.685
[8.611]*
-0.179
[-4.288]*
0.412 2.065 12.024*
[103]
Guinea-Bissau, Korea, Niger, 
Panama, Tanzania, Togo
1981-
90
X/GDP 2.654
[7.076]*
-0.301
[-2.816]*
0.286 2.214 10.728*
[116]
Benin, Comoros, Iran, 
Mozambique
1981-
90
X gr 5.180
[10.443]*
-0.224
[-1.583]
0.190 2.135 6.692*
[116]
Benin, Comoros, Iran, 
Mozambique
The Report also argued that HPAEs have been successful in maintaining stable 
exchange rates compared to some Latin American countries thanks to their ‘pragmatic 
macroeconomic management.’48 Table 7.5 shows the rank order of the countries 
according to their real exchange rate and export stability indices.49 Even though the 
HPAEs seem to be in a better position in terms of exchange rate and export stability 
compared to Latin American and African countries, their performance is not 
particularly impressive.
48 World Bank (1993: 115).
49 Export stability is calculated by estimating the following simple regression:
Ln X = f (T) or (Ln X = a + bT), where X is exports in logarithmic form and T is time trend. 
Residuals from this regression were saved and their absolute values were divided with the fitted 
(estimates) values and summed X|e/YA| where e is residual and YA is fitted (estimate) value. This 
gives variability of the variable around the time trend.
Real exchange rate stability can be calculated in two ways. One is the simple coefficient of 
variation through time and the second is the above regression method. Here both methods are 
employed since some countries have clear trends in their exchange rates such as China, Chad, 
Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Singapore which make their exchange rate variation in terms of 
CoV very high. When this trend is removed, however, their exchange rates are more stable around 
this trend.
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Table 7.5: Rank order of countries according to export and internal real exchange rate
(IRER) stability. (1968-93)
HPAE IRER
stability
(regression
method)
IRER
stability
(CoV
method)
Export
stability
Latin
America
IRER
stability
(regression
method)
IRER
stability
(CoV
method)
Export
stability
Japan 10 53 21 Argentina 90 73 40
H. Kong 11 22 32 Bolivia 108 98 66
S. Korea 29 51 65 Brazil 62 48 25
Singapore 1 56 19 Colombia 70 55 61
Taiwan NA NA NA Peru 81 57 69
Indonesia 64 83 37 Africa
Malaysia 57 60 52 Ghana 96 93 89
Thailand 47 27 41 Tanzania 86 100 85
Zaire 73 72 88
No of 
Countries
109 109 109 Zambia 40 42 49
Note: Lower means stable, higher means unstable 
Source: World Bank Stars Database
To analyse a possible relationship between IRER stability, export stability, GNP per 
capita and export growth, the following regressions were estimated for 108 countries.
1. IRER instability = f (Exports instability) + sig
2. IRER instability = f (GNP per capita) - sig
3. Exports instability = f (GNP per capita) - sig
4. Exports growth = f (ER instability) - sig
5. Exports growth = f (Exports instability) - not sig
The results suggest some interesting insights (see table 7.6). The first regression shows 
a positive correlation between IRER instability and export instability. The direction of 
causality is not obvious. The World Bank would probably argue for causality to run 
from IRER instability to export instability. However, given the earlier argument that 
the IRER devaluation is in general a panic response to export fluctuations, causality 
could run from export instability to IRER instability. The second and third regressions 
clarify this point. Both the IRER and export instability are negatively correlated with 
per capita GNP which suggests that fluctuations in export performance have to do with 
the development level and with the nature of the commodities produced by the 
countries. Exports and thus the IRER performance of developed countries are more
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stable. Regressions 4 and 5 suggest that IRER instability and export instability are 
negatively correlated with export performance even though the latter is insignificant.
Table 7.6: Regressions on IRER instability, export instability, GNP per capita and
export growth (1968-93)
Dept.
var.
Indept.
Var.
Coefficient Constant R-
Bar-
Squ
DW F-test & 
DF
Country dummies
1 IRER
instability
Export
instability
0.383
[7.002]*
0.019
[0.352]
0.309 1.924 49.038*
[106]
2 IRER
instability
GNP pc -0.165
[-4.788]*
1.455
[5.641]*
0.170 1.747 22.932*
[106]
3 Export
instability
GNP pc -0.385
[-9.316]*
3.408
[11.027]*
0.445 2.103 86.796*
[106]
4 Export
growth
IRER
instability
-0.237
[-3.678]*
2.234
[56.823]*
0.538 1.718 25.970*
[102]
Trinidad & Tobago, 
Kuwait, Libya, 
Sierra Leone
5 Export
growth
Export
instability
-0.026
[-0.579]
2.196
[46.709]*
0.478 1.869 20.673*
[102]
Trinidad & Tobago, 
Kuwait, Libya, 
Sierra Leone
* is one-percent significance level.
Finally, table 7.7 illustrates the results of a ‘Granger causality test’ for 41 countries 
between exports and the IRER for 26 years (1968-93).
Formulations for the Granger causality test are:
1. Xt = cc + p.IRERt + Pi.IRERn + p2.IRERt.2 + p3.Xt.i + p4.Xt.2 + u
2. IRERt = (X + p.Xt + Pi.Xt-i + p2.Xt.2 + Ps.IRERt-i + P4.IRERt-2 + u
Summary of the Table 7.7
Total Significant total Ten-percent sig One-percent sig
- + - + - + - +
Current 28 13 12 0 8 0 4 0
IRER => X 17 24 6 6 5 6 1 0
X => IRER 22 19 6 7 6 7 0 0
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Table 7.7: Causality text for internal real exchange rate (IRER) and exports
A rg en tin a A u stra lia B e lg iu m B razil C anada C h ile C h in a
Current - - + - - - +
ER => X + - - - - + +
X  => E R - - + - + - +
C o lo m b ia D enm ark France G erm any G hana G reece G uatem ala
Current - + + + - - -
E R ^ X + - - - + + +
X  => ER + + + + + - -
Hong Kong In don esia Ireland Italy Japan K enya K orea
Current - - + + + - -
E R  => X + - - + + + +
X  => ER - - + - + + -
K uw ait L ibya M alaysia M ex ico N ig er ia Peru Philippines
Current - - - - - - -
E R  => X - + - + - + -
X = > E R - - + - - - -
Senegal S. Africa Sri Lanka Sweden Switzerland Tanzania Thailand
Current - - - + - - -
ER => X + + + - - + +
X  => ER + + - + - + -
T urkey U K U S A U rugu ay Z aire Z im b ab w e
Current + + + - + -
ER => X + - + + - +
X = > E R + - - - + +
T en -p ercen t s ig n if ica n ce  level 
O ne-p ercen t s ig n if ica n ce  level
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If the Report’s argument was correct, one would expect a positive correlation between 
current values of the IRER devaluations and the export growth. This would not prove 
causality. One would also expect a positive correlation between the past values of the 
IRER and the current values of export growth. The results are surprising. Out of 41 
countries, only for 12 is there a significant correlation between the current values of 
the IRER devaluations and export growth. The coefficients, however, do not have the 
expected sign; they are all negative. Four of them have a significance level of one- 
percent. For almost all oil exporting countries a significant negative correlation is 
apparent. This suggests that the more these countries export the more their currencies 
appreciate. For these countries, causality cannot run from the exchange rate to exports, 
because a negative coefficient does not make any sense.
As to past values of the IRER, the story is contrary to the Report. For only 12 
countries is there a causal relationship from exchange rates to exports. Only half of 
them have the expected sign. Out of 12 only Sweden exhibits strong causality at the 
one-percent level. The sign of the coefficient is not what the Report would predict. So 
the evidence seems to be against the Report’s expectations. For 13 countries causality 
runs from exports to the exchange rate.
In summary, the Report’s argument regarding the impact of exchange rate 
devaluations is unsubstantiated. There seems to be no strong correlation between real 
exchange rate devaluation and the export performance. When there is a strong 
correlation, causality seems to run from exports to exchange rates rather than vice 
versa. There is no empirical evidence to suggest that the HPAEs relied on exchange 
rate policies to stimulate exports. One needs to look elsewhere to find an explanation 
for success in stimulating exports.
7.3.2. Trade and trade policy
The Report admits that ‘[m]ost HPAEs began industrialisation with a protectionist 
orientation.’50 It then argues that protectionism in these countries was lower compared 
to other developing countries, and they gradually moved toward free trade. The Report 
reviews the protectionist measures adopted by these countries. The evidence it
50 World Bank (1993: 295).
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presents for individual countries proves that the protectionist measures were very high 
at the beginning of their development period and declined gradually. As the Report 
perceives import-substitution and export-promotion strategies as alternatives, it does 
not see the naturalness of the move from protectionism to more liberal policies. This is 
despite its admission that in Japan the ‘ERP levels in the machinery sector were 
reduced during the 1970s, only after it was evident from export performance that the 
sector had become internationally competitive.’51 In this passage the Report 
summarises the typical expectations of import-substitution theorists. As is argued in 
chapter four, there is a dynamic relationship between import-substitution and export- 
promotion strategies. According to this view, countries should protect their domestic 
markets until they become competitive in international markets. When the 
competitiveness is secured however, there is no need to continue with the import- 
substitution. Import-substitution policies are usually designed as temporary policies to 
stimulate industrialisation and competitiveness. Even if the HPAEs had relatively lower 
protection rates, this would not prove causality. It makes more sense to explain the 
low level of protectionism with a competitive economy rather than to explain a 
competitive economy on the basis of a low level of protectionism.
The Report also argues that ‘while these economies favoured production of 
import-substitutes, they did so less than most other developing countries.’52 To prove 
this point, the Report compares the HPAEs with other regions in terms of ‘nominal 
tariff rates adjusted for the presence of non-tariff barriers,’ and domestic price 
distortions. The Report concludes that both indicators are lower for the HPAEs than 
other regions. The first measure is taken from Erzan, e t a l. (1989) and the second from 
Dollar (1990).
The most obvious problem with the first indicator is, as Perkins points out, 
‘[t]he data used to support this proposition are for 1985, roughly a quarter century 
after rapid industrialisation began in the more interventionist states, and US pressure 
among other elements had forced these states to sharply reduce their level of 
intervention.’53 Furthermore the difficulties of dealing with non-tariff barriers are well
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 299.
53 Perkins (1994: 659).
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established in the literature. Non-tariff barriers are extremely difficult to calculate. 
Thus, the validity of these figures to support the Report’s arguments is questionable.
The Dollar’s index, which is based on a comparison of the price levels of 
countries, is criticised in chapter five, and will not be discussed in detail here. The 
index is derived from a certain theoretical approach on how prices are formed in 
national and international markets and once the basic assumption of this theory is 
rejected, Dollar’s price distortion index loses its credibility.
Even if it is assumed that the Dollar index is a proper measure of trade 
liberalisation, as Perkins (1994: 659) argues, the Report’s data do not support its 
conclusions. According to the Report ‘Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore rank in 
the top two deciles of the index.’54 which indicates a lower rate of effective protection. 
On the other hand ‘surprisingly, Thailand, with higher effective protection, also is 
ranked in the top decile, while Indonesia is in the top third.’55 This inconsistency is not 
surprising given the weaknesses of the Dollar index as a measure of trade liberalisation. 
The Report also admits that ‘Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, China, rank in the fifth and 
sixth deciles, below such developing-economy comparators as Brazil, India, Mexico, 
Pakistan, and Venezuela.’56 Nonetheless, on average, the HPAEs are ranked at the top 
of the list57 above all developing and OECD countries thus indicating that they are 
relatively more ‘liberal’.
The way in which the individual country figures are aggregated to create the 
regional figures is not clear. If simple averages are taken, the existence of two city- 
states, Hong Kong and Singapore, may substantially distort the picture. As Perkins 
argues ‘[o]ne problem with this World Bank study is that, despite its frequent mention 
of the diversity of the HPAEs experience, it keeps trying for generalisations that apply 
to all.’58 The structural characteristics of the two city-states are fundamentally different 
from the others and this should be taken into account.
Moreover, even if these two indicators are technically accurate they fail to 
capture many other price distortions created by industrial policies. Dollar index at best 
measures the real exchange rate overvaluation but tells us nothing about the degree of
54 World Bank (1993: 301).
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Figure 6.4 in the Report.
58 Perkins (1994: 658).
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market distortion. The nominal tariff rates are not the only way to promote and protect 
domestic industries. The HPAEs used many other industrial policies to promote 
particular sectors such as investment subsidies, low interest rates, tax incentives, 
preferential allocation of foreign exchange, exemption from anti-monopoly laws, public 
investment in applied research, and wide sharing of information among the public and 
private sectors.
Given the strict industrial and trade policies of these countries, one may 
wonder what else could these countries have done to distort their prices in addition to 
what they already had done. As Lall (1994:650) argues,
[t]here is a clear positive relationship within the group of HPAEs between the 
extent of industrial deepening and the degree of price distortions: the most 
successful industrialisers in Asia (and arguably in the world in recent 
experience) distorted their prices significantly.
In brief, the HPAEs did not adopt non-interventionist trade regimes during the period 
of their rapid penetration into world markets. On the contrary, they practiced export- 
promotion and selective import-substitution policies, which included subsidised credit, 
tax rebates, and a variety of incentives including such things as awards at public 
ceremonies for successful export performance.
7.4. EFFECTIVENESS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY
The Report admits that, except for Hong Kong, all HPAEs employed industrial 
policies but it also asserts that ‘industrial policies were largely ineffective’59 for two 
reasons. First, the changes in the sectoral composition of output were largely market- 
conforming and industrial policy did not guide industrial development along paths that 
it would not have taken if it were guided by market forces. Second, the productivity 
change in the promoted sectors was not higher than in the others.
59 World Bank (1993: 312). This argument is contradicted by the Report itself. For example, as Casse 
and Lall (1995: 97) observe, Box 3.3. in the Report titled “Samsung Industries Battle for the 
Microwave Market” admits that ‘[t]he government’s Economic Development Board was a key player 
in Samsung’s success.’ (World Bank, 1993: 130)
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These arguments, however, are contradicted by the Report itself. For example, 
as Cassen and Lall (1995: 97) observe, Box 3.3. in the Report titled “Samsung 
Industries Battle for the Microwave Market” admits that ‘[t]he government’s 
Economic Development Board was a key player in Samsung’s success.’60 Moreover, 
as Chang (1995b: 104) points out, the Report at many points accepts theoretical cases 
for “selective” intervention. It accepts that certain “selective” interventions such as 
directed credit and export subsidies worked in some countries. However, it insists that 
industrial policy did not work. There is, however, a major inconsistency in this 
argument. If directed credit and an export push were the major instruments of 
industrial policy in these countries, how is it possible that industrial policy did not 
work? Before dealing with the empirical investigations of the Report, the logic of these 
investigations themselves can be criticised.
7.4.1. Industrial policy and structural change
The argument put forward by the Report on the structural change of exports, which is 
assumed to support comparative advantage theory, is little more than a simple 
empiricism. The fact that these countries moved from the production of labour- 
intensive commodities to capital-intensive ones does not necessarily prove the validity 
of comparative advantage theory.
As argued in chapter three, comparative advantage theory is not about an 
anticipation of the trade pattern but rather it involves promoting economic 
development through free trade policies and specialisation. It is the nature of 
development to move from labour-intensive to capital-intensive production and, in 
fact, a country cannot develop unless this transformation takes place. If development 
itself is identified by this structural transformation, defining this process as comparative 
advantage is tautological. The success of industrial policy can be judged in terms of its 
contribution to the speed of this transformation. When industrial policy is employed 
one should not expect a country to jump stages, but to move quickly to capital- 
intensive industries. The Report assumes that this transformation will take place 
automatically as a result of free market policies in line with comparative advantage.
60 World Bank (1993: 130).
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Then, it compares this hypothetical case with industrial policy to see if the industrial 
policy created another pattern of development. In the absence of an example of 
market-based industrialisation, one should be more curious about whether the free 
market forces could produce an alternative path to that provided by industrial policies.
In this context, the Report’s argument can be criticised from two perspectives. 
First, even if one accepts the Report’s argument, the issue is not whether industrial 
policy can create a non ‘market-conforming’ pattern, but which policy can bring better 
and faster results. Second, instead of comparing the results of industrial policy with the 
hypothetical results of the free market economy, one could easily reverse the logic and 
discuss whether the same results could have been achieved had these countries 
followed free market policies.
Industrial structure
The Report asserts that ‘[t]he cross-economy comparisons of industrial structure raise 
questions about the efficacy of government efforts to promote or discourage specific 
sectors.’61 This argument compares the ‘actual and predicted’62 shares of each sector in 
total manufacturing value-added. The results show that in Korea, given its level of 
economic development, two sectors, metal products/machinery (MPM) and 
textiles/clothing, had a relatively larger size than expected. By taking the size of 
textiles and clothing as an example, the report argues that industrial policy, aimed at 
moving from labour-intensive to capital-intensive industries, must have failed.
In Korea, for example, despite the government’s extensive efforts to speed the 
private sector’s shift from labour-intensive to capital- and technology-intensive 
industries, the relatively labour-intensive textiles and garments sector was 
nearly three times bigger than international norms predicted in 1988, a 
substantial increase relative to international norms from 1968. (World Bank, 
1993: 312-313)
61 Ibid. p. 312-313.
62 Which is obtained from cross-country regressions similar to that of Hollis-Chenery. See World 
Bank (1993) for details of the ‘actual/predicted’ values of industrial sectors.
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The Report also argues that the increase in the ‘actual/predicted’ value for the MPM is 
very modest. Indeed, table 6.15 in the Report shows that the ratio of the 
‘actual/predicted’ share of textiles increased from 1.75 in 1968 to 2.74 in 1988 and the 
same ratio for the MPM increased from 2.07 to 2.76. The question, of course, involves 
the validity of this test to prove that industrial policy has been ineffective in Korea.
The first and most obvious criticism is that in reality the textiles industry was 
one of the most heavily promoted industries and ‘the fact that Korea has an 
‘exceptionally large’ textile and clothing industry is not proof that industrial policy did 
not work but in fact suggests that it worked well.’63 Furthermore as Rodrik (1994: 29) 
points out, to examine only broad groupings of industries as represented by the 
standard two-digit classification codes is a little problematical since ‘this level of 
aggregation may be too coarse to discern much of the intended structural change. 
Many subsectors within the broader textiles industry are certainly capital and 
technology intensive.’
Second, as argued earlier, there is no reason to believe that promotion of 
capital-intensive sectors will reduce the importance of labour-intensive sectors. In 
Korea, ‘industrial policy was not intended to suppress existing activities and some 
policies tried to upgrade technologies within mature sectors.’64 Furthermore the 
argument is that as development takes place, the relative share of the labour-intensive 
industries in general declines, but not the share of each labour-intensive industry. 
There is no reason why an internationally competitive sector should diminish in relative 
importance just because it is labour-intensive. If the researchers of the Report looked 
at other labour-intensive commodities such as food, beverages and tobacco; wood and 
wood products; paper and printing, they would see a substantial fall in the 
‘actual/predicted’ ratio of their share in total manufacturing. World Bank researchers 
were very selective in highlighting the items that would support their argument.
Third, table 6.14 in the Report shows that the share of textiles in total 
manufacturing value-added fell from 19 percent in 196865 to 15 percent in 1988. Our 
calculation in table 7.8 shows a more drastic fall, from 17.2 percent in 1973 to 6.5 
percent in 1994, the largest among all the sectors. On the other hand, the same World
63 Chang (1995: 214) see also Chang (1993) and Rodrik (1994: 29).
64 Lall (1994: 651).
65 The table reads as 1986. There seems to be a printing mistake.
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Bank table shows a remarkable threefold increase for the share of MPM from 13 
percent to 36 percent. Our table also supports this expansion. The increase in the share 
of MPM is remarkable even though the Report undervalues it by looking at a relatively 
modest increase in the ‘actual/predicted’ ratio for MPM from 2.07 in 1968 to 2.76 in 
1988. This is obviously just an illusion. If MPM is the leading sector and the Korean 
economy grew very fast because of the increased share of MPM, and if the richer the 
economy, the higher the expected share of this sector, this would reduce the relative 
importance of it. The Report argues that as per capita income increased, similar 
structural change could have also been achieved through free market policies. 
However, as Wade (1994) argues, it is not clear whether income could have risen at 
the same speed without industrial policies. It is not clear if the promoted sectors could 
have grown as fast as they did. The same illusion is also true for the textiles sector. It is 
not that the importance of the textile sector increased but it increased relatively since it 
did not decline according to expectations. If a donkey is running faster and faster to 
reach the carrot, the fact that the distance of the carrot to the donkey is the same does 
not mean that carrot as an incentive does not work.
Fourth, if the Report’s researchers had been less selective in highlighting the 
facts that the tables produce, they would not have failed to notice the incredible 
increase in the ‘actual/predicted’ share ratio of textiles in Hong Kong from 10.31 in 
1973 to 118.95 in 1988. If Hong Kong is a free market economy, as opposed to Korea 
where industrial policies had been adopted, how could one explain this drastic 
increase? Does this prove the effectiveness of the free market economy and 
comparative advantage theory? How one can account for the apparent decline in the 
same ratio for the MPM sector from 2.86 to 1.96 in Hong Kong during the same 
period?
When the Report points out an increase in the same ratio from 2.14 in 1973 to
11.32 in 1989 for textiles and a decrease from 12.56 to 5.1 for MPM in Singapore, it 
contradicts its earlier argument that after Hong Kong, Singapore is the least 
protectionist country among the HPAEs.66 If comparative advantage theory holds and 
if these two countries adopted relatively liberal trade policies, one would expect a
66 World Bank (1993: 298).
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Table 7.8: Share of sector value added in total value added in South Korea, actual and
change through time.
1973 1994 Change
1973-94
Machinery electrical 6.6 14.9 8.2
Machinery except electrical 2.3 8.9 6.6
Transport equipment 4.4 10.6 6.2
Fabricated metal products 2.3 5.6 3.3
Plastic 1.5 4.2 2.7
Printing & publishing 1.6 2.9 1.2
Furniture 0.2 1.1 0.9
Other chem icals 3.9 4.7 0.8
Footwear 0.3 1.0 0.6
Food manufacturing 6.2 6.5 0.3
Glass 0.7 1.0 0.3
Professional & scientific equipt 0.6 0.9 0.2
Non-ferrous metals 0.8 1.1 0.2
Leather 0.7 0.8 0.1
Pottery 0.2 0.3 0.1
Wearing apparel, except footwear 3.5 3.4 -0.2
Other non-metallic minerals 4.2 4.0 -0.2
Paper 2.8 2.3 -0.5
Industrial chemicals 4.6 3.8 -0.8
Other manufactured products 2.2 1.4 -0.8
Iron & steel 6.7 5.8 -0.9
Rubber 2.1 1.1 -1.0
M iscellaneous prod, of petr & coal 1.9 0.4 -1.5
Petroleum refineries 6.0 2.7 -3.3
Wood 4.4 0.9 -3.5
Tobacco 6.0 1.8 -4.3
Beverage 5.9 1.6 -4.3
Textiles 17.2 6.5 -10.7
Source: UNIDO Database (INSTAT 3)
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decline in the share of textiles and an increase in the share of MPM as development 
takes place.
Finally, as Lall (1994) and Wade (1994) argue, the comparisons based on 
Chenery-Syrquin norms may be misleading because they reflect the promotion efforts 
of other countries such as India, Brazil, and Argentina. The researchers of the Report 
needed to be more convincing if they wanted to argue that industrial policy in Korea 
has been ineffective.
Predicting the pattern of sectoral growth
To substantiate its argument that industrial policy has been ineffective in the HPAEs, 
the Report estimates simple regressions between relative growth rates of each 
industrial sector and two measures of factor endowment. The Report aims to test 
whether the sectoral evolution of the HPAEs has differed from a hypothetical case of 
neutral policies. If it can be proven that actual industrial structural change has followed 
a pattern similar to what could be predicted by the hypothetical case of comparative 
advantage theory, it could be argued that (the Report believes) industrial policies were 
ineffective. The simple Heckscher-Ohlin version of comparative advantage theory 
argues that for low-income countries, those sectors that have a lower capital-labour 
ratio are natural candidates for growth. Thus, if one can prove that in the HPAE the 
low capital-labour sectors have grown faster than the others, then one can claim that 
industrial policies have failed in their objectives.
In order to prove its argument, the Report estimates the following simple 
regressions:
V*i = f  (X i)
where
v*; : change in the current price share of value-added in sector ‘i \  relative to value
added in all manufacturing.
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xj : wage per worker at the beginning, wb, or end of the period, we, or value-added 
per worker at the beginning or end of the period, vab or vae.
The Report argues,
In competitive labour markets, the wage per worker should measure the skill 
intensity of workers in each sector. Value-added per worker should reflect both 
skill and capital intensity and is a proxy for technological complexity. [...] 
Wage per worker may be translated as “good jobs,” while value-added per 
worker is a natural measure of “high productivity.” (World Bank, 1993: 330)
Thus both measures are assumed to measure the capital-labour ratio. It is argued that if 
there is a negative (positive) correlation between the dependent variable (v*) and the 
independent variables at the beginning of the time period (wb, vab), this would show 
that low (high) capital-labour sectors have grown faster (slower) than the others. If 
there is a negative (positive) correlation between the dependent variable (v*) and the 
independent variables at the end of the time period (we, vae), this would show that the 
sectors that expanded display a low (high) capital-labour ratio. By using two-digit ISIC 
classifications of industrial sectors, these regressions were estimated for Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Table 7.9 summarises the results of the Report’s 
regressions.67
The Report focuses on Korea because the other countries disprove the 
Report’s hypothesis. Except in Korea, the sign of the coefficients are nowhere negative 
and significant. Moreover, the positive coefficients outnumber the negative coefficients 
in Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore. Thus, whatever the theoretical and empirical 
validity of this simple exercise, the results are disappointing for the Report’s 
researchers. Despite the results, the researchers do not drop or modify their arguments. 
Even for Singapore where the coefficients have positive signs, the Report first accepts 
that ‘for the period 1980-89, output grew more rapidly in more capital- and 
knowledge-intensive sectors, supporting the view that the Singaporean authorities
67 Table A6.2 in the Report.
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successfully intervened to encourage increasingly capital-intensive development.’ 
Then the researchers attempt to deny the results of the table by arguing that ‘given the 
rapid growth in the capital-labour ratio in Singapore, this result also conforms to factor 
proportions theory predictions.’69 This argument cannot be won against the World 
Bank. If the coefficients are negative, the results are market conforming. If they are 
positive they still conform to the predictions of the factor proportions theory! By 
concentrating on the only country, which seems to support their argument, the 
researchers continued to argue that developments in these countries are proven to be 
‘market conforming’.
A total of six critiques can be directed at this empirical test. First, the problems 
associated with using wages and per capita value-added to measure factor intensity are 
well documented in the literature. In the case of market imperfections (both labour and 
commodity), neither state intervention nor real exchange rate devaluations, can be 
good indicators of factor intensity. This is particularly true for Korea70 and Taiwan 
where repressive labour systems were created by authoritarian and militarised 
regimes.71 Thus it is not surprising to see that the coefficients of the regressions are 
negative for these countries.
Second, to measure factor intensity with those indicators that presume perfectly 
competitive markets, and then to use them to test whether the evolution of the sectors 
is market conforming is a contradiction. If the markets are not perfectly competitive, 
the indicators are not reliable. If the markets are perfectly competitive, there is nothing 
to confirm.
Third, as Chang (1995b: 105) points out, focussing at the 2-digit level is 
misleading, since many industrial policy measures were targeted at lower levels. 
Moreover, the promoted industries were not identified by a single criteria like capital 
intensity or the value-added component.
Fourth, a similar regression shows that not only wages and value-added but 
also profits are lower in the fast-growing sectors (see table 7.10). This suggests that
68 World Bank (1993: 314). Singapore as the ‘second most’ liberal economy after Hong Kong among 
the HPAEs obviously poses serious problems for World Bank arguments.
69 Ibid. p. 315.
70 To be able to compete in international markets, Korea suppressed wages particularly in exporting
sectors which happen to be the fastest growing sectors.
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Table 7.9: Signs of regressions explaining change in value-added share of sectors
(World Bank results)
Economy_______Period_______ Wg_________W e_________ Vg_________ V e
Hong Kong 1973-80 - + - +
1980-88 + + + +
1973-88 - + - +
Japan 1953-63 - - - -
1963-73 + + + +
1973-80 - + - +
1980-89 + + + +
S. Korea 1968-73 — — — +
1973-80
* *
—
* * *
—
1980-88 — —
* *
—
1973-88 — — * * * * *
Singapore 1969-73 - - - +
1980-89 +
ate*+ + +
1973-89 + + +
*+
Taiwan 1966-86 - - - -
+ and -  signs are sign of coefficient.
* Significant at ten-percent level 
** Significant at five-percent level 
*** Significant at one-percent level
Note: WB(E) = Wage per employee at the beginning (end) of the period. VB(E) = Value added per 
worker at the beginning (end) of the period.
Source: World Bank, 1993, p. 332
Table 7.10: Signs of regressions explaining change in value-added share of sectors, for
Korea
Economy Period n B n E JT/Lb TL/Le
S. Korea 1968-73 _ + + +
1973-80 *** *
1980-88 ***
*** *** ***
1973-88
*** *** *** ***
+ and -  signs are sign of coefficient.
* Significant at ten-percent level 
** Significant at five-percent level 
*** Significant at one-percent level
N otel: nB(E) = Profit rate at the beginning (end) of the period. Profit rate is the ratio of total profits to 
sum of total cost (wage and non-wage cost). n/LB(E) = Profit per worker at the beginning (end) of the 
period.
Note 2: Number of dummy variables are used to remove normality problems. Even though with 
dummy variables the coefficients become more significant, with dummies they stay negative.
Source: UNIDO Database (INSTAT 3)
71 Henderson and Appelbaum (1992: 17).
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the Report’s previous argument that Korea used undervalued exchange rates to 
promote exports cannot be true. If Korea used undervalued exchange rates to promote 
exports, fast growing sectors (these are mainly exporting sectors) would be as 
profitable as, if not more profitable, than the others. However, according to 
comparative advantage theory, in developing countries profitability in labour-intensive 
sectors must be higher.
Fifth, as Lall (1994: 649) argues, the aim of industrial policy is not simply to 
move from labour- to capital-intensive activities. As argued earlier, many modem 
sectors have relatively lower capital-labour ratios. Table 7.11 shows the capital-labour 
ratios of major industrial sectors relative to the industrial sector as a whole in Korea, 
Colombia, Pakistan and South Africa. In Korea, fast-growing sectors indeed have a 
relatively low capital-labour ratio. But evidence in table 7.11 suggests that many 
modem sectors have lower than average capital-labour ratios. Even if it is true that in 
Korea low capital-labour ratio sectors have grown faster this does not mean that 
industrial policies did not work. The aim of industrial policy is not necessarily to 
increase the share of those sectors that have higher capital-labour ratios but to increase 
the shares of the sectors that have more market opportunities such as modem 
technologies. As Yanagihara (1994: 667) also points out, if in Korea the MPM sector 
is the only sector that substantially increases its share in total industrial production, and 
if the labour-intensive sectors grow faster than the others, this can only mean that the 
MPM sector is labour-intensive.
Table 7.11: Capital-labour ratios of sectors relative to overall industrial sector.
Korea
(1990)
Colombia
(1989)
Pakistan
(1988)
S. Africa 
(1989)
Machinery electrical 79 73 48 55
Machinery except electrical 77 37 63 39
Transport equipment 139 82 46 66
Fabricated metal products 78 53 37 32
Plastic 90 108 57 39
Printing & publishing 70 77 46 39
Source: Letteri and Weeks (1994)
Note: Capital-labour ratio for overall industrial sector is 100.
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Sixth, Kwon (1994) argues that the Report’s claims that in Korea many of the 
promoted sectors are not capital-intensive and that the most rapid growth in sectoral 
shares of value-added occurred in lower wage or lower value-added per worker are 
erroneous. Table 7.3 in his article shows that
not only the rapid growth of the capital labour ratio (K/L) but also the striking 
difference of the ratio between light and heavy industries. It also shows that the 
K/L ratios in government-promoted heavy industries, such as chemicals, iron 
and steel, machinery, and equipment, are considerably higher then the average 
for heavy manufacturing. (Kwon, 1994: 638)
The same table also shows that in 1989 the value-added per worker for heavy 
industries was 1.6 times larger and the wage rate was 26 percent higher than that for 
light manufacturing.
7.4.2. Industrial policy and productivity
The report puts interventionist policies into three categories: 1. promotion of specific 
industries; 2. mild financial repression combined with directed credit; and 3. export 
push. The Report admits that,
[d]uring their heavy and chemical industries programs, Japan and Korea were 
the most active HPAEs, in promoting individual industries and sectors. 
Singapore and Taiwan, China, have also actively provided incentives for the 
technological upgrading. Malaysia had an HCI program reminiscent of Japan’s 
and Korea’s, while Indonesia has attempted to leadfrog from labour-intensive 
manufacturing to high-technology industries such as aircraft and electronics. 
(World Bank, 1993: 293)
The report further accepts that ‘mild’ financial repression and directed credit have been 
partially successful. However, it then contradicts itself by arguing that ‘government 
efforts to promote specific industries generally did not increase economywide
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productivity.’72 The Report later contradicts itself once more by arguing that ‘broad 
government support for exports was a highly effective way of enhancing absorption of 
international best-practice technology, thus boosting productivity and output 
growth.’73 All these contradictory assertions make it hard to understand what the 
Report actually advocates. As Rodrik argues,
to say that directed credit and export-push policies worked, whereas promotion 
of specific industries did not, is a logical inconsistency of major proportions. 
[...] Where was credit directed, if not to specific industries? Whose exports 
were pushed, if not those of exportable-goods industries? And how is it 
possible to judge selective industrial policies a failure if at the same time 
directed credit and export-push policies were successful? (Rodrik, 1994: 28)
The report also provides empirical evidence to suggest that total factor productivity 
growth in the promoted sectors was not higher than in the non-promoted sectors in the 
HPAEs (except in Japan) which proves that selective intervention did not work. This 
argument, however, is misleading for several reasons. First, as Chang argues,
TFP studies are subject to massive problems of specification (i.e., assumptions 
regarding production functions), measurement (measuring capital stock, 
adjusting for improved quality of labour), and interpretation (it is a statistical 
“residual”, which includes a large component of our “ignorance”). (Chang, 
1995b: 105)
Second, the Report compares the non-comparables. Theoretically, it is not obvious 
why productivity should increase faster in promoted industries than in others. Total 
factor productivity in different sectors may grow differently because of the nature of 
the industries. The relevant benchmark is either ‘what the TFP performance of the 
promoted industry itself would have been in the absence of intervention’74 or the
72 World Bank (1993: 293).
73 Ibid.
74 Rodrik (1994: 32).
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comparative performance of the promoted industries in other developing countries.75 
The government may also promote the weaker sectors. There is abundant literature on 
the government’s incentives to support and subsidise strategic, infant or declining 
industries.76 Targeting weaker sectors may increase the performance of these sectors 
even though they may not perform as good as the others. In this case, even though 
productivity growth in the promoted sectors will appear slower than in the others, in 
the absence of promotion, they may perform even worse. The same argument is also 
true for the relative importance of the labour- and capital-intensive sectors in the 
economy. As long as there are market opportunities, labour- as well as capital- 
intensive sectors can both be promoted.
Third, market opportunities must be taken into consideration because good 
industrial policy should be based on an anticipation of those sectors that have income- 
elastic demand and wider international markets. From this perspective, it is important 
to note that as long as market opportunities exist, the promotion of an industry is not 
necessarily linked to whether the supported industries are labour- or capital-intensive.
Fourth, the Report’s argument contradicts the basic principles of comparative 
advantage theory. According to the theory, what is important is the relative -  not the 
absolute -  productivity increase of the sectors. A country might have a comparative 
advantage in one industry or sector even though productivity is growing faster in 
another. Even if free market policies are adopted, productivity might grow faster in 
sectors for which a country has no comparative advantage. For example, productivity 
increase in agriculture might be slower than in industry but the theory insists that 
labour-abundant low-income countries should specialise in agricultural products. In 
this sense, if comparative advantage theory cannot be criticised by comparing 
productivity increase in different sectors, then industrial policy should also not be 
criticised.
Fifth, the high level of aggregation at the two-digit sector level may be 
problematical and may not capture spillover effects.77 As Lall (1994: 651) notes, ‘[i]t 
cannot capture the productivity effects of upgrading within activities or across 
technologically distinct activities.’
75 Rodrik (1994: 32) and Wade (1994: 60).
76 Page (1994: 615).
77 Rodrik (1994: 32), Wade (1994: 62).
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Sixth, as Lall (1994), Wade (1994) and Chang (1995b) point out, the choice of 
time period can be critical to the outcome of the analysis since ‘higher TFP figures may 
simply show that the sectors concerned were behind others at the start. Differences in 
total factor productivity may also reflect different periods of maturity of different 
activities.’78 Wade argues that if the Report choose 1975-1990 period instead of 1965- 
1985 for Korea, the results could have been more favourable to the promoted sectors 
as many of the promoted sectors were promoted after the mid-1970s and by 1985 
many were still suffering from the recession of the early 1980s. Furthermore, Chang 
argues that during the first half of the period covered, many “promoted” industries 
(e.g., iron and steel, shipbuilding, semiconductors) were not actually promoted -  in 
fact did not even exist in their present form. When several years for maturation are 
allowed, the period covered becomes almost irrelevant.
Seventh, a simple comparison of different sectors ignores externalities. As 
Wade argues,
assistance given to one industry may spill over from one industry to another, in 
a way that escapes the “outcome” measures. The Japanese government 
subsidised upstream infrastructural industries like steel and oil-refining as a way 
of facilitating the growth of downstream consumer products. But slower 
growth of more subsidised infrastructural industries, and faster growth of less 
(directly) subsidised consumer products, hardly attests to the “failure” of the 
targeted measures. (Wade, 1995: 108)
Finally, the report’s argument can also be challenged empirically. The report simply 
compares the changes in the total factor productivity for promoted and unpromoted 
sectors and concludes that industrial policy did not meet its productivity-enhancing 
objective, except for Japan. As Wade notes,
The measurement of TFP in general depends critically on the assumptions 
about the production functions, the choice of output measure (value-added 
versus gross output), the use of capital stock versus flows of capital services,
78 Lall (1994: 651)
302
the quality of inputs, cyclical smoothing, the time period studies, and so on. 
Different assumptions yield radically different results. (Wade, 1994: 61)
The Report estimated total factor productivity by using a neoclassical Cobb-Douglas 
production function which is based on number of assumptions such as constant returns 
to scale and perfect competition. The so-called recent ‘new growth theories’ emphasise 
non-constant scale economies particularly for fast-growing newly industrialised 
economies. Using an alternative technique, Park and Kwon (1993) estimated total 
factor productivity for Korea and found that in fact the TFP grew faster in the 
promoted sectors than the unpromoted ones.79
7.5. CONCLUSION
The aim of this chapter was to criticise the World Bank’s ‘East Asian Miracle’ report 
and display the weaknesses of its arguments. It has been argued that the Report’s 
theoretical arguments are weak while its empirical works are biased, selective, 
inadequate and contradictory. In most cases its conclusions do not follow from the 
evidence produced. In this sense it is hard not to feel disappointed80 with it. Why was 
the World Bank so persistent in the defence of its comer at the expense of the 
credibility of the report it produced? The answer is an obvious one. As Lall rightly 
points out,
had the study found that selectivity was necessary for, or even conducive to, 
industrialisation of the sort witnessed in East Asia, the foundations of much of 
its recent policy work and adjustment programs would have been shaken. The 
implications for the Bank would have been enormous. (Lall, 1994: 646)
It is the stand of this paper that the Report has a clear ideological mission: it aims to 
discredit industrial policy as a viable policy option and defend the structural adjustment 
policies produced and vigorously implemented in many developing countries. The 
changes in World Bank policies, which led to the so-called ‘Post-Washington
79 Kwon (1994: 637-638).
80 Cassen and Lall (1995: 97).
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Consensus’, can be traced back to the East Asian Miracle Report. The Report, on the 
one hand, recognises the use of heavy state involvement and implementation of 
industrial policies in these countries and, on the other hand, paradoxically denies that 
industrial policies were effective. The Report’s desperate efforts to deny the role of the 
state and industrial policies should be interpreted as a last attempt to justify the 
previous World Bank policies as well as to prepare the ground for a transition to less 
‘anti-state’ policies. In this sense the report marks a historical change. The publication 
of the World Development Report (1997) signifies the transition from an anti-market 
stance to a ‘market-conforming’ and finally to a ‘market-friendly’ approach. Wade 
(1996) produces an incredible insight into the motivations of the Report and its 
ideological mission. He argues that the Report ‘reflects an attempt at compromise 
between the well established World Bank view and the newly-powerful Japanese 
view.’81 In this sense the Report’s value lies in its historical significance rather than its 
scientific or analytical content.
The debate over the success of the HPAEs will continue. Even though the 
causes of the ‘miracle’ are complex and the recent financial crisis has undermined the 
belief in their success, there is a lot to learn from the experiences of these cases for 
other developing countries. Development is a complex and uneven process and there 
are no magical solutions to the vast problems of many developing countries. One thing 
is clear, however: to leave everything to market forces and to deny the role of the state 
in the development process is not part of the solution, on the contrary, it is the part of 
the problem. The experiences of these countries clearly show that an active industrial 
policy can produce results. A ‘developmental state’ can bring development. The 
composition of a developmental state, however is a matter of debate that requires 
additional research.
81 Wade (1996: 5).
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
The primary objective o f this thesis was to investigate the theoretical and empirical 
validity o f the export-led development and trade liberalisation hypothesis. This 
chapter first reviews the findings of the thesis chapter by chapter. Then, it provides an 
alternative interpretation o f the recent revival o f liberal trade theory. By doing so, it 
puts the basic arguments of the thesis into broader perspective. Lastly it evaluates the 
current changes in World Bank policies and suggests possible lessons for developing 
countries.
8.1. REV IEW  OF THE CHAPTERS
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part tackles the theoretical discourse and 
the second part investigates the empirical literature. Each part is comprised o f three 
chapters.
Chapter two examines classical trade theory. It focuses on Ricardo’s theory of 
comparative advantage. It argues that given the simplicity o f the model, Ricardo’s 
static comparative advantage theory is fundamentally correct. Critics who focus on its 
assumptions contribute significantly to the development o f the theory by removing or 
modifying the assumptions. However, they do not challenge the basic tenets o f the 
theory. Its basic assertions remain unaffected. In its static form, where all parameters 
are fixed and assumed constant, specialisation according to Ricardo’s model makes 
sense. This, however, neither means that free trade will equally benefit all countries 
nor that developing countries should accept the rules o f comparative advantage and 
specialise in primary commodities. The theory is wrong in asserting that trade 
liberalisation and free markets are the best mechanisms for trade and that all 
participants gain from free trade. The real weaknesses o f the theory are threefold: first, 
the theory is static and exclusively focuses on short-term static-efficiency gains 
through specialisation. It completely disregards long-run gains from protectionism 
designed to maximise future wealth. Second, it ignores the distributional conflicts
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among participant countries. It assumes that all countries benefit from trade but does 
not specify by which mechanism. In reality, the benefits might be unevenly distributed 
and may cause international conflict. Lastly, the theory is based on a simplistic 
interpretation o f labour theory of value. It assumes that the same amount o f labour 
time creates an equal amount of value in the production o f different commodities. 
This is not true in reality, as different types of labour power have different 
characteristics (e.g. skilled and unskilled labour) and create different quantities o f 
value given the same labour time in the production process. For example, the value 
created by spending one hour of labour in computing is not equal to the value created 
by spending one hour in shoe-polishing. In Ricardo’s original example, if  value 
creation in spending one hour in wine production is lower than in cloth production, 
specialisation on wine production is not a good option for any country, regardless o f 
its comparative advantage. Specialisation may indeed save labour time and thus 
increase productivity. It is wrong, however, to assume that all participants will benefit 
equally from this static-efficiency. This chapter concludes that the comparative 
advantage theory is misleading, and specialisation based on comparative advantage 
may seriously damage the development process o f a country. Developing countries 
need to develop competitiveness in certain commodities, which bring long-term 
benefits, by employing industrial policies including protectionist trade policies.
Chapter three deals with the neoclassical version o f comparative advantage 
theory. It argues that, even though the Heckscher-Ohlin model was produced as an 
alternative to the Ricardian model and is assumed to be the greatest contribution to 
international trade theory, it marks a leap backwards. The model has a clear 
ideological mission: eliminating labour value theory and incorporating the 
neoclassical price mechanism into international trade theory. The neoclassical theory 
blames the Ricardian model for assuming, rather than explaining, the reasons for 
comparative advantage. The factor endowment theory, however, explains not only the 
reasons for the differences in relative commodity prices by the factor endowments o f 
the countries but also the effect of international trade on these factors o f production. 
This chapter argues that the Heckscher-Ohlin model is theoretically weak and 
empirically inconclusive. It first shows that the basic predictions o f the theory go 
against the facts o f history. The empirical evidence is contrary to the expectations o f
the theory: there is no tendency for factor prices to equalise, trade between the 
developed and developing countries is relatively small and the ‘Leontief paradox’ 
continue to puzzle researchers. This chapter also challenges the validity o f the 
empirical literature. Most o f the empirical literature is concerned with the ability o f 
the theory to explain trade patterns in a country. The advocates o f the theory 
mistakenly believe that if  the theory predicts the trade pattern correctly, this would 
prove its validity. There might indeed be some similarities between a country’s trade 
pattern and its ‘endowments’. However, even if  the theory could predict the trade 
pattern accurately, it would still not prove the alleged benefits o f trade, based on 
comparative advantage theory. This chapter finally elaborates the theoretical validity 
o f the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. The problems o f the model are heavily imbedded in its 
assumptions. It argues that the treatment o f capital and labour as factor endowments is 
fundamentally misleading. The theory assumes capital and labour to be given to all 
countries by a ‘divine force’, and then tries to predict the trade pattern accordingly. 
This argument is fundamentally flawed since capital is a product o f labour. When 
capital is allowed to be produced, there is no such thing as capital ‘scarcity’ and 
‘abundance’. Moreover, as the well-known ‘capital controversy’ proves, there is no 
unambiguous way to know whether a country is labour or capital-abundant, since the 
value o f capital cannot be determined independently o f factor prices. This chapter 
concludes that even though the theory has serious theoretical and empirical problems, 
the ideological convenience of the theory is so great that it is unlikely to be abandoned 
unless another, better performing, general equilibrium model can be devised.
Chapter four is divided into three sections. The first section tackles the so- 
called ‘dynamic-comparative advantage’ theories. The dynamic versions o f 
comparative advantage theory seek to remove the static nature o f the theory by 
focusing on future rather than current cost structures. This section argues that dynamic 
comparative advantage is a contradiction: first, because relative future cost remains a 
static concept, as it relies on static parameters like the production function and factor 
endowments; and second, if  competitiveness is created dynamically by the decisions 
o f the policymaker, this cannot be called comparative advantage. This is because a 
country may not have any current or future comparative advantage in the production 
o f a commodity, but future competitiveness might be created through the conscious
production and protection decisions o f policymakers. In this case, future 
competitiveness will be determined by the success o f industrial policies, and the only 
comparative advantage a country might have is a carefully designed industrial policy. 
Thus, it can be argued that comparative advantage theory is a static theory by nature 
and cannot be made dynamic.
The second section briefly evaluates the debate over trade policies. This 
section attempts to clarify the confusion over the concepts o f import-substitution and 
export-promotion, and argues that these are not alternative but complementary trade 
policies. First, the ‘import-substitution -  export-promotion’ dichotomy derives from 
the two-sector, static neoclassical model. In a more dynamic world where there are 
three sectors and unemployment, these two policies can be implemented together. 
Second, leaming-by-doing and scale economies depend on the size o f the market, and 
import-substitution and export-promotion policies guarantee the size o f the market in 
turn. Thus, import-substitution can be seen as a precondition for export-promotion 
policies. They are both structuralist policies. Export-promotion should not be 
confused with trade liberalisation. The last section o f this chapter summarises and 
critically evaluates the controversy over export pessimism. Export pessimism argues 
that developing countries benefit less from trade as a result o f the characteristics o f the 
commodities they trade. It advocates protectionist policies in order to change the 
composition o f exports, from primary and agricultural commodities to manufactured 
commodities. Export pessimists believe that specialisation in primary commodities 
has certain disadvantages such as low price elasticity and declining demand in 
international markets. Even though these arguments have come under attack, this 
chapter produces theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that their arguments 
are generally correct. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that specialisation in 
specific commodities does not benefit a country.
Chapter five critically reviews the empirical literature on the impact of 
openness on economic growth to prepare the ground for an alternative empirical 
framework. It questions the validity o f the empirical literature by examining the 
measures o f openness and the techniques used. It argues that a large part o f the 
literature is irrelevant and does not provide meaningful evidence to support or reject 
the export-led development hypothesis. This chapter starts by emphasising the
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difficulties in finding a coherent measure of trade openness. The existing measures 
either have serious theoretical deficiencies or are very difficult to calculate. As a 
result, they are either unreliable or cover only a limited number o f countries or short 
time periods. Thus they are incomparable across countries and through time. 
Consequently, different measures of openness are uncorrelated, indicating a serious 
measurement problem. Moreover, different methods that are intended to measure 
trade intensity and trade liberalisation are assumed to be measuring trade openness. 
This is a mistake. The impact o f trade liberalisation on openness is not as simple as 
some researchers believe.
This chapter moves on to summarise the earlier literature regarding the relation 
between export growth and economic growth. It first examines the work based on 
production function. Earlier empirical work usually tested for a correlation between 
export and economic growth rates. Any correlation was interpreted as support for the 
export-led development hypothesis. This method was criticised on the grounds that 
exports were a component o f GDP. Therefore, autocorrelation between them was 
expected. It also excluded other important determinants o f economic growth, such as 
the investment rate.
The proponents o f the export-led development hypothesis dismissed the first 
criticism by arguing that exports and import-substituting production compete over 
limited resources. Thus, a positive correlation demonstrates a positive efficiency gain 
through a movement of resources from inefficient import-substituting sectors to 
export sectors. As a response to the second criticism, exports were introduced into the 
production function with capital and labour and was meant to prove that the marginal 
productivity o f both labour and capital are higher in the export sector. The inclusion 
o f exports in the production function was justified on the basis that the export sector 
had positive externalities that could feed into the non-export sector. This proposition 
was tested by Sheehey (1990 and 1993) and found to be inconsistent since the 
application of the same test for each o f the major subcategories o f GDP (such as 
government consumption, manufacturing and services) gave similar results. This 
section tested both hypotheses (first, that exports and import-substituting production 
compete over limited resources; and second, that exports have positive externalities) 
by running a Granger causality test between home goods and exports. I f  the first
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hypothesis is right, there must be a negative correlation between a change in the 
production o f current exports and a change in the current production o f home goods. If  
the externality argument is right, there must be a positive correlation between past 
values o f exports and current values of home goods. The results o f the test provided 
no support for either hypothesis.
Moreover, this line of empirical work was criticised because a strong 
correlation between exports and economic growth does not prove causality from 
exports to economic growth. This chapter provides theoretical arguments to explain 
causality running from economic growth to exports. Then empirical tests were done 
on the validity o f the causality arguments. Employing four different methods, the 
causality between exports and economic growth was tested and the results did not 
support the export-led development hypothesis.
Finally, this chapter investigated the validity o f David Dollar’s increasingly 
popular trade liberalisation index. Dollar developed this index based on the idea that 
trade barriers cause higher prices. He adjusted national price levels by factor 
endowments and used the differences between the actual and predicted price levels as 
a measure o f real exchange rate distortions. He then used this index to show that 
economic growth rates were negatively correlated with exchange rate distortions. This 
chapter challenges Dollar’s index at both theoretical and empirical levels. It argues 
that an international comparison of domestic price formation is more complex than 
Dollar’s interpretation. There are reasons for a country having a higher or lower price 
level than can be ‘justified’ by its factor endowments. Consequently a country may 
have a perfectly competitive real exchange rate with a relatively higher average price 
level. Dollar’s index is also challenged empirically. The results show that there is no 
consistent relationship between the index and economic growth rates for different time 
periods and country groups. The correlation coefficients are in some cases positive 
and/or insignificant. Second, there is a weaker and inconsistent correlation between 
the index and export performance. Obviously, if  real exchange rate distortions have 
any impact on economic performance, this must come through its impact on export 
performance. The results of the empirical tests, however, show that in some cases 
there is a strong correlation between the Dollar index and economic growth, even 
though there is no significant correlation between the index and export performance.
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Consequently, this result casts some doubts on the validity o f the index as a measure 
o f trade liberalisation.
Chapter six offers an alternative measure o f trade openness and empirically 
tests the hypothesis that openness accelerates economic growth. The alternative 
measure o f openness is based on Balassa’s (1985) structurally adjusted trade intensity 
index. This index aims to separate the differences between actual trade figures and 
trade policy objectives by adjusting trade intensity by the structural characteristics o f a 
country. If properly formulated, this method isolates those other factors that influence 
trade performance and determines the extent o f trade openness as a result o f conscious 
policy choice. If  all the factors influencing trade performance can be identified and 
controlled, then the unexplained can be assumed to be openness by policy choice. In 
order to construct this index, trade intensity is modified by the structural 
characteristics o f the economy which are the size o f manufacturing, the size o f the 
economy and the availability o f natural resources. This is done by running a 
regression between the trade intensity and the other relevant variables and saving the 
residuals from this regression as the openness index. This index is then included in a 
regression where the dependent variable is the economic growth rate. Other 
independent variables are assumed to control for the external and internal factors 
(including policy variables) that may influence economic performance.
The regressions reveal some interesting results. With this method, the 
classification o f countries according to their openness displays important differences 
from the classification o f the World Development Report (1987). Countries classified 
as strongly or moderately inward-oriented in the report, such as Nigeria and Sri 
Lanka, are much more open according to the new index. On the other hand, countries 
such as Brazil and Chile, classified as moderately open in the report, do not appear to 
be so in this classification. More interestingly, Japan and the United States are 
classified among the strongly inward-oriented countries. The regression results also 
suggest that openness has a significant impact on economic growth only for middle- 
income countries. This means that openness, as a policy choice, does not make a 
positive contribution to economic growth in the low- and high-income countries. 
These results strongly deny the validity of the export-led development hypothesis for 
low- and high-income countries. However, the existence o f a positive correlation
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between openness and economic growth does not necessarily support the export-led 
development hypothesis for middle-income countries. An investigation o f trade 
intensity and economic growth figures reveals that, from the 1960s to the 1990s, 
economic growth rates for the middle- and high-income countries have declined, 
while the trade ratio has increased substantially. This figure suggests that if  there is 
any correlation between openness and the economic growth rate, it must be negative. 
Indeed, a regression between the GDP growth rate and the trade ratio (with investment 
and export growth rates as the other independent variables) reveals that the correlation 
is negative. These results inevitably lead to the conclusion that there must be fallacies 
o f composition. In other words, more open middle-income countries grow relatively 
faster but they do not grow faster altogether when they increase their overall 
openness.
Finally chapter seven criticises the World Bank’s ‘The East Asian Miracle’ 
report and displays the weaknesses o f the arguments it uses to defend the neoclassical 
paradigm. The development experiences o f these countries are increasingly used 
against the adherents o f liberalisation policies. The report accepts the presence o f 
industrial policies in these countries but argues that they were ineffective and 
unnecessary. Since they were ineffective, the success o f these countries must have 
occurred despite industrial policy. They could have done even better without state 
intervention. According to the report, their success resulted from getting the ‘basics’ 
or ‘fundamentals’ right. This chapter first summarises the historical circumstances 
that contributed to the rapid development o f these countries. The impact o f the Cold 
War and the influence of the US policy on development are fairly uncontroversial. 
Then, it focuses on the report’s empirical arguments on industrial policy. The report 
puts strong emphasis on exchange rate policies. It argues that HPAE governments 
used exchange rate policies in order to stimulate exports. The empirical evidence 
presented in this chapter, however, does not support this argument. An observation o f 
the real exchange rate devaluations o f these countries denies the report’s arguments. 
Moreover, further empirical investigations suggest that the relationship between 
exchange rate devaluations and export performance is not as simple as the Report 
believes. This chapter also criticises the empirical work in the report, which seeks to 
prove that industrial policies did not contribute to the industrialisation process in this
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countries. It argues that they are based on very weak theoretical foundations and, even 
so, still do not support the conclusions derived by the Report. This chapter concludes 
that because the report cannot prove its own conclusions, it is political and 
ideological.
In conclusion, this thesis provides theoretical and empirical evidence to 
suggest that neither openness nor trade liberalisation necessarily lead to improved 
economic performance. The appropriate levels of openness and trade liberalisation are 
different for different countries and will be determined by their specific 
circumstances. Any attempt to impose a universal solution is bound to be ineffective 
as well as costly. Trade is not an engine of growth, nor is it a magical solution for 
development problems. Rather than being preoccupied with trade liberalisation, 
developing countries ought to find alternative ways to promote capital accumulation 
and increase their competitiveness in international markets.
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